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Abstract

This dissertation views the Principle of Legitimate Cooperation as a guiding norm
for the activity of Catholic institutions in the world. It samples various expressions
of the principle from the seventeenth century to the present day, noting the
significance of the central terms ‘intrinsically evil acts’ and ‘sufficiently serious
reason’, and suggests that while the principle traditionally applied to individual
moral agents, it can also apply to institutions. Taking as starting-points the Second
Vatican Council’s call for a renewal of moral theology and the Church’s postconciliar view of itself as ‘sacrament of Christ’, the dissertation sketches an
essentially Christological and ecclesiological background against which to view the
identity and mission of Catholic institutions: their actions make the Church ‘present
and active in the world’. From the case study of a Catholic hospital in rural Western
Australia the dissertation concludes that while the principle often forbids cooperation
with others who do evil, in particular instances a Catholic institution might determine
that its Catholic identity impels it to cooperate.
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A Note on Language
The English language suffers from having no singular personal pronoun which is
gender-inclusive. The author considers that the use of ‘one’ in place of ‘he’ or ‘she’
is often clumsy. In view of this difficulty, he wishes the Reader to understand that if
at times the text refers to a moral agent as ‘he’, ‘him’ or ‘his’, or as ‘she’, ‘her’ or
‘hers’, it is to be taken as referring to moral agents of either gender, unless the
context demands otherwise.
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INTRODUCTION

A Case Study
In September 1927 the Sisters of Saint John of God bought a colonial
homestead and opened a hospital in Bunbury, then a small rural port in south-west
Western Australia. As the town grew, so did the hospital: by 1939 it had become an
80-bed general and maternity facility; a new five-floor hospital was built in 1972 to
cater for 110 patients (83 general and 27 maternity); and a major building program
in 1988 added surgical and casualty services.1
But by the late 1980s the provision of rural health care in Western Australia
had become not only a public health priority but also a ‘hot’ political issue.
One of the problems facing the John of God Health Care System as
a whole, and the Bunbury hospital in particular, is the difficulty of
planning for the future because of the frequency of changes in
government health policy, especially with regard to the location of
public hospitals. If a new public hospital is situated beside a St
John of God hospital, it is clearly not advisable to spend millions of
dollars on a new private hospital at precisely the same time. In the
short term the hospital will examine possible working opportunities
with the government’s health department in extending health care
services to public patients.2
Over sixty years the St John of God Hospital had become an important thread
in the fabric of life in Bunbury.

In numerous country towns in Western Australia

and elsewhere the Sisters had been among the first to provide hospital-based nursing
care. Some of the St John of God Sisters had dedicated their entire religious lives to
serving the people of Bunbury in that particular hospital.

Their commitment to

1

Data on the history and development of St John of God Hospital Bunbury were kindly provided by
Sr Mary Eugenia Brennan SJG of the St John of God Heritage Centre in Subiaco, Western Australia,
in private communication with the author. See also her publication to mark the centenary of the
Sisters in Australia, The Love of Christ Urges Us. (Subiaco WA: Sisters of St John of God, 1994).
Information on negotiations with the State Government of Western Australia, on various proposals
examined and on the final configuration of the collocated health care campuses was kindly provided
by Mr Don Good, Trustee of St John of God Health Care, in private communication with the author.
2
John Scally, To Speed on Angels’ Wings: The Story of the Sisters of St John of God. (Dublin:
Columba Press, 1995) 98-99.
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excellence in health care combined with sincere respect for the dignity of all patients
had made them valued members of the growing rural community. The people of the
region did not want to lose the St John of God Hospital, yet by the early 1990s that
had become a real possibility.
For at that time the State Government announced that it would replace its
existing Bunbury Regional Hospital with an entirely new public facility capable of
meeting the needs of the town into the next century. At virtually the same time, St
John of God Health Care realised that its 1988 renovations would be inadequate to
meet present or future needs, which raised the possibility of St John’s having to build
an entirely new hospital themselves. It was evident that Bunbury could not support
two new facilities of such size and quality, so St John of God Health Care began
discussions with the State Government on a number of proposals which might meet
increasing community needs, while also preserving the presence of a Catholic
hospital in the town.

Realising that its original plan was too ambitious and

expensive, the Government came to view a joint facility as a cost-effective way of
delivering the required upgrade of medical services in Bunbury.
The first proposal (Proposal 1) was for St John’s to build and manage a single
new public hospital.

Obviously some morally objectionable procedures (such as

terminations of pregnancies and contraceptive sterilisations) could not be conducted
in a facility under Catholic management, so the Government was prepared to build a
separate clinic on another site to deliver these services.
It will become plain that not all Catholic moralists would have been content
with this arrangement.3

In any event Proposal 1 did not proceed, due in no small

part to overwhelming public reaction against the perceived privatisation of regional
hospital care.

But since subsequent public consultation revealed considerable

support for both public and private facilities in the town, other possible
configurations were considered:
• Proposal 2 would have seen the development of two completely separate
hospitals, with a full range of medical services apportioned between them.
3

But

In particular see 3.1.4.2 below.

2

because this would have necessitated a duplication of some paramedical and
ancillary services which would not have been cost-effective, Proposal 2 was
rejected.
• Proposal 3 would have seen the Government build a major public regional
hospital with a private wing in which St John’s could provide a limited range of
care.

There were obvious management problems with this proposal, but the

definitive objection came from the private health insurance industry: this
arrangement would have been prohibitively expensive to fund.4
So the preferred option, Proposal 4, became ‘collocation’: there would be
two separate hospitals located on the same site; each would manage its own
administration and admissions, and each would maintain its own medical and
hospital services, but between them they would provide the full range of services
required in Bunbury. Furthermore, each hospital could ‘bid’ for the provision of a
single set of ancillary services, which is where cost-savings would be made.
Equally, of course, each hospital could ‘opt out’ of services it did not wish to deliver.
In terms of medical services, then, Proposal 4 sees each hospital provide its
own children’s, obstetric, general medical and surgical wards, as well as delivery
suites, operating theatres and day surgery units.

The public regional hospital

provides Accident and Emergency, intensive care and psychiatric services, while St
John’s provides renal dialysis, oncology and palliative care.

As for ancillary

services, the public hospital is under contract to provide instrument sterilisation
services to St John’s, while St John’s is under contract to provide catering and
maintenance services to the public hospital.

St John’s also maintains a separate

medical centre, in which many of Bunbury’s medical specialists have rooms.

The

collocated campuses of the Bunbury Regional Hospital and the St John of God
Hospital Bunbury accepted their first patients in 1999.
4

Under existing health insurance legislation in Australia, a public patient admitted to a public hospital
attracts a fixed payment from Medicare (the national public health insurer) which is made to the
hospital and the treating practitioner; a private patient in a public hospital attracts a slightly lower
Medicare payment; but a private patient in a private hospital can only be funded by private health
insurance - at a substantially higher level. Theoretically, a public hospital with a ‘private’ ward
could admit private patients to that ward and reap higher financial rewards from the private insurer
than from Medicare. This arrangement is strenuously resisted by private health insurers, who believe
that this would eventually drive them out of business.

3

The outcome of this arrangement is that the State Government has been able
to provide better quality hospital facilities for Bunbury at a fraction of the original
capital cost; the people of Bunbury now have access to a much greater range of
health services and more up-to-date facilities; and the Sisters of St John of God have
been able to continue their particular vocation to the people of Bunbury and so
maintain a Catholic health-care ministry in the south-west of Western Australia.

Material Cooperation and Catholic Institutions
As in the Bunbury case, the cost of providing quality hospital care in the
developed world is a major factor impelling Catholic and non-Catholic health
facilities toward cooperative arrangements.

Another factor, from the Catholic

perspective, is changing patterns in membership of religious orders which have
traditionally provided hospital care.

Not to put too fine a point on it, for Catholic

health care facilities the choice has sometimes come down to ‘collaborate or close’.
But the challenges posed by institutional collaboration are not limited to
financial or religious concerns, nor even to the central question of health care
provision.

From the Catholic institution’s point of view there is also a critical

ethical question, which might be put as follows: in view of some of the medical and
surgical procedures conducted at public health facilities - procedures which the
Catholic Church considers gravely immoral - should this Catholic institution enter
into formal collaboration with this public health facility?

Is such structured

institutional cooperation justifiable in view of the immoral procedures which the
public facility will inevitably provide?

The ethical question is not whether a

collaborative arrangement can be forged, but whether it should be forged. It is the
question of institutional cooperation in evil.
As suggested, not all Catholic moralists would have been happy with
Proposal 1 in the Bunbury case, largely because it would have tied a Catholic
institution officially and structurally to procedures such as abortion and
contraceptive sterilisation. It could be argued, of course, that the Catholic hospital
4

would never provide these services itself, for that would be a clear contradiction of
the Church’s stated opposition to these procedures.

But even so, some Catholic

moralists would maintain that the Catholic institution is not therefore excused from
guilt because its intention to enter such a cooperative arrangement includes an
acceptance that immoral procedures will be performed (albeit on other premises).5
A similar concern has greatly exercised the minds of the Catholic bishops of the
United States of America, where many such collaborative arrangements have already
been made.6 It is the same vexed question which prompts the present study.
Fortunately the Catholic moral tradition has long since developed a principle
which sheds some light on these complexities:
7

Cooperation in Evil.

the Principle of Legitimate

This principle is difficult to state in a few words - indeed,

reference is sometimes made to ‘the principles which govern cooperation in evil’,8
because analysing instances of cooperation requires application of a number of more
fundamental moral norms. For the time being, however, the following will serve as
a ‘definition’ of the Principle of Legitimate Cooperation in Evil:
Cooperation in evil, as distinct from actually doing evil oneself,
occurs when one moral agent concurs in the evil deed of another.9
Cooperation is formal if one agrees (either directly or indirectly)
with the other’s evil deed: for example, a gunsmith willingly
supplies a gun to a bank robber, with the intention of assisting the
robber in his evil deed. Cooperation is material if one does not
agree with the other’s evil deed, but only innocently provides some
goods or services which the other abuses in order to perform the
deed: for example, to sell petrol to a bank robber, who
subsequently uses his car for the getaway. Formal cooperation is
always wrong, because to cooperate formally is to adopt the
evildoer’s end as one’s own.
Depending on the relationship
between one’s own act and that of the other agent, material
cooperation may be permitted if one holds a sufficiently serious
reason for cooperating.

5

For example, this is the position of American philosopher Germain Grisez - see 3.1.4.2 below.
See 4.2.2.2 and 4.3 below.
7
Different authorities entitle this the ‘Principle of Cooperation’, the ‘Principle of Legitimate
Cooperation’, or the ‘Principle of Material Cooperation’. For all practical purposes these refer to the
same principle, and in the present study these titles will be used interchangeably.
8
See the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic
Health Care Services (1994), Appendix. This is discussed in 4.2.2.2 below.
9
Compare with Henry Davis SJ, Moral and Pastoral Theology. 4 vol. 1st ed. (London: Sheed and
Ward, 1935). Volume I, 341: ‘Cooperation . . . is concurrence with another in a sinful act.’
6

5

This definition will undergo considerable refinement as the present work
unfolds.

One of the major aims of this work is to explore the meaning of

cooperation in evil through studying the evolution of the principle over the last 400
years.
It will be noted that the principle as stated applies to individual moral agents
rather than to groups or institutions.

This is consistent with the history of the

principle, and is one of the reasons why it can be said that the principle only ‘sheds
light on’ rather than ‘resolves’ instances of institutional cooperation.

There are

significant differences between individual moral agents and institutions as moral
agents.

Another major aim of the present work is to explore the relationship

between ‘cooperation in evil between individual moral agents’ and ‘cooperation in
evil between institutional moral agents’, and to suggest how the traditional principle
might be applied to institutions.10
It will also be noted that the principle as stated ‘permits’ material cooperation
for a serious reason. The ‘permission’ of material cooperation emphasises the fact
that, were circumstances otherwise, one would not cooperate at all.

But given the

circumstances which prompt Catholic and non-Catholic health care facilities to
consider cooperative corporate arrangements, another question might legitimately be
put: could a Catholic institution ever be compelled to cooperate with another doing
evil? A third major aim of the present work is to suggest a framework within which
one might consider this question.11
The present work, accordingly, falls into three broad sections. The focus of
the first part (Chapters One and Two) is the way in which the principle of legitimate
cooperation evolved in history and was presented in Catholic moral theology up to
the time of the Second Vatican Council.

Chapter One examines the origins of the

principle in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and follows through
its preservation in the moral manuals. What emerges is a picture of one process by
which moral principles evolve, are clarified, and sometimes atrophy unless re-

10
11

See below, 4.3.
See Chapter Five below, in particular 5.2.

6

examined periodically in the light of contemporary moral questions. Chapter Two
seeks to unfold the principle in terms of the traditional metaphysics of human action,
as the principle had come to be defined prior to Vatican II, and to unfold the meaning
of the principle’s central terms: ‘intrinsically evil acts’ and ‘sufficiently serious
reason’.

These two chapters reveal that, as happens so often in moral reasoning,

morally right answers were reached before satisfactory explanations of their
rightness were developed.
The focus of the second part (Chapters Three and Four) is the evolution of the
principle of legitimate cooperation since Vatican II.

Chapter Three reviews the

principle as it appears in the successors to the moral manuals and in magisterial
teaching, revealing both innovative approaches on the part of some modern moralists
and an increasingly proactive role on the part of the magisterium. In Chapter Four a
double transition is made: from ‘moral theology conducted within the confines of
the Catholic Church’ to ‘moral theology conducted in dialogue with the modern
world’;

and from ‘cooperation among individual moral agents’ to ‘cooperation

among institutions’. These two chapters bring the discussion more or less up to date
and place it in the context of the contemporary renewal of moral theology. Here too
one notes what is, at least at the time of writing, a major point of controversy: the
meaning and legitimacy of ‘immediate material cooperation’ by Catholic institutions.
The focus of the third part (Chapter Five) is the renewal of moral theology
sought by Vatican II, and in particular the question of Catholic institutions entering
into cooperative arrangements with non-Catholic bodies. Drawing on the insights of
some recent trends in theology in general - in particular, transcendental Thomism a theological framework is developed for interpreting institutional cooperation. The
aim of this chapter (and of the work as a whole) is not to arrive at fixed solutions for
particular cases - indeed, it will be argued that questions of cooperation in evil
cannot be answered in the abstract - but to suggest an additional level of meaning
which may shed light on institutional cooperation.
This arrangement of material permits a comparison to be drawn between the
principle as it appeared in the ‘traditional’ Catholic moral theology, and its treatment
7

in light of Vatican II’s call for a renewal in the discipline. Nevertheless this study is
only more or less chronological, and some anomalies are inevitable: for example,
some theologians studied in Chapter Four are contemporaneous with those studied in
Chapter Three; and a consideration of specifically institutional cooperation does not
occur until late in Chapter Four. Further comments on the ordering of material will
be made in the text.
While the present work is wide-ranging in some respects, its aims are quite
tightly circumscribed. The intention is not to present a comprehensive study of the
origins and development of the principle of cooperation, because such studies have
been made previously.

Nor is it to analyse the entire manual tradition of

cooperation, but only to sample a selection of manuals which were once influential in
this country. A complete metaphysics of human action is likewise beyond the scope
of this work, as is a fuller treatment of ‘intrinsically evil acts’ and ‘sufficiently
serious reason’

-

although it will be necessary to arrive at an adequate

understanding of all of these.

The temptation to develop a more comprehensive

analysis of trends in the emerging renewal of moral theology has also been resisted,
in order to stay focused on the major question under investigation.
It is recognised that the interpretation of the principle of material cooperation
which is offered here is neither exclusive of other interpretations nor exhaustive in
itself - but it will be sufficient to ground the theological view offered in the final
chapter.

Furthermore, the present work does not claim to resolve controverted

questions nor settle every argument which might be mounted for or against the
immediate material cooperation of Catholic institutions in such procedures as invitro fertilisation. It claims only to develop a framework within which these matters
might be addressed.
In terms of sources, selections have been made according to various criteria,
including influence on the practice of moral theology in Australia, relevance to the
specific question of institutional cooperation, and impact on contemporary thinking
on material cooperation. There are further specifications of sources in the text.

8

The present work will have achieved its aim if it is able to demonstrate that a
truly theological interpretation of legitimate institutional cooperation in evil can be,
at one and the same time, grounded in the Catholic moral tradition and responsive to
the Second Vatican Council’s call to a renewal of moral theology.

9

Chapter One
MATERIAL COOPERATION IN THE TRADITION

1.0

Introduction
Moral principles have history. They do not simply appear from the ether -

mysterious, unheralded and perfect in form - to resolve theoretical moral dilemmas.
By the time they are received as ‘principles’ they have undergone a long process of
evolution: proposition, testing, recasting. They originate and evolve in response to
real situations faced by real people in the real world.

They are the fruit of living

moral communities and of their attempts to address real moral problems, to give
practical guidance to real people in the concrete circumstances of their lives. Moral
principles are the children of many parents, with successive generations contributing
questions or clarifications or refinements to their ‘final’ form.
The evolutionary development of moral principles, the result of an interplay
between an actual moral problem and contemporary attempts to address it, gives rise
to both strength and weakness. One strength is that a principle which has developed
in this way is able to offer a degree of practical help in addressing moral dilemmas,
for there is always something to gain from the wisdom of those who have previously
sought answers to the questions one presently confronts. But one weakness is that
the concrete situations which gave rise to the principle are themselves constantly
evolving, taking on new and more complex forms which often were never previously
envisaged, much less addressed.

For example, the principle that ‘non-combatants

should not be targets of aggression’ was easy to honour in the traditional model of
warfare, in which each side wore a distinctive uniform that helped to identify
combatants from non-combatants and one side from the other.

But the same

principle becomes almost impossible to apply in modern guerrilla warfare in which,
by the very nature of that style of conflict, anyone may be an aggressor and hence a
legitimate target.

10

The perpetual challenge for the moralist is to imitate the householder who
draws on both old and new (Mt 13:52): to bring the truth of the moral tradition into
play with the concrete realities of contemporary life, and so to find a path toward
acceptable resolutions to moral problems.

This can be achieved only by first

‘piercing through’ various historical expressions of the principle in question to reach
its unchanging core, that central moral truth which the principle seeks to express and
protect.

This often intensely academic pursuit, ironically, is undertaken only in

order to render the principle more practically applicable.

So the moralist must

descend through issues of interpretation and history to dialectic, and then work
outwards again to a systematic resolution of the previously unmanageable moral
problem.
The principle of legitimate cooperation is a good example.

Cooperation in

evil, as distinct from doing evil oneself, is ‘concurrence’ or ‘collaboration’ with an
evildoer.1

The problem of legitimate cooperation takes the form of a dilemma: on

one hand, one knows that one’s own good works will be taken up and used by
another person to serve some evil purpose; on the other hand, like every moral
agent, one is bound to avoid evil in any form. For example, the owner of a liquor
store knows that a particular patron will abuse the alcohol purchased from him:
should he therefore stop serving this patron? Knowing that his act of selling alcohol
will be abused, is the store owner (‘the cooperator’) justified in continuing to do so?
If he continues to serve him, will the cooperator share the guilt of the patron (‘the
principal agent’) for becoming intoxicated? When is he justified in totally refusing
to cooperate with the principal agent?

The principle of legitimate cooperation

provides a base from which to analyse this kind of problem and work towards a
morally justifiable resolution.
In the following study it will emerge that each instance of cooperation in evil
must be assessed individually, since solutions will vary according to numerous
variable factors in the equation: for example, the relationship which exists between

1

See for example Henry Davis SJ, Moral and Pastoral Theology. 4 vol. 1st ed. (London: Sheed
and Ward, 1935.) Vol. I, 341.
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the agents; other duties of the cooperator; and the kind of evil intended by the
principal agent. Nevertheless the principle offers a solid framework within which to
assess these variables and work towards a solution. This is a tribute to the careful
analysis of countless moralists who each contributed to the development of the
principle throughout its history.
The aim of this chapter is two-fold: to study briefly the early development of
the principle of legitimate cooperation (1.1) and its treatment in the later moral
manuals (1.2), and on the basis of this development, to deduce something of the
world-view within which the principle arose (1.3). This will prepare the ground for
a study of the structure of cooperation (Chapter Two), and for an exploration of the
principle in more recent Catholic moral theology (Chapters Three and Four).

12

1.1

Material Cooperation: The Development of a Principle
1.1.1

Introduction

Previous inquiries into the principle of material cooperation obviate the need
for any exhaustive historical survey in the present work.2 Nevertheless, in order to
situate the present study it will be helpful to highlight three key moments in the
development of the principle:

the contributions of Thomas Sanchez and St

Alphonsus Liguori and, falling between them, an action of the Tribunal of the
Roman Inquisition in 1679.
Alphonsus Liguori (1696-1787) is recognised as making the greatest
contribution to the development the principle of cooperation, most notably in his
Theologia moralis and his works of guidance for confessors.3 But his achievement
in reframing the principle and bringing new insight to the problem of cooperation in
evil came only by way of a substantial reworking of the tradition as he had received
it through Thomas Sanchez (1550-1610).4

1.1.2

Thomas Sanchez

Thomas Sanchez studied the question of cooperation in the particular context
of sin, exploring how one’s venial sin (or even one’s otherwise morally indifferent
act) could become serious sin by virtue of scandal or cooperation in the sin of
another.5

His principal interest was in the cooperating agent’s culpability: the

manner and extent to which a cooperator would share in the guilt of the principal
agent, and consequently the extent to which the cooperator would share
responsibility for making restitution for harm done to third parties.

2

Two essential studies are: Roger Roy CSsR, ‘La coopération selon Saint Alphonse de Liguori.’
Studia Moralia 6(1968) 377-435; and Ronald Fabbro, Cooperation in Evil: A Consideration of the
Traditional Doctrine from the Point of View of the Contemporary Discussion About the Moral Act.
Doctoral Dissertation. (Rome: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1989).
3
The forerunner of Alphonsus’s Theologia moralis was his commentary in 1748 on the work of
Herman Busembaum SJ.
Roy notes three distinct works of Alphonsus for the guidance for
confessors (the best known of which is the Homo apostolicus of 1759), and one for ‘the people’. See
Roy, ‘La coopération’, 399-400.
4
See Roy, ‘La coopération’, 378.
5
Roy, ‘La coopération’, 379.
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In view of his particular context, it is not surprising that Sanchez’s focus was
on the ‘direct-indirect’ distinction of cooperation: for Sanchez, ‘all cooperation is
culpable participation in the other’s fault’.6 In this view, direct cooperation occurs
(in the moral order) when one immediately participates in an evil act to which one
has induced the other agent, and (in the physical order) when one participates
immediately in that action while intending the same evil end, or when one
participates more remotely but by some intrinsically evil means, or when one
participates more remotely by morally indifferent means but with the intention of
facilitating the sin of the other.7

For example, a locksmith directly cooperates in

theft if he provides skeleton keys to a burglar with the direct intention of facilitating
the burglar’s evil deed.

Indirect cooperation is had when one participates more

remotely in the sin of the other by a morally indifferent act and without intending to
favour the sin of the other, and where one has some duty to prevent or avoid the sin
of the other, and where there is no sufficiently good reason to justify one’s
cooperation.

For example, purely for friendship’s sake and without directly

intending to aid the other’s evil deed, one volunteers to repair the weapon of an
assassin.
So for Sanchez, if one’s participation was not intimately connected with the
other’s sin, and one’s own act was good or morally indifferent, and one did not
intend the sin of the other, and one either had no duty to prevent the sin of the other
or one had such a duty but also held a sufficiently serious reason to act, then one’s
action was neither direct nor indirect cooperation in that sin, and one did not share
culpability for it.8
To furnish another with a material which is itself indifferent, without
willing his sin, but for another motive, is not to cooperate directly in
evil.
No one is said to be a direct moral cause of that which he
neither commands, nor counsels, nor wills, nor assists. Now, here,
he neither counsels, nor commands, nor wills, nor assists with the
other’s sinful act, but he only offers the material; and it is not in this
way that the sin of the other is constituted, but by the act through
which the other abuses that material.9
6

Roy, ‘La coopération’, 390.
Roy, ‘La coopération’, 382-383.
8
Roy, ‘La coopération’, 384.
9
Sanchez, Opus morale in Praecepta Decalogi. (Parma, 1723) Lib. I, cap. VII, 8 (cited in Roy,
‘La coopération’, at 381).
7
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This is an important step in the evolution of the principle.

Sanchez

establishes here a distinction between direct and indirect cooperation according to
the moral causality in question.

One who cooperates directly is one who

participates immediately, or by intrinsically evil means, or by evil intention; while
one who cooperates indirectly participates by otherwise innocent means but without
good reason. In both cases the cooperator exercises some form of moral causality in
the principal agent’s evil deed: directly when the participation bears directly on the
evil nature of the action itself, and indirectly when the participation is more remote
but offered without good reason.
It is also important to note that, in the case of indirect cooperation, the
cooperating agent’s act becomes involved in the principal agent’s sin not by virtue of
the cooperator’s intention, nor by the nature of the act he performs, but solely by the
principal agent’s abuse of that act. But, for Sanchez, there was no real cooperation
at all (at least in any morally relevant sense) if the cooperator had a good reason to
act; the implication is that this reason was sufficient to justify the cooperator’s act
even in the face of the other’s abuse.

Cooperation for Sanchez was therefore not

mere physical participation, but morally culpable participation in the sin of another.
It is inevitable, then, that sometimes he confused the question of cooperation with
that of induction and active scandal.10
Roy notes that Sanchez takes his definition of scandal from Thomas Aquinas:
‘a word or action lacking rectitude (minus rectus) which furnishes to another an
occasion of ruin’.11 By ‘furnishing another with the occasion of ruin’ one provides
a moral cause, in the strict sense of supplying to the will an object likely to elicit
consent. It is in providing this moral cause (especially when one has a duty not to
do so, or lacks any good reason to do so) that one can be said to counsel or to assist
with the sin of the other. This renders one morally culpable, and Sanchez calls this
action ‘cooperation’.

10

Roy, ‘La coopération’, 384-386.
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However, the category minus rectus causes Sanchez a problem: ‘The act of
scandal is called minus rectus because it lacks in one manner or another the
rectitude which is its due, whether the act in itself is evil or whether it presents the
appearance of evil’.12

But Sanchez must explain how an act which is morally

indifferent in itself, and which does not have the appearance of evil, can fall into this
category. He does so by expanding the definition of minus rectus to include an act
which ‘even if it does not have the appearance of evil, can avoid the spiritual ruin of
another if it is not performed’.13 Because the obligation to avoid the spiritual ruin of
one’s neighbour falls within the precept of charity, Sanchez here opens the way for
the fuller treatment of cooperation under this precept which Alphonsus Liguori
achieved.14
Another development is the emerging definition of ‘indifferent’ and
‘intrinsically evil’ acts. An indifferent act is simple enough: it is one which is not
already morally determined and can be made to serve either a good end or an evil
end.

But for Sanchez there seem to be two varieties of intrinsically evil acts: a)

those which are actually intrinsically evil, or truly evil in their very essence, and b)
those which are virtually intrinsically evil. The latter are acts which are indifferent
in themselves, but normally so closely identified with evil ends that they themselves
deserve to be called evil.

Actually intrinsically evil acts may never be

commissioned lawfully, while virtually intrinsically evil acts ‘so nearly approach the
evil’ that they require a proportionately grave reason to justify their performance.
Without this justifying reason, the one performing such acts could be said to

11

See Roy, ‘La coopération’, 385-389. The reference to Thomas is to ST II-II, 43, 1: ‘ . . .
dicitur quod dictum vel factum minus rectum praebens occasionem ruinae sit scandalum.’
12
Roy (‘La coopération’, 387, footnote 20) quoting Sanchez, Opus Morale, Lib. I, cap. VI, 1:
‘Dicitur minus rectum, id est, quod ex aliquo capite caret debita rectitudine, aut quia in se malum est,
aut mali speciem habet . . . ’
13
Roy (‘La coopération’, 387, footnote 21) quoting Sanchez, Opus Morale, Lib. I, cap. VI, 1: ‘. . .
aut si nec hanc (speciem mali) habeat, dicitur inordinatum, aut minus rectum eo quod gratia vitandae
proximi ruinae, dimittendum esset.’
14
Roy (‘La coopération’, 388) quoting Sanchez, Opus Morale, Lib. I, cap. VII, 10: ‘Obligatio
huius occasionis peccati alterius vitandae, non ministrando haec indifferentia illis abusuro, oritur ex
generali caritatis praecepto, quo tenemur scandalum generaliter acceptum proximi vitare. Dare
enim hanc occasionem non excusante causa justa, pertinet ad scandalum generaliter acceptum.’
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(virtually) intend the evil done by the principal agent and so to cooperate culpably in
it.15
It seems, then, that Sanchez classifies human acts on two planes.

On the

universal or speculative level an act may be essentially evil, or it may be essentially
indifferent depending on the use to which it is put.

However, on the particular or

practical level where concrete circumstances must be taken into account, some of
these ‘essentially indifferent acts’ are in fact evil in virtually every case: that is, in
almost no set of circumstances would one have a sufficiently serious reason to justify
them - and so these acts are virtually ‘intrinsically evil’.16
So while it seems true that Sanchez sometimes confused the distinct moral
issues of scandal and cooperation, he certainly carried forward the concept of
intrinsically evil acts, and highlighted the need for a proportionately serious reason
to justify one’s cooperation in the sin of another.

These factors were to figure

prominently in another development not long after Sanchez’s death.

1.1.3

The Condemnation of 1679

On 4 March 1679 the following proposition was the fifty-first in a list of
sixty-five condemned by the Tribunal of the Roman Inquisition under Pope Innocent
XI:
A servant who, following orders, knowingly helps his master to climb
through a window in order to ravish a virgin, and furthermore serves
the same by carrying a ladder, opening a door, or cooperating in a
similar manner, does not sin mortally if he does this out of fear of
substantial harm, such as fear of being treated badly by his master, or
being looked upon fiercely, or being expelled from service.17
15

Roy, ‘La coopération’, 395-397. At 397 he quotes Sanchez, Opus Morale, Lib. I, cap. VII, 16:
‘Si res indifferens sit ita proxime ad peccatum ordinata, ut per se mala sit merito censenda, quamvis
in aliquo casu possit esse licita, juxta dictum 7, suppeditans non excusatur a culpa, quamvis certo
sciat alium paratum ad peccatum et inventurum alium, qui materiam suppeditet. . . . Et ratio est,
quia tales actiones ita proxime peccato accedunt, ad illudque ordinantur ut ex se malae dici merito
quaeant, nisi causa aliqua urgenti excusentur.’
16
Roy, ‘La coopération’, 398. Note that Sanchez ties these ‘virtually intrinsically evil acts’ to the
question of whether they are able to produce good effects.
17
Alphonsus (Theologia moralis, Tom. 1, lix-lxi) cites the Propositiones Damnatae ab Innocentio
XI in March 1679: ‘Famulus, qui submissis humeris, scienter adjuvat herum suum ascendere per
fenestram ad stuprandam virginem, et multoties eidem subservit deferendo scalam, aperiendo
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In view of Sanchez’s achievement, and for the purposes of the present study,
the critical question is: did the Inquisition condemn this proposition because the
servant’s actions were intrinsically evil in the circumstances, or because the servant
lacked a sufficiently serious reason to justify his cooperation?18
Following Sanchez, ‘intrinsically evil acts’ were understood to be acts which
could not serve any but evil ends. If the 1679 proposition was condemned because
the servant’s acts were judged to be ‘intrinsically evil’ in this sense, the key
questions then become: (i) on what basis are human acts to be judged to serve
nothing but an evil end? and (ii) how does the agent’s foreknowledge (that his acts
will be abused unto evil) influence this judgment?19
Most moralists took the position that, if the servant’s acts are ordered solely
to the intrinsically evil end of the master, then the servant’s acts themselves are also
intrinsically evil.

It would be this issue of ordering or intending an act to an evil

end, and the manner in which the act is so ordered, which would open the way for
Alphonsus to clarify the distinction between formal and material cooperation.
On the other hand, if the proposition had been condemned because the
servant’s actions lacked a sufficiently serious reason, then the focus of attention
switches to the justification of cooperation: in what way do the circumstances
surrounding a proposed cooperative act, circumstances which are known to the
servant, help to justify that act? Do they alter the moral species of the cooperative
act, or do they so complicate the subjective assessment of its good and evil effects
that cooperation may be rendered excusable? In more modern terms: is cooperation
in evil to be objectively justified on the basis of the morality of the act itself, or
subjectively excused on the grounds of the cooperator’s intention?

januam, aut quid simile cooperando, non peccat mortaliter, si id faciat metu notabilis detrimenti,
puta, ne a domino male tractetur, ne torvis oculis aspiciatur, ne domo expelletur.’ [DS 1201] Roy
(‘La coopération’, 412-418) examines the origins and some of the effects of this condemnation. Roy
gives the date of this condemnation as 2 March, Alfonsus as 4 March.
18
Roy, ‘La coopération’, 415.
19
Roy, ‘La coopération’, 416.
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Moralists of the time remained divided over these matters and seemed
unwilling to propose definitive answers.

This may have been because the

Inquisition’s moral weight discouraged any claims to absolute resolution of such
controverted aspects of the condemnation. These questions, and clarification of the
categories of cooperation which would serve to illuminate them, remained essentially
unresolved until the time of Alphonsus Liguori.

1.1.4

Alphonsus Liguori

Alphonsus treats cooperation in two locations in his Theologia moralis: the
particular question of cooperation and scandal is dealt with in the tract on charity,
while the more traditional problem of ‘restitution for unjust damage’ is dealt with in
the tract on justice.20

Like prior and subsequent manualists, Alphonsus uses the

term ‘cooperation’ somewhat equivocally in these locations, but his great
achievement was to untangle various meanings of ‘cooperation’ and give that term
its clearest definition.

More complete assessments of his work may be found

elsewhere.21
As Sanchez, so Alphonsus in de restitutione examines whether those who
cooperate in doing harm to another should be held to make restitution.22

The

response is clear:
All are held to make restitution who in any manner are a cause
influencing and effecting the harm which follows; and those who,
being by office and the obligations of justice obliged to guard
against such harm, do not prevent it.23

20

Roy, ‘La coopération’, 399. The reference for the treatment of scandal is: Theologia moralis,
Lib. II, Tract. III, Cap. II De praecepto caritatis erga proximum, Dubium V. [Hereafter: Alphonsus,
de caritate followed by the paragraph number.] The reference for the treatment of unjust damage is:
Theologia moralis, Lib. III, Tract. V, Cap. II De restitutione, Dubium II. [Hereafter: Alphonsus, de
restitutione followed by the paragraph number.] All excerpts from Alphonsus’s Theologia moralis
are taken from the 1905 critical edition (Leonardi Gaudé, ed.).
21
See for example Roy, ‘La coopération’, 398-435.
22
Alphonsus, de restitutione, Dubium II: An qui cooperantur ad damnum alterius teneantur ad
restitutionem.
23
Alphonsus, de restitutione 557: ‘Tenentur omnes illi, qui quoquo modo sunt causa influens et
efficax damni secuti; ac qui, ex officio et obligatione justitiae obligati cavere damnum, non
caverunt.’
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He then considers the ‘nine modes of cooperation’ which had become
traditional: ‘Jussio, concilium, consensus, palpo, recursus, participans, mutus, non
obstans, non manifestans’.24

The first six represent positive cooperation in harm

done to another, while the last three are negative - cooperation by omission. Roy
notes that, ‘by relationship to the act of damage, cooperators exercise influence in a
dual way according to the two modes of physical causality and moral causality’.25
This distinction based on causality becomes significant as Alphonsus begins to
distinguish ‘cooperation properly so called’ from ‘scandal’ and ‘induction’.
Two points are clear in de restitutione.

First, as with Sanchez, the focus

here is on the issue of culpability: in general terms, a cooperator is required to make
restitution to the extent to which he shares moral responsibility for damage done by
the evil he helps to cause. The crucial point for Alphonsus, as for Sanchez, is moral
causality: in the question of restitution, the cooperator is to be considered culpable
insofar as he has exercised moral causality by influencing the will of the principal
agent either by helping to form the principal agent’s evil will (for example, by
command, counsel or flattery), or by strengthening the principal agent’s existing evil
will (by agreement, defense or participation), or by failing to dissuade the principal
agent (by being silent, or remaining passive, or failing to reveal the other’s fault).26
In all of these the cooperator is held to make restitution.
Second, however, among these nine modes of moral causality Alphonsus
notices that the cooperator can also exercise purely physical causality in one mode:
participation in the evil act itself.27

One’s moral culpability for purely physical

participation in an evil act (and therefore one’s duty of restitution) depends on two
factors:

the proximity of one’s cooperation in the evil act, and whether one

cooperates freely or because of some grave fear.28 Many moralists held that because
24

Alphonsus, de restitutione 557. See Roy, ‘La coopération’, 401.
Roy, ‘La coopération’, 402.
26
The focus on culpability here prompts even Alphonsus at times to confuse cooperation with
scandal or induction. Roy, ‘La coopération’, 401-402.
27
Alphonsus, de restitutione 571: ‘Participantes dupliciter intelligi possunt: nempe in re furata et
in actione furti. Participantes in re furata tenetur quidem restituere quantum de illa ad ipsos
pervenit. Quoad participantes vero in actione furti, videndum an ipsi concurrant at totum damnum
vel ad partem.’
28
Alphonsus, de restitutione 571, quoting Lessius: ‘Excusantur tamen (modo actio per se non sit
mala) qui ea non sponte, sed justo metu coacti faciunt . . .’
25
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too proximate a cooperation would render the cooperative act intrinsically evil,
proximity itself was the major factor in determining culpability even in the presence
of an excusing reason.29 Alphonsus preferred an alternative approach: given that the
cooperator exercises no moral causality in the principal agent’s sin (that is, his is
purely physical participation), the cooperator’s act and the principal agent’s act must
each be considered to have their own moral status.

Even very proximate physical

cooperation may be permissible so long as the cooperator holds a sufficiently grave
reason to act.30
So in the first place Alphonsus distinguishes between participation by an
intrinsically evil act and participation by an essentially indifferent act. In the second
place, he distinguishes between participation by an essentially indifferent act with a
sufficiently serious excusing reason, and participation by an essentially indifferent
act without such an excusing reason.
The distinctions which Alphonsus uncovers in de restitutione also occur in
the tract de caritate. Here Alphonsus’s primary concern is not with culpability and
restitution, but with the demands of the virtue of charity itself - and again the role of
the sufficiently serious reason is crucial. His progress towards defining ‘cooperation
properly so called’ can be traced in three phases.
First, with regard to causality: in de caritate 47 the question is put whether it
would be a sin of scandal to ask of someone that which he could not do without sin,

29

Alphonsus, de restitutione 571 : ‘Si actiones cooperantis remote concurrant ad furtum . . . tunc
cooperans ob metum mortis vel alterius gravis mali, excusatur tam a restitutione quam a culpa; quia
istae sunt actiones per se indifferentes, neque laedunt dominum, nisi ex malitia furis. - Secus, si
actiones sint proxime influentes in furtum . . . tunc cooperans non excusatur neque a culpa neque a
restitutione. Ratio, ut dicunt, quia actiones hae, utpote intrinsece malae, non possunt ob
quemcumque metum excusari.’
30
That is, if the cooperator acts for the same end as the principal agent then his deed is obviously
evil; but if he acts for another end, for example to prevent a greater harm befalling himself, then his
act must be considered as distinct from that of the principal agent. See Alphonsus, de restitutione
571: ‘Ratio, quia omnes praefatae actiones, tam primi quam secundi generis, sunt revera
indifferentes: cum, juxta finem quo fiunt, vel licitae vel illicitae esse possint. - Si enim tu praestas
illas cum pravo fine nocendi domino, certe erunt tibi illicitae. - Si vero praestas, ad damnum tuum in
vita vel honore praecavendum, tunc licitae tibi erunt; et quod fur illis abutatur ad suam pravam
voluntatem exsequendam, hoc per accidens se habet; tuque solum materialiter tunc cooperaris ad
peccatum illius, quod ex justa causa licite permittis.’
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if he were already of a mind so to sin.31

In his reply Alphonsus notes that a

principal agent who is already prepared to perform an evil act cannot be the subject
of scandal or induction in the strict sense, since the evil object has already been
presented to, and approved by, his will.32

The logic here is compelling: the

cooperator in question is clearly participating in the other’s evil action, but is not
strictly inducing it.

There is, therefore, a real distinction between cooperation on

one hand, and scandal or induction on the other.

As in de restitutione, it is when

Alphonsus notices that one may physically cooperate in an act without exercising
any moral causality that the nature of ‘cooperation properly so called’ becomes
clear: if the cooperator’s act exercises moral causality in the principal agent’s act,
that act qualifies as scandal or induction and is best dealt with under those titles; if
there is no moral causality at all, but only physical participation in some form, then
the act is one of cooperation properly so called and is best handled under that title.33
It will be recalled that Sanchez had defined cooperation primarily with
reference to the fault of the principal agent, and his emphasis on moral causality is
similarly with reference to that agent’s fault, to the point that he seems reluctant to
consider purely physical participation within his definition of cooperation.34 While
this frame of reference is in keeping with Sanchez’s concern to study the question of
restitution for unjust damage, it is now obvious that this approach must inevitably
lead to some confusion. For Alphonsus, on the other hand, cooperation properly so
called is defined primarily not in terms of participation in the principal agent’s fault,
but in terms of the cooperator’s participation in the principal agent’s act by
contributing some physical assistance.

The same distinction allows Alphonsus to

define formal and material cooperation:
But it is better to say, with others, that [cooperation] is formal
which agrees with the evil will of the other, and cannot be done
without sin; true material [cooperation] is that which concurs only

31

Alphonsus, de caritate 47: ‘Quaestio 3: An sit peccatum scandali, petere ab alio aliquid, quod
ipse non praestabit sine peccato, si jam paratus sit ad peccandum?’ Roy (‘La coopération’, 408)
notes that while Alphonsus poses the question in terms of induction, he responds to it in terms of
cooperation.
32
Roy, ‘La coopération’, 408.
33
Roy (‘La coopération’, 403) notes that in the tract on charity Alphonsus no longer identifies as
‘cooperators’ those who exercise such moral causality - rather they are agents of scandal.
34
Roy, ‘La coopération’, 384.
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with the evil action of the other, [which is] outside the intention of
the cooperator.35
Second, with regard to the nature of the cooperative act and the cooperator’s
subjective intention: defining ‘cooperation properly so called’ as ‘cooperation
without induction’ effectively eliminates eight of the nine modes dealt with in de
restitutione, since none of the eight could avoid influencing the principal agent’s will
in some way. This leaves only participans - or more precisely, only one form of
participans, namely purely physical participation - and this would be ‘cooperation
properly so called’ only if certain conditions apply. Given that the principal agent
has already formed a will to sin, Alphonsus lists these conditions as:
1° If the work or cooperation would be in itself good or at least
indifferent. 2° If it would be through a good intention and for a
reasonable cause, and not in order to help the other to sin. 3° If one
is unable to impede the sin of the other, or at least for a reasonable
cause one would not be expected to do so.36
These conditions strictly circumscribe participans as ‘cooperation properly
so called’. The first condition specifies that the cooperative act must not be evil in
itself, or else the cooperator would sin in his own right.

The second condition

requires a good intention, since an evil intention would vitiate an otherwise good or
indifferent act;

it also requires a justifying reason serious enough, in the

circumstances, to override one’s normal obligation not to participate even only
physically in an evil deed. The third condition requires that, even given a good or
indifferent act, a good intention and a sufficient reason, one must also hold some
reason to be excused one’s normal obligation to prevent or impede spiritual harm to
one’s neighbour.

35

Alphonsus, de caritate 63: ‘Sed melius cum aliis dicendum, illam esse formalem, quae concurrit
ad malam voluntatem alterius, et nequit esse sine peccato; materialem vero illam, quae concurrit
tantum ad malam actionem alterius, praeter intentionem cooperantis.’ Emphasis added. See also
Roy, ‘La coopération’, 422.
36
Alphonsus, de caritate 59: ‘1° Si tuum opus vel cooperatio sit secundum se bona vel saltem
indifferens. 2° Si bona intentione et rationabili ex causa fiat, et non ut juves alterum peccare. 3° Si
alterius peccatum impedire nequeas, aut saltem non tenearis propter causam rationabilem.’
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It will be noted that, like Sanchez, Alphonsus defines as intrinsically evil an
act which cannot be commissioned except as ordered to sin.37 Granted that the
cooperator’s act is not intrinsically evil in this sense - that is, not in itself ordered to
the principal agent’s evil act - the cooperator’s act is taken to be essentially
indifferent in itself, and Alphonsus’s major concern then is with the cooperator’s
intention.

He insists that the cooperator’s intention must be good or at least

indifferent, since an evil intention would vitiate an otherwise morally indifferent act.
But even where the act is good or indifferent in itself and the cooperator’s intention
is also good, Alphonsus points out that the cooperator must still evaluate his
cooperation with prudence, according to various considerations:
1° How grave is the sin to which occasion would be given; 2° how
probable it is that, if one did not cooperate, the other would not
commit the sin; or how inevitable is the sin; 3° how closely one’s
cooperation bears upon the sin; 4° how great a right one has to
perform the cooperative act; 5° finally, how greatly the sin offends
the demands of justice, by virtue of the harm it does to a third party.38
Third, with regard to the question of culpability, Alphonsus notes that a
sufficiently grave reason is always required to justify material cooperation:
cooperation without a proportionate reason would constitute a sin against both the
virtue offended by the evil with which one cooperates, and the virtue of charity
which requires one to avoid allowing serious harm to one’s neighbour (that is, the
principal agent)

-

including spiritual harm.39

But cooperation with a

proportionately grave reason may constitute a sin against neither virtue.40

Again,

Alphonsus’s reasoning is compelling:
•

with regard to an offence against the virtue of charity :

37

Alphonsus, de caritate 59 : ‘Et Sanchez censet auctores citatos locutos fuisse casu quo absit
justa causa excusans; vel quando cooperatio sit intrinsece mala. Semper autem est intrinsece mala
illa actio, quae ex se determinata est ad peccatum: uti esset, quaerere domino concubinam, idola
fabricare, et quid simile. Secus, si actio potest fieri sine peccato: puta, ministrare mensae, aperire
januam, etc.’
38
Alphonsus, de caritate 59 : ‘1° quanto gravius est peccatum cujus occasio datur; 2° quanto
probabilius est, te non cooperante, alterum non peccaturum; aut quanto certior est affectus peccati;
3° quanto propinquius tua cooperatio peccatum attingit; 4° quanto minus jures habes ad tale opus;
5° denique, quanto magis peccatum cum justitia pugnat, idque propter damnum tertii.’
39
Alphonsus, de caritate 47.
40
Note that ‘offences against the virtues’ here refers to the sin of the cooperator which is tied to
the nature of his cooperation and whether or not it is justified. The sin of the principal agent is a
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Indeed, charity obliges us to avoid serious harm to our neighbour, as
often as it may be done without serious inconvenience. However,
when we have a grave reason for asking, we cannot abstain from
asking without serious inconvenience; and therefore in this case we
are certainly excused; the opposite is true if the reason is not serious,
and much more so if the reason is unlawful or frivolous.41
•

and with regard to offence against the other virtue in question:
Truly we say that someone asking without a just cause . . . would not
be excused a grave sin against the other virtue to the offending of
which he morally induces his neighbour. And this is so even if it
might be the case (which in practice, as we have just said, is morally
impossible) that the external act would not strengthen the malice of
the neighbour who is already prepared to sin. The reason is that,
without a just cause, it is never lawful to cooperate with an
objectively evil action; even if it is only permissive concurrence, to
concur even morally with an objectively evil act without a just cause
is of itself always evil; accordingly it is certain that to induce another
senselessly to perjury, fornication, etc., even if the other person does
not actually sin, is a grave sin against the opposite virtue; . . . 42
It seems, therefore, that Alphonsus requires the cooperator to hold a

sufficiently serious reason for two purposes: firstly in order to excuse the cooperator
from his normal duty in charity to prevent spiritual harm befalling his neighbour, and
secondly in order to excuse the cooperator from his normal duty to refrain from
assisting the principal agent to offend another virtue or virtues. This double sense of
‘sufficiently serious reason’ appears when the cooperator acts under some threat of
harm:
. . . when one performs an action which is indifferent in itself, that is,
one which may be either good or evil, one is not held out of charity to
abstain from it, not even if another person would abuse it in order to
commit sin; moreover, when someone threatens one with serious
distinct question: as Alphonsus notes in de caritate 47, the cooperator may well sin himself even if
the principal agent does not.
41
Alphonsus, de caritate 47: ‘Caritas enim nos obligat ad vitandum damnum grave proximi,
quotiescumque sine notabili incommodo id possumus. Cum autem habemus gravem causam petendi,
non possumus sine gravi incommodo a petendo abstinere; et ideo tunc equidem excusamur; secus
vero, si causa sit levis, et tanto magis si sit illicita aut vana.’
42
Alphonsus, de caritate 47: ‘Verum dicimus quod petens sine gravi causa . . . non excusatur ab
alio peccato gravi contra virtutem, ad quam laedendam moraliter inducit proximum. Et hoc, etiamsi
daretur casus, quem practice jam diximus moraliter impossibile esse evenire, quod opere externo non
augeretur malitia proximi parati ad peccandum.
Ratio, quia sine justa causa nunquam licet
cooperari ad actionem objective malam; concurrere enim moraliter, etsi permissive, ad actum
objective malum sine justa causa, per se semper est malum; prout certum est, quod inducere
amentem ad pejerandum, fornicandum, etc., etiamsi ille non peccat, est grave peccatum contra
virtutes oppositas; . . . ’
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harm, it can be lawful to permit the other person to sin. For on one
hand charity does not oblige one to suffer grave harm in order to avert
the other’s sin; and on the other hand, the malice of the other person
does not alter the nature of one’s own act, which by its indifference
avoids being intrinsically evil. And the author Continuator Tournely
teaches the same opinion as me, saying: I am not held to undergo
serious harm in order to avert the sin of another; rather his own
malice is imputed to himself only. 43
In all of these cases Alphonsus assumes the principal agent’s will to sin.
Without this prior intention of the principal agent, virtually any cooperation would
constitute inducement: either as assisting the principal agent to form his evil
intention, or as strengthening the evil intention he has already formed.

It is

significant therefore that in de caritate, while Alphonsus eliminates what he admits
is virtually impossible (that the cooperative act would not strengthen an evil
intention already formed), he still finds a grave sin in the case of one who cooperates
without just cause. In this case, the grave sin is not defined primarily with reference
to the fault attaching to the principal agent’s act: the sin is defined primarily in terms
of the cooperator’s own act, which constitutes unjustified participation in the
principal agent’s evil deed.
Here the importance of Alphonsus’s achievement is clear.

In defining

cooperation primarily in relation to the act of the cooperator rather than to the fault
of the principal agent, he effectively identifies a boundary which previously had
gone unnoticed: it is the boundary between the cooperator’s culpability for his own
act, and his shared culpability for the act of the principal agent.44

Consequently

Alphonsus insists that several conditions must be met for legitimate cooperation:
•

the principal agent must already be determined unto evil (so there is no
question of induction);

•

the cooperator’s act must be good or indifferent in itself (so it does not merit
condemnation in its own right);

43

Alphonsus, de caritate 66: ‘ . . . cum te praestas actionem per se indifferentem, scilicet, quae
potest esse bona et mala, non teneris ex caritate ab illa abstinere, ne alter ea abutatur ad peccandum;
quando autem alias grave damnum metuis, licite permittere potes peccatum alterius. Nam ex una
parte, caritas te non obligat cum gravi damno peccatum ejus avertere; et ex altera, malitia alterius
nequit mutare naturam tuae actionis, ita ut de indifferenti evadat intrinsece mala. Et idem mecum
sentit doctus auctor, Continuator Tournely, dicens: Non . . . teneor grave subire detrimentum, ut
alterius peccatum avertam; ipse sane malitiam suam sibi imputet.’
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•

the cooperator must not intend the evil of the principal agent (so that his
cooperation is not formal); and

•

the cooperator must possess a sufficiently serious reason to act (in the
knowledge that the abuse of his act will occur only in virtue of the principal
agent’s evil will).
In lawful cooperation properly so called, the cooperator is not at all culpable

for the sin of the principal agent or for the evil wrought by the principal agent’s act,
and therefore he is excused any harm which follows from the abuse of his own act.
This boundary clarifies much of the confusion inherited from Sanchez.
In this way Alphonsus resolved the question posed by the condemnation of
1679. The servant in that case is not condemned because his actions are intrinsically
evil by virtue of assisting his master to sin, since ‘opening a door’ or ‘holding a
ladder’ are acts which are indifferent in themselves and may in other circumstances
be ordered to good ends.

Therefore (assuming that he acts with a good intention)

the servant’s acts do not constitute formal cooperation in the master’s evil deed but
only material cooperation, and a sufficiently serious reason (such as the threat of
death) can justify such cooperation.45

However, the servant’s reasons as given in

the condemned proposition are not serious enough to justify his cooperation in this
case, so Alphonsus concludes that what was condemned by the Inquisition was not
‘formal cooperation’ but ‘unjustified material cooperation’. He holds that only the
threat of death would excuse this material cooperation, but not even the threat of
death would excuse material cooperation in a more serious evil, such as the killing of
innocent people.46
Alphonsus himself provides a concise summary of his achievement in de
caritate 63 :
• First, in distinguishing cooperation as formal and material he ties material
cooperation to physical participation in the principal agent’s act, and formal
cooperation to moral participation in the principal agent’s fault:
44
45

See Roy, ‘La coopération’, 422.
Alphonsus, de restitutione 571.
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But it is better to say, with others, that [cooperation] is formal which
agrees with the evil will of the other, and cannot be done without sin;
true material [cooperation] is that which concurs only with the evil
action of the other, [which is] outside the intention of the
cooperator.47
• Second, in specifying the conditions for legitimate material cooperation he hints at
a definition of ‘proportionate reason’:
That [act of material cooperation] is lawful when of itself the act is
good or indifferent; and when there is also a just cause proportionate
to the gravity of the sin of the other and to the proximity of the
concurrence . . . 48
• Third, in explaining how the cooperator may be excused from the demands of
charity, he clearly distinguishes the principal agent’s intention and act from the
cooperator’s intention and act:
The reason is that simultaneously with your indifferent action
performed without an evil intention, should the other person wish to
abuse [your action] in order to perform his sin, you will not be held to
impede his action even out of charity. This is because charity does
not oblige when it demands grave inconvenience, so in performing
your cooperation for a just cause, you do not sin. Then indeed his sin
does not proceed from your cooperation, but from his own malice by
which your action will be abused. 49
• Fourth, Alphonsus explains what might be called the psychological structure of
material cooperation properly so called:
It is not true to say that your action, even if indifferent, becomes evil
when it conjoins with the circumstances of the depraved intention of
the other person; for your action does not conjoin itself with his evil
will, but he conjoins his evil will with your action; so your action
then will not be a cause in itself influencing the sin, but only an
occasion which the other person abuses in order to sin.50
46

Alphonsus, de caritate 66.
Alphonsus, de caritate 63: ‘Sed melius cum aliis dicendum, illam esse formalem, quae concurrit
ad malam voluntatem alterius, et nequit esse sine peccato; materialem vero illam, quae concurrit
tantum ad malam actionem alterius, praeter intentionem cooperantis.’
48
Alphonsus, de caritate 63: ‘Haec autem est licita, quando per se actio est bona vel indifferens;
et quando adest justa causa et proportionata ad gravitatem peccati alterius, et ad proximitatem
concursus, qui praestatur ad peccati exsecutionem.’ Emphasis added.
49
Alphonsus, de caritate 63: ‘Ratio, quia cum tu praestas actionem indifferentem sine prava
intentione, si alter illa abuti voluerit ad suum peccatum exsequendum, non teneris nisi ex caritate
illud impedire. Et quia caritas non obligat cum gravi incommodo, ideo ponens tuam cooperationem
cum justa causa, non peccas; tunc enim peccatum illius non provenit ex cooperatione tua, sed ex
malitia, ipsius qui tua actione abutitur.’
50
Alphonsus, de caritate 63: ‘Nec valet dicere quod tua actio, etsi indifferens, conjuncta tamen
cum circumstantia pravae intentionis alterius, evadit mala; nam revera actio tua non est per se
47
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Finally, it is apparent that the locations of the two discussions of cooperation
are very significant.

In de restitutione, where the central concern is assessment of

the degree of recompense to be made for unjust damage, the primary question of
cooperation is: in view of the evil effects which will follow from the principal agent’s
evil action, is the cooperative act still justified on this occasion? In de caritate, on
the other hand, the central concern is purely whether charity always obliges one to
prevent the principal agent from suffering spiritual harm from an evil which he wills
upon himself.

Regardless of any further evil effects which may flow from the

principal agent’s action, the primary question of cooperation in evil here is: in view
of the spiritual harm which the principal agent will do to himself, is the cooperator’s
action justified?
Alphonsus looks at cooperation through the two lenses of ‘justice’ and
‘charity’, and identifies two distinct focal points: the harm done by the principal
agent’s act, and the principal agent’s sin in itself.

In the former, the question of

cooperation in evil (properly so called) certainly arises, but it may easily be confused
with the attendant issues of harm done to third parties and responsibility for
restitution, and even with the problems of scandal and induction.

It is only in the

latter, where the sole focus is on the principal agent’s sin, that the question of
cooperation in evil (properly so called) is seen in itself.

This point was not

universally appreciated by many subsequent authors.
But since many instances of cooperation in evil involve injustice to third
parties in one way or another, it is valid to ask: is Alphonsus’s distinction real or
only notional? Is it useful in fact, or only in theory? In the condemnation of 1679,
for example, the questions concern only the servant’s cooperation: is the servant
justified in cooperating with his master, and if so, why? But it is incontestable that a
grave injustice is being done to a third party, the virgin ravished by the master.
Does this injustice not go to the heart of the servant’s action? Does not the servant
share some culpability for the master’s sin?
conjuncta cum mala voluntate illius, sed illud conjungit suam malam voluntatem cum actione tua;
unde tua actio non erit tunc causa per se influens in peccatum, sed tantum occasio, qua ille abutitur
ad peccandum.’

29

This is precisely the point of Alphonsus’s distinction. The servant will share
culpability for the master’s sin only if the servant’s cooperative action is itself
unjustified - which, as Alphonsus noted, depends on the ‘fear of substantial harm’
involved.

Alphonsus believed that the servant would not be bound to redress any

injustice toward the virgin if his cooperation was not in fact unjust (and the threat of
grave harm to himself might guarantee precisely that).

Again, subsequent authors

did not always appreciate this point. It is perhaps significant that these two issues the effect of ‘duress’ and the question of whether a cooperator is responsible for the
effects of the principal agent’s action

- continue to arise even in much later

treatments of the principle of legitimate cooperation.

1.1.5

Conclusions

The following schema illustrates, in a simplified way, the clarification of
concepts which Alphonsus brought to the question of cooperation in evil.
Cooperation
Immediate

Mediate

inducing the other to sin

Sanchez
Direct cooperation

Induction

Alphonsus

intending the same evil end

Direct cooperation

Formal cooperation

by intrinsically evil means

Direct cooperation

This act is evil in itself

by innocent means,

Indirect cooperation

Unjustified material cooperation

Not cooperation

Legitimate material cooperation

for no serious reason
by innocent means,
for a serious reason

Figure 1.1

Cooperation in Thomas Sanchez and Alphonsus Liguori.

The century following Alphonsus saw the moral manuals make no
appreciable improvement to his position. In one sense this was a period marked by
repetition and consolidation of past achievements: ‘. . . nothing seems to have
changed much in a hundred years except the names of those articulating the old
arguments’.51

It is not surprising, then, that while there were inevitably some

variations between one manual and another, the principle of cooperation remained
essentially as Alphonsus had left it.
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Nevertheless, the nineteenth century did see the beginnings of a renewal in
moral theology. Discontent at the style of the manuals, and at what was perceived
as an excessively legalistic approach to the ministry of the confessional and to moral
life, was fuelled by the need to address challenges issuing from the rise of
rationalism.

Beginning in the universities, this renewal movement was marked

broadly by ‘a recovered sense of the past and of historical development, a renewed
sense of speculation, of mysticism and an effort to align theology more closely with
life’.52
This trend in moral theology emerges very unevenly and very late in the
manuals of the twentieth century.

And in most respects, as noted, the principle of

cooperation remained unaffected by these developments - which is both a comment
on the vitality of the genre, and a tribute to the work of St Alphonsus.

51

Raphael Gallagher CSsR, ‘The Manual System of Moral Theology Since the Death of
Alphonsus.’ Irish Theological Quarterly 51(1985) 1-16, at 5.
52
R Gallagher, ‘The Manual System’, 6. Another good commentary on this emerging climate of
change and its effects may be found in John A Gallagher, Time Past, Time Future: An Historical
Study of Catholic Moral Theology. (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 1990) 123-183.
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1.2

Cooperation in the Later Manuals
1.2.1

Introduction

The moral manuals hold a particularly important place in the Catholic moral
tradition.

They had the specific aim of preparing clerical students for the role of

confessors, but as a genre which evolved over time they also provide a base-line for
longitudinal studies of particular moral questions.
This section will explore the principle of cooperation as it appears in three
moral manuals.53

It has already been noted that in most respects the manualists’

treatment of cooperation does not vary greatly from that of Alphonsus, but this study
will help to situate a later discussion of the structure and content of the principle. In
some ways these texts - all taken from the first part of this century and frequently
illustrating the tendencies noted above - may be taken as representative of what
turned out to be the final stage of the manual tradition.
The choice of these particular manuals is driven by two factors: the
parameters of the present work, and the influence which these authors exercised on
the formation of priests in Australia in the years just prior to and immediately after
the Second Vatican Council. That Council is a natural boundary since it mandated a
far-reaching revision of moral theology, a renewal which is having a significant
impact on the way in which moral principles are presented today.

1.2.2

Aertnys-Damen

Three aspects of Aertnys-Damen’s Theologia moralis (1932) make it an
immediate candidate for study: it is typical of the genre as it stood at the beginning
of this century; it underwent many editions in its long history (eight prior to the
53

The manuals chosen are: (1) J Aertnys CSsR and C A Damen CSsR, Theologia Moralis
secundum doctrinam S Alfonsi de Ligorio doctoris ecclesiae. 2 vol. 12th ed. (Turin: Marietti, 1932).
[Hereafter, cited as Aertnys-Damen followed by an abbreviation of the title of the relevant tract, and
paragraph number.] (2) Henry Davis SJ, Moral and Pastoral Theology. 4 vol. 1st ed. (London:
Sheed and Ward, 1935). [Hereafter, cited as Davis followed by the volume number and page.] (3)
Bernard Häring CSsR, The Law of Christ. 3 vol. 1st English ed. Translated by Edwin G Kaiser
CPPS. Cork: Mercier, 1963. [Hereafter, cited as Häring 1963 followed by the volume number and
page.]
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1918 Code of Canon Law, the eighteenth and final edition in 1967); and as the work
of two (and eventually three) notable Redemptorist theologians it could be expected
to stand squarely in the tradition of Alphonsus Liguori.
True to that tradition, Aertnys-Damen treat cooperation in two locations: de
restitutione54 and de caritate.55
In de restitutione the treatment follows the focus of Alphonsus very closely:
cooperation is defined broadly as concurrence in the action of another which brings
about unjust damage. The authors list the traditional nine modes, and note the two
offences inherent in unjust cooperation: against charity, and against the other virtues
in question.56

They deal with the problem of cooperation by induction in the first

five positive modes, before treating of participans.57
Here the authors repeat the distinctions made by Alphonsus between
participation through benefiting from an unjust act, and participation in the
commissioning of the unjust act itself.

Participation in the latter case is either

formal or material,58 and material cooperation may be either immediate (when one
cooperates in the performance of the evil act itself) or mediate (when one offers
some matter which serves the commissioning of the evil act). Some of the examples
have not changed from the time of Sanchez: offering one’s shoulders for someone to
climb through a window, making or providing skeleton keys for a thief, and so on.59
In assessing restitution the authors also repeat the doctrine of Alphonsus:
whoever participates through benefiting from the unjust act is always held to make
restitution; whoever participates through contributing to the commissioning of the
unjust act itself is held to make restitution when their cooperation is theologically
culpable.

Formal cooperation is always sinful, and so restitution is always

54

Lib. III De praeceptis Decalogi, Tr. VII De VII et X praecepto, Pars I De justitia commutativa,
Sectio III De resitutione, Cap. IV Restitutio ob injustam cooperationem ad damnum.
55
Lib. II De praeceptis virtutum theologicarum, Tr. III De caritate, Cap. VI Peccata contra
caritatem, Art. 3 Cooperatio.
56
Aertnys-Damen, de restitutione 769.
57
Aertnys-Damen, de restitutione 782-783.
58
The authors have already defined these in their de caritate 398.
59
Aertnys-Damen, de restitutione 782, with reference to Alphonsus in his de restitutione 571.
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required.

Those who cooperate materially are held to make restitution when they

have no ‘just and proportionate reason’ for acting, since only such a reason can
justify material cooperation.60
Aertnys-Damen seek to shed some light on what might constitute this ‘just
and proportionate reason’ in various cases. Immediate material cooperation would
not be justified if, in seeking to avoid harm to oneself, one cooperated in inflicting a
harm of the same order on one’s neighbour; but it would be justified if the threat of
harm to oneself was of a higher order than the threat to one’s neighbour. Mediate
material cooperation would be permitted where the threat of harm to both parties
was equal.
In de caritate the authors also follow closely the doctrine of Alphonsus
whom they acknowledge as making the greatest contribution to clarification of the
question. While the reserve the strict sense of cooperation to one who ‘concurs
either physically or morally in the evil action of the other more principal agent’,61
they immediately note that the principal agent is one who is already determined to
act: that is, they exclude all notion of induction. Granted this, formal cooperation
is defined as ‘concurrence in the formal sin of another, or in his evil will in such a
way that it necessarily includes concurrence in the sin itself’.62

This may come

about ex fine operis, when the act is of its nature ordained only unto the sin, or ex
fine operantis, by the intention of the cooperator.

In either case the sin of formal

cooperation is taken to be obvious, and directly voluntary, and so never lawful.
Material cooperation, on the other hand, concurs ‘only in the material sin or
in the evil action of the other and not with his evil will’63 - that is, the cooperator
must not formally intend the evil of the principal agent. Here the traditional concept
of intrinsically evil and morally indifferent acts is employed: material cooperation
60

Aertnys-Damen, de restitutione 783 : ‘Materialiter cooperans ad restitutionem tenetur nisi ex
justa et proportionata causa auxilium praestet; tunc enim solum cooperatio ejus licita est.’
61
Aertnys-Damen, de caritate 397.
62
Aertnys-Damen, de caritate 398: ‘Cooperatio formalis ea est quae concurrit ad formale
peccati alterius, seu ad ipsius malam voluntatem, ita ut necessario includat consensum in ipsum
peccatum.’ Emphasis original.
63
Aertnys-Damen, de caritate 398: ‘Cooperatio materialis ea est, quae concurrit tantum ad
materiale peccati seu ad malam actionem alterius et non ad malam voluntatem.’ Emphasis original.
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occurs ‘when anyone without evil intention performs a work in itself indifferent,
which of its own nature is not ordained solely unto the sin, but which can be made to
serve either good or evil purposes, and which the other agent abuses in order to
sin’.64 Material cooperation is further categorised, somewhat vaguely, as proximate
or remote ‘according to the matter or means of sinning, or better, as it leads
proximately or remotely to the execution of the sin’.65
Material cooperation per se is illicit, but per accidens it may be lawful for a
proportionately serious justifying reason.

The authors conclude that lawfulness

depends upon three simultaneous conditions:

that the act is in itself good or

indifferent, that the end (intention) is good, and that it is for a just and proportionate
reason.66 Illicit cooperation, whether formal or material, is always a sin against all
virtues offended.
Aertnys-Damen then further specify their position on what constitutes a ‘just
and proportionate reason’: it must be proportioned to the one cooperating, and to
the manner of cooperating, and to the sin of the principal agent. Only in relation to
all of these circumstances can a truly prudential judgment be reached.67

A more

serious reason would be required to justify material cooperation as the following
factors vary:
• whether the cooperator is bound by office to prevent the sin;
• the more likely it is that the sin would not occur if one did not cooperate;
• the more certainly the cooperator knows that his act will be abused;
• the more proximate the cooperation to the sin;
• the more serious the sin itself; and

64

Aertnys-Damen, de caritate 398: ‘Hoc autem contingit quando quis absque mala intentione
operam praestat de se indifferentem, quae non natura sua ad solum peccatum ordinatur sed tam bono
quam malo usui inservire potest, at qua alter abutitur ad peccandum.’
65
Aertnys-Damen, de caritate 398: ‘ . . . prout materia vel medium peccandi, quod praestatur,
proxime vel remote conducit ad peccati exsecutionem.’
66
Aertnys-Damen, de caritate 399.
67
Aertnys-Damen, de caritate 400: ‘Causa cohonestans cooperationem materialem debet esse
proportionata tum ad personam cooperantem, tum ad modum cooperationis, tum ad peccatum cui
exsequendo opera praestatur.
Hae enim sunt actionis circumstanatiae quas respicere debet
prudentia, cujus est determinare quaenam causa in casu particulari cooperationem materialem
cohonestet.’
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• the more severe the judgment of the principal agent. 68
Then the special rules governing material cooperation are given: material
cooperation is always lawful if it is done in order to avoid a greater evil; proximate
cooperation in an action which gravely damages the public good is never excusable
on the grounds of protecting a private good; proximate cooperation in the sin of
another, especially necessary cooperation, is excused if one acts out of a fear of
grave harm or loss at least equivalent to that suffered by a third party - whereas
remote cooperation in the sin of another may be lawful for a less serious reason.
But if denying one’s cooperation would prevent the sin being committed, then a
more serious reason is required to justify one’s act.69
Note that here the authors cite Alphonsus directly, and refer to a footnote in
the Gaudé edition which draws attention to the fact that while he is considering
cooperation with a specific focus on whether charity permits the cooperator to allow
the principal agent to sin, Alphonsus also counts ‘harm done to third parties’ as a
relevant factor.70 This does not represent a loss of focus on the primary question in
de caritate, but is rather an indication that the extent of harm done by the evil deed
helps to define the gravity of the principal agent’s sin. As noted, some later authors
missed the subtlety of this point and referred instead simply to ‘further harmful
effects’ as a distinct matter to be considered under de caritate.
Finally the authors note that, as clear-cut as these distinctions may seem in
theory, they are not always so in practice :
The application of principles and rules to individual cases of
cooperation are prone to certain difficulties. The heart of these lie in
discerning: 1° which actions are indifferent in themselves, and which
are truly determined unto evil; 2° which actions are proximate and
which are truly remote insofar as they apply to the perpetration of the
sin; 3° when a reason would be just and proportionate such as to
excuse from material cooperation.
In these matters it is not
uncommon for the classical authors to disagree among themselves,
68

Aertnys-Damen, de caritate 400. Compare this with Alphonsus, de caritate 59.
Aertnys-Damen, de caritate 401, where there are signs of a distinction between necessary and
contingent cooperation.
70
The reference is Alphonsus de caritate 66. Alphonsus refers the reader to his own treatment of
cooperation in his de resitutione 571.
69
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and St Alphonsus, speaking of just and proportionate reason, wrote in
Homo apostolicus n.32: ‘Before everything else, it should be the rule
to observe what the Doctors say; because it arises from a prudent
estimation, [their] judgment in this matter will be more common and
also more probable’.71
This monitum precedes an analysis of individual cases of cooperation: many
of these are virtually unchanged from the time of Alphonsus, although in a few
instances the authors include more contemporary issues.72
If the moral manuals form a single genus of many species, Aertnys-Damen
would seem to serve as a typical specimen.

The authors systematise and preserve

the best of traditional teaching, including supporting arguments, and apply
traditional principles to particular questions. But with few exceptions the teaching
on material cooperation in this manual is much as Alphonsus had left it over 150
years before.

1.2.3

Henry Davis

The first edition of Henry Davis’s Moral and Pastoral Theology (1935) was
almost exactly contemporaneous with the twelfth edition of Aertnys-Damen, yet
there are significant differences between them.
In the Preface to his first edition Davis provides an intriuging glimpse into
the world from which his manual emerges and for which it is intended.

On one

hand he reflects the inertia of the tradition:
A writer on Moral Theology today must be indebted beyond measure
to the labours of past writers, for the matter is one that has been
treated with the greatest acumen and scholarship during well-nigh
three centuries, and there is no room for originality.73
On the other hand he demonstrates a sense of the emerging interdisciplinary
demands of moral theology, urging the reader to have recourse to experts in various
71
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fields of study, since ‘a Moral theologian cannot hope to have exact knowledge in
any other science than his own’.74 He also acknowledges that he is ‘painfully aware
how easy it is to misapply a principle to a concrete case, especially when several
principles which appear to be mutually antagonistic have to be co-ordinated’.75 It
is apparent that Davis does not intend simply to repeat in English the content of the
Latin manuals, but aims rather to strike a balance between that long moral tradition
on one hand, and practical guidance for his contemporaries on the other.

That

practical guidance often comes in the form of ‘Pastoral Notes’, which nevertheless
are normally couched in the traditional language and attitudes of canon law.
The structure is more or less in keeping with the Latin manuals, and Davis
treats cooperation in the traditional locations. Under ‘restitution’ he perpetuates the
confusion of cooperation with scandal and induction, noting various divisions of
cooperation: positive (‘by actual help or moral suasion’) which includes the first six
of the traditional nine modes, and negative (‘by not preventing injustice when one
could and should prevent it’) which embraces the remaining three modes.76

The

positive modes are treated first, but the discussion is much less detailed than in
Aertnys-Damen and there are few case studies.
Concerning participation, Davis echoes the traditional distinction between
participating in the unjust act itself and participating in the results of an unjust act.
In the latter case the cooperator is bound to make restitution;

in the former,

restitution is required for any harm of which he was ‘the efficacious and culpable
cause’.77 The author also distinguishes necessary and unnecessary cooperation: the
former is required in order to produce the damage, the latter is not. Concerning the
negative modes of cooperation, he notes that restitution must be made where ‘one is
bound in justice to prevent injustice to another, and refrains from doing so, though
one could have prevented it without an equivalent harm to oneself’.78 It is perhaps
significant that, unlike Aertnys-Damen, Davis does not dwell on what might
constitute ‘equivalent’ or ‘greater’ harm, beyond noting the general principle that
74
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‘no one is bound to forestall harm to another at the cost of greater harm to
himself’.79
Under the virtue of charity Davis defines cooperation as ‘concurrence with
another in a sinful act’, whether by acting with another in sin or by supplying
another with the occasion of sin.80 He touches on proportionate reason, noting that
‘. . . it is important to distinguish between immediate and mediate, proximate and
remote cooperation, since a more serious excuse is required for immediate than for
mediate cooperation, as also for proximate than for remote’.81 Davis’s definitions
are worth quoting in full:
1. Cooperation is formal when A helps B in an external sinful act,
and intends the sinfulness of it, as in deliberate adultery.
2. Cooperation is material when A helps B to accomplish an external
act by an act that is not sinful, and without approving of what B
does.
(a) This material cooperation is immediate, if it is cooperation in
the sinful act of the other, as to help a burglar to empty the
jewels that he is stealing into the burglar’s wallet.
(b) Material cooperation is mediate, if it is an act that is secondary
and subservient to the main act of another, as to supply a
burglar with tools for his burglary.
(i) Mediate cooperation is proximate, if the help given is very
intimately connected with the act of another, as to hold a
ladder for the burglar as he climbs up to a window for the
purpose of burglary.
(ii) Mediate cooperation is remote, if the help given is not
closely connected with the other’s act, as to purchase tools
for a burglar.82
It is notable that in defining material cooperation Davis maintains
Alphonsus’s boundary between the acts of the principal and secondary agents. But
a certain imprecision in the next distinction threatens to obscure this boundary once
again: if the tools supplied to the burglar are tools specifically for burgling (for
example, skeleton keys), some manualists would consider this to be virtually formal
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cooperation because the supplier is morally certain that the tools will be used for an
evil purpose, rather than for lawful entry to a property.83
Broadly speaking, Davis’s treatment of the morality of cooperation is a
conflation of the standard manualist teaching:84 formal cooperation is always illicit,
constituting a sin against charity and against the other virtues offended; material
cooperation is normally sinful, unless two conditions are verified simultaneously:
that the cooperative act is not in itself sinful (that is, is morally good or indifferent);
and that there is a sufficient cause (sufficiently serious reason) to permit the other’s
sin.

Like Aertnys-Damen, Davis notes that material cooperation in grave harm to

the Church or State is never lawful, since great public good always comes before
private good.

Immediate material cooperation in sin is always wrong unless it is

necessary to avoid a greater evil, as may happen (for example) under the threat of
death.
Finally, it is worth noting Davis’s comment as he attempts to describe what
might constitute a ‘sufficient cause for permitting the sin of another’:
In estimating the sufficiency of the excuse for material cooperation,
we must consider the spiritual character and needs of another, our
relations to him, what and how great is his offence against God, the
harm that may accrue to a third person, the public harm likely to
ensue, how close the cooperation, how indispensable it may be. So
many factors enter into all questions of material cooperation, that
only the most general principles can be laid down. Great varieties of
opinion, therefore, on any given case except the most obvious, are
inevitable, and there is no more difficult question than this in the
whole range of Moral Theology.85
1.2.4 Bernard Häring (1963)
Bernard Häring’s The Law of Christ marks a critical point in the history of
the moral manuals.86

On one hand the author sets out to present traditional moral

teaching in the context of Christ seen as the most fundamental ‘law’ of the
83
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Christian.87

On the other hand his work represents the fruits of a reaction to the

traditional manuals which had developed in the universities in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, and which contributed to the Second Vatican
Council’s call for renewal.

As a result, moral theology would no longer merely

repeat the old formulae but would be based on a solid foundation of Scripture and
patristics, and philosophical and empirical anthropology.88 The fact that this work
predates the Second Vatican Council - it was published in German in 1954 and in
English translation in 1963 - underscores its profound significance.
The origins of the text are indicative of its nature: the author’s professional
training was not in canon law but in philosophy and theology;89 he had studied not
at one of the traditional Roman academies but in Tübingen;90 in addition to the
traditional manuals Häring’s sources included the ‘more recent works’ of Tillmann,
Sailer and Hirschmann.91 Furthermore, where the traditional manual was intended
for the training of confessors, Häring’s work was intended for clergy and laity
alike.92 It was, in the words of the translator, ‘a new and rich approach to the whole
field of moral theology’.93
This was nowhere more apparent than in the structure of the work: where
Aertnys-Damen and Davis followed the traditional order (Human Acts - Law - Sin Virtues - Decalogue - Sacraments), The Law of Christ flowed in three broad steps:
‘The nature of the moral agent’ - ‘Fellowship with God’ - ‘Fellowship with the
created order’. The author professed this to be an arrangement ‘very largely in the
traditional manner’,94 yet in many respects it laid out a whole new orientation for
the modern moral text: a strong theological anthropology with reduced reliance on
87
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abstract notions of law; an emerging appreciation of the biblical sources of Christian
morality; characterisation of the moral life as responsive relationship with God,
other human beings, and creation; and emphasis on the ‘new’ fields of bioethics and
social justice.95

Yet it also maintained continuity with the tradition by largely

preserving the scholastic terminology and (occasional) cross-references to more
traditional manuals and to the Code of Canon Law.
This tension between the dying manual tradition and the nascent renewal in
moral theology is apparent in Häring’s treatment of cooperation. The context of the
teaching is the Christian mission to ‘bear witness in the midst of the world to the
divine love and cooperate in the establishment of a fellowship of love reaching out to
embrace all mankind’.96 Unjust cooperation is portrayed principally as a violation
of Christian love - love of self, and of one’s neighbour.97 Given the more narrative
style of the text it is understandable that the nine modes of cooperation are not
systematically listed, but they are represented in ‘Sins against Love of Neighbour’
and more clearly in the treatment of ‘Restitution for Culpable Cooperation in
Damage’.98
Häring defines only the more fundamental categories of cooperation.
Formal cooperation is ‘every cooperation in the sin of another which by its inner
purpose (finis operis) or deliberate intent (finis operantis) is characterised as
complicity in the sin of another’.99 This is always sinful, and it violates both of the
virtues noted by Alphonsus. In ‘merely material cooperation’ the cooperator’s act
is good or indifferent and contributes to the other’s sin neither in itself nor by the
cooperator’s intent, but solely through being misappropriated by the principal agent.
95
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Häring also emphasises a point which is so obvious that it could easily be
overlooked: the cooperator must foresee that his good or indifferent act may be
abused by the principal agent; without this foresight, cooperation as a real moral
question simply does not arise.
All relevant circumstances must be considered in assessing the morality of
cooperative acts. While an act in the abstract may be good or indifferent, it may not
be so in a particular concrete situation.

Häring notes that concrete circumstances

may alter the morality of a cooperative act in two ways: they may so impact on the
act that what in other circumstances may be justifiable material cooperation
becomes, in this case, formal cooperation; or the particular circumstance of lacking
a ‘morally good motivation’ (= sufficiently serious reason for acting) may lead the
cooperator to judge that his act ‘has no value at all except insofar as it contributes to
the sin of another. And this is formal cooperation’.100

Maintaining a clear

thomistic line, Häring stresses that
. . . the circumstance that one’s act is in itself meaningful and
justifiable is an important condition or presupposition for merely
material cooperation. In taking this position, we abstract entirely
from the question whether another [person] perverts it or not: we hold
that the act itself must be founded in right reason.101
Thus, in line with Alphonsus, Häring underlines a critical element in the
equation:102 the perversion of the cooperative act must be due entirely to the malice
of the principal agent, and not at all to either the intention of the cooperator or to the
moral nature of the cooperative act itself when all relevant circumstances are
considered. The presence of a sufficiently serious justifying reason is one of those
circumstances. Only under these conditions can the cooperator continue to fulfil the
Christian virtues of love of God, love of self, and love of neighbour. Yet while the
spiritual motivation which justifies material cooperation (‘prevention of spiritual
hurt to oneself and others and the possibility of effective action “in the world”.’103)
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may be a leitmotif of Häring’s ‘new’ manual, his practical principles for material
cooperation vary little from the tradition.104
Häring does not define the categories of cooperation, beyond ‘formal and
material cooperation’ in the tract on charity, and ‘positive and negative cooperation’
in the tract on restitution.105

In keeping with the tradition he emphasises the

importance of holding a proportionately serious reason, but he offers no further
clarification of this concept.

He also emphasises the importance of the good or

indifferent act, with the added insistence that a proper evaluation can be made only
in light of all relevant circumstances surrounding the concrete act. But his greatest
contribution to the question is probably in the matter of motivation: material
cooperation, as indeed the whole of the moral life, assumes a new quality and texture
when the agent is motivated not by fear of the law, but by love of God and a desire
to live the Gospel.106
1.2.5

The Manuals: A Postscript

The Law of Christ did not mark the end of the manual system of moral
theology, but it does embody some of the ‘strands of influence’ which, since the
1940s, had prepared the way for the passing of the manuals.
From within the manual system itself, even those of a definitely
casuist outlook, there was an awareness of the lack of theological
coherence. The regula agendi should more clearly follow on the
regula credendi: casuistry should never be an end in itself: it is
given its context by other theological principles. The acceptance of a
more obviously thomistic approach by many manualists logically
104
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questioned the place of conscience in the overall methodology of
moral theology and, further, the commandments-schema of the
manual was seen as a deviation from the virtue schema which was the
more logical extension of thomistic principles.107
In some respects the internal renewal of moral theology, which hurried the
demise of the manuals, was an extension into this discipline of a fundamental spirit
of renewal which had already impacted biblical studies, liturgy and systematic
theology. Another factor in the decline and disappearance of the manuals was the
emergence of other arenas in which theological discourse could be carried forward at this time, in particular, the growth of theological journals.108
But the greatest contributing factor to the end of the manual system was the
Second Vatican Council itself.109

Not only in calling for a more scriptural,

Christocentric, virtue-based moral theology,110 but more broadly in its re-visioning
of the nature and ministry of the Church, the Council opened a door through which
the manual system simply could not pass. As Raphael Gallagher has pointed out, as
long as the Church subscribed to a single ecclesiology giving rise to a single view of
ministry - and a single role for moral theology - the manual system of moral
theology was safe.111 But a renewed ecclesiology, a wider sense of ministry and a
subsequently broader vision of the role of moral theology meant that the traditional
manual could no longer cope with the task.

The genre had atrophied, so it was

simply allowed to disappear.
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On the positive side it may be claimed that however cold the manuals appear
to the modern eye, they possessed a clarity which seems to have disappeared from
much of contemporary moral theology.112 Perhaps this is a function of the evolution
which has occurred from the manuals’ magisterial, declarative tone to the broader
narrative style and indicative tone of many modern texts - a style often containing
other ecclesiological suppositions which are yet to be clearly enunciated and
explored. Bernard Häring rightly indicates that this shift away from an imperative
style of moral theology runs the risk of bringing with it a weaker sense of the
binding force of moral truth, as though a more narrative formulation of moral
teaching naturally implies a change of content.113

His suggestion of a more

‘paracletic’ style of moral teaching, originating in the gift of the Spirit who from
within our consciousness impels us to live the Truth, may be a way forward.
However, as with much in the emerging renewal of the discipline, this possibility
remains to be developed.
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1.3

Conclusions: Observations on the Principle of Cooperation
1.3.1

Introduction: A Question of Perspective

In a now-famous passage of his address at the opening of the Second Vatican
Council, Pope John XXIII drew a distinction between the substance of a doctrine on
one hand and, on the other hand, the way in which that doctrine is expressed.114 A
similar distinction emerges in the seminal writings of Bernard Lonergan on
theological method and historical consciousness.115
Underlying these distinctions is the same critical insight: a truth which is
best expressed in one manner at one point in history may be more appropriately
expressed in a different manner at another point in history.

This has been further

developed in the context of evangelisation and catechesis: the preaching of the
unchanging Word must be adapted to the requirements of different individuals,
communities and cultures, and this kind of adaptation ‘must always remain a law for
all evangelisation’.116

In catechesis these adaptations are to be determined in

relation to such factors as ‘differences in culture, age, spiritual maturity and social
and ecclesial conditions amongst those to whom it is addressed’.117
These understandings all refer to the ‘forward’ processes of doing theology
and proclaiming the Word.

In this light, the evolution of the principle of

cooperation from Sanchez to Häring may be portrayed as the result of a dual process:
on one hand, an ongoing quest for greater understanding of the central moral truth
captured by the principle, and an exploration of the structure of cooperation; and as
a corollary of this, on the other hand, application of the principle to new moral
114
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situations - without, perhaps, such precise insights into theological or catechetical
method.
The following observations are based on the reverse of these processes: from
the various received expressions of the principle of cooperation it is possible to gain
an insight into the world from which that principle emerged and in which it evolved.
A comprehensive analysis of the historical-cultural sources of the principle is
obviously beyond the scope of the present work.

Nevertheless, the following

observations should be sufficient to help address the question: how effective is the
principle of cooperation in its own world-view?

1.3.2

The World-View of Cooperation

The following are three aspects of the treatment of cooperation in the
manuals which help to reveal the world-view in which the principle evolved. They
reflect approaches taken by manualists who, like their works, were products of their
times.
1.3.2.1 Cases studied in the manuals
The kinds of cases of cooperation analysed in the manuals reveal something
of the world in which the principle evolved.

Aertnys-Damen, for example, group

cases under several headings:118
i) Servants cooperating with their masters in evil deeds, such as serving food
in violation of ecclesiastical law, assisting the master to fulfil his lustful desires, or
assisting in illicit medical practices or surgery.
ii) Innkeepers selling wine to intoxicated clients, or serving forbidden food
on days of fast or abstinence.
iii) Merchants selling goods which are destined only to evil purposes, or
providing premises for prostitution or other illicit purposes.
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iv) The writing, publication, advertising, or selling of immoral or heretical
books.
v) Cooperation with non-Catholic ministers or practices, or in building nonCatholic places of worship, or in making items for use in non-Catholic rituals.
This list may create an impression that sins of cooperation relate exclusively
either to contraventions of ecclesiastical law (fasting, abstinence, cooperation with
non-Catholics), or to sexual immorality in one kind or another. It is apparent that
many of the cases studied in the early manuals concern what a Catholic might or
might not do - that is, the moral duties incumbent upon Catholics by virtue of their
religion.

This is entirely in keeping with the sacramental destination of the moral

manuals, but it may also reflect early studies of cooperation (like that of Sanchez)
which confused cooperation with active scandal: sometimes the real moral question
concerned the scandal which might follow if a Catholic were to perform or
cooperate in certain actions.119
Apropos of which it may be significant that, in the manuals, cases of
cooperation in de restitutione deal with the virtue of justice and so are applicable to
all moral agents, while those in de caritate often seem to deal with the fundamental
demands of the Christian virtue of charity.

Of course, as noted above, matters of

justice are also matters of charity; but it is very important to identify clearly which of
these virtues is the particular focus of one’s attention, since the categories of
cooperation employed and the questions one asks will differ from one virtue to the
other.
The cases in the manuals also provide some insight into the world in which
the principle evolved.

Some of the cases are fairly universal and would probably

apply at any point in history, referring to the cooperator as a servant or employee:
selling alcohol to one who is already inebriated, or providing premises for
prostitution, or assisting one’s employer to commit immoral acts.

Others refer

specifically to the agent’s Catholic duties at that time (the laws of fast and
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abstinence,

assistance at non-Catholic religious services), some of which were

substantially redefined after Vatican II.
The first class of cases reflect a world marked by two factors: a certain
transparency in affairs (the servant knows who his employer is, and knows the
employer’s evil intention), and relationships of financial and social dependence (the
threat of loss of employment would constitute a sufficiently serious reason in some
cases, because the servant might thereby lose also his home and livelihood).

The

second class of cases reflects a perspective in which the Catholic faith was the only
valid religion, and all reasonable persons should accept and observe the wisdom of
ecclesiastical laws, and no-one should willingly help to promote or assist nonCatholic religions in any way.

It is also interesting that in extreme cases (such as

that dealt with in the 1679 condemnation), only the threat of death would justify a
servant’s cooperation in evil.

This appears to demand not only a finely honed

ability to weigh greater and lesser values, but also highly developed virtues of justice
and courage.
Once again the later manual of Häring takes a slightly different line. While
he also demands great courage and even heroism in some cases,120 he reflects a
more contemporary view of the world in which other religions are treated with more
respect: in some circumstances Catholics may even make financial contributions to
the construction of Protestant churches!121
1.3.2.2 Styles of moral dialogue
The principle of cooperation evolved within the tradition of the moral
manuals. In their destination for the use of confessors, the manuals point to a world
in which the Sacrament of Confession is both valued and frequently accessed by the
faithful, and in which the confessor has a duty to shed light on complex moral
situations from his educated vantage point. In this perspective the confessor seems
120
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to act more as judge than as physician.

And in the magisterial tone they often

adopted, the manuals reflect a world in which certainty in moral matters is not only
possible, but to be expected; nevertheless, some also recognise that the question of
cooperation in evil is so complex that ‘only the most general principles can be laid
down’.122
On one hand the traditional treatment of cooperation indicates a prevailing
paradigm of law: what man is expected to do in his moral life can be expressed in
terms of laws known by revelation of the Divine Will directly, and in natural law.
However, there is often no great distinction drawn between duties which flow from
natural law and those which flow from ecclesiastical law. On the other hand, after
Alphonsus the treatment of cooperation was also seen in light of the virtue of
charity, perhaps indicating a greater appreciation of the virtues in moral life. This
is particularly well-developed in Häring’s The Law of Christ, in which the principal
task of the Christian is to ‘bear witness in the midst of the world to the divine love
and cooperate in the establishment of a fellowship of love reaching out to embrace
all mankind’.123
1.3.2.3 Probabilism and proportionality
It is evident from the older texts that not all of the manualists agreed on the
solution of particular cases of cooperation: it was not unusual for an author to cite a
dozen or more sources holding differing opinions of greater or lesser probability.124
Today this would be taken to indicate a healthy variety within the moral community
where ongoing dialogue, analysis and discussion are valued avenues to greater
clarity and moral certainty. But at a deeper level this reliance on ‘probable’, ‘more
probable’ and ‘most probable’ opinions portrays a world in which one’s principal
task is to obey the law, at least to the extent that one knows one’s duties under the
law.

Furthermore, the authority of the magisterium is also considerable: it has

already been suggested that general response to the 1679 condemnation was
overwhelmingly passive, with moralists limiting their comments to merely justifying
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Davis, vol. I, 342.
Häring 1963, vol. II, 494.
124
See for example Alphonsus, de caritate 61.
123
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that condemnation on the basis of one or other interpretation of intrinsically evil
acts.125
Finally, and curiously, the manuals seem to rely on some form of
proportionality in resolving cases of cooperation.

Questions of proximity and

necessity, and of sufficiently serious reason, are essential to the resolution of most
cases, but these can normally be assessed only in the context of other variable
factors.

In many manuals this seems to entail weighing benefits gained against

harm done (or harms avoided against harms permitted).

This highlights another

surprising lacuna: despite Alphonsus’s ground-breaking work in de caritate, it is
generally the effects of actions, and not their objective natures, which play a
determining role in many manuals. This indicates a certain lack of a metaphysical
base which will be discussed further in the next chapter.

In the later manuals the

situation was only notionally better: Davis provides a substantial treatment of the
structure of the human act,126 as does Häring in the context of the human agent as
moral subject,127 but neither seems to rely greatly on this metaphysical base in
resolving cases of cooperation.

1.3.3

Conclusions

In the evolution of the principle of cooperation from the treatment of Sanchez
to that of Häring, one observes a late movement towards greater openness to the
complexities of life in a changing world and yet, in the midst of this complexity, a
persisting desire for absolute certainty in moral judgments. One finds this tension
clearly marked in The Law of Christ: Häring makes a conscious effort to engage the
concrete realities of life in the modern world - a vast enterprise fraught with
uncertainties - yet still manages to speak magisterially in resolving cases as far as
his casuistry allows. His analysis is detailed and searching, but is balanced by his

125

See Roy, ‘La coopération’, 415.
Davis, vol. I, 11-63.
127
Häring 1963, vol. I, 189-195.
126
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note that only general principles can be laid down, because very different principles
may need to be applied in individual cases.128
In the context of this movement, the principle of cooperation as it appears in
the earlier manuals seems to reflect a world of established and fixed social, political
and ecclesial structures in which each moral agent apparently knows with a degree
of certainty the relevant circumstances of their situation: who they work for, what
purpose their work serves, where their moral responsibilities lie.

Much of their

moral knowledge is nourished by the teachings of a Church which appears
supremely sure of its moral ground, and whose faith the moral agents clearly either
do or do not share. The employee-employer relationship is equally unequivocal: the
employer holds the upper hand, and the employee is often pictured as having few
alternatives to obedience.

He also deals directly and individually with the

employer: there is no concept of organised labour, unionism or arbitration. In this
light the cooperator’s question seems to be: ‘what does the law allow me to do?’
Coming virtually at the other end of the manual tradition The Law of Christ
shares many of the same characteristics, and yet approaches the question of
cooperation more from a perspective of virtue.

In their mission of sanctifying the

world, Christians must never descend to the level of the world or be animated by its
spirit, but must ‘painfully permit that our good works now and again be perverted to
evil ends’.129 This delicate balance requires Christians to be as innocent as doves,
yet as wise as serpents (Mt 10:16).130 The cooperator’s question here seems to be:
‘how may I engage the world without compromising my Christian integrity?’
This evolution in the manuals was neither smooth nor gradual: in most
respects the genre singularly failed to keep pace with the great changes in worldview which were occurring beyond the Church in the century prior to Vatican II.
This became a basis for considerable criticism of the genre, and certainly contributed
to its demise.
128

Häring 1963, vol. II, 500-501: ‘Our first task is to illustrate the universal principles which are
always valid. The conclusions we arrive at in individual instances, however, may in their concrete
application under different sets of circumstances involve new principles.’
129
Häring 1963, vol. II, 500.
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And despite some undoubted achievements in describing various aspects of
cooperation in evil, the manuals never managed to solve the subjective pole of the
problem: in assessing the circumstances which contribute to his ‘sufficiently serious
reason’ for cooperating, how can a cooperator be sure that his interpretation of
circumstances is adequate? Can a cooperator always be absolutely clear about what
he intends and what he excludes from his intention? Can he always distinguish
between an ‘intrinsically evil act’ and a ‘virtually intrinsically evil act’?
Even within its own world-view, as the manuals themselves sometimes
indicate, the traditional principle of cooperation does not always seem to have
worked well. Even if the cooperator had a clear picture of the extent of his moral
responsibilities and was able to draw the boundary first identified by Alphonsus, still
the application of the principle was fraught with difficulty and uncertainty.

But

then, with the accumulated wisdom of the Church behind him, the cooperator needed
only to ask what the moral law allowed him to do, and so he was able to arrive at
resolutions which, if not absolutely certain, were at least probable - and this was
sufficient.

The role of the pastor was limited to the examination of cases in the

confessional, and there the traditional principle of cooperation provided at least a
stable frame of reference.
That the principle continues to play a significant role in Catholic moral
theology following the demise of the manuals is evident from many contemporary
sources: the texts which began to ‘replace’ the manuals, the teaching of the Roman
magisterium and of episcopal conferences, and the moral dialogue which flourishes
ever more abundantly in theological journals.

Some of these will be studied in

Chapters Three and Four of the present work.

Prior to this, however, it will be

helpful to clarify the ‘inner structure’ of cooperation in Chapter Two, in order to
arrive at a better understanding of two concepts which are of great importance to the
principle - ‘intrinsically evil acts’ and ‘sufficiently serious reason’.

130

Häring 1963, vol. II, 500.
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Chapter Two
THE STRUCTURE OF LEGITIMATE COOPERATION

2.0

Introduction
The early evolution of the principle of legitimate cooperation can be viewed

as the simultaneous development of two perspectives on the problem of participation
in evil: on one hand, clarification of fundamental categories needed to define and
apply the principle of legitimate cooperation and, on the other hand, deepening
appreciation of the wider moral significance of cooperation in evil.
The latter perspective embraces the broad picture, the overall meaning of
legitimate participation in evil in the context of Christian life in the world.

The

Christians’ need to be ‘wise as serpents and innocent as doves’ has its basic
significance here, where deeper questions arise concerning the broad implications of
engagement in a world in which evil is often done, a world which often seems
hostile to Christian values.

The emergence and evolution of the principle of

cooperation is one response to this challenge.
But progress on this level requires a clear view of the structure of
cooperation in evil.

Here the tangled threads of physical and moral responsibility

must be identified, sorted and defined in relation to one another in order to ground
general rules in keeping with the fundamental norms of morality.

Sanchez,

Alphonsus and the manuals advanced the evolution of the principle at this level
because the practical questions they addressed demanded structural clarity.
In other words, the second perspective addresses questions of meaning which
take the form: ‘what are the moral implications of living in a world in which evil is
frequently done?’ These arise through more practical questions of the form, ‘am I
justified in cooperating in evil in this particular case?’

But there are even more

fundamental or meta-ethical questions of structure, such as, ‘what makes a good act
55

to be good, or an evil act evil?’

The practical cases of cooperation which were

studied in the manuals, then, stand methodologically midway between the issues of
structure on which they depend, and the issues of meaning to which they lead. As is
so often the case in moral matters, the devil is in the detail.
Aertnys-Damen identify three difficulties on the structural level, and these
form a focus of the present Chapter:
• identifying which acts are morally good or indifferent and which are truly evil;
• identifying which cooperative acts more proximately or remotely approach the
evil act of the principal agent; and
• identifying when a reason is just and proportionately serious enough to render
licit a materially cooperative act.1
The second part of this work will reflect on the meaning of cooperation in evil in the
modern world, and on the parameters of the traditional principle.

To lay the

groundwork for that perspective, the present chapter seeks to clarify key elements of
cooperation at the structural level. The first step is to frame cooperation in terms of
of Thomas’ view of the structure of human acts (2.1).2 This will permit exploration
of various categories of cooperation which have emerged in the evolution of the
principle (2.2), and investigation of the two central terms of that evolution, namely
‘intrinsically evil acts’ and ‘sufficiently serious reason’ (2.3).3

These represent

some of the most controverted issues in the recent history of moral theology,4 but a

1

Aertnys-Damen, de caritate 402.
It should be noted that, for Thomas, questions of structure are necessarily connected with the
perspective of the moral agent, and so with questions of meaning. This is implicit in Thomas’
understanding of the terms ‘moral’ and ‘good’ applied to human acts: an act within a person’s
voluntary dominion is ‘moral’, and ‘good’ if it accords with authentic human nature. See below,
2.1.2, at point 2.
3
This study will refer to ‘sufficiently serious reason’ rather than to ‘proportionate reason’, in
order to distinguish this concept from the question of ‘proportionalism’. See below, 2.3.3.
4
Two of the better known studies are John Finnis, Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and
Truth. (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1991); and Richard A McCormick SJ
and Paul Ramsey, eds. Doing Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict Situations. (Chicago:
Loyola University Press, 1978). Some of the primary literature is brought together in Charles E
Curran and Richard A McCormick SJ, eds. Readings in Moral Theology 1: Moral Norms and
Catholic Tradition. (New York: Paulist, 1979). An assessment of Richard McCormick’s own
position may be found in Peter J Black CSsR, The Moral Relevance of the Object of the Human Act in
the Developing Thought of Richard A. McCormick 1965-1984: Fundamental Moral Theology
through Critical Dialogue. Doctoral Dissertation. (Rome: Academia Alfonsiana, 1994).
2

56

more comprehensive study of these terms lies beyond the scope of the present work.
2.1

The Structure of the Moral Act
2.1.1

Introduction

Case studies in the manuals indicate that cooperation in evil can occur in
many ways, and yet the basic ‘shape’ of legitimate cooperation remains fairly
constant: a principal agent abuses the act of a cooperator and, independently of the
cooperator’s will, turns that act to an evil purpose. Enquiries at the structural level
concern the conditions under which a cooperator who foresees this abuse may still
commission his act without offending the virtues of charity or justice.
Sanchez identified two of these conditions: the cooperator’s act must itself
be either good or morally indifferent; and the cooperator must hold a sufficiently
serious reason for acting.

Alphonsus added several important refinements:

legitimate cooperation occurs only on the level of physical causality where there is
no question of scandal or induction; therefore the cooperator’s act can be kept
distinct from the principal agent’s act and must be justified in itself in the same way
as any other moral act. Furthermore, the cooperator must also hold a reason which
justifies his act in light of the principal agent’s sin and the harm which will be done
thereby - in its most basic form, harm to the principal agent’s own spiritual welfare.
Alphonsus did not base his treatment of cooperation on the psychological
structure of the human act as it appears in the writings of Thomas - Roy indicates
that Alphonsus’s treatment of cooperation was fully developed well before he
included a substantial metaphysics of human acts in his Theologia moralis.5

But

Thomas’ analysis of human action was adopted widely in the manuals, and indeed in
the Church in general, so it is reasonable to employ that analysis to clarify the ‘inner
structure’ of cooperation.

5

See Roy, ‘La Coopération’, 434-435.
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One of the key elements in Thomas’ analysis of human acts is ‘intention’,6
and one of the principal reasons that different manuals employ different categories of
cooperation is that they hold different positions on two key questions: what a
cooperator intends, and how he intends it.
For example, in defining formal cooperation Aertnys-Damen teach that what
a cooperator intends is the formal sin of the principal agent; and the manner of
intending may be two-fold: either ex fine operantis (by the deliberate willing of the
cooperator) or ex fine operis (by the ‘inner purposiveness’ of the action performed).7
But when he defines formal cooperation, Davis teaches that what is intended is the
sinful act of the principal agent, and the manner of intending is by participation in
the external sinful act while intending the sinfulness of it.8 As will be noted below,
Davis therefore employs the category ‘immediate material cooperation’ to describe
what Aertnys-Damen call simply ‘formal cooperation ex fine operis’.
It will be recalled that Alphonsus defines formal cooperation in terms of
cooperation in the other’s evil will (which is why formal sin occurs), and material
cooperation in terms of cooperation in the other’s evil action (which, in the simple
case, implies only material sin).9

While this distinction was not uniformly

maintained in the manuals, it is obvious that what one intends and how one intends it
are critical structural issues. The question of what an agent intends is the question
of ‘moral object’, for which an answer will be sought in the next section.

The

question of how an agent intends a moral object will be discussed in the subsequent
section.10
6

ST I-II 12.
Aertnys-Damen, de caritate 398. On describing the finis operis as ‘inner purposiveness’, see
Häring 1963, vol. II, 496. By ‘inner purposiveness’ is meant the end or object of the action
performed by the agent, where this end or object is distinguishable from the agent’s own further
object or end. This ‘inner purposiveness’ is sometimes referred to as the act’s own ‘intentionality’,
precisely to distinguish this from the further intention of the agent. It is important to note that this use
of ‘intentionality’ does not imply that an action can exist apart from the agent who performs it: it is
rather a term employed by some moralists to convey the idea that the finis operis of the action
performed sometimes determines the morality of the action itself, regardless of whatever further
intentions the agent may have. See below, 2.1.2, point 10 (a), and 2.1.3.
8
Davis, vol. I, 341.
9
See 1.1.4 above.
10
These two issues lie at the heart of many contemporary debates in moral theology. See for
example: Gerard N Casey, ‘A Problem of Unity in St Thomas’s Account of Human Action.’ The
New Scholasticism LXI(1987) 146-161; John Finnis, ‘Object and Intention in Moral Judgments
7
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2.1.2

Moral Objects

Turning to Thomas raises two difficulties.

First, the sheer size of the

thomistic corpus makes it a daunting task to attempt a comprehensive analysis of his
thought on any one subject. Such an analysis is obviously beyond the scope of the
present work, which will confine itself to the substantial study found in the Prima
secundae of the Summa theologiae.
Second, at different times Thomas studies the human act from different points
of view and, naturally, what he sees depends on the point of view he is taking at the
time. Further, he often uses one term to describe distinctly different aspects of what
he sees, which can lead to further confusion. For example, ‘finis’ is the ‘objectum’
of the will (ST I-II 1, 3; 19, 2 ad 1); in 19, 2 moral good and evil derive from
‘objectum’; in 1, 3 the moral species of acts derive from ‘finis’; and in 18, 6 where
the human act is considered in its interior and exterior dimensions, the form of an act
is provided by the ‘finis’ of the internal act while the matter is provided by the
‘objectum’ of the external act.11 To minimise confusion, this analysis will attempt to
clarify at every point the precise concept in question, as far as this is possible.
This difficulty raises a critical point. It has been argued that at least some of
the debates in modern moral theology arise because neo-thomist commentators did
not view matters from the same perspective as Thomas himself: where Thomas
examines the human act from the point of view of the acting person, others took the
perspective of the act itself.12 One result is that Thomas and the manualist may use

According to Aquinas.’ The Thomist 55(1991) 1-27; Bernard Hoose, ‘Circumstances, Intentions
and Intrinsically Evil Acts’ in Joe Selling and Jan Jans, eds. The Splendor of Accuracy: An
Examination of the Assertions made in Veritatis splendor. (Kampen, Netherlands: Kok-Pharos, 1994)
136-152; Richard A McCormick SJ, ‘Some Early Reactions to Veritatis splendor.’ Theological
Studies 55(1994) 481-506; Martin Rhonheimer, ‘Intrinsically Evil Acts and the Moral Viewpoint:
Clarifying a Central Teaching of Veritatis splendor.’ The Thomist 58(1994) 1-39; and Martin
Rhonheimer, ‘Intentional Actions and the Meaning of Object: A Reply to Richard McCormick.’ The
Thomist 59(1995) 279-311. This last article in particular describes well the two meanings of
‘intention’ in this debate. On McCormick’s understanding of moral object, see Black, The Moral
Relevance.
11
Thomas uses the one ‘matter-form’ distinction in a variety of ways to illustrate various different
aspects of the human act, and this too can cause confusion. John Finnis makes a similar point on
Thomas’ sometimes confusing use of language in ‘Object and Intention’, at 1.
12
On this question see for example Rhonheimer’s comment on Veritatis splendor 78 in
‘Intrinsically Evil Acts’, at 3.
John A Gallagher’s Time Past, Time Future is an extended
commentary on the recovery of Thomas from the distortions of neo-thomism.
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the same terms to denote what are in fact quite distinct moral realities. It is lack of
clarity in moral discourse which necessitates the following definition of terms.
The problem of defining moral objects of human acts amounts to a problem
of providing an adequate description of those acts.13

It is often very difficult to

determine which elements are necessary to provide an adequate description of the
basic moral species of the act (as good or evil in species, which is the question of
‘moral object’), and which elements provide an adequate description of the total
moral quality of the act in its species (as possessing more or less goodness or evil).
So: what constitutes an adequate description of the moral object of an act?
More specifically:
•

what constitutes the moral object which determines the moral species of a
human act?

•

in shaping the moral object of an act, how significant are the agent’s own
intentions?

•

and

how do circumstances touch upon and influence the moral species of an act?
The following points, drawn from the teaching of Thomas Aquinas,

summarise the structure and morality of human acts:
1. A human act is deemed ‘human’ because it proceeds from reason (ratio):
‘intellect’ (intellectum) which apprehends the end (finis) and presents it to the
will as a good (bonum), and ‘will’ (voluntas), the rational appetite which inclines
to that end considered as bonum.14
2. A human act is in the genus ‘moral’ insofar it flows from the action of the will it is a voluntary act.15 A human act is in the species ‘good’, ‘evil’ or ‘indifferent’
13

On the question of ‘adequate description’, see Michael K Duffey, ‘The Moral-NonMoral
Distinction in Catholic Ethics: The Sterilization of Moral Language.’ The Thomist 49(1985) 343-366.
At 357-366 the author draws on an account of morality he finds in Julius Kovesi’s Moral Notions.
(New York: Humanities Press, 1967). See also 2.3.2 below.
14
ST I-II 13, 1: ‘Manifestum est autem quod ratio quodammodo voluntatem praecedit et ordinat
actum ejus, inquantum scilicet voluntas in suum objectum tendit secundum ordinem rationis, eo quod
vis apprehensiva appetitivae suum objectum reppraesentat.’ And I-II 18, 5: ‘Dicuntur autem aliqui
actus humani vel morales secundum quod sunt a ratione.’
15
ST I-II 1, 1. See Brian Thomas Mullady OP, The Meaning of the Term ‘Moral’ in St Thomas
Aquinas. Studi Tomistici 27. (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1986) 57: ‘It is by relation to the
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insofar as it does or does not accord with right reason (ratio recta).16 A human
act must be in conformity with right reason in order to be judged morally
‘good’.17 This judgment is based on what is essential to the agent, that is, what
is proper to man considered precisely as ‘man’. 18 (It is important to note that, in
concrete cases, Thomas holds no human acts to be morally indifferent.)
3. Within this structure an initial distinction can be made between the order of
intention and the order of execution. In the order of intention, intellect and will
are concerned with settling on both the end which is desired (finis), and that
which is for the end and needed to obtain the end (id quod est ad finem);19 in the
order of execution, intellect and will are concerned with commanding the exterior
powers to actually obtain the end.
4. For the purposes of this study we may therefore distinguish three acts of will: in
the order of intention
•

the elicited act of will intentio whose object is finis;20 and

•

the elicited act of will electio whose object is id quod est ad finem;21

and in the order of execution
•

the imperated acts moving external powers to obtain the end (usus).22

power of the will that human acts have the term ‘moral’ applied to them. Human acts are placed in
the genus of morals by the fact that they are in the power of the will. For St Thomas, the term human
and the term moral mean the same thing, with reference to the agency of the human will. On the
other hand, to say a human act is good or evil is decided by reference to the intellect.
‘Thus good and evil in human acts are considered insofar as the act is in accord
with reason informed by the divine law, either naturally, by instruction, or by
infusion.’’ [De Malo 2, 4.]
16
ST I-II 18, 5 ad 2: ‘Dicitur enim malus actus secundum suam speciem, non ex eo quod nullum
habeat objectum, sed quia habet objectum non conveniens rationi, sicut tollere aliena.’ Emphasis
added. See also ST I-II 18, 9: ‘si [actus] non sit ad debitum finem ordinatus, ex hoc ipso repugnat
rationi et habet rationem mali; si vero ordinetur ad debitum finem, convenit cum ordine rationis,
unde habet rationem boni.’
17
See Louis Janssens, ‘St Thomas and the Question of Proportionality.’ Louvain Studies IX(1982)
26-46, at 30. The following chapter will note that Germain Grisez holds ‘good’ to refer not merely to
the essence or nature of man as such, but also to the future possibilities of human fulfillment. On this
he is able to ground the value theory which distinguishes his work. On the question of ‘man as man’,
see below, 5.1.2.
18
ST I-II 18, 9.
19
See for example ST I-II 1, 1 ad 2; 9, 1; 13, 5.
20
ST I-II 12.
21
ST I-II 13.
22
ST I-II 16.

61

The object of each discrete act provides the form of that act.23

Insofar as the

object of each act is apprehended as an end or good which is ‘fitting’ according
to reason, that end or object sets the will in motion;24 and insofar as the object
actually does accord with right reason (and so is actually ‘good’), that end or
object establishes the act of will as good.
5. Considering the objects of intentio and electio as the ends of those acts: it is
evident that the end of electio (id quod est ad finem) is willed only on account of
the end of intentio (finis). It is in this sense that the human act as a whole can be
considered to embrace more than one end: a remote end finis which is what is
willed as end of the entire act, and a proximate end id quod est ad finem which is
what is willed in order to attain the finis.25 Furthermore, insofar as id quod est ad
finem is willed only on account of finis, intending the means (proximate end)
implies intending the end (remote end).26 This establishes the possibility of two
kinds of intending in human acts: one directed to the remote end, and the other
directed to the proximate end.
•

It is also possible that several proximate ends may need to be willed in order
to conduct the agent to the one remote end finis, in a chain or ‘nested set’ of
means-and-ends.27 If the one human act may be considered as a composite
of intermediate acts in this way, it becomes clear that what is the remote end
finis of one act may be considered a means or proximate end id quod est ad
finem of the next act, and so on, until the ultimate finis (the last remote end!)
is attained.28 At this point the ‘motion’ of intellect and will reaches that state
of fruitio or quies which marks the satisfaction of the appetite, and so the act
(‘motion’) ceases.29

6. If intentio and electio are considered as discrete acts of will, each may be
considered to have its own distinct object.30

The goodness of these objects is

23

ST I-II 9, 1.
ST I-II 9, 2.
25
ST I-II 12, 2.
26
ST I-II 8, 3 ad 2; 12, 4.
27
ST I-II 13, 3. On the concept of ‘nested sets’, see Finnis, ‘Object and Intention’, at 13.
28
ST I-II 13, 3. But note that the ‘ultimus finis’ cannot strictly be an object of ‘electio’.
29
ST I-II 11; See also I-II 31-34.
30
ST I-II 12, 4 Resp. and ad 2.
24
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judged in relation to right reason, per comparationem ad rationem:31 finis is
judged insofar as it is good and fitting in itself, and id quod est ad finem is judged
insofar as it is good and fitting (‘proportioned’) to that finis.32

But from the

integrated viewpoint in which finis and id quod est ad finem are taken together
(since id quod est ad finem is willed only for the sake of finis),33 then in a
‘nested set’ of means-ends finis and id quod est ad finem can be viewed as the
single object of a single act,34 the goodness of which is determined by finis since
this serves as ‘form’ of the total act.35
7. Thomas teaches that, because it provides the form of the act, it is the end of the
act which provides its moral species: ‘finis enim dat speciem in moralibus’.36 If
intentio and electio are considered as two discrete acts of will, then consideration
of the moral species must include the object or end of each act - and these may
be of different species.37
•

If the end of electio (proximate end, id quod est ad finem) is per se ordered to
the end of intentio (remote end, finis) then the human act as a whole can
rightly be considered a single moral act with a single object, since both acts
are clearly ordered to the same end.

Thus, in an ideal case, almsgiving is

ordered to the relief of poverty as a remote end: the object of electio (giving
money to the poor) is per se ordered to the object of intentio (the relief of
31

ST I-II 18, 5. This is the meaning of ‘intrinsic morality’: see Fabbro, Cooperation, 37.
ST I-II 8, 2 ad 2; 3. Thomas seems to suggest that, in relation to the comparative goodness of
finis and id quod est ad finem, sometimes a subordinate objective (means) may not be proportioned to
the intended end, in which case the act of willing the subordinate objective (electio) is less good than
the act of intending the remote end (intentio): ‘Sed voluntas potest velle aliquod objectum non
proportionatum fini intento; et sic voluntas, quae fertur in illud objectum absolute consideratum, non
est tantum bona quantum est intentio.’ (ST I-II 19, 8). See also II-II 64, 7: ‘Potest tamen aliquis
actus ex bona intentione, proveniens, illicitus reddi, si non sit proportionatus fini.’
33
ST I-II 8, 3. Wherefore Mullady says that the elicited acts of will are moral per se, while the
imperated acts of will are moral per accidens. See Mullady, The Meaning of the Term Moral, 79.
34
ST I-II 12, 4 ad 2; ad 3 explains the distinction between intentio and electio: ‘Sic igitur
inquantum motus voluntatis fertur in id quod est ad finem, prout ordinatur ad finem, est electio;
motus autem voluntatis qui fertur in finem, secundum quod acquiritur per ea quae sunt ad finem,
vocatur intentio.’
35
ST I-II 18, 7.
36
ST II-II 43, 3; see also I-II 1, 3; 18, 4. Mullady, The Meaning of the Term Moral, 103: ‘The
application of ‘finis enim dat speciem in moralibus’ is a cornerstone of the moral doctrine of St
Thomas. This end refers to the intended end. It can also refer to the proximate end of the exterior
act. In both cases, it is always judged as good or evil in relation to reason as final cause.’ On this
and the subsequent point - including the example here of ‘almsgiving’ - see William E May, An
Introduction to Moral Theology. (Huntington, Indiana: Our Sunday Visitor, 1991) 132-136.
37
ST I-II 1, 3 ad 3.
32
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poverty); the proximate end id quod est ad finem (giving money to the poor)
is ordered to the remote end finis (relief of poverty), so this human act has a
single object.
•

But if the end of electio (proximate end, id quod est ad finem) is only per
accidens ordered to the end of intentio (remote end, finis) - that is, there is
no necessary or essential ordering between the two - then the single human
act, considered as a composite of intentio and electio, may be considered to
embrace two moral species. Thus in another case, the object of an apparent
act of almsgiving (giving money to the poor) is not essentially ordered to the
object of an agent who intends vainglory, yet it can be made to serve that end.
Here the proximate end id quod est ad finem (giving money to the poor) is
ordered only per accidens to the remote end finis (vainglory) - it serves the
end of ‘vainglory’ not of itself but only by the agent’s intending - so while
this human act may be considered single in number, it has two distinct
species because it engages two distinct objects.38

8. In all cases, the principle bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu
applies.39
•

Where the proximate end is ordered per se to the remote end (that is, where
the act effectively has a single object), then the moral species of that act will
flow from the integrity of that object: if the object is good with reference to
reason, the act may be good in species; where the object is evil, the act will
be evil in species.40

Thus, the former case above may be adequately

described as ‘almsgiving’.41
38

ST I-II 18, 7.
See ST I-II 18, 4 ad 3; and II-II 110, 3: ‘Bonum enim est ex integra causa, malum vero est ex
singularibus defectibus.’ Casey, ‘A Problem of Unity’, at 150: ‘The point of this evident principle is
that if an action is to be adjudged morally good, it must be good in all respects. In the context of St
Thomas’ thought, this amounts to saying that an action is good only if it be both good in kind and
done for a good end. If an act fails to be good in either one of these respects, then it fails to be good
as a whole. This being the case, one must realise that neither the goodness of the end nor the
goodness of the moral object alone is sufficient to render an act completely good.’
And Mullady,
The Meaning of the Term Moral, 94: ‘However, because evil derives from a single defect, it cannot
change the disorder of the act in relation to reason on a more common level, but rather places one
moral act in two species of good and evil.’
40
ST I-II 18, 5.
41
Black, The Moral Relevance, 83: ‘We can conclude therefore that the object of the external act
may be subsumed under the one generic meaning with the end of the will if that act is per se ordered
to the end. The object of the external act may not be subsumed under the one generic meaning with
39
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•

But by the same token, where the proximate end is ordered only per accidens
to the remote end (that is, where there are two objects which may be of
different species), then the moral species of the entire act will flow from the
diversity of those objects: if all objects are good, the entire act may be good
in species; but if even one object is evil, the entire act is vitiated.

In the

latter case above it is clear that the remote end intended by the agent
(vainglory) is evil, so regardless of the proximate end it would not be
accurate to describe the entire act as ‘almsgiving’ - it is more adequately
described as ‘vainglory’, which is the form given it by the agent’s intended
end or object.42
•

Note that the latter case is one in which a ‘nested set’ of means and ends
serves a single finis to which the means are not ordered per se or necessarily.
If one considers the means (giving money to the poor) as a discrete act, it
evidently has its own intentio and electio which the agent must will in order
to attain his further end of vainglory. It can be said, then, that the agent truly
intends to give money to the poor, which is a good thing to do. But this does
not provide an adequate description of the total act because the agent has an
additional intention (a more remote end) which vitiates the act considered in
its wider or more complete dimensions. Because the additional remote end
is vainglory, the entire act is rendered evil ex quocumque defectu.

•

By the same token, even if an agent intends a good remote end, his total act
may be vitiated by a disproportioned means:43 for example, if the agent
intends ‘almsgiving to relieve poverty’ as his finis, but chooses ‘theft’ as an
id quod est ad finem, then his entire act is evil in species ex quocumque
defectu - the defect resides in the fact that the means are not proportioned to
the end.

the end of the will if the object of the external act is only per accidens ordered to the end of the will.
If the object of the external act is only per accidens ordered to the end of the will then this object must
be given its own proper moral meaning.’ See ST I-II 18, 7.
42
Thus also Thomas (ST I-II 18, 6) holds, with Aristotle, that ‘he who steals in order to commit
adultery is directly more adulterer than thief.’
43
ST II-II, 64, 7: ‘Potest tamen aliquis actus ex bona intentione, proveniens, illicitua reddi, si
non sit proportionatus fini.’
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From this analysis it seems clear that an adequate description of the moral
object of an act must embrace what the act is actually about, what it actually means,
and not just what physically happens.

That is, the moral object of an act can be

adequately described only by taking into account the moral species of both its
proximate and remote ends in the context of all of the circumstances which are
morally relevant to the act considered in its entirety.44
9. So for Thomas, the ‘finis’ which determines the moral species of a human act is
not simply the object of intentio, nor merely the material object or physical
matter of the act - the materia ex qua.45 Rather:
•

the finis which gives moral species is the moral object of the act - the object
of the act considered as proceeding from the will according to the order of
reason;

•

the moral object in this sense is that moral matter which the act aims to attain
or with which the act deals - the materia circa quam,46 the ‘intelligible
subject matter upon which the will’s act of choice bears’,47 which is the
‘intentional object’;

not the physical form, but the ‘form conceived by

reason’.48
•

the moral species of an act can be known only when the moral object (and so
the act itself) is adequately described - that is, when it is known for what it
actually is in genere moris, as ‘the doing of what was chosen, ie as the
carrying out of the proposal shaped by intelligence and adopted by choice ie considered under the description which it had in the practical reasoning
which made it seem the thing to be doing’;49

•

according to this structure, the goodness or evil of a human act depends on
whether the materia circa quam itself accords with the order of reason, per

44

That the object of an act must embrace what the act really means - which includes the agent’s
intention as well as the act’s own intentionality or ‘inner purposiveness’ - is emphasised by Finnis in
‘Object and Intention’, 22-23; and by Rhonheimer in ‘Intentional Actions’, 296.
45
ST I-II 18, 2 ad 2.
46
ST I-II 18, 2 ad 2.
47
May, An Introduction to Moral Theology, 134.
48
ST I-II 18, 10. See also Rhonheimer, ‘Intrinsically Evil Acts’, 28; and 2.3.2 below.
49
Finnis, ‘Object and Intention’, 24.
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comparationem ad rationem - whether or not the moral object befits the
nature of the agent:50
◊

where the object of electio is ordered per se to the object of intentio, the
act can be seen to have one moral object which is provided by the object
of intentio, finis; and where this finis is according to the order of reason,
the act considered thus far has a single moral species, ‘good’;

◊

where the object of electio is not ordered per se to the object of intentio,
but rather is made to serve this end only by the agent’s intention, the one
act can be considered as having two objects and two moral species; and
where either the object of electio or the object of intentio does not accord
with the order of reason, the act considered as a whole is ‘evil’ ex
quocumque defectu;

•

in either case, considering the human act as a whole, the moral object is that
which places the total act in its moral species as good, evil or indifferent; as
such the moral object is circumscribed by the objects of intentio and electio,
considering these in the context of all morally specifying circumstances, and
this provides an adequate description of the act in its basic moral species.51

10. The total moral quality of an act can be known only when the moral act as a
whole is adequately described - that is, when all morally relevant factors are
considered - which requires account to be taken of all of the traditional ‘sources
of morality’: the object, the end/intention, and the circumstances.
•

Thus far only the first of these has been considered, the object of an act, and
this may be described from varying points of view:

50

That is, whether the object is capable of being ordered to God and to the good of the person. See
ST I-II 1, 8; and Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Veritatis splendor. ‘On Certain Fundamental
Questions of the Church’s Moral Teaching.’ (6 August 1993). AAS 85(1993) 1133-1228, n.72.
51
Note that the use here of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ is truly moral (as flowing from willed acts), but as
yet these do not refer to the culpability of the agent.
A distinction between ‘malum’, ‘peccatum’ and ‘culpa’ occurs in Thomas in ST I-II 21, 1 and 2:
‘Dicendum quod malum in plus est quam peccatum, sicut et bonum in plus est quam rectum . . . ’ (21,
1); ‘Dicendum quod sicut malum est in plus quam peccatum, ita peccatum est in plus quam culpa.
Ex hoc enim dicitur actus culpabilis vel laudabilis, quod imputatur agenti;’ (21, 2). Where malum
refers to evil simply, peccatum refers to an action which is morally evil insofar as it lacks due order
(ratio recta); but this moral evil is not yet that morally culpable fault (culpa) to which the English
word ‘sin’ normally refers.
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a) considering the act as an integral whole, ‘object’ is the moral object, that
moral matter which the act as a whole aims to attain or with which it deals.
When this is adequately defined, the object places the act in its fundamental
moral species: it is assessed in the light of all those circumstances which
affect the act’s fundamental species (what kind of act it is, and whether it is
good, evil or indifferent in itself), and is that moral matter which is the end of
intentio, finis, for which the end of electio, id quod est ad finem is also willed.
The moral object is the materia circa quam (in its moral meaning) which
provides the moral meaning of the act considered in itself, independent of the
agent’s further intentions or motives and independent of any non-specifying
circumstances which surround and accompany the act.
b) considering electio and intentio as discrete acts, the ‘object’ is the first source
of morality defined by the diversity of finis and id quod est ad finem: where
both are good, the object in itself is good, but where either is evil the object is
evil. As morally specified by this object, the act as a whole may be further
strengthened or weakened in its goodness or evil by the agent’s further
intentions and/or other attendant circumstances; or it may be vitiated by
further intentions or other circumstances - that is, its moral object when
adequately defined may be evil.
c) as that which provides the act’s fundamental moral species, the ‘object’ is the
heart of objective morality. It is the moral object which enables one to say
that human acts have a moral meaning and moral species (can be classified as
good, evil or indifferent) ex objecto or ex genere,52 that is, prior to and
independently of any non-specifying intentions of the agent and of all nonspecifying circumstances. In this sense it is the moral object which provides
the basis for an adequate moral description of the act.
•

As a source of morality further to the moral object, end/intention refers to the
further intentions or motives of the agent. It is that which the agent aims to
attain, in those cases where this end may be distinguished from the moral
object of the act considered in itself :

52

ST I-II 18, 2.
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◊

where the object is morally indifferent in species, further intentions may
provide the specification necessary to place the act in its particular species of
good or evil, or

◊

where the moral object provides the basic moral species of the act as good or
evil, the agent’s further intentions or motives may increase or decrease the
goodness or evil of the act without altering this fundamental moral species,
but

◊

if the act as a whole is already specified as evil ex objecto, further good
intentions or motives in themselves cannot place the act in the species ‘good’,
since the act as a whole has already been vitiated ex quocumque defectu.

•

The circumstances surrounding an act, which are numbered as a further
source of morality distinct from object and end/intention, are to be
distinguished from those circumstances whose task it is to specify the moral
object of the act:

◊

the circumstances here are those ‘properties’ surrounding or accompanying
the act which do not touch the act’s object or fundamental moral species as
good, evil or indifferent, but which ‘fill out’ the act’s complete goodness or
evil ;53

◊

while non-essential to the moral object, they are ‘due circumstances’ to the
act as a whole, such that if one due circumstance is missing, the whole act
may be vitiated;54

◊

they are morally significant insofar as they are like ‘properties’ of the moral
act considered as a whole - otherwise they are merely incidental to the act;
an example would be the circumstance time: an act which is good by both
object and intention may be vitiated if performed at the wrong time.55
2.1.3

A Problem of ‘Intending’

It has been determined that the ‘moral object’ of an act is to be defined in
terms of both the remote end (the agent’s deliberate intention of the end, the object

53

ST I-II 18, 3, especially 3 ad 2. See also I-II 73, 7.
ST I-II 18, 3: ‘Nam plenitudo bonitatis ejus non tota consistit in sua specie, sed aliquid additur
ex his quae adveniunt tanquam accidentia quaedam; et huiusmodi sunt circumstantiae debitae.
Unde si aliquid desit quod requiratur ad debitas circumstantias erit actio mala.’
55
See ST I-II 18, 9.
54
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of intentio, the finis of the act considered as an integral whole) and the proximate end
(the intentionality implicit in the means, the object of the discrete act of electio, id
quod est ad finem) considered in the context of all morally relevant circumstances.
Thus in their treatment of charity Aertnys-Damen define ‘formal cooperation’
not only in terms of the ‘finis operantis’ but also of the ‘finis operis’. In the former,
it is clear that an agent’s intention to assist or facilitate another’s evil deed
constitutes formal cooperation: for example, one freely keeps watch for a thief while
hoping that he succeeds in his crime. In the latter, cooperation may be considered
formal ex fine operis because the cooperator intends an act which of its nature (that
is, of its own intentionality) is ordained only to the other’s evil act, and so implicitly
intends the evil itself: ‘nam finis operis intrat in essentiam rei; qui ergo vult rem,
necessario vult finem operis’.56

For example, without explicitly hoping that the

crime succeeds, one keeps watch for a thief; if the act of ‘keeping watch’ is freely
undertaken, then its object is clear: it can have no intentionality other than to assist in
the crime.

For Aertnys-Damen, then, regardless of whether it is intended ex fine

operantis or ex fine operis, the evil of the principal agent is intended by the
cooperator - which leaves no doubt as to the moral species of formal cooperation.
But Davis defines formal cooperation more restrictively: formal cooperation
occurs when the cooperator assists the principal agent ‘in an external sinful act, and
intends the sinfulness of it, as in deliberate adultery’.57 So ‘formal cooperation’ for
Davis applies only to an act which is both in itself materially evil by virtue of the
intentionality or ‘inner purposiveness’ of the act itself (ex fine operis), and also
formally evil by virtue of the will of the cooperator who ‘intends the sinfulness of it’
(ex fine operantis).

In the first example above, for instance, the act of keeping

56

Aertnys-Damen, de caritate 398. See also Servais Pinckaers OP, Le Renouveau de la Morale:
Études pour une morale fidèle à ses sources et à sa mission présente. (Téqui, 1964) 139: ‘Finis
operis et finis operantis ne constituent pas, du point du vue moral, deux sortes de finalités de nature
différente; ce sont deux degrés d’une même finalité issue de l’intention volontaire.’ This insight of
Pinckaers, and the summary explanation of Aertnys-Damen, serve to prevent the notion of
‘intentionality’ from assuming excessive significance. Even granting the existence of the ‘objective
moral order’, every action that is a truly moral action proceeds only from an act of will/intention of a
particular human agent.
57
Davis, vol. I, 341. Emphasis added.
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watch is materially evil, but the cooperator’s desire that the crime succeed makes it
formally evil as well.
Using Davis’s definition it seems evident that an act not of its own
intentionality ordered to an evil could still be classed as formally cooperative solely
on the grounds of the evil intentions of the cooperating agent.

For example, a

hardware salesman sells a hammer (in itself an innocent act), but hopes that the
buyer will use it for some evil purpose. In this case the first condition (that it is an
‘external sinful act’) is fulfilled by virtue of the second (that the cooperator ‘intends
the sinfulness of it’): the salesman’s intention is sufficient to render it an ‘external
sinful act’ ex quocumque defectu.

Thus an act can be made to constitute formal

cooperation even if it does not have that intentionality in itself and would in other
circumstances be a good or indifferent act.

On this point Davis can be reconciled

with Aertnys-Damen on the question of formal cooperation ex fine operantis.
But Davis seems to suggest that an act which is not in itself externally sinful,
and which is commissioned by one who does not intend the evil of the principal
agent, does not strictly constitute formal cooperation at all, even if it directly and
immediately assists the principal agent in carrying out his evil deed. The example
he offers is ‘to help a burglar to empty the jewels that he is stealing into the
burglar’s wallet’.58

Even ‘without approving of what [the burglar] does’, the

cooperator’s act of helping a burglar in such an intimate way seems to have no
intentionality other than to assist in the evil deed, which for Aertnys-Damen would
be sufficient to render it formal cooperation ex fine operis.

Yet Davis deems this

‘immediate material cooperation’, implying that this kind of cooperation is somehow
morally distinct from what he defines as formal cooperation. It is on this point that
he seems to diverge from Aertnys-Damen.59

58

Davis, vol. I, 341.
It is significant that the category ‘immediate material cooperation’ does not appear in AertnysDamen in their treatment of charity. They do employ the category in their treatment of restitution,
where the question is not centred on one’s duties in charity but on one’s duties in justice to make
good any damage for which one is morally responsible. Material cooperation is immediate when one
cooperates in the very same evil act as the principal agent; it is mediate when one cooperates by some
other discrete action which the principal agent abuses to his own evil end. Since the focus here is
not so much on the question of the cooperator’s intention as on the proximity of his action to that of
the principal agent, it seems apparent that the matter of ‘immediacy’ bears directly on the
59
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The reason lies in Davis’s account of the moral object of the cooperative act:
Immediate material cooperation in another’s sinful act is always
wrong, though there are many apparent exceptions, especially in
matters of justice.
Thus, under threat of death, I may, very
probably, help another to destroy the property of a third person,
because if in extreme hunger it is permissible to take the food that
belongs to another not in extreme need, it would seem that an
analogous method of saving one’s life is not sinful. The owner of
the property destroyed is, it is alleged, not reasonably willing that
his property should be preserved at the cost of my life. . . . [under
the circumstances] this is not using a bad means to compass a good
end: the means are not bad, for nobody’s rights are invaded.60
The argument is simple: even though the material action of the cooperator
immediately participates in the evil deed of the burglar, the cooperator is not
committing theft as such because, in Davis’s view, ‘theft’ is to be defined in terms of
taking another’s property against his reasonable will.61

Since it would be

objectively unreasonable for the property owner to prefer his property to the
cooperator’s life, the cooperator is not committing theft at all. Therefore, regardless
of the outward appearance of his action and its obvious immediacy to the burglar’s
crime, his cooperation is material and not formal because it has its own distinct and
cooperator’s responsibility to make restitution for the harm he himself has caused, and only indirectly
on the question of the cooperator’s moral status. See Aertnys-Damen, de restitutione, 782.
For his part, Häring employs the dual sense of ‘intention’ noted here - formal cooperation occurs
when the cooperator directly serves the evil: ‘Either through his own inner approval of the principal’s
sinful deed (ex fine operantis) or through a cooperation which by its very nature (ex fine operis) is
approval of the act he formally makes the (principal agent’s) act his own.’ Häring 1963, vol. II, 496,
parentheses and emphasis added. Material cooperation is had by an act which ‘neither in itself (ie by
its own inner purposiveness) nor by the intent of the agent, contributes to the sin of another, but is
misused or misappropriated by the latter and is thus placed in the service of his sinful activity’.
Häring 1963, vol. II, 496, emphasis added. Häring thus requires that neither the agent nor the act
itself may have an evil purpose. This reflects Alphonsus, de caritate 66.
Furthermore, Häring traces the distinction between formal and material cooperation to those
morally relevant circumstances which ‘penetrate the structure of the action’ and thereby ‘qualify it
unequivocally for direct complicity in the sin of another’. Häring 1963, vol. II, 497. This is the
question of ‘moral object’, discussed above. To the problem of determining which circumstances do
or do not touch the moral object of the act, Häring proposes a practical solution (drawn from
Alphonsus) which is remarkably like that later adopted by Finnis and proposed here in terms of an
‘adequate description’ of the act: ‘We hold that if an act is to be appraised as merely material
cooperation, it must be such also in relation to the immediately determining circumstances, so that a
clear-thinking man can, without wrestling with concepts and abstractions, simply say: ‘What I am
doing is in itself good. I am doing it sincerely and with worthy motives. The perversion of my act is
entirely due to human malice.’’ Häring 1963, vol. II, 498. Compare this with Finnis, ‘Object and
Intention’, 23-25.
60
Davis, vol. I, 342-343. Emphasis added.
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legitimate moral object: the preservation of his life.

The material aspect of the

cooperator’s act may seem to coincide with the burglar’s action, but its moral species
is in fact quite distinct.62
Davis could have opted for another argument, along the following lines: one
may distinguish between an evil act as peccatum (objectively morally evil) and an
evil act as culpa (subjectively morally culpable) since, as Thomas explains, an act is
imputed to its agent only when he is master of that activity through his will.63

In

Davis’s case, while the cooperator by an external act renders direct assistance to the
burglar, the circumstance of fear or ‘duress’ (the threat of death) diminishes his
subjective culpability.

Fear for his very life places the evilness of the principal

agent’s deed beyond the cooperator’s voluntary dominion (which is the meaning of
praeter intentionem), and so the total evil of principal agent’s act cannot be imputed
to the cooperator.64
Davis’s approach draws attention to the implied questions one may ask
concerning an apparently formally cooperative act:
• If one asks about the imputable sinfulness (culpa) of the cooperation, one might
well label this act ‘immediate material cooperation’, because where an agent acts
under considerable pressure or duress his cooperation may be materially evil
(peccatum) but not formally sinful (culpa).
• If instead one asks only about the material evil (peccatum) of the cooperation, then
one might prefer to label it ‘implicit formal cooperation’: when the agent acts under
duress the intentionality of his action certainly encompasses the material evil ex fine
operis, even if by virtue of the duress that material evil is not fully imputable to him.

61

Davis, vol. II, 269: ‘It is of the essence of theft that a thing be taken with the intention of
keeping it, at least for a time, against the owner’s reasonable will; this is unjust taking away.’
62
See 2.3.2 below. At the risk of complicating this analysis: the cooperator’s action is, in Sanchez’
terms, a virtually intrinsically evil action which is rescued from being intrinsically evil because it is
justified by an extremely serious reason.
63
ST I-II 21, 2: ‘Dicendum quod sicut malum est in plus quam peccatum, ita peccatum est in plus
quam culpa. Ex hoc enim dicitur actus culpabilis vel laudabilis, quod imputatur agenti; nihil enim
est aliud laudari vel culpari, quam imputari alicui malitiam vel bonitatem sui actus. Tunc enim actus
imputatur agenti quando est in potestate ipsius, ita quod habeat dominium sui actus.’ See also above,
footnote 51.
64
See also below, 4.3.2.
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Davis’s approach suggests that there is a real distinction to be drawn between
explicit formal cooperation and at least some forms of implicit formal cooperation.
While both are evil according to their basic moral species, he believes that they differ
greatly in at least one important respect: in explicit formal cooperation the agent is
deliberately willing the evil and so is fully culpable; in implicit formal cooperation
(or that variety which he calls ‘immediate material cooperation’) the agent may not
be entirely culpable if, because of extreme circumstances, the evilness of the
principal agent’s action is excluded from the cooperator’s voluntary dominion.65
In favour of this interpretation it could be argued that too strict an adherence
to the two senses of ‘intention’ in Aertnys-Damen might risk contradicting the very
tradition in which the principle of cooperation evolved. The moral manuals, which
served to clarify and then preserve the principle, had precisely the task which would
only be complicated by such a strict interpretation of ‘intention’: the task of helping
pastors to assess the culpability of penitents. In his own moral and pastoral works
Alphonsus defines formal cooperation in terms of ‘concurrence’ in the evil will of
the other, while material cooperation is ‘concurrence’ only in the evil action of the
other.66 This suggests that formal cooperation requires the cooperator to approve or
intend the evil intended by the principal agent, while to participate without this
intention (such as merely through supplying id quod est ad finem) might be to leave
that evil praeter intentionem.

When assessing the culpability of penitents in the

Sacrament of Reconciliation, for example, this distinction is very important.
Herein lies the value of Davis’s position. Even if it is more strictly accurate
to deem such acts ‘implicit formal cooperation’, the category ‘immediate material
cooperation’ not only makes clear where the source of the act’s objective moral
disorder might lie (that is, in the intentionality or ‘inner purposiveness’ of the
material action and not in the cooperator’s formal intention), but also serves to draw

65

This was the point made by the US Bishops in the Appendix to their Ethical and Religious
Directives for Catholic Health Care Services. [Origins 24(1994) 449, 451-462. Hereafter: ERD] See
461, where the terms ‘immediate material cooperation’ and ‘implicit formal cooperation’ were
distinguished on the basis of duress. See below, 4.2.2.2 and 4.3.2.
66
Alphonsus, de caritate 63. The use of ‘concurrence’ may also be significant: in itself the image
of ‘concurrence’ does not require ‘intention’ but only a ‘running together’ or ‘coinciding’ of things.
Perhaps Alphonsus is deliberately avoiding the question of intention?
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one’s attention to the parallel and not insignificant issue of the subjective moral
status of the agent.67
In summary, then, while Aertnys-Damen’s position seems more strictly
faithful to Thomas, Davis’s position also has clear practical advantages. Certainly
both are represented in the manual tradition.68

2.1.4

Conclusions

The moral meaning of a human act is fully determined with reference to
several of its aspects: firstly, the moral object, which is the moral matter with which
the act is concerned (embracing the totality of ends and means adopted); secondly,
the agent’s intentions or other purposes in commissioning the act; and thirdly, the
other circumstances which ‘fill out’ the total moral meaning of the act. The moral
object is the moral meaning of what the agent actually does, which is quite distinct
from the physical or material aspect of the act. The agent intends this moral object
explicitly by forming a deliberate act of will to achieve it, and/or implicitly by willing
a material action which of its own intentionality or ‘inner purposiveness’ possesses
that moral meaning.
These distinctions have great significance for the question of cooperation in
evil.

Some of the manuals insist that if an agent commissions an act which of its

very nature is cooperative in evil, then the agent intends that evil. Others teach that
if an agent commissions an act which of its very nature is cooperative in evil, but the
agent does not explicitly will that evil himself, then that agent should be held
culpable for that evil only if he lacks a sufficiently serious reason for commissioning
his act.
This diversity would confuse the question of cooperation in evil, but for three
points:
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The question of immediate material cooperation will be taken up again in Chapter Four.
For an extended discussion of this point see Fabbro, Cooperation, 49-54.
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•

First, the two sides of this debate seek to highlight two distinct aspects of the
problem of cooperation; they are taking two different views of the same reality.
The first view emphasises the cause of the evil in formal cooperation, while the
second view emphasises responsibility for the evil in formal cooperation.

In a

correct understanding of cooperation these will not always coincide.
•

Second, reference to the structure of the moral act reveals the importance of the
first and most fundamental determinant of morality: the moral object.

The

physical fact that an agent is cooperating in an evil does not necessarily reveal
whether that cooperation is formal or material, justified or unjustified. For this to
be known the moral object must be known, and the moral object is rationally
distinct from the material object. The moral object can be known accurately only
when the act in its total moral meaning is adequately described.
•

Third, following Alphonsus, it is clear that in order to cooperate legitimately a
cooperating agent must have a moral object of his own, distinct from that of the
principal agent.

This emphasises the importance of the cooperator’s own

intentions and the totality of those morally specifying circumstances which touch
his own act. This underscores again the need to achieve an adequate description
of the act of the cooperator, considered both in itself and as cooperative.

76

2.2

The Structure of Legitimate Cooperation
2.2.1

Introduction

The preceding description of the metaphysics of the human act permits
analysis of the structure of legitimate cooperation.

This will be assisted by two

preliminary observations.
First: the principle of legitimate cooperation assumes that the ‘First Principle
of Practical Reason’ will be observed: ‘bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et
malum vitandum’.69

This principle bears the following interpretation:

a) a bonum which is intended as finis of a morally good act often
encompasses at least some of the good consequences of the act but some evil consequences may also occur; 70
b) only a good is to be actively done or pursued or intended as an
end - that is, willed as the object of intentio, finis, to which the
object of electio, id quod est ad finem, tends;
c) an evil is not to be actively done - that is, not to be willed as an
intentional object of a moral act either ex fine operis or ex fine
operantis, even if it would be done only in order to obtain a good;
d) nor is an evil to be passively tolerated - that is, permitted to
occur even as an unavoidable and unintended consequence
(‘praeter intentionem’) of a moral act - unless this is warranted
by a sufficiently serious reason.71

69

ST I-II 94, 2.
That the end of a human act may be counted a bonum because of the good consequences which
flow from that act, is implicit in the agent’s ability to intend one finis over another according as one
finis may serve more purposes than another (ST I-II 12, 3), or to freely choose one means over
another according to its superior attraction (ST I-II 13, 6 ad 3). It is also the meaning of Finnis’
statement (‘Object and Intention’, 25): ‘What consequences, results, outcomes of one’s choosing and
doing are to be judged intended and what are to be judged side-effects (praeter intentionem) . . . is
settled simply by considering why one is doing what one is doing, counting as within the proposal one
has adopted by choice everything which one wants for its own sake or for the sake of what one wants
for its own sake. . . ’
71
This explains why, in the tradition, cooperation is spoken of as ‘lawful’ or ‘unlawful’, rather
than as ‘good’ or ‘evil’. This language implies that the moral law requires in c) that if the act by
which one cooperates is itself an evil act, then simply because it is an evil act (and not because it is
cooperating in evil) it ought never be done; and in d) that to cooperate in evil is not morally
70
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These points allow further definition of two frames of reference which have
already been noted in the traditional distinctions of cooperation:
•

the cooperative act considered in itself simply as a human act must be justified in
itself, judged to be good or indifferent in species;

•

the cooperative act considered as cooperating in an evil: even when the evil
which ensues remains ‘praeter intentionem’, the act may be judged lawful
(‘legitimate cooperation’) only where there is a reason serious enough to override
the cooperator’s normal obligation to avoid evil.
Second: as described above, it is of the nature of cooperation that a

cooperator’s act is used by a principal agent to attain his own evil finis - that is, to
assist in the fulfilment of the principal agent’s own act.

In some sense, then, the

whole structure of cooperation can be conceived as a kind of ‘nested set’ of means
and ends, with the cooperator’s act in the role of means (id quod est ad finem)
serving the principal agent’s end (finis).

This analogy has its limitations: for

example, it tends to blur the moral boundary established by Alphonsus, and this
opens up the possibility of confusing ‘cooperation’ with ‘double effect’.72

But it

also highlights the role of the cooperator’s act within the second frame of reference:
the fact that it is cooperating in another’s evil.

2.2.2

Categories of Cooperation

Using the structure and the two frames of reference noted above, and
recognising that hypothetical examples of cooperation may admit of more than one
legitimate interpretation,73

the traditional categories of cooperation may be

described as follows.
2.2.2.1 Formal and Material Cooperation
permissable unless it is justified in the circumstances by a sufficiently serious reason, and then only
when the evil remains strictly ‘praeter intentionem’.
72
It has been noted that, for Alphonsus, each agent commissions his own discrete act: if
cooperation is to be legitimate then there must exist a moral boundary between the act of the
cooperator and the act of the principal agent, such that the cooperator’s own finis and his id quod est
ad finem are distinct from the evil of the principal agent’s finis. See Roy, ‘La Coopération’, 422.
73
This is because in a hypothetical example it is always possible to add or remove circumstances
which would radically alter the interpretation of the case. This is a danger in virtually all theoretical
studies, as the manuals attest. The examples used in the present survey are certainly not so well
defined as to restrict their interpretation to only one or other category of cooperation.

78

•

In the first frame of reference: It is the cooperator’s intended object which
provides the form of the cooperative act. If the cooperator intends the same evil
object as the principal agent, then the cooperator’s act is evil ex objecto by virtue
of his own deliberate intention.74 For example, it would be formal cooperation
for an accomplice, acting freely and willingly, to help a robber commit theft.

•

In the second frame of reference: Given that the cooperator does not directly
intend the same evil object as the principal agent, he may nevertheless intend that
an otherwise-innocent action should be of service to the principal agent in
attaining that evil end - in which case, again, the cooperator’s act is evil ex
objecto by virtue of his own intention. Here the cooperator is intending that his
act, which is otherwise quite distinct and complete in itself, should serve as ‘id
quod est ad finem’ to the principal agent’s ‘finis’.

For example, it would be

formal cooperation for an accomplice freely to assist a robber by driving him
away from the scene of a crime, with the intention that the robber escape. Even
though the action of driving the vehicle has its own (otherwise innocent) end, the
cooperator intends - and therefore makes his act to serve - the robber’s evil
end.

Despite having its own finis operis it is ordered to the robber’s crime ex

fine operantis: therefore it shares in the same species as the principal agent’s act,
and by virtue of the cooperator’s intention is explicit formal cooperation in evil.
•

Still within the second frame of reference: Even if the cooperator does not
explicitly intend to cooperate either in an evil or with the principal agent who is
intent upon evil, the cooperator’s action may of its own intentionality or ‘inner
purposiveness’ be ordered to assisting the principal agent’s evil act.

That is,

while the cooperator does not explicitly hold the principal agent’s evil as the
object of his act of intentio, that evil may still be, ex fine operis or implicitly, the
object of the cooperator’s act of electio.

For example, a worker in a

pharmaceuticals laboratory freely and willingly makes abortifacient medications.
These tablets have only one purpose, so they are only destined to the one evil
end.

Since willing the means necessarily implies willing the end to which the

74

Note that if the cooperator wills the evil simply and solely by himself, the act is evil ex objecto
and in this respect at least does not strictly qualify as cooperation in evil. But it is assumed here that
the cooperator intends the evil for the sake of the principal agent or because that evil is also intended
by the principal agent - in which case the act truly qualifies as formal cooperation.
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means are necessarily ordered,75

the cooperator’s act in this case may be

described as evil ex objecto (ex fine operis) and, if commissioned freely, this
qualifies as ‘implicit formal cooperation’.76
All of these varieties of cooperation are forbidden under the First Principle of
Practical Reason. It follows that if cooperation in evil is ever to be permitted, it can
never be formal cooperation.

This leaves only material cooperation, that purely

physical participation (participans) identified by Alphonsus.
Material cooperation is also defined variously. For Aertnys-Damen material
cooperation is ‘concurrence only in the material sin or evil action of the other but
not in his evil will’ by an action which is indifferent in itself (that is, not evil either
ex fine operantis or ex fine operis) but which the principal agent alone makes to
serve his evil end.77

For Davis material cooperation occurs when the cooperator

helps the principal agent to ‘accomplish an external act by an act which is not sinful,
and without approving of what [the principal agent] does’.78

For Häring material

cooperation is had by a good or indifferent act (that is, an act which is not evil ex fine
operis).79 The differences between these positions have already been discussed. In
all cases material cooperation is normally unlawful, but may be permitted for a
reason which is sufficiently serious to override one’s normal obligation to prevent
the other from falling into sin.80
So material cooperation is distinguished from formal cooperation because it
has its own moral species, and this by virtue of having its own moral object.

The

moral species of the cooperative act is determined by the personal intention of the
cooperator and also by the ‘inner purposiveness’ of the action by which he
75

See Aertnys-Damen, de caritate 398.
But note that if the medications could also be used for an innocent purpose, then the worker’s
action would not automatically (ex fine operis) qualify as implicit formal cooperation in abortion. In
this case their destination to an evil end is not implicit in the production of the medications
themselves, but would rest with the intention of those who use them.
77
Aertnys-Damen, de caritate 398.
78
Davis, vol. I, 341,
79
Häring 1963, vol. II, 496.
80
This is based in Alphonsus, de caritate 47. Aertnys-Damen state that material cooperation is
per se illicit, but per accidens lawful for a just and proportionate cause (de caritate 399); Davis
76
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cooperates, all considered in light of the circumstances surrounding the act - which
may or may not justify this cooperation.
2.2.2.2 Immediate and Mediate Material Cooperation
As noted already, immediate material cooperation is defined by some who
use this category as ‘cooperation in the sinful act of the other’.81

Others require

that the cooperator ‘actually performs the immoral action in cooperation with
another person’82 - that is, physically performs all or part of the evil action itself.
For example, Davis counts as ‘immediate material cooperation’ the action of a
cooperator who helps a burglar ‘to empty the jewels that he is stealing into the
burglar’s wallet’.83
It may be significant that some definitions refer to cooperation in an ‘immoral
action’ rather than in an ‘immoral act’: this could be interpreted to imply that
‘immediate material cooperation’ relates only to the material action performed (id
quod est ad finem) and not to the totality of the moral act (which includes the
deliberately intended finis). This seems to be the meaning of some manualists who
maintain that immediate material cooperation may be excusable when the cooperator
has an extremely serious reason for acting.84
In any event, because in immediate material cooperation the moral object of
the cooperative act is either the same as the moral object of the principal agent’s act,

requires ‘a sufficient cause for permitting the sin of another’ (vol. I, 342); Häring 1963 (vol II, 499)
virtually repeats the teaching of Alphonsus in de caritate 59.
81
Davis, vol. I, 341. This is derived from Alphonsus, as distinct from Sanchez who tied
cooperation to the fault rather than to the act of the principal agent.
82
Thomas J O’Donnell SJ, Medicine and Christian Morality. Second revised and updated edition.
(New York: Alba House, 1991) 31. Note that O’Donnell adopts substantially the same definition of
‘formal cooperation’ as Davis.
83
Davis, vol. I, 341.
84
See Fabbro, Cooperation, 50-51: ‘In his treatment of immediate cooperation Zalba remarks
that, even though the cooperator is subjectively ordered to a good end, the fact that he participates so
closely in the evil action will often mean that the object of his action (the finis operis) will implicitly
be infected by the evil in which he is actively participating. His cooperation will then be implicitly
formal. Nevertheless, Zalba goes on to say that this need not be the case. In special circumstances
one can cooperate immediately in the other's sinful action without incurring its malice. This
cooperation is material and can be justified for a proportionately grave reason.’ Fabbro gives the
reference as: Marcellinus Zalba, Theologiae Moralis Compendium, 2 vols. Biblioteca de Autores
Cristianos (Madrid, 1958) vol 1, n.285.
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or at least is difficult to distinguish from it, immediate material cooperation is
normally held to share the same moral species as the principal agent’s act.85
By contrast, mediate material cooperation is defined as cooperation by an act
which is ‘secondary and subservient to the main act of another, as to supply a
burglar with tools for his burglary’.86 Here there is a clear distinction between the
act of the cooperator and the act of the principal agent: the cooperator’s act (if
considered in itself) has its own clear moral object which qualifies it as good or
indifferent, but that act still provides the principal agent with some means or goods
or services which are required for the commissioning of the principal agent’s evil
act. For example, it would be mediate material cooperation in theft if a storekeeper
were to sell a ladder which the buyer subsequently uses in a robbery. Of course, that
the service he provides subsequently assists the principal agent’s evil deed must
remain praeter intentionem for the cooperator.
Foreseeing that his act will be abused by the principal agent (that is, in the
second frame of reference), the cooperator must have a sufficiently serious reason for
commissioning his act.

Häring further insists that the materially cooperative act

must be in itself ‘meaningful and justifiable’ if it is to qualify as legitimate material
cooperation:

that is, when considered within the first frame of reference, the

cooperator’s act must in itself be ‘founded in right reason’.87
Just as the category ‘immediate material cooperation’ used by some moralists
coincides with some senses of ‘formal cooperation’ used by others, as noted above,
the category ‘mediate material cooperation’ employed by some moralists seems to
equate more or less with plain ‘material cooperation’ employed by others.
2.2.2.3 Proximate and Remote Material Cooperation

85

In Chapter Four it will become apparent that some moralists believe that ‘duress’ provides the
cooperator with a different moral object in some cases (which differentiates ‘implicit formal
cooperation’ from ‘immediate material cooperation’). See 4.3.2 below.
86
Davis, vol. I, 341.
87
Häring 1963, vol. II, 498.
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This distinction is employed only when the cooperator’s act has already been
judged to be merely material cooperation - that is, it has its own good moral object
distinct from the evil moral object of the principal agent’s act.
Some actions of a cooperator will be more closely connected to those of the
principal agent (such as the cooperator who actually holds a ladder for a burglar
while he breaks into a building), while other actions will be more remote (such as the
cooperator who merely sells the ladder in the first place). That is, although they are
clearly distinct from the principal agent’s evil deed, some cooperative acts will more
closely serve as id quod est ad finem to the principal agent’s evil finis, and others
more remotely serve it. Given that the cooperator’s act is not ordered ex fine operis
to the evil end of the principal agent, it is apparent that this ‘proximity’ or
‘remoteness’ cannot originate in the will of the cooperator but is, as it were, an
objective potential of his act, either in itself or in its outcomes: the cooperative action
has its own potential to be of service, proximately or remotely, to the principal agent.
But this potential must always remain praeter intentionem.

It must be solely the

principal agent’s evil will which actuates this potential and makes the cooperator’s
act serve his evil end. For example, the act of selling ammunition to a gun-owner is
not in itself ordered to the gun-owner’s intention to shoot his neighbour, but it more
proximately serves his evil intention than does the action of, say, the person who
manufactures the ammunition.
What are not so evident are the criteria by which some actions are judged to
be ‘proximate’ and others ‘remote’ from the principal agent’s evil act.

Aertnys-

Damen make this judgment according to ‘the matter or means of sinning, or better,
whether it serves proximately or remotely the execution of the sin’;88 Davis refers
vaguely to help which is ‘very intimately connected’ or ‘not closely connected’ with
the other’s act;89 while Häring simply calls cooperation ‘all the more serious if the
act serves the evil purposes of another not merely remotely but also immediately and
proximately’.90

Some manualists seem to require the cooperator’s act to exercise

some form of causality of the principal agent’s evil act (although it has been noted
88

Aertnys-Damen, de caritate 398.
Davis, vol. I, 341-342.
90
Häring 1963, vol. II, 498. These positions are in line with Alphonsus in de caritate 63.
89
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that Alphonsus resists this on the grounds that it risks confusing cooperation with
induction and scandal), while most insist that the very fact that the act is cooperative
constitutes a circumstance which must be taken into account in forming an adequate
description of the act.91 All agree that more proximate cooperation requires a more
serious justifying reason.92
Given the uncertainties surrounding this distinction, some manualists hold
that proximity or remoteness cannot be more clearly defined and are best left to a
prudential judgment of individual cases.93
2.2.2.4 Necessary and Contingent Material Cooperation.
This distinction is based on whether a cooperator, either by office or other
circumstance, has a duty or ability to prevent the evil from being done; or whether
by withholding his material or service he would be likely to impede the principal
agent. That is, the central issue is not how closely the cooperator’s action serves the
principal agent’s act, but how necessary it is to the successful completion of that evil
act.
Some manualists do not distinguish between necessity and effectiveness.
‘Necessity’ refers to a necessity of agency, and concerns whether this particular
agent’s cooperation is necessary for the evil act to be done. ‘Effectiveness’ refers to
a necessity of means, and concerns whether the goods or services supplied are
necessary for the evil to be done.94 When the category is employed, ‘necessity’ in
cooperation generally refers to necessity of agency.
Aertnys-Damen require a more serious reason to justify material cooperation
when there is a greater necessity of agency.

This occurs when a particular

cooperator has the ability to prevent the principal agent’s evil deed simply by
withholding his services - that is, the sin can be prevented because there would be

91

See Fabbro, Cooperation, 16-19.
Aertnys-Damen, de caritate 401; Davis, vol. I, 342; Häring 1963, vol. II, 499.
93
See Fabbro, Cooperation, 19.
94
See Fabbro, Cooperation, 20.
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no-one else to provide that material or service.95 For example, the night-watchman
of a business has a greater duty not to cooperate in burglary than, say, the janitor.
Among factors required to assess a sufficient reason Davis counts how
‘indispensable’ the cooperator’s act may be to the principal agent’s act,96 which is in
line with Häring’s assessment that a more serious reason is required if the
cooperator’s act ‘should be the indispensable condition for the execution of the
[principal agent’s] nefarious design’.97
All three agree: if the required goods or services would probably be supplied
by some other cooperator anyway, then there is less necessity (or greater
contingency). One then requires a less serious reason to cooperate because one has
a less serious moral duty to withhold one’s act.

And if the evil will come about

regardless of what this particular cooperator does, then the justifying reason would
not need to be very strong at all.
It seems, then, that this distinction touches on the sufficiency of the justifying
reason: one may have a prima facie obligation to prevent an evil from occurring, but
in the actual circumstances - including the presence of a sufficiently serious reason
- this may not translate into a concrete duty to withhold the good or indifferent
services which will be abused.

2.2.3

Conclusions

The structure of legitimate cooperation reflects the two frames of reference
noted above.

In the first frame of reference the distinction between material and

formal cooperation refers to the morality of the cooperative act in itself - the
morality of the act considered simply as ‘act’: insofar as one who cooperates
formally shares the same evil object as the principal agent, the cooperator’s act is
evil in itself.

In the second frame of reference the distinctions between proximate

and remote cooperation, and necessary and contingent cooperation, refer to the
question of whether the act is justified in the circumstances - the morality of the act
95
96

Aertnys-Damen, de caritate 400.
Davis, vol. I, 342.
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considered as ‘cooperative’: since the cooperator’s act is good in itself, its morality
must further be assessed in light of its nature as cooperating in evil.
Questions of proximity and necessity therefore do not arise until the morality
of the act, considered simply as a human act, has been established. Within the first
frame of reference a proposed act may be judged evil ex objecto by virtue of either
the finis operantis or the finis operis; in either case it is an evil act and ought not be
commissioned.
But the question may be asked: is it legitimate even to attempt to evaluate a
cooperative act ‘in itself’, without any reference at all to its nature as cooperative?
It is reasonable to answer ‘no’, since to assess an action in this way would be to omit
circumstances which may touch the very moral nature of the act. Nevertheless it is
legitimate to make an initial evaluation of the act ‘in itself’ in order to judge whether
it merits condemnation ‘in itself’ prior to any consideration of its nature as
cooperative. This is clear concerning the first touchstone of legitimate cooperation,
the intrinsically evil act: only if an act is not intrinsically evil - is either good ‘in
itself’ or indifferent ‘in itself’ up to this point - is it necessary to proceed to an
assessment of it insofar as it is cooperative.
And in that second frame of reference an act which is not intrinsically evil
may be commissioned even though it constitutes material cooperation in evil, but
only if there is a reason sufficiently serious to excuse the cooperator from the
obligation to avoid evil.

The gravity of this justifying reason will vary with the

judgment of proximity and necessity, inter alia.
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Häring 1963, vol. II, 498.
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2.3 Conditions for Legitimate Cooperation
2.3.1

Introduction

These clarifications allow further investigation into the nature of ‘intrinsically
evil acts’ and the ‘sufficiently serious reason’ required to justify material cooperation
in evil.

Like the categories ‘formal’ and ‘material’, these two elements have

undergone considerable redefinition during the evolution of the principle: modern
definitions of them would be foreign to the early manualists. It is necessary, then,
not only to sketch these two elements in the development of the principle, but also to
establish clear descriptions of them as they stand today. They play a very important
role in the modern understanding of cooperation in evil.

2.3.2

Intrinsically Evil Acts

It is instructive to note that, notwithstanding the evolution since 1610 of the
formal definition of ‘intrinsically evil acts’, some aspects of the process of defining
these acts have not really changed at all since the time of Sanchez.
Sanchez categorised acts according to the purposes or ends they served: an
intrinsically evil act was one which could not be made to serve any good end, while
an indifferent act was one which could be made to serve either a good or an evil end,
depending on the will of the agent.98 Two points are immediately significant.
First: in his category of ‘indifferent act’ Sanchez held that some acts, while
essentially indifferent, are
. . . commonly defined in favour of an evil end. These acts have
such a connection with this evil use that ordinarily, in fact, they
require a good reason to be called indifferent rather than evil in
themselves.99
He illustrates what he means: to kill innocent people and burn their houses
would normally be deemed an act which is evil in itself, but in rare circumstances in
98

Roy, ‘La Coopération’, 392.
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time of war it may be lawful, for example when grave necessity requires it and the
agent’s intention is to do no further evil.100
Second: it is significant that even though he defines these acts in terms of the
purpose they normally serve, Sanchez still describes the connection between moral
species and finis in terms of the agent’s implied volition:
These acts have such a strict relationship to their abusive use that the
one who performs them, as an almost necessary consequence, adheres
voluntarily to the evil use. . . . According to this interpretation, these
essentially indifferent acts are practically evil in themselves.101
This corresponds more or less with the argument that an agent who wills id
quod est ad finem implicitly wills the finis to which those means are ordered.
It has been noted that some more modern manualists hold exactly this
position on formal cooperation, but they define the moral species of this kind of act
in terms of the act’s own moral object, whereas Sanchez defines the moral species in
terms of the uses to which the act can be put. In both cases, however, the definition
of this type of ‘virtually intrinsically evil act’ rests on an adequate description of the
act in the concrete: only when the act is adequately described in terms of all morally
relevant circumstances is its moral species finally revealed.

So even though

Sanchez and the modern moralist use different criteria to define these acts, they are
really using more or less the same path to arrive at a definition.
Until Alphonsus, at least, the 1679 condemnation was generally interpreted
according to Sanchez’s criteria.

In that example, a servant cooperates with his

master’s evil action by opening a door, holding a ladder, and similar actions. While
they may have been indifferent in other circumstances, the servant’s acts were
commonly considered to be intrinsically evil in the concrete case because they were
ordered solely to the master’s evil designs: since the master’s act was evil, so was the
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Roy, ‘La Coopération’, 395. These are the acts which some moralists call ‘male sonantes’, or
acts which ‘only become good if the agent supplies them with a good end’. See Fabbro, Cooperation,
43.
100
See Roy, ‘La Coopération’, 394, who quotes from Sanchez, Opus morale in Praecepta
Decalogi. (Parma, 1723) Lib. I, cap. VII, n.7.
101
Roy, ‘La Coopération’, 395-396.
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cooperation of the servant.102

Thus the criterion for determining whether an act is

intrinsically evil or not was held to be not the cooperator’s act itself but the totality
of circumstances in which the act occurred, including especially the moral species of
the act with which he cooperated.103
Alphonsus drew a critical distinction: even if the cooperator’s act is to be
defined with reference to the principal agent’s act, the cooperator’s act still must
have its own moral meaning.

The evil intention of the principal agent does not

affect the morality of the cooperator’s act considered in itself, for this has its own
moral species.

In the particular case of participans identified by Alphonsus as

genuine cooperation, the fact that the cooperator’s act will be cooperative in evil
remains praeter intentionem for the cooperator, because his act is rendered
cooperative only by the principal agent’s will.104

This is an essential condition of

legitimate ‘material cooperation’ properly so called: Alphonsus emphasises that the
principal agent must be already determined to sin, and that the cooperator’s act must
be indifferent or good in itself.

Obviously, these conditions guarantee that the

cooperator’s act has its own distinct moral object.105
But Alphonsus further differs from his predecessors in defining an
intrinsically evil act not in terms of the use to which it can be put, but more strictly in
terms of the effect it has on the evil will of the principal agent:
The criterion which St Alphonsus carefully chooses places the
intrinsically evil act by which one cooperates in immediate relation to
the concept of formal cooperation. Formal cooperation concurs with
the evil will of the other agent which it augments or confirms. For St
Alphonsus, the intrinsically evil act is precisely that which achieves
such an act of cooperation. An act of cooperation which has the
effect of augmenting, of confirming, of rendering more confident the
evil will of the other is an intrinsically evil act.
‘One may not, however, on account of any fear perform any
action which has the effect of augmenting or confirming the evil will
of a thief, as for example by keeping watch, or advising of the hour,
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Roy, ‘La Coopération’, 422.
Roy, ‘La Coopération’, 431.
104
See Alphonsus, de caritate 63
105
Thus Häring , for example, insists that the cooperator’s act must be justifiable in and of itself.
Häring 1963, vol. II, 498.
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or telling him a better way to steal, because these actions are
formally and intrinsically evil.’ 106
Two points are significant here. First: Alphonsus does not seem to require
the cooperator to intend his act to augment or strengthen the will of the principal
agent - the question is more simply whether the cooperator’s act, of itself, is apt to
exercise such an influence. That is, this influence may follow purely ex fine operis
and remain praeter intentionem: one who cooperates with a thief out of fear might in
some cases do so by an act which is apt to augment the thief’s evil will, even though
this is not what the cooperator intends to do.
Second: Alphonsus offers no objective criteria for determining when a
cooperator’s act would have such a causal influence on the principal agent’s will,
and therefore no objective criteria for determining when a cooperative act is
intrinsically evil. He leaves this to prudent judgment in individual cases. This gap
in his otherwise masterly treatment has been explained in terms of the prevailing
state of metaphysics: most of Alphonsus’s sources pay scant attention to the tract on
human acts, so he does not define ‘intrinsically evil acts’ in terms of their moral
object, as later manualists would. Roy notes that it was only in the sixth edition of
his Theologia moralis that Alphonsus developed his own treatment of the structure of
human acts - by which time his treatment of cooperation had been in its final form
for ten years.107
On the other hand, this lacuna may indicate that Alphonsus considered the
assessment of causal influence to be possible only in concrete cases - which is the
arena of the virtue of prudence.

If this is so, then Alphonsus’s definitions here

would seem to concern that second category of acts considered by Sanchez: the
‘virtually intrinsically evil act’ which requires some serious circumstance to rescue it
106

Roy, ‘La Coopération’, 432-433. Roy quotes Alphonsus from his Il confessore diretto per le
confessioni della gente di compagna. (Benevento, 1764) Cap. X, n.24.
107
Roy, ‘La Coopération’, 435. See also Fabbro, Cooperation, 38-39. Note that Thomas seems
to use not the ‘intrinsece malum’ of Veritatis splendor 80, but ‘secundum se malum’, as in ST II-II 64,
2 ad 3: ‘Et ideo quamvis hominem in sua dignitate manentem occidere sit secundum se malum . . . ’
In the Blackfriars edition the phrase is rendered ‘intrinsically evil’, but it might be better translated
literally as ‘evil in itself’: this has the advantage of indicating exactly where and why the action is
evil in such a way that no subjective intentions or circumstances can possibly render it ‘good’ which, of course, is precisely the meaning of ‘intrinsically evil’ in Veritatis splendor 80.
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from its normal evil species and justify its commission. In this light it is significant
that Alphonsus, like Sanchez, insists that the cooperative act be considered in the
context of all morally relevant circumstances:
As with other moralists of his era, St Alphonsus judges the act of
cooperation as it is performed here and now. He does not judge in
the abstract an act of carrying a gift to someone, but he judges in
itself the act of carrying a gift to the concubine of someone. If that
act is not conceived as augmenting or confirming the will of the one
who commanded it, St Alphonsus does not call it intrinsically evil.108
This is an important condition for an eventual resolution of the problem of
intrinsically evil acts. Some later moralists would insist that an intrinsically evil act
was not one which in the concrete circumstances served only an evil end, but one
which could not serve any good or honest end in any circumstances.109

Others

would hold, more in line with Sanchez, that what was otherwise an intrinsically evil
act may be rendered legitimate in some particular situations.
These two positions can be reconciled if, like Alphonsus, one maintains the
need to describe adequately each act in the context of its concrete circumstances. It
is not the mere physical action which is intrinsically evil, but the entire ensemble of
the moral object of the act itself, with the agent’s intention, in the concrete
circumstances.110

Morally, the act is not adequately described until all relevant

factors are taken into account; but when the act has been adequately described which requires taking account of neither too few nor too many factors - then the
moral species of that particular act is defined.
How does this sit with Thomas Aquinas’ assertion that circumstances can
alter the moral species of an act?111

The answer is: perfectly happily, and the
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Roy, ‘La Coopération’, 434. Emphasis added.
Fabbro, Cooperation, 40, referring to Noldin-Schmitt, Summa theologiae moralis. 3 vols. 34th
ed. G Heinzel, editor. (Innsbruck, 1962-63) vol. 2, n.120.
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Rhonheimer, Intentional Actions, 284: ‘What is called ‘intrinsically evil’ [in Veritatis splendor
80], therefore, is concrete choice, describable in behavioral terms, that cannot be reduced to simple
‘behavior’, however, because every choice includes an intention of the will and a corresponding
judgment of reason. That is also the reason why the encyclical speaks here about ulterior intentions,
and not about intention as such: because ‘object’ and intention are not mutually exclusive terms.
There is some intentionality required so that an object of a human act can be constituted.’
111
ST I-II 18, 10; 73, 7.
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examples which Thomas offers only serve to illustrate the importance of describing a
moral act adequately.
Thomas teaches that in order to describe moral acts adequately one must turn
not to the natural forms of acts but to their ‘forms as conceived by reason’.112 These
are neither as self-evident nor as fixed as natural forms. Thus, theft can be defined
as ‘taking what belongs to another’.113

In the simple case, with no other

circumstances influencing the act, all acts of this kind are adequately described as
‘theft’.

But of the many circumstances which surround every human act in the

concrete, some so touch the act that they alter its object and therefore sometimes its
species.
For example, ‘retaining the gun of another who would use it to kill an
innocent person’ might not be classed as an act in the species ‘theft’ but as an act of
another species (perhaps ‘preservation of life’).

Similarly a circumstance such as

‘place’ (for example, taking a sacred object from a church) might require an act to be
described as ‘sacrilege’ rather than ‘theft’ - in which case ‘theft’ is not an adequate
description, but ‘sacrilege’ is. But it is not really accurate to say here that an evil
act (‘theft’) has been made good by additional circumstances; it is more accurate to
say that, in the circumstances, ‘theft’ is not an adequate description of these
particular acts. The natural or physical forms of the external actions may be similar,
but their rational or moral forms are radically different, and so they require different
moral descriptions as ‘theft’, ‘sacrilege’ or ‘preservation of life’.114
So when Thomas teaches that ‘circumstances can alter the moral species of
an act’, he is not teaching that one act may be described differently under two
different sets of circumstances. Rather he is insisting that the two different sets of
112

ST I-II 18, 10: ‘. . . sicut species rerum naturalium constituuntur ex naturalibus formis, ita
species moralium actuum constituuntur ex formis, prout sunt a ratione conceptae . . . ’ The example
of theft is drawn from this article.
113
ST I-II 18, 10: tollere alienum.
114
In the same vein, it is not accurate to say that the basic moral species of an act cannot be
defined from its object, independent of factors such as the agent’s further intentions and other
circumstances surrounding the act. It is more accurate to say that, quite independently of the agent’s
personal motives for acting and of other circumstances, the object of an act may provide the act’s
basic moral species if the moral object (and so the act in itself) is adequately described.
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circumstances effectively circumscribe two distinct acts with two different ‘forms as
conceived by reason’, which require the acts to be described differently. This may
come about in various ways:
•

some concrete circumstances surrounding an act are not merely accidental to the
act but are essential to it because they touch its moral species;115 thus the act of
taking something which belongs to another may not always be adequately
described as ‘theft’ - it may be ‘preservation of life’, or ‘sacrilege’, depending
on essential circumstances.

•

from the perspective of the cooperator’s intention: the one who, under duress,
cooperates with a thief might not be described as ‘stealing’ as such if he does so
purely to preserve his own life.

His action may have a similar natural or

physical form but his intention is different from the principal agent’s intention, so
when he acts only in order to save his own life his action may have a different
moral form and might require a different description.116
In contrast to Alphonsus, the modern definition of ‘intrinsically evil acts’ is
grounded solidly in the metaphysics of human action.

The primary point of

reference is the moral object of the act, and that object is measured against ratio
recta:
Reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by
their nature ‘incapable of being ordered’ to God, because they
radically contradict the good of the person made in his image. These
are the acts which, in the Church’s moral tradition, have been termed
‘intrinsically evil’ (intrinsece malum): they are such always and per
se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart
from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances.
Consequently, without in the least denying the influence on morality
exercised by circumstances and especially by intentions, the Church
teaches that ‘there exist acts which per se and in themselves,
independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by
reason of their object’.117
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ST I-II, 18, 3 ad 2.
Fabbro, Cooperation, 4: ‘Vittrant’s analysis [of a similar case] clearly illustrates that in the
moral evaluation it is insufficient to consider the physical phenomenon in isolation from the agent’s
intention in the concrete circumstances.’ [The reference to Vittrant is given as: Jean-Benoit Vittrant,
Théologie Morale. Third ed. (Paris, 1941) n.217.] Fabbro notes that Vittrant here follows Alphonsus,
de restitutione 571. This reflects Davis’s argument on immediate material cooperation: see Davis,
vol. I, 342-343, and at 4.3.2 below.
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Veritatis splendor, 80.
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So even in cases of acts which gain their (evil) moral species from the finis
operis itself, it is clear that, from a structural point of view, an act is to be deemed
‘intrinsically evil’ only when it is adequately described.

All morally specifying

circumstances must be ‘factored in’ in order to describe the moral object (as distinct
from the physical object), and only then can the act be placed in its moral species.
But in whatever manner intrinsically evil acts are considered, one problem
remains: how does one determine which circumstances are truly accidental to the
moral object of an act and so are incapable of altering its species, and which
circumstances intimately touch the moral object, are able to alter its moral species,
and so are essential to the adequate description and moral specification of the act?
This problem dogs the question of intrinsically evil acts, even in its most
recent formulations.118

While it is evident that individual circumstances must be

considered within ‘the sum total of circumstances which provoke or motivate the
action and directly accompany it’,119 it may not be possible to go past the example
of Alphonsus who leaves the determination of such difficult matters ‘to the prudence
of moralists and to the conscience of each person to judge in particular cases’.120

2.3.3

Sufficiently Serious Reason

A ‘sufficiently serious reason’ is required to justify cooperation in evil. The
task here is to uncover what ‘sufficiently serious reason’ means, and how it functions
in the case of legitimate cooperation.
A ‘sufficiently serious reason’ seems to imply some process of comparing
various factors, leading to an outcome which permits cooperation.

The key

questions here are: what would be the ‘terms’ of such a comparison? and how would
the comparison actually be made and an outcome reached?
118

For modern formulations see Veritatis splendor 79-83, and the CCC 1754. Thomas recognises
the difficulty of evaluating circumstances in ST I-II 18, 10: ‘Et ideo quod in actu uno accipitur ut
circumstantia superaddita objecto, quod determinat speciem actus, potest iterum accipi a ratione
ordinante ut principalis conditio objecti determinatus speciem actus . . . ’
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Häring 1963, vol. II, 497.
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Roy, ‘La Coopération’, 434.
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An associated question is: does the ‘sufficiently serious reason’ merely
permit cooperation, or may it impose an imperative to cooperate?

Indeed, is a

‘sufficiently serious reason’ ever really capable of compelling cooperation in evil?
This will be discussed in more detail later in the present work, but for present
purposes ‘sufficiently serious reason’ will be taken to have the meaning it has
generally in the manual tradition: it is ‘sufficiently’ strong to overcome objections
which would otherwise forbid cooperation in evil.

In other words, ‘sufficiently

serious reason’ here is taken as permissive rather than as imperative.
It is useful to note that some manuals prefer the term ‘proportionately serious
reason’, or variations of the same.

While this raises the spectre of some kind of

proportionalism, these terms do have a place in the discussion of cooperation under
de restitutione where one task is, precisely, to balance one set of harms against
another set of harms.121

But the problems inherent in trying to balance goods and

122

and in any event the very structure of material cooperation

evils are well known,

would seem to make such a calculus extremely difficult or even impossible because,
from the cooperator’s point of view, the ‘goods’ and ‘evils’ flow from two distinct
acts commissioned by two different agents.
Alternatively, ‘proportionately serious reason’ could refer to that ‘proportion’
which must exist in a morally good act between objectum and ratio recta, or between
id quod est ad finem and finis. But this is based on a developed metaphysics of the
human act, of a kind which does not seem to have played a significant role in the
critical early evolution of the principle of material cooperation.
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For example, Aertnys-Damen hold that ‘Materialiter cooperans ad restitutionem tenetur nisi ex
justa et proportionata causa auxilium praestet; tunc enim solum cooperatio ejus licita est.’ (de
restitutione, 783. Emphasis added.) and Häring 1963, vol. II, 499 refers to a ‘proportionately good
reason.’
122
See for example Brian V Johnstone CSsR, ‘The Meaning of Proportionate Reason in
Contemporary Moral Theology.’ The Thomist 49(1985) 223-247, which systematically questions
three interpretations of proportionalism; and Bartholomew M Kiely SJ, ‘The Impracticality of
Proportionalism.’ Gregorianum 66(1985) 655-686, which refutes proportionalism on logical and
psychological grounds.
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In any event it will become clear that even if it has been used in this way by
some commentators, the terms ‘proportionate reason’ or ‘proportionately serious
reason’ do not adequately capture the meaning intended by Alphonsus and those
subsequent manualists who sought to develop his insight into the virtue of charity.
It will be argued here that in de caritate there is only an apparent ‘apportioning’ or
‘balancing’ of effects; and since it is in de caritate that cooperation properly so
called is discussed, it is preferable here to use the term ‘sufficiently serious reason’
to express the condition required for legitimate material cooperation.
This discussion addresses two points. First, the ‘sufficiently serious reason’
required to justify material cooperation refers to both of the frames of reference used
in this chapter. In the first (the act considered in itself), it refers to the need for the
agent to hold a sufficiently serious reason to perform the act itself;

in the second

(the act considered as cooperative), it refers to the need for the cooperator to hold a
sufficiently serious reason to permit evil to occur.

It is possible, of course, that a

single reason may meet the requirements of both frames of reference. Second, since
the manuals discuss cooperation in two places, de restitutione and de caritate, there
is the possibility that ‘sufficiently serious reason’ may not have the same meaning in
both locations. This remains to be investigated.
In the first frame of reference any sense of ‘cooperation’ may be ignored. It
is evident that an agent requires a good reason to perform any moral act, and this
reason must be good enough to justify the act in view of any evil effects which may
follow from that act either directly or indirectly (praeter intentionem).

Here the

‘sufficiently serious reason’ plays a positive role: given Thomas’ understanding that
no human act is indifferent in the concrete, a ‘sufficiently serious reason’ is
necessary to render any act morally good in itself.123

As noted, this ‘goodness’

arises from a combination of the intentionality of the action itself, the agent’s further
intentions, and any additional circumstances which may be necessary to ‘fill out’ the
moral object of the act.

123

ST I-II 18, 9.
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However, this particular reason will not automatically satisfy the
requirements of the second frame of reference, which considers the act precisely as
cooperative in bringing about some evil.

Indeed, many acts which are good in

themselves would be manifestly unjustified in view of the evil in which they
participate, and this is the very heart of the problem of legitimate cooperation. The
second frame of reference is therefore the major field of inquiry.
The manuals raise the matter of cooperation in two tracts - de justitia (under
de restitutione) and de caritate (under de scandalo).

Questions in de restitutione

concern an agent’s culpability (and therefore his duty to make restitution) for
damage in which he participates and of which he is a moral cause, if he acts without
a ‘just and proportionate cause’.124

Note that the focus here is not on the

cooperator’s own act in itself, but on the evil effects of the action with which he
cooperates, insofar as those evil effects impact on a third party.

The central

question in de restitutione is: is the cooperator justified in allowing harm to come to
a third party as a result of the principal agent’s abuse of an otherwise innocent act?
The function of a ‘sufficiently serious reason’ here is to permit the cooperator
to act despite the harm to third parties, which his act is made to serve. The general
consensus is that a cooperator who is himself subject to substantial threat of harm
may cooperate legitimately - that is, without being held to make restitution - if he
does not otherwise exercise moral causality in the harm done.125 Here the threat of
harm to oneself seems to be compared with the threat of harm to the third party, so
the function of a ‘sufficiently serious reason’ is to ensure that, even if the cooperator
does participate in bringing harm to another, the strict demands of justice are not
offended.
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See for example Alphonsus, de restitutione 571.
Alphonsus requires a substantial threat of harm such as death itself (de restitutione 571);
Aertnys-Damen make the same immediate-mediate distinction as Alphonsus, teaching that immediate
material cooperation is excusable if it is commissioned under threat of harm greater than that
threatening the third party, while mediate material cooperation is excusable under threat of equal
harm because this constitutes a just and proportionate cause for remote cooperation in harm to another
(de restitutione 783); Davis notes simply that ‘No one is bound to forestall harm to another at the
cost of greater harm to himself’ (vol. II, 314); Häring 1963 vol. III holds that the culpable action
must be ‘actually the effective cause, not merely the occasion’ of the damage (487) and that ‘If the
agent carried out the evil action freely, he is also liable’ (488) - which implies that the agent is not
liable to the extent that his cooperation is not freely given.
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In contrast, the ‘simple case’ in de caritate defines cooperation properly so
called: whether one may cooperate in evil if one exercises no moral causality
whatever in the harm which the principal agent is already determined to bring about.
Here again Alphonsus sets the terms: the principal agent must already be determined
to sin, so that there is no question of moral causality on the part of the cooperator;
and the cooperator’s deed must be good or indifferent in itself, so that it is not
blameworthy in its own right.

The focus then is on a single evil effect - indeed,

upon the primary evil effect: the sin or ‘spiritual ruin’ which the principal agent will
bring upon himself.

The central question in de caritate is: is the cooperator

justified in allowing the principal agent to sin by abusing an otherwise innocent act?
The function of the ‘sufficiently serious reason’ in this case is to excuse the
cooperator from the prima facie duty to prevent one’s neighbour from committing
sin and thereby suffering spiritual harm.126

A reason such as the ‘threat of grave

harm to oneself’ is normally held to justify material cooperation in this case. Here
the ‘sufficiently serious reason’ seems to compare the harm which the cooperator
would suffer as a result of non-cooperation with the harm the principal agent
threatens to cause to himself by abusing the cooperator’s act, so the function of a
‘sufficiently serious reason’ here is to ensure that, even if the principal agent does
sin, the cooperator does not offend the strict demands of charity.
Two problems are immediately evident.

First, in both of these tracts it

seems clear that regardless of his good intentions, the cooperator intends (at least
implicitly) to permit an evil - which the First Principle of Practical Reason bids him
avoid.

Second, even if this difficulty can be overcome, the ‘sufficiently serious

reason’ still seems to require some form of ‘proportioning’ of the harms permitted and how can the problems of proportionalism be avoided?
In regard to the first objection, the principle of cooperation requires that the
cooperator’s act must be itself good or indifferent, and that the evil must flow solely
from the principal agent’s evil will. Furthermore as de restitutione makes plain, the
126

Alphonsus, de caritate 63.

98

cooperator is not held responsible if he is not a moral cause of the damage done. If
he were a moral cause, the harm done by the principal agent would be attributable to
him and could be treated as ‘indirectly voluntary’, in much the same way as the
unintended evil effects of an act which he alone commissions (as occurs under the
Principle of Double Effect).

Clearly there is a difference in physical causality

between ‘cooperation’ and ‘double effect’, but if the cooperator exercises moral
causality in the principal agent’s evil act the two cases may be treated in
approximately the same way.127

What sets cooperation proper apart, then, is

precisely the question of moral causality: in legitimate cooperation the cooperator
himself is not a moral cause, even indirectly, of any harm which the principal agent
may do to himself or to other parties.
Clearly this holds true for cooperation in both tracts: where the principal
agent is already determined to sin, a legitimate cooperative act will exercise no moral
causality and the cooperator will not be held responsible for either the principal
agent’s sin (in de caritate) or for unjust damage to third parties (in de restitutione).
On one hand the different foci of the two tracts are of great significance.
The fact that de restitutione focuses on the harmful effects of the principal agent’s
action does not mean that the principal agent’s sin is negligible - rather, this tract is
simply asking a specific question concerning restitution. Similarly the focus of de
caritate - the principal agent’s sin itself - does not deny that questions of
restitution may also arise in connection with a particular case of cooperation. The
two tracts simply focus on different aspects of the one phenomenon.
On the other hand, as Alphonsus indicated, the ‘simple case’ of cooperation
properly so called raises only the question of the principal agent’s sin - the focus of
de caritate - without any question of further harmful effects or of restitution. This
is extremely significant, for some later moralists attempted to apply Alphonsus’s
criteria for cooperation properly so called in de caritate to clear cases of injustice in

127

Cooperation differs markedly from double effect: in material cooperation there are two acts
and two sets of consequences to consider, whereas in double effect it is a single act which causes both
sets of consequences.
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de restitutione.128

The result was a re-confusing of issues which Alphonsus had

been so careful to distinguish and define.
It is far more fruitful to follow Alphonsus’s lead: in any given case of
cooperation, one ought to treat the issue of cooperation proper under the criteria of
de caritate, and treat the issue of restitution under the criteria of de justitia.

This

parallels the situation noted above concerning moral causality: where there is no
moral causality (cooperation properly so called) one deals with the specific issue of
cooperation alone, but where there is moral causality one must address the additional
question of culpability (and restitution) for indirectly voluntary evil effects.
So does a cooperator actually intend to permit an evil, which the First
Principle of Practical Reason forbids?

At best only indirectly, and then only for a

reason serious enough to excuse his prima facie duty not to permit harm to befall his
neighbour. In legitimate material cooperation it is clear that, because the cooperator
exercises no moral causality whatever and possesses a sufficiently serious reason to
act, he is in no way culpable for any evil which results.
In regard to the second objection concerning ‘sufficiently serious reason’ and
a ‘proportioning’ of harms: even where any harm done by the principal agent
remains strictly praeter intentionem for the cooperator, it may be that traditional
treatments of cooperation in de caritate only seem to define the justification of
cooperation in terms of ‘comparing’ this harm with the harm threatening the
cooperator himself. It can be argued that there is in fact an entirely different process
at work.
In order to develop this argument the situation of cooperation may be
described in the following terms:

a ‘sufficiently serious reason’ allows one to

perform a good or morally indifferent act even though the principal agent will bring
about an evil (of whatever kind, and always praeter intentionem), because material
cooperation in that act is somehow ‘preferable’ to material cooperation in some other
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In Chapter Three it will be suggested that Germain Grisez attempts to do this in a later work.
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act, or to no cooperation at all. The question then is: is there an objective basis for
this ‘preference’?129
It has been noted that the question of charity always arises in cases of
cooperation, but the question of justice does not.

It therefore seem reasonable to

look to charity, as Alphonsus did, to locate an objective basis for the ‘preference’
inferred.
There is generally held to be an order which is to be observed in the practice
of charity, and that order places (i) one’s own spiritual good above the spiritual good
of one’s neighbour; (ii) the neighbour’s spiritual good above one’s own physical
self; and (iii) one’s own physical self above the physical self of one’s neighbour.130
Thus, ‘charity does not oblige us to sacrifice our own body for our neighbour’s
safety, except where we are bound to provide for it’.131
This ordo caritatis establishes the ground on which Alphonsus insists that
one is not bound to endure grave harm in order to prevent one’s neighbour from
sinning.132 Given that one is under no other obligation to prevent the principal agent
from sinning, the virtue of charity alone does not demand that the cooperator
withhold a good or indifferent act simply in order to prevent the principal agent from
coming to spiritual harm, where the cooperator himself is also under the threat of
spiritual harm.133 Since any sin flows from the principal agent’s evil will alone, the
virtue of charity leaves the cooperator free to cooperate or not.
129

This idea of ‘preference’ is found in Johnstone, ‘The Meaning of Proportionate Reason’, 234.
Thomas gives the order of charity in ST II-II 25, 12 as: God, self, neighbour, one’s body. See
also ST II-II 26, especially 2-5. Alfonsus gives another order in de caritate 25: ‘(1) seipsum,
secundum bona spiritualia; (2) proximum, quoad eadem bona; (3) seipsum, quoad bona corporalia;
(4) proximum, quoad eadem; (5) denique seipsum, et deinde proximum, quoad bona externa.’
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ST II-II 26, 5 ad 3.
132
Alphonsus, de caritate 63; and at 66: ‘Ratio, quia, ut mox supra diximus, cum te praestas
actionem per se indifferentem, scilicet, quae potest esse bona et mala, non teneris nisi ex caritate ab
illa abstinere, ne alter ea abutatur ad peccandum; quando autem alias grave damnum metuis, licite
permittere potes peccatum alterius. Nam ex una parte, caritas te non obligat cum gravi damno
peccatum ejus avertere; et ex altera, malitia alterius nequit mutare naturam tuae actionis, ita ut de
indifferenti evadat intrinsece mala.’ Emphasis added.
133
Alphonsus, de caritate 66. Others would express this simply in terms of a ‘principle of
preference’ without offering any objective grounding for that preference: for example Johnstone
(‘The Meaning of Proportionate Reason’, 234-235) considers that Johannes Gury SJ had such a
principle in mind when he dealt with this issue in relation to double effect. Interestingly, while
Johnstone rightly concludes that the assessment of proportion in this case involves a complex of terms
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Hence the ordo caritatis establishes an objective basis for the cooperator
‘preferring’ to cooperate in what is for him a lesser rather than a greater evil. Where
there is no obvious good to be done, or when faced with a choice of spiritual harm to
oneself or to another, the cooperator who acts for a just cause does not act with the
intention of actively doing an evil of any magnitude, since this would be contrary to
the First Principle of Practical Reason.

Neither does the cooperator enter into a

balancing of good and evil effects, or of evil and worse effects.

He simply

recognises his objective obligations in charity - and the ordo caritatis does not
oblige him to endure spiritual harm in order to prevent the principal agent from
causing spiritual harm to himself.
So as Alphonsus realised, the ‘sufficiently serious reason’ which would
justify cooperation properly so called is grounded in the virtue of charity and
preserves the order of charity. By observing this order the cooperator preserves the
integrity of both himself and his action. The evil which results is not intended either
explicitly or implicitly but remains strictly praeter intentionem, and this is
permissible as long as the cooperator’s act is good or indifferent in itself, that is, it
does not exercise any moral causality with regard to the evil which results, and the
order of charity is preserved.

While it may be an act of the greatest charity to

sacrifice oneself for another, the ordo caritatis does not require this.134
On one hand, then, a sufficiently serious reason is required to justify the
cooperator’s act simply as an act; on the other hand a sufficiently serious reason is
required to exempt the cooperator from the normal demands of charity.

In both

cases a reason can qualify as ‘sufficiently serious’ only if it maintains the order of
charity.135
such as proximity and probability, he makes no reference to Alphonsus’s own treatment of exactly
this point in his de caritate 59.
134
ST II-II 26, 5 ad 3.
135
For his part, Richard A McCormick SJ [‘Ambiguity in Moral Choice’ in Richard A
McCormick SJ and Paul Ramsey, eds. Doing Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict
Situations. (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978) 7-53] makes three telling points:
∗ at 45: ‘[p]roportionate reason means three things (a) a value at least equal to that sacrificed
is at stake; (b) there is no less harmful way of protecting the value here and now; (c) the
manner of its protection here and now will not undermine it in the long run.’ For McCormick,
then, some form of moral calculus is of the essence of proportionate reason.
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One major question remains: how does the cooperator know, in a concrete
case, that he is exempted from the normal demands of charity? How does he know
when he holds a sufficiently serious reason to cooperate in this particular evil in this
particular case?
Like the assessment of circumstances surrounding the moral act, this is
normally not a matter of absolute certainty but requires prudential judgment.
Neither Alphonsus nor subsequent manualists seem prepared to go beyond indicating
which factors are to be considered in such an assessment.

In Alphonsus’s view

these factors include the gravity of the other’s sin, the probability that the other
would not sin if the cooperator withholds his act, the proximity of the cooperation to
the sin, the right of the cooperator to act in any case, and any offence against justice,
especially against third parties.136 Clearly, they also include the cooperator’s basic
reason for acting, and that reason would have to be greater or weaker depending on
other variable factors.

What is certain is that this assessment can only be made

when all morally relevant factors are taken into consideration - that is, when the
cooperator’s act, considered as cooperative, is adequately described - and this is a
matter of prudence.
Figure 2.1 compares

-

in general terms only

-

the function of the

‘sufficiently serious reason’ which justifies cooperation in de restitutione with that in
de caritate.

de caritate

de restitutione

∗

at 47: charity consists of beneficentia as well as benevolentia and ‘is always controlled by the
possible’ - that is, where no good can actually be done one is obliged to do (or permit) the
least evil. For McCormick, a moral conflict is essentially a choice between greater and lesser
evils.
∗ at 48: the notion of proportionate reason is always only analogous: when all is said and done,
the agent does not engage in a simple utilitarian calculus but in a much more complex - and
subjective - weighing of alternatives in which ‘the preference of a good for or in another at
the cost of that good for or in myself should not, in view of human weakness and immaturity,
be demanded.’ For McCormick, Christ’s command to ‘love one another as I have loved you’
is not to be demanded as an absolute norm but rather proclaimed as a principle of growth.
136
Alphonsus, de caritate 59.
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Relevant Virtue

Charity

Justice

Focus

The principal agent’s sin itself

Further evil effects of the principal
agent’s sin

Function of
Justifying Reason

To permit my action despite
the principal agent’s sin

To permit my action despite these
evil effects

Key Questions

Am I justified in allowing the
principal agent to sin by
abusing my good or indifferent
action?
or
In light of the principal agent’s
sin, am I justified in acting?

Am I justified in allowing further evil
effects which will flow from the
abuse of my good or indifferent
action?
or
In light of these evil effects, am I
justified in acting?

Restricting
Cooperation

Even where there will be no
offence against justice in
regard to other parties (ie no
further evil effects), charity
toward the principal agent may
require me to refrain from
acting

Even where charity toward the
principal agent does not of itself
require me to refrain from acting,
justice may require me to avoid
contributing to the production of evil
effects which will harm other parties

Permitting
Cooperation

Cooperation may be permitted
for a serious reason if the
demands of charity are not
offended, because my action
exercises no moral causality in
regard to the principal agent’s
sin

Cooperation may be permitted for a
serious reason if the demands of
justice are not offended, because
my action exercises no moral
causality in regard to the harm
done to others

Figure 2.1 Alfonsus, Theologia moralis: the function of ‘sufficiently serious reason’ in
‘de restitutione’ and ‘de caritate’.

2.3.4

Conclusions

Contemporary debates on the moral assessment of human acts reveal
divergent positions which, unsurprisingly, are often difficult to reconcile.137 At the
core of much of this divergence is the question: what is to count as pertaining to the
object of a moral act?138
137

For example, the debate between Richard McCormick and Martin Rhonheimer noted above in
this Chapter, Footnote 10.
138
See McCormick, ‘Some Early Reactions’, 497.
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•

Some modern moralists (the ‘proportionalists’) are accused of wanting to include
too much in their concept of moral object: not only the finis and id quod est ad
finem of the act and its moral meaning in itself, but also all of the agent’s
intentions and all surrounding circumstances, including all foreseeable
consequences;139

•

Others are accused of wanting to include too little in their concept of moral
object: no consequences and few circumstances, but two meanings of
‘intention’.140
It is true that some consequences of an act will enter into the definition of its

moral object, since often an agent acts precisely in order to obtain those outcomes.
These consequences are usually embraced in the notion of finis. But in this context
those consequences are to be assessed primarily in relation to ratio recta and not by
any calculus of benefits and burdens, or of good and evil effects.

An adequate

description of the moral act, in other words, will not stop short of embracing
whatever is necessary to classify the act in its species, but nor will it wish to confuse
that assessment by going beyond what is necessary.
The tradition recognises that in some cases an act will be seen to be ‘evil’ by
virtue of its very object, in such a way that no combination of circumstances or
further intentions could possibly render this action justifiable or ‘good’. These acts
are ‘actually intrinsically evil’, or evil ex objecto in every case.141 Thus ‘abortion’
may be described as ‘intrinsically evil’ because no possible complex of
circumstances or subjective intentions can alter its fundamental moral meaning: the
deliberate and voluntary killing of an innocent human being.142

139

Rhonheimer accuses McCormick of having an ‘expanded notion of object’ in ‘Intentional
Actions’ at 285; at 291-300 he assesses this further, insisting that ‘proportionalists’ describe actions
in terms of their consequences and commensurate reasons, rather than in terms of their objects seen
from the point of view of the acting person.
140
McCormick accuses Rhonheimer of this in ‘Some Early Reactions’ at 501; Rhonheimer
defends his view of moral object and intentionality in ‘Intentional Actions’ at 285-291.
141
See Veritatis splendor, 79-83 for a discussion of this point.
142
Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Evangelium vitae. ‘On the Value and Inviolability of
Human Life.’ (25 March 1995). AAS 87(1995) 401-522, n.57. See also n.62, where direct abortion
is defined as ‘a grave moral disorder’: ‘No circumstance, no purpose, no law whatsoever can ever
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The tradition also recognises that in other cases an act will be seen to be
‘evil’ by virtue of its very object as defined in the context of its concrete
circumstances, and be ‘virtually intrinsically evil’ or evil ex objecto in this case.
But other rare and extreme circumstances may demand another assessment such that,
in those rare circumstances, a materially similar act might be adequately described as
‘morally good’. These are acts which Sanchez held to ‘so nearly approach the evil’
that they require a sufficiently serious reason to justify their performance, and
without this justifying reason the one performing such acts could be said to intend
the evil.143

It is not accurate to say that this justifying reason changes the moral

species of the act; it is more accurate to say that, considering the gravity of the
reason for acting, this act is more appropriately described in another way.

Thus

what is ‘theft’ in one situation is better described as ‘preservation of life’ in another,
and ‘sacrilege’ in a third.
All of this is critical in the assessment of legitimate cooperation in evil.
Structural emphasis on the moral object demands great attention to what it is that the
cooperating agent is actually doing: if his act is not evil in virtue of its object and he
holds a sufficiently serious reason to act, then his action must be distinguished from
that of the principal agent.

Furthermore, it is only by attending carefully to the

totality of his act - its moral object, his own further intentions, and all other relevant
circumstances including the strength of his reason for acting - that the cooperator
can determine how his action is most accurately to be described.

The years since the Second Vatican Council have brought enormous changes
in the social, economic and political shape of a world in which evil is so often done.
How some of these changes might affect the interpretation of the traditional principle
of cooperation will be a subject of Chapter Four of the present work.

First,

however, it will be helpful in Chapter Three to review some of the ways that the
principle has been preserved, developed and presented since Vatican II.

make licit an act which is intrinsically illicit, since it is contrary to the Law of God which is written in
every human heart, knowable by reason itself, and proclaimed by the Church.’

106

143

Roy, ‘La Coopération’, 395-397.
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Chapter Three
MATERIAL COOPERATION SINCE VATICAN II

3.0

Introduction
Bernard Lonergan indicated that theological investigation of particular

questions requires the development of a critical history of their origins and evolution,
which may lead to that insight which is ‘understanding’.1 What is true for particular
questions is true a fortiori of the theological disciplines in which they arise and, in
the view of many modern moralists, this is especially so in the case of Catholic moral
theology.2
However, a critical history of past and current trends in moral theology would
take the present work well beyond reasonable bounds. Nevertheless, some general
comments will help to establish a context for this chapter.
As noted above,3 the moral theology of the manuals had been intended to
prepare clerical students for ministry in the confessional;

this is evident, for

example, in the manuals’ emphasis on distinguishing mortal from venial sin, and on
resolving doubts of conscience.4 According to the prevailing view of that ministry,
it was necessary for the confessor to know what the moral law would allow or forbid.
1

Lonergan, Method in Theology, 187-189.
Studies of the status of moral theology since Vatican II include: Germain Grisez, The Way of
the Lord Jesus. Vol. 1: Christian Moral Principles. (Chicago: Franciscan Press, 1983) 7-17; John
Mahoney SJ, The Making of Moral Theology: A Study of the Roman Catholic Tradition. (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1987) 302-347; Klaus Demmer MSC, ‘Cristologia - Antropologia - Teologia morale’ in
René Latourelle, ed. Vaticano II: Bilancio e Prospettive. (Assisi: Cittadella, 1987) 1033-1048; Josef
Fuchs SJ, ‘A Harmonisation of the Conciliar Statements on Christian Moral Theology’ in René
Latourelle, ed. Vatican II: Assessment and Perspectives. (New York/Mahwah: Paulist, 1989) Volume
Two: 479-500; J Gallagher, Time Past, Time Future, in particular 140-161 and 203-222; three
articles of Richard A McCormick SJ republished in his Corrective Vision: Explorations in Moral
Theology. (Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1994): at 1-22 ‘Moral Theology from 1940-1989: An
Overview.’ [originally in Theological Studies 50(1989) 3-24], at 23-29 ‘Moral Theology in the Year
2000.’ [original citation given simply as ‘Campion College, University of Regina, Saskatchewan.’],
and at 40-45 ‘Self-Assessment and Self-Indictment.’ [originally in Religious Studies Review
13(1987) 37-39]; Servais Pinckaers OP, The Sources of Christian Ethics. Translated by Sr Mary
Thomas Noble OP. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995) in particular 298-323; and Alberto Bonandi,
Veritatis splendor: Trent’anni di teologia morale. (Milano: Glossa, 1996) 167-194.
3
See 1.2.1 above.
4
Grisez, Christian Moral Principles, 12. Grisez calls this ‘classical moral theology’.
2
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This explains why the traditional manuals speak of material cooperation as ‘licita’ or
‘illicita’. But such an orientation also carries the risk of a moral minimalism which
is less concerned with knowing God’s will and more concerned with avoiding God’s
punishment for sin. Moral theology of the manualist period has been described as
‘casuistic, unecumenical, unbiblical, ‘domestic’ in its concern (social morality being
relegated to the periphery), centrally controlled, natural law oriented, and sincentred’.5 Its view of moral obligation was generally permissive (‘what the moral
law allows’) rather than genuinely imperative (‘what God calls me to do’).
Servais Pinckaers OP notes that late in the nineteenth and early in the
twentieth century, a renewal of Thomism brought about two reorientations. First, in
place of the Commandments some manualists sought to restore the moral and
theological virtues as ‘the principle of the organisation of moral material’.6 It was
hoped that this would lead to a more positive view of moral obligation: less of ‘what
the commandments allow’ and more of ‘what the virtues require’.

But it was not

entirely successful:
. . . the material itself was not transformed by these
improvements. The categories changed, but the content was
always shaped by obligations and legal prohibitions.
The
teaching on the virtues was interesting but remained more
theoretical than practical and still suffered from the
impoverishment of notions inherited from nominalism. Virtue,
prudence, chastity were far from recovering their lost power and
dynamism.7
Second, the tract on man’s last end and beatitude was restored,8 but because
the overall focus still remained on ‘what the law allows’ the positive moral
implications of ‘beatitude’ were never fully explored. So moral theology languished
as a poor cousin of canon law, and moral obligation generally continued to be
conceived as permissive rather than imperative - except, of course, where it was
expressed in the negative: ‘Thou shalt not’.

5

McCormick, ‘Self Assessment’, 42.
Pinckaers, Sources, 299.
7
Pinckaers, Sources, 299.
8
See Pinckaers, Sources, 200-300.
6
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The Second Vatican Council caught up and gave formal impetus to what had
already developed as a substantial movement for renewal in moral theology.9

It

called for a solid grounding in the Scriptures, for a much more positive perspective
on the moral life, and for a focus on the Christian’s sense of being ‘called’, of having
an ‘obligation to bring forth fruit in charity for the life of the world’.10 It is notable,
however, that conciliar and post-conciliar documents generally provided few specific
guidelines on the method or content of this renewal.11

This may be simply a

function of the complexity of the renewal itself, or it might be a recognition that, just
as Christians fulfil their moral duty by responding to a concrete ‘call’ from God here
and now, so the shape of modern moral theology can be ‘worked out’ only in relation
to the concrete moral challenges of contemporary life. In any event the Council has
generally been interpreted as calling for not simply a rearrangement of existing
material, but a radical refounding of the discipline.12
The process of renewal has been anything but smooth.13 Mahoney notes that
it took off in two unplanned and uncoordinated directions - methodology and

9

Above, 1.2.5.
Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Decree on the Training of Priests Optatam totius. (28
October 1965) 16: ‘Special care should be given to the perfecting of moral theology. Its scientific
presentation should draw more fully on the teaching of holy Scripture and should throw light upon
the exalted vocation of the faithful in Christ and their obligation to bring forth fruit in charity for the
life of the world.’
11
In Sources at 302 Pinckaers notes that, apart from Optatam totius 16, the council made little
specific reference to moral theology at all. He maintains that an earlier general statement in the same
paragraph of Optatam Totius should be taken to include moral theology: ‘[Seminary students] should
learn to seek the solution of human problems in the light of revelation, to apply its eternal truths to
the changing conditions of human affairs, and to express them in language which people of the
modern world will understand.’ Other than these texts, Pinckaers holds that Gaudium et spes offers
only general themes which should be reflected in a renewed moral theology (‘the human condition
and vocation, the dignity of the person, human activity in the world, the dignity of marriage and the
family, socioeconomic life, the political community and the safeguarding of peace.’ Pinckaers,
Sources, 302) while the post-conciliar document of the Congregation for Catholic Education, The
Theological Formation of Future Priests (22 February 1976) offers a more specific agenda for
renewal.
Mahoney (The Making of Moral Theology, 303) maintains that Gaudium et spes 33 should also be
taken to embrace moral theology: ‘The Church is guardian of the heritage of the divine Word and
draws religious and moral principles from it, but she does not always have a ready answer to every
question. Still, she is eager to associate the light of revelation with the experience of mankind in
trying to clarify the course upon which mankind has just entered.’
12
Mahoney, The Making of Moral Theology, 307: ‘It was not simply a matter of tuning the engine
and tightening the steering of moral theology, but of a thorough systematic overhaul of the whole
vehicle and of sending it off into quite new and (for it) uncharted areas of modern living.’
13
Pinckaers, Sources, 304: ‘The postconciliar era has produced a sort of defrosting of Catholic
moral teaching as a new wind sweeps over it. But as often happens when the wind gets too strong,
10
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specific moral issues14 - while McCormick identifies fundamental, methodological
and ecclesiological issues as basic areas in which modern moral theology is still
finding its feet.15
Leaving aside the uneven and at times tempestuous unfolding of the renewal,
it is easy to see why methodological issues should figure so prominently. In order to
arrive at a positive conception of the nature of moral obligation flowing from
Christian vocation, one requires a point of departure which is, at one and the same
time, both as universal and as particular as that vocation itself. Raphael Gallagher
has suggested that such a point may be found in ecclesiology.16 The search for an
appropriate ‘point of departure’ is essentially an exercise in hermeneutics; one
critical challenge in the renewal of moral theology may well turn out to be the quest
for an ecclesiology which grounds, simultaneously and with equally imperative
power, both universal moral obligation and particular Christian vocation.
Meanwhile, the methodological, ecclesiological and systematic details of a
moral theology faithful to the call of Vatican II are still evolving by means of that
energetic dialogue which both precedes and facilitates authoritative verification (or
falsification) of particular positions.17
This Chapter will sample the treatment of legitimate cooperation in the genre
which succeeded the moral manuals (3.1), and then in more recent magisterial
teaching (3.2), before making some preliminary observations on the status of the
principle in contemporary moral theology (3.3).
things can get turned upside down, and it is not rare to hear people, even priests, wondering aloud if
there is still any moral theology to be taught.’
14
Mahoney, The Making of Moral Theology, 308.
15
McCormick, ‘Self-Assessment’, 43-45, where he also discusses the related question of
theological dissent.
16
R Gallagher, ‘The Manual System’, 13. See also McCormick, ‘Self-Assessment’, 43. The
relationship between ecclesiology and moral theology will be explored further in Chapter Five.
17
Pope John Paul II’s own interventions in the process of renewal may be seen as precisely this
kind of ‘authoritative verification (or falsification)’: see especially his Apostolic Letter Spiritus
Domini. ‘On the Occasion of the Bicentenary of the Death of St Alphonsus M de Liguori.’ (1 August
1987). AAS 79(1987) 1365-1375; the Encyclical Letter Veritatis splendor. ‘On Certain Fundamental
Questions of the Church’s Moral Teaching.’ (6 August 1993). AAS 85(1993) 1133-1228; the
Encyclical Letter Evangelium vitae. ‘On the Value and Inviolability of Human Life.’ (25 March
1995). AAS 87(1995) 401-522; and the Encyclical Letter Fides et ratio. ‘On the Relationship
between Faith and Reason.’ (14 September 1998). AAS 91(1999) 5-88.
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This arrangement of material creates some anomalies: for example, the
authors of the modern moral texts studied (Häring, Peschke and Grisez) are
contemporaries of other writers who will figure in the following Chapter. It should
be emphasised that the intention here is not to facilitate a strictly chronological
study, but rather a study of a genre which approximates the traditional moral manuals
in intent, if not in method. This section, then, aims merely to study the successors to
the moral manuals: for a more comprehensive view of contemporary writing on
legitmate cooperation, one should view the material in this and the succeeding
Chapter as a whole.
Another anomaly is the placement of papal and other magisterial teaching in
this context. The reason for this lies in the method of the traditional moral manuals
themselves: they often cited papal and curial documents as definitive sources of
moral teaching - for example, the Condemnation of 1679. In addition to their other
ends, however, modern texts treat moral theology as a distinct discipline with its own
legitimate aims and methods, rather than as merely an interpreter of magisterial
teaching. But if magisterial teaching in modern moral texts is less prominent than it
was in the manuals, it is perhaps more significant in contemporary moral theology as
a whole: for example, the moral teaching of Pope John Paul II continues to have
incalculable impact on the discipline as it proceeds along the path of renewal. For
this reason it is appropriate to consider modern moral texts and recent magisterial
teaching in close proximity, but separately. Again, a more comprehensive view of
the status of modern moral thinking about legitimate cooperation would require
Chapters Three and Four of the present work to be taken together.
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3.1

Cooperation in Later Moral Texts
3.1.1

Introduction

In order not to abandon the moral tradition - or rather, in order to renew it
for the benefit of the same Christian community which gave birth to the manuals - a
modern moral text must address at least some ‘traditional’ moral issues, albeit in new
ways.

New approaches are necessary for several reasons: ‘traditional’ moral

problems often need to be re-interpreted in light of changing social circumstances,
and new cultural contexts sometimes prompt entirely new questions or pose new
difficulties which traditional methods could neither foresee nor address.
It is not surprising, then, that contemporary moral texts have employed a
number of different approaches

-

with varying degrees of success

-

in

reinterpreting the challenge of legitimate cooperation. The aim of this section is to
gain some insight into the nature and parameters of this re-interpretation, and to
illustrate the significance of some of the methodological issues which are proving
crucial to the direction of this renewal.

3.1.2

Bernard Häring (1979)

Twenty-five years after The Law of Christ Bernard Häring began publication
of a new three-volume textbook in moral theology, Free and Faithful in Christ.18
By this time his view of the task of moral theology had undergone a considerable
revolution:
Moral theology, as I understand it, is not concerned first with
decision-making or with discrete acts. Its basic task and purpose is
to gain the right vision, to assess the main perspectives, and to
present those truths and values which should bear upon decisions to
be made before God . . .
[therefore] the author does not follow the trend of those
who confine moral theology practically to ‘normative ethics’: his

18

Bernard Häring CSsR, Free and Faithful in Christ. 3 Volumes. (Homebush, NSW: St Pauls,
1978-1981). These volumes are subtitled respectively: General Moral Theology [Hereafter: Häring
1978]; The Truth will Set you Free [Hereafter, Häring 1979]; and Light to the World, Salt for the
Earth [Hereafter: Häring 1981]. Material and formal cooperation is treated in Häring 1979, at 479486.
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first intention is to form a Christian mind set and that profound
vision which is essential for Christian maturity.19
This ‘profound vision’ of the Christian moral life is the key to Häring’s view
of a renewed moral theology.

Its central concepts are responsibility for one’s

Christian life of creative liberty and creative fidelity, and co-responsibility with
others for the moral quality of social life.20 This co-responsibility - also expressed
as ‘creative mutuality’ and ‘reciprocity of consciences’

-

is grounded in a

personalism which professes to resist ‘individualistic narrowness’:

‘It is a

personalism that confronts each of us with God, with our fellowmen and with all of
creation’.21

The manualists clearly drew on a very different vision of moral

theology, so Häring feels free to claim an independence from their work. Instead of
citing the opinions of numerous traditional experts, he turns to
. . . great prophetic figures throughout history who have had the
charisms of creativity and fidelity, and who, even in the midst of
conflict, were as faithful as they were bold in bringing their
contributions into the common heritage.22
Given that ‘creative liberty’ is such an essential aspect of his new vision of
the moral life, and in view of this new and prophetic source of inspiration, it is
perhaps surprising that Häring’s treatment of cooperation in Free and Faithful in
Christ differs so little in structure and content from that which he had offered twentyfive years earlier.23

Nevertheless, several aspects of his later approach merit

attention.

19

Häring 1978, 6. Since the publication of his The Law of Christ, Häring had become a vocal
critic of the 1968 encyclical letter of Pope Paul VI Humanae vitae [‘Of Human Life.’ (25 July 1968).
AAS 60(1968) 481-503], a stance which caused him - and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith - much angst for the rest of his life. (In Terzo Milennio at 121 Häring offers the prayer, ‘A
furore theologorum libera nos, Domine!’) The influence of these experiences on his evolving vision
of moral theology would be fertile ground for research.
20
Häring 1978, 1.
21
Häring 1978, 3. On ‘creative mutuality’ and ‘reciprocity of consciences’ see the same volume
at 70-71 and 265-270 respectively. On the latter, see also Terzo Millennio 66-79.
22
Häring 1978, 5.
23
The introduction to ‘Complicity in the Sins of Others’ in Häring 1979, at 479, virtually
summarises Häring 1963, vol II, 495-6. The treatments of formal and material cooperation are
virtually identical in structure and content, but the examples of licit and illicit cooperation in Häring
1979, at 483-486, differ from those in Häring 1963, vol II, 500-517, insofar as they are gathered
under only three broad headings: cooperation in politics; complicity of managers and employees;
complicity in abortion. In the spirit of ecumenism promoted by Vatican II Häring omits from his
later work all reference to ‘cooperation in false rites’.
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In terms of its meaning, cooperation is seen as a sin against ‘actualising the
Truth in love’.24

‘Charity’ is a virtue for every person, but it has a particular

meaning for Christians who are ‘free and faithful in Christ only to the extent that we
are grounded in him who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life, and who has promised
to send us the Spirit of Truth to guide us into all the truth’.25
neighbour the Christian makes Christ present;

By charity towards

by failing in charity towards

neighbour (for example, by illicit cooperation in his sinful deed) the Christian is
unfaithful to Christ.
This orientation is very significant. In his introduction to ‘Complicity in the
sins of others’ Häring emphasises that the call from God to be ‘yeast in the dough,
salt to the earth’ makes it difficult for the Christian to avoid confronting the problem
of cooperation.

In practical terms, cooperation in evil can only be avoided

completely if Christians ‘opt out’ altogether - but this would preclude them from
ever ‘actualising’ Christ in the world.

Häring is concerned that Christians must

confront head-on the challenge of cooperation in evil, but this will always test the
fidelity and creative mutuality which lie at the heart of authentic Christian moral life.
Having distinguished carefully between cooperation and scandal,26 Häring
deals with material and formal cooperation in turn before outlining the principles
which apply.

Here he adds a single paragraph to his earlier treatment of the same

principles:
The moral conviction of the principal agent has to be taken into
account. The concurrence of my good action with that of another
who is convinced that his action is good is not formal cooperation
although one might be convinced that the other’s action is wrong.
This happens frequently in our pluralistic society. We think, for
instance, of situations where the sincere conviction of the main
agent is supported by that of a considerable number of good
people.27

24

This is the title of Häring’s tract on charity in which he deals with cooperation - see Häring
1979, 419.
25
Häring 1979, 2.
26
‘Whereas scandal furnishes the occasion for another’s sin, cooperation, as we treat it here,
enters into the actual execution of a sinful action already determined. Of course cooperation also
poses the question of scandal.’ Häring 1979, 479.
27
Häring 1979, 482. Emphasis added.
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This addition is significant on two levels.

On a fundamental level it

indicates how Häring’s new orientation leads him to a heightened awareness of the
methodological implications of ethical pluralism: it may require a review of the
traditional processes of moral decision-making. Translating this to the question of
cooperation itself, Häring believes that the principal agent may well be
commissioning evil, but in virtue of his sincere but erroneous conscience his action is
not formally sinful. Obviously this begs the question of cooperation in formal sin: if
the principal agent is not committing formal sin because he is acting in erroneous
conscience, then clearly the cooperator is not formally cooperating in formal sin.
But Häring is claiming more than that: he holds that this is not formal cooperation at
all, and so is presumably at most merely material cooperation.

Is this necessarily

true?
In Häring’s example it seems obvious that the cooperator is still cooperating
in evil, and (in traditional terms) in material sin, since that is what the principal agent
is doing.

The critical moral question then is: is this cooperation necessarily only

material? Could it ever be formal cooperation and therefore seriously wrong, even
though the principal agent’s act constitutes ‘merely’ material sin?
In view of the discussion in the previous chapter, the answer to the latter
question must be ‘yes’.28

Even in Häring’s world of ‘creative mutuality’ the

cooperator’s action must still be distinguishable from the principal agent’s action, or
else the problem of cooperation simply would not arise: the cooperator’s action
would always be evil in itself.

Therefore it is obvious that the actions of the

cooperator must be judged on their own merits, and not merely in relation to the
material or formal sinfulness of the actions of the principal agent.
If a cooperator intends the evil which is done unwittingly by the principal
agent - and this ‘intending’ may be either ex fine operantis or ex fine operis,
according to the traditional approach

-

then by virtue of this intention his

cooperation is formal. The moral quality of the cooperator’s action does not depend
on the subjective moral status of the principal agent’s action: thus he may commit
28

See 2.1.3 and 2.2.2.1 above.
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formal cooperation in evil even when his action does not constitute any kind of
cooperation in formal sin. For example, a child may not be aware that lighting fires
can have serious consequences, but the shopkeeper who sells him matches with the
intention that the child should cause damage to property would surely be cooperating
formally in that evil.

And because it is formal by his own intention, the

shopkeeper’s act is evil in and of itself.

In the case in point Häring rescues his

position only by insisting that the cooperator’s action must be ‘good’ - presumably,
not intentionally cooperative (either ex fine operis or ex fine operantis) in the
principal agent’s materially evil action.
Häring himself seems to affirm this line of reasoning - if not this conclusion
- in the case of a pharmacist who supplies contraceptives to a customer who, he
believes, is acting in good conscience:
[the pharmacist here] commits, in my opinion, no formal or
material cooperation with a sin of another, due to his conviction
that the customer is in good conscience. If there is no sin on the
part of the other, there is no cooperation in sin.29
Obviously this position poses other problems. It is true that an evil done in
good conscience may not constitute formal sin,30 but that is an issue primarily for
the principal agent.

In Häring’s example this enters into the cooperator’s

deliberation only in terms of whether or not he may leave the principal agent in good
faith, and whether in so doing the order of charity remains intact. But here Häring is
claiming even more than this: he assumes that if the customer commits no formal sin,
then there is no sin at all with which to cooperate - apparently, if there is no culpa
there can be no peccatum.

29

Häring 1979, 485. Emphasis added. It is important to note that this case follows that of
‘formal complicity’ which occurs, in Häring’s opinion, when for example a pharmacist sells an item
to a customer while quite aware that the item has only one purpose, and that evil. This is what the
manuals would have called ‘formal cooperation in an intrinsically evil act’.
30
This is clear in magisterial teaching: see the Congregation for the Clergy, The Washington
Case. (26 April 1971). L’Osservatore Romano 20(164) 20 May 1971, 6-7; Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith, Replies to Questions. (29 July 1974) as yet unpublished (see this Chapter,
footnotes 155 and 156); and the Australian Catholic Bishops’ Conference, Pastoral Letter on the
Application of ‘Humanae vitae’. (September 1974) in Nicholas Kerr, comp. Australian Catholic
Bishops’ Statements Since Vatican II. (Homebush, NSW: St Pauls, 1985) 151-155.
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In terms of the traditional metaphysics this is manifestly untrue.

The

customer’s good conscience is a question of the subjective or formal aspect of his
action, which may be considered in distinction from the objective or material quality
of his action.

The fact is, the customer is committing (or is about to commit)

material sin, and it is in this that the pharmacist’s action will cooperate.

Häring’s

position here appears indefensible. His approach to the problem of ethical pluralism
seems to require him to discount all moral implications of the material sins of others.
But if that were the case, it would mean that whenever a principal agent acts in good
conscience, the question of formal cooperation by a secondary agent would simply
never arise. It is not immediately evident why Häring takes this course.
He next turns his attention to the precise question of cooperation in evil that is, objective evil or ‘merely’ material sin. Häring immediately introduces two
new ideas into his analysis of cooperation:
If, however, the pharmacist himself feels in conscience that these
means are intrinsically and absolutely evil, it can be disputed especially in view of differing opinions on this point even within
his own Church - whether respect for the other person’s
conscience allows him to serve the customer of good conscience.
In this case tolerance may be better for peaceful relationships and
for avoiding hard reactions against the Church.31
Häring seems hold that where the principal agent’s act is intrinsically evil
‘respect for the other person’s conscience’ may not suffice to justify cooperation, but
‘tolerance’ may justify merely material cooperation in this act. The same reasoning
seems to underpin his closing comments on cooperation, where he deals with a very
different scenario:
It is very much disputed and can be disputed whether Catholic
hospitals must in all circumstances refuse cooperation (for instance
by offering their facilities) for sterilisation when in the eyes of the
doctors and patients, it can be qualified as therapeutic in a broad
sense. A good reason for allowing doctors who, in conscience, are
convinced that this is a positive health service in the particular case,
and are ready to offer it only to those patients requesting it in good
conscience, can be taken from a broad understanding of tolerance
and respect for a sincere conscience, especially in questions and

31

Häring 1979, 485-486. Emphasis added. Häring carefully adds that this reasoning cannot be
applied ‘where unjust damage to third persons must be avoided’.
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situations where the givenness of an objective moral evil is
doubtful.32
Häring makes no effort to define or to develop the concepts ‘respect for
sincere conscience’ and ‘toleration’, so it is difficult to evaluate his position
accurately.

He seems to have received these terms indirectly from an analysis of

religious liberty, but the text does not explain what he might mean by them.33 It is
possible that he is simply extending into the field of cooperation a principle he treats
earlier under the virtue of charity, in which he notes the conditions under which one
may omit the duty of fraternal correction.34 Alternatively, his position here may be
an expression of his general concern to promote ‘creative mutuality’ and ‘reciprocity
of consciences’ - which in his view, seemingly, require one to ignore ‘merely’
material evil. This difficulty in grasping the exact meaning of Häring’s claim may
be due to the particular style of his later work, which he deems ‘paracletic’: it is
meant to ‘manifest the binding force of the beatitudes, the ‘law of the Spirit’, while
also demonstrating the attractive power of the Christian moral message’.35
However he understands them, Häring’s use here of ‘tolerance’ and ‘respect for
sincere conscience’ later attracted considerable attention from theological and
magisterial authorities.36
Whatever Häring’s intention in the balance of Free and Faithful in Christ, his
treatment of cooperation here is neither as coherent nor as satisfying as his earlier
work.

His goal to ‘form a Christian mind set and that profound vision which is

essential for Christian maturity’ would certainly seem to warrant a re-interpretation
of the whole problem of cooperation, but his later treatment of the principle is really
32

Häring 1979, 486. Emphasis added. A surprising aspect of this paragraph is that Häring makes
no reference at all to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s Response Quaecumquae
sterilizatio. ‘On Sterilization in Catholic Hospitals.’ (13 March 1975) [AAS 68(1976) 738-740] which
had been in circulation for three years by the time he published this volume of Free and Faithful in
Christ. And in view of his emphasis on reciprocity of conscience in moral life it is equally surprising
that while the traditional treatment of cooperation often notes the associated danger of scandal - an
obvious problem in this case - Häring here makes no mention at all of scandal.
33
A footnote refers the reader to an article of Charles Curran, which in turn is an interpretation of
cooperation based on concepts found in John Courtney Murray SJ, The Problem of Religious
Freedom. (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1965). For further discussion, see 4.1.2.4 below.
34
Häring 1979, 456-458: ‘Fraternal encouragement and correction.’
35
Häring, Terzo Millennio, 50-51. On his understanding of ‘paraclesis’, see Terzo Millennio, 5358.
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just a re-working of The Law of Christ which fails to preserve its clarity.

It is as

though the ‘paracletic’ nature of his renewed moral theology and its grounding in his
version of a solidly Christian anthropology - his ‘turn to the subject’ - has
absolved Häring from the need to develop a sound metaphysical basis for his later
position on cooperation in evil, and especially formal cooperation.37

3.1.3

Karl H Peschke

The first edition of Karl Peschke’s Christian Ethics (1975) was intended as a
response to the call of Vatican II for a renewal of the discipline, and as a ‘handbook’
of moral theology for priests and lay people involved in religious education.38 Both
volumes of the work underwent substantial revision in light of the revised code of
Canon Law (1983).
Peschke’s understanding of moral theology is grounded in a decidedly
scholastic metaphysics:
Christian ethics or moral theology is that part of theology which
studies in the light of Christian faith and of reason the guidelines
which man must follow to attain his final goal.39
This ‘goal-orientation’ is central to Peschke’s design.

One of his major

insights into method is the importance of both the ontological and the eschatological
orientations of the human person: moral theology must attend not only to who man
is, but also to who man is to become.40
36

Häring’s ideas attracted the attention of Germain Grisez and Pope John Paul II, both in 1993.
See below, at 3.1.4.2 and 3.2.1 respectively.
37
J Gallagher argues that Häring’s emphasis on ‘creative fidelity’ rather than normative ethics
leads him in Free and Faithful to dissolve the metaphysical foundations of natural law itself because,
in Häring’s vision of Christian morality, natural law ‘does not any longer provide access to an
objective moral order which the Christian need only look at in order to see. . . . Given the historical,
social, and cultural contexts in which persons seek the good, the only caveat that remains of the
traditional natural law is that it ought not be sought arbitrarily.’ J Gallagher, Time Past, 206. This
would explain Häring’s conflicts with magisterial authorities who have consistently sought to
preserve the objective moral order.
38
Karl H Peschke SVD, Christian Ethics: Moral Theology in the Light of Vatican II. Vol. 1
General Moral Theology. Revised edition. (Alcester: C Goodliffe Neale, 1986) [Hereafter: Peschke
1986]; Vol. 2 Special Moral Theology. Revised edition. (Alcester: C Goodliffe Neale, 1993).
[Hereafter: Peschke 1993] This reference: Peschke 1986, 1.
39
Peschke 1986, 3.
40
Peschke’s approach illustrates the scientific nature of theology as described by Lonergan: ‘The
methods employed are partly of a positive nature, as used in the biblical and historical sciences, and
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The ontological point of departure consists in the study of man’s
concrete, existing nature and of the world around him. . . . The
knowledge of what man is, what his possibilities are and the limits
he cannot transcend, is indispensable for a realistic moral discourse.
However in order to decide what man should choose among the
many possibilities open to him, the ontological point of departure
alone is not sufficient.
It must be complemented by the
teleological and eschatological point of departure, which informs
man about the goal to be achieved, the kind of person he should be
and the work he is to do.41
The eschatological orientation is significant not only for the content and
general tenor of Peschke’s work, but also for its structure.42

One discussion of

cooperation is located under ‘Restitution for culpable cooperation in damage’ as was
usual in the manuals;43 however his more general treatment of cooperation is found
not under ‘charity’ but under ‘sin’ - specifically, ‘Responsibility for sins of others
and sinful cooperation’, which covers seduction and scandal as well as counselling
the lesser evil.44 The theme of ‘responsibility’ enables Peschke to present ‘charity’
principally in terms of its positive demands, rather than in terms of what it forbids or
merely allows. ‘Charity’ provides for Peschke an eschatological point of departure:
his positive vision of the obligations of Christian charity enables him to explain how
man’s actions conduct him to his final end, rather than merely circumscribing limits
beyond which he dare not go.45
In this light it is understandable that Peschke pays particular attention to the
‘ordo caritatis’. He distinguishes charity as ‘appreciative esteem and benevolence’
partly of a speculative nature, as used by philosophy and speculative theology. Positive theology
employs literary and historical criticism as its instruments. Hermeneutics has here its proper place,
ie the methods to be followed for a correct interpretation of biblical texts and historical documents
and of the moral statements they contain.’ Peschke 1986, 7.
41
Peschke 1986, 7-8.
42
The structure of Peschke’s work is much closer to that of Häring’s The Law of Christ than to
any of the traditional manuals, or even to Häring’s later text.
43
Peschke 1993, 711ff.
44
Peschke 1986, 314ff; cooperation is at 320-324.
45
Even under ‘sin’ Peschke manages to retain an eschatological orientation: ‘Man is bound to
strive after the ultimate end and not to offend in any of his actions against it.’ Peschke 1986, 286.
This means that (a) man is obliged to pursue his ultimate end actively, and certainly to avoid anything
which would lead him away from that end - or, in view of man's social-historical nature, anything
which would lead others away from it; but also (b) given appropriate conditions - and according to
the order of charity - man is not obliged in every case to intervene in order to prevent his
neighbour’s sin, and may at times even be justified in materially cooperating with his neighbour in
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from charity as ‘intensity of affection’, and he distinguishes both of these from
charity as ‘responsibility for one’s personal obligations’.46 Under the last he notes
that ‘[o]ur own development, sanctification and salvation depend more on our own
responsible acts than does the salvation of our fellowmen’ 47 - which approximates
Alphonsus’s position on justifying material cooperation under the order of charity.
Thus, in dealing with scandal, Peschke argues that
. . . every moral obligation demands from a man that he should not
violate it or wilfully cause its violation; but it does not require by
itself to hinder others from violating it; if such an obligation exists,
it is usually an obligation of charity.48
He uses another of Alphonsus’s criteria to distinguish seduction and scandal
from cooperation: seduction implies deliberate moral causality, scandal implies
moral causality praeter intentionem, but cooperation proper implies no moral
causality at all.49
In describing the categories and principles of cooperation Peschke attempts to
encompass several positions, with mixed success.
First, formal cooperation is defined as occurring ‘when one externally
concurs in the sinful deed of another and at the same time internally consents to it.
This kind of cooperation is always sinful’.50

Here he agrees with Davis: formal

cooperation requires both intention of the end, finis, and intention of means, quod est
ad finem. It is self-evident that this kind of action is sinful, because an evil end is
directly intended.

He notes that ‘moral handbooks’ distinguish explicit from

implicit formal cooperation:

direct intention of the other’s evil end (ex fine

operantis, by willing the same finis) is explicit formal cooperation, while indirect
intention of that end (ex fine operis, by willing only id quod est ad finem) is implicit
formal cooperation.

He also notes that some authors prefer to use ‘immediate

order to fulfil his own obligation to pursue his own ultimate end. Peschke does not greatly develop
this latter insight in the context of his discussion of cooperation.
46
Peschke 1993, 208f.
47
Peschke 1993, 210.
48
Peschke 1986, 316.
49
Peschke 1986, 314-316. At 321: ‘In contradistinction to seduction and scandal, cooperation
does not give rise to the sin of another, but it only assists a principal agent, who is already
determined to the evil deed previous to the cooperation.’
50
Peschke 1986, 321.
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material cooperation’ rather than ‘implicit formal cooperation’, but only the latter is
necessarily ‘sinful’.
Peschke also reflects Davis in defining material cooperation, even using
identical examples, and he is no more able than Davis to provide a definitive
distinction between proximate and remote material cooperation.51

But then he

introduces a confusion:
More useful for the formulation of moral norms however seems to
be the distinction between cooperation by means of actions which
in themselves are not harmful to others, such as selling a bottle of
whisky, giving a key, driving a car, preparing instruments for an
operation, and cooperation by means of actions which by their
own, internal finality cause harm to another, such as telling a lie,
damaging another’s property, beating a person, killing him. All
the actions forbidden by the traditional absolutes belong to this
second category.52
Here he appears to refer to indifferent acts and intrinsically evil acts, but
chooses to define these in terms of whether they do harm to another ‘by their own,
internal finality’. This is unfortunate, because it seems to place Peschke in the line
of consequentialism. But perhaps Peschke here is simply providing an idiosyncratic
definition of these critical concepts, in line with the ‘moral/pre-moral’ distinction.53
The effect is to blur the field of vision at a time when clarity is of paramount
importance: ‘damaging another’s property’ may indeed be an action which by its
own internal finality does harm to another person, but Davis argues that under
extreme conditions it may also qualify as, for example, justified immediate material
cooperation.

Peschke’s additional distinctions - and the terms he chooses to

express them - are not particularly helpful.
In his introduction to ‘Norms for Material Cooperation’ Peschke states:
Material cooperation in sinful deeds of others is in general illicit,
since the evil of sin should not be supported by any means; on the
contrary it should be opposed and suppressed. Yet on the other
51

Peschke 1986, 322.
Peschke 1986, 322.
53
For example, in Peschke 1986 at 265, 276 and 323 he seems to favour the idea of ‘pre-moral’
intrinsic evil, but with Milhaven acknowledges the difficulty of allowing the possibility of
intrinsically evil acts at the ‘moral’ level. This question was addressed in Chapter Two in terms of
‘adequate descriptions’ of moral acts.
52
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hand man often cannot escape some cooperation in the sins of
others in order to avoid still greater evils.54
This grounds the justification of material cooperation in a preference for a
lesser evil, which at first blush might open Peschke to suspicions of proportionalism.
But given that he has defined evil and sin in terms of that which leads man away
from his ultimate end, Peschke’s position seems to have a soundly thomistic
metaphysical base.
He lists factors to be considered in estimating the sufficiency of reasons to
justify cooperation: the gravity of the other’s sin, closeness of one’s cooperation to
the sinful act, the indispensability of that cooperation, and one’s obligation to
prevent the wrongdoing.

These are four of the five factors listed by Alphonsus.55

But Peschke then takes his own path again.
The fifth factor noted by Alphonsus is ‘how greatly the sin offends the
demands of justice by virtue of the harm it does to third parties’.56

This passage

clearly refers to the harm done by the act (‘the sin’) of the principal agent.

In

contrast, Peschke’s final norm refers to the damage done by the cooperator’s act:
Material cooperation by means of actions which by their own
finality cause harm to others is most of the time not allowed and if permissible - always requires a much graver reason than other
kinds of cooperation. The reason is that in this case one does not
merely indirectly make an evil possible, as in the previous category
of cooperation, but one directly causes it. Therefore one also has a
greater responsibility for it. In such instances a strict proportion is
required between the damage inflicted on the one hand and the
damage threatening the person who renders cooperation on the
other. More exactly that means to say, the damage inflicted upon
the other person must be less than the evil threatening the person
who cooperates.57

54

Peschke 1986, 322. Emphasis added.
Alphonsus, de caritate 59.
56
Alphonsus, de caritate 59: ‘quanto magis peccatum cum justitia pugnat, idque propter damnum
tertii.’
57
Peschke 1986, 323. Emphasis added.
55
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Traditional studies of cooperation follow the pattern of Alphonsus on this
point,58 so it is difficult to see why Peschke chooses to focus on the cooperator’s
action and not on the principal agent’s sin. It may be that this is how he wishes to
address the question of cooperation in unjust damage without separating it from his
general treatment of cooperation.

Certainly the examples he offers deal not with

causality (the question of who actually causes the harm) but with the proportion
between the harm one inflicts on the third party and the harm threatening oneself.
The question of restitution for cooperation in unjust damage is handled elsewhere.59
It is possible that Peschke here is struggling with a problem which falls
somewhere between ‘cooperating in unjust damage’ in the traditional sense, and
‘counselling the lesser evil’ (which follows immediately in his analysis): it is the
question of whether one may oneself directly commission a lesser evil in order to
avoid a greater harm to oneself.

This could be argued in terms of merely

counselling for oneself the lesser evil - following one’s own counsel, as it were although there is a considerable difference between counselling evil and
commissioning evil.

Alternatively, following Davis, it could be argued in some

cases that an adequate description of one’s action would show that one inflicted
unjust harm on no-one: in view of the graver threat to oneself, the harm one is
forced to cause to a third party could not adequately be described as ‘unjust’. But
however it is argued, the question of directly causing harm to others is clearly
distinct from that of cooperation in causing harm; by raising it here Peschke seems
to introduce more confusion than clarity.
Perhaps it is this uncertainty which prompts Peschke to close his treatment of
cooperation with another clear tribute to his principal sources:

58

Aertnys-Damen refer to ‘cooperatio proxima ad peccatum alterius’ especially the case: ‘si
cooperatio tertio innocenti graviter damnosa est, requiritur metus damni saltem aequalis’. (AertnysDamen, de caritate 401, III); Davis refers to ‘immediate material cooperation in another’s sinful act’
such as helping the other in destroying property in order to save one’s own life. Davis’s argument is
that this is not using an evil means to a good end, because no-one’s rights are invaded: the owner of
the property could not reasonable will that his property be preserved at the cost of my life. (See Davis
vol. I, 342-343); Häring 1963 refers to ‘material cooperation in a deed which inflicts unjust damage
on a third party’, and adds: ‘In this we assume of course that one has a right per se to do the deed
which becomes a contributing factor or cooperates in inflicting the damage on others.’ (Häring 1963,
vol 2, 499).
59
Peschke 1993, 710-713.
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These are some general guidelines to give orientation in the thorny
problem of permissible cooperation. The concrete instances of
cooperation are very often complicated and therefore inevitably
give rise to various opinions. Perhaps there is no more difficult
question in the whole range of moral theology.60

3.1.4

Germain Grisez

Among contemporary attempts to renew Catholic moral theology, none is
more radical or thoroughgoing than that of Germain G Grisez. At the centre of his
vast project stands The Way of the Lord Jesus, a proposed four-volume textbook of
moral theology for seminary students and others.61

This monumental undertaking

does not pretend to be a successor to the manuals, but rather represents a novel line
of Catholic moral reasoning.
This section will attempt to present Grisez’s treatment of cooperation as it
has been developed in the three volumes of The Way of the Lord Jesus published to
date.62

Because his approach to cooperation is so distinctive it is only possible to

summarise Grisez’s position here; and in order to make valid comparisons between
that position and the tradition, it will be necessary first to provide an interpretation of
his whole project.
3.1.4.1 Grisez’s Project
As moral theology emerged from the era of the manuals, some traditional
doctrines came to be considered more or less problematic - among them, the

60

Peschke 1986, 324. Compare with Aertnys-Damen, de caritate 402; and Davis, vol. I, 342.
The first three volumes of The Way of the Lord Jesus have been published to date (2001): Vol.
1: Christian Moral Principles. (Chicago: Franciscan Press, 1983) [Hereafter: CMP]; Vol. 2 : Living
a Christian Life. (Quincy Il.: Franciscan Press, 1993) [Hereafter: LCL]; Vol. 3: Difficult Moral
Questions. (Quincy Il.: Franciscan Press, 1997) [Hereafter: DMQ]. Volume 4 is planned for
publication in 2004. The whole work is addressed to a very wide audience: ‘This book is constructed
primarily as a textbook in fundamental moral theology for students in Catholic seminaries . . .
However, those already ordained to the priesthood, teachers of religion, parents concerned about the
catechetical formation of their children, and others may find the book helpful.’ CMP, xxix. Similar
statements are to be found in the introductions to LCL and DMQ.
62
Cooperation figures in CMP at 300-303, and in LCL at 440-444, but the most developed
presentation is in DMQ at 871-897. DMQ applies Grisez’s ethical theory to 200 case studies, fully
25% of which deal with questions of cooperation. The question most relevant to the present study is
Question 87: How far may Catholic hospitals cooperate with providers of immoral services? This is
discussed in more detail at 4.3 below.
61
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teachings on abortion and contraception.63 Traditional doctrinal arguments against
these practices begin in natural law and proceed by a kind of deduction to conclude
in absolute moral norms.64 But some theologians considered that their grounding in
natural law opened these doctrines to question on the basis of the so-called
‘naturalistic fallacy’ - the belief that, because a thing is true in the realm of nature,
it ought to be normative for moral behaviour.

According to their argument, if

natural law theory should prove faulty - if the ‘is’ of nature cannot generate a moral
‘ought’ - then the whole fabric of Catholic moral teaching would be at risk.65

It

was to avert this threat that Grisez began a thorough study of natural law theory in
Thomas Aquinas.66
63

This summary is drawn from John Daniel Mindling OFMCap., Germain Grisez: Commitment
and Choice. Doctoral Dissertation. (Rome: Academia Alfonsiana, 1987), especially at 42-45 and
180-183.
64
The tradition recognises that this is not a strictly logical process, and the ‘induction’ is only
apparent: Thomas Aquinas holds that particular moral norms are only like unto conclusions drawn
from basic principles; see for example ST I-II, 94, 4: ‘Sed quantum ad quaedam propria, quae sunt
quasi conclusiones principiorum communium . . . ’
65
Grisez believed that ‘the whole fabric of traditional teaching would unravel unless it could be
shown philosophically that contraception is intrinsically immoral. His setting out to do just that goes
far beyond the specific issue of contraception precisely because it is the whole Catholic moral
tradition which is implicitly challenged by the denial of the category ‘intrinsically immoral’ . . . But
even arguments which support the traditional condemnation of contraception are rejected: the
classic argument that the natural finality of the act is morally determinative Grisez accuses of the
naturalistic fallacy. This same accusation is leveled at those defending the traditional teaching with
a so called ‘perverted faculty argument’, and to those using a phenomenological argument.
Presumably because Grisez’s study of Thomas led him to see the value theory of the practically selfevident basic human goods, the speculative move from ‘ought’ to ‘is’ is repeatedly invoked as the
weakness of other ethical theories which attempt to defend the tradition.’ Mindling, Germain Grisez,
181-182.
For a critique of Grisez’s position on the ‘is-ought’ question, see Janice L Schultz, ‘Is-Ought:
Prescribing and a Present Controversy.’ The Thomist 49(1985) 1-23. Pope John Paul II critiques
central aspects of the ‘is-ought’ question in Veritatis splendor, 47-50 especially 47.
66
Grisez’s position on natural law is developed in ‘The First Principle of Practical Reason: A
Commentary on the Summa theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2.’ Natural Law Forum 10(1965)
168-201. For a more accessible summary of his position see Germain Grisez, ‘A Contemporary
Natural-Law Ethics’ in William C Starr and Richard C Taylor, eds. Moral Philosophy: Historical
and Contemporary Essays. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1989) 125-143; and ‘Natural
Law and Natural Inclinations: Some Comments and Clarifications.’ The New Scholasticism
LXI(1987) 307-320. For a critique of Grisez’s position on natural law, see Ralph McInerny, ‘The
Principles of Natural Law’ in Charles E Curran and Richard A McCormick SJ, eds. Readings in
Moral Theology No. 7: Natural Law and Theology. (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1991) 139-156. Grisez
and John Finnis mount a spirited defence in ‘The Basic Principles of Natural Law: A Reply to Ralph
McInerny’ in the same volume, 157-170. For a wider and more searching critique of Grisez’s
approach to Thomas, see Giuseppe Abbà, ‘I Christian Moral Principles di G Grisez e la Secunda pars
della Summa theologiae.’ Salesianum 48(1986) 637-680.
A comprehensive summary of his value theory and ethical theory may be found in Germain
Grisez, Joseph Boyle and John Finnis, ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends.’ The
American Journal of Jurisprudence 32(1987) 99-151. For a response, see George W Constable, ‘A
Criticism of ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends’ by Grisez, Boyle, and Finnis.’
The American Journal of Jurisprudence 34(1989) 19-22. A good summary of Grisez’s position in
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He identified several lacunae. First, in some respects Thomas treats the First
Principle of Practical Reason (‘Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be
avoided’) simply as a corollary to the Principle of Finality (‘All beings act for an
end’).

But there is an unhelpful circularity in defining something as a ‘good’

because it is an ‘end’ of human action, while simultaneously defining it as an ‘end’
because it is a ‘good’. Consequently, the First Principle of Practical Reason of itself
does not provide an adequate basis for establishing specific moral norms such as
those prohibiting the evils of abortion and contraception. Some intermediate steps
are required to fill the gaps: a value theory to define ‘goods’ in terms more useful
than simply as ‘ends’ of human actions; and an ethical theory in which these ‘goods’
may be related to the structures and processes of human choosing in such a way as to
ground the claim that they ‘ought’ to be chosen.67
In developing his value theory Grisez, like Peschke, notices that it is not only
man’s objective nature which provides the rule or measure of moral choices, but also
man’s future possibilities.68

In this perspective, true human goods grasped by

practical reason may be considered under the title ‘good’ because they promise to be
perfective of the human agent and fulfilling of the potencies (or inclinations or
tendencies) which first ‘reach out’ for those goods.69

The same goods may be

considered under the title ‘end’ because the ‘perfection’ towards which they conduct
the agent is not only the goal of the particular human action but also the very
the context of contemporary moral debate may be found in Jean Porter, The Recovery of Virtue: The
Relevance of Aquinas to Christian Ethics. (London: SPCK, 1994) 17-21.
67
‘Free choice is only an initial grounding of Christian moral thought which explains personal
responsibility in light of values (goods) which are real apart from one’s freely choosing them. Grisez
couples with the position that human persons can choose freely a theory of what they are free to
choose (and later on what grounds they choose): morality consists precisely in the responsibilities of
freedom.’ Mindling, Germain Grisez , 123. Emphasis original.
68
‘But scholastic natural-law theory must be rejected. It moves by a logically illicit step - from
human nature as a given reality, to what ought and ought not to be chosen . . . It is not human
nature as a given, but possible human fulfilment which must provide the intelligible norms for free
choice.’ CMP, 105. Emphasis added. Also: ‘Reason prescribes according to the order of natural
inclinations because reason directs to possible actions, and the possible patterns of human action are
determined by the natural inclinations, for man cannot act on account of that toward which he has no
basis for affinity in his inclinations.’ Grisez, The First Principle, 180.
69
‘It is true that Grisez describes the goods as ends sought for themselves, perfective of the human
agent, fulfilling the capacities of the person. . . . The very way practical reason works is to think in
terms of goods to be pursued, and it is [in] thinking thusly (ought thinking) that an entire complex of
irreducibly basic human goods are primarily grasped as to-be-done.’ Mindling, Germain Grisez,
133-135.
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fulfilment of the agent’s being. However, in the latter sense this ‘perfection’ is to be
understood not as a closed but an open state, ‘a guiding ideal rather than a
realisable idea’,70 an ‘openness to continuing and expanding fulfilment’.71 Integral
human fulfilment - understood (1) in terms of openness to continuing fulfilment,
and (2) not as an ‘individualistic satisfaction of desires’ but rather as ‘the realisation
of all the human goods in the whole human community’72 - is the end of all morally
good choices.

Any moral choice which offends or inhibits the possibilities of

integral human fulfilment is to be considered ‘evil’.
The next step is to identify which goods are conducive to integral human
fulfilment.

One category of basic human goods are the ‘existential’ or ‘reflexive’

goods which are honoured in every morally good choice: these include selfintegration, authenticity, justice, and holiness.

The other category are the

‘substantive’ or ‘nonreflexive’ goods which provide ‘free-standing’ reasons for
making particular choices: these include life itself, truth and beauty, and skill.73 The
basic human goods thus describe both the goal of integral human fulfilment, and the
conditions for the possibility of integral human fulfilment. Like first principles they
are underived, and their negation or denial in any moral choice amounts to selfcontradiction. The basic human goods fill the first gap in Thomas’ moral theory.
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Mindling, Germain Grisez, 136.
CMP, 182.
72
CMP, 186.
73
‘In sum, there are seven categories of basic human goods which perfect persons and contribute
to their fulfilment both as individuals and in communities. Four of these can be called ‘reflexive’,
since they are both reasons for choosing and are in part defined in terms of choosing. These are: (1)
self-integration, which is harmony among all the parts of a person which can be engaged in freely
chosen action; (2) practical reasonableness or authenticity, which is harmony among moral
reflection, free choices, and their execution; (3) justice and friendship, which are aspects of the
interpersonal communion of good persons freely choosing to act in harmony with one another; and
(4) religion or holiness, which is harmony with God, found in the agreement of human individual and
communal free choices with God’s will. The reflexive goods also can be called ‘existential’ or
‘moral’, since they fulfill human subjects and interpersonal groups in the existential dimension of
their being. The other three categories of basic human goods fulfil persons in the other three
dimensions of their being. These goods can be called ‘nonreflexive’ or ‘substantive’, since they are
not defined in terms of choosing, and they provide reasons for choosing which can stand by
themselves. These are: (1) life itself, including health, physical integrity, safety, and the handing on
of life to new persons; (2) knowledge of various forms of truth and appreciation of various forms of
beauty or excellence; and (3) activities of skilful work and of play, which in their very performance
enrich those who do them.’ CMP, 124.
71
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Grisez’s value theory affirms that it is the totality of these goods that the
agent ‘does’ or ‘pursues’, and the denial of them that the agent ‘avoids’, when acting
according to the First Principle of Practical Reason.74 This is specified in his basic
principle of morality:
In voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is
opposed to them, one ought to choose and otherwise will those
and only those possibilities whose willing is compatible with a
will toward integral human fulfilment.75
Note the wording of this principle: it is not only the good which is willed, but
also the willing itself, which must be compatible with integral human fulfilment. So
both the choice and the choosing are determinative: in traditional terms, morality
resides in both imperated and elicited acts.76
General determinations of the First Principle of Practical Reason are the basic
precepts of natural law - indeed, these precepts are the natural law.77 But between
the First Principle of Practical Reason and the basic principle of morality on one
hand and, on the other, specific determinations of these principles (particular moral
norms), some intermediate specifications are required in order to establish two
necessary relationships: (1) to relate general principles to specific instances of human
goods, and (2) to relate specific human goods to integral human fulfilment.78
The core of Grisez’s ethical theory are the eight intermediate specifications
which he calls the ‘modes of responsibility’. These identify and exclude actions or

74

Grisez calls this ‘the First Principle of Practical Reasoning’, to emphasise the dynamic nature of
human reason directed to action. See for example CMP, 180: ‘The first principle of practical
reasoning articulates the intrinsic, necessary relationship between human goods and appropriate
actions bearing upon them.’ But note that this principle only delineates what might be done; another
phase of practical reasoning is required to choose what ought to be done from this range of
possibilities.
75
CMP, 184.
76
CMP, 233: ‘The action of an individual is defined by the proposal adopted by a choice, just as
the action of a group is defined by the motion adopted by a vote.’
77
CMP, 180; Grisez, ‘The First Principle’, 181.
78
‘By itself, the first principle of morality is obviously too general to provide practical guidance.
Even if acts are defined in terms of choices and human goods, the principle’s bearing on them
remains obscure. Specifications of the first principle are needed. They must have a clear bearing
on possible choices, so that the relationship - positive or negative - between the choices and
integral human fulfilment will be clear. The principles of practical reasoning in general - for
example, Life is a good to be preserved - do not specify the first principle of morality, for each refers
only to one basic human good, not to integral human fulfilment.’ CMP, 189.
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patterns of action which represent kinds of choosing inconsistent with an orientation
towards integral human fulfilment.79 In this way they protect the basic human goods
which, precisely because they are oriented to integral human fulfilment which is
common to all moral agents, may be portrayed as ontological aspects of moral
choosing.

The most important existential aspects of moral choosing are the

‘vocational commitments’ by which an individual agent freely constitutes and
reaffirms his personal identity in a most fundamental way.80

In every free choice

one bears a responsibility to honour not only the basic human goods but also these
commitments.

Individual moral choices thus assume great significance.

The

modes of responsibility mediate between the First Principle and the specific norms
which guide individual choices, and so fill the second gap in Thomas’ moral
theory.81
The ‘modes of responsibility’ provide an important clue to Grisez’s treatment
of cooperation in evil. The structure of these modes reveals that they link the basic
human goods not firstly with the objects of human choice, but with the process of
choosing itself.

Morality for Grisez resides primarily in the elicited acts, in the

process of choosing which precedes and accompanies imperated acts, because it is
here that moral responsibility is most fundamentally attributable to the agent. It is
in the elicited act that one first honours both integral human fulfilment and one’s
personal vocational commitments.

So Grisez’s approach to the naturalistic fallacy

amounts to this: he takes the notion of ‘morality’ away from the mere choice of
79

CMP, 189.
Freedom and consistency in choosing are basic to Grisez’s ethical theory. See CMP, 41-59.
81
The eight modes of responsibility are studied in detail in CMP. They are:
1. One should not be deterred by felt inertia from acting for intelligible goods. (CMP 205)
2. One should not be pressed by enthusiasm or impatience to act individualistically for intelligible
goods. (206)
3. One should not choose to satisfy an emotional desire except as part of one’s pursuit and/or
attainment of an intelligible good other than the satisfaction of the desire itself. (208)
4. One should not choose to act out of an emotional aversion except as part of one’s avoidance of
some intelligible evil other than the inner tension experienced in enduring that aversion. (210)
5. One should not, in response to different feelings toward different persons, willingly proceed
with a preference for anyone unless the preference is required by intelligible goods themselves. (211)
6. One should not choose on the basis of emotions which bear upon empirical aspects of
intelligible goods (or bads) in a way which interferes with a more perfect sharing in the good or
avoidance of the bad. (214)
7. One should not be moved by hostility to freely accept or choose the destruction, damaging, or
impeding of any intelligible human good. (215)
8. One should not be moved by a stronger desire for one instance of an intelligible good to act for
it by choosing to destroy, damage, or impede some other instance of an intelligible good. (216)
80
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external objects or ends, and restores it to its rightful place in the processes of the
human heart and mind.

The object of a moral ‘ought’ is not an ‘is’ which stands

outside the moral agent: at its deepest level it is the moral agent.
In terms of the objects of human choosing Grisez’s ‘integral human
fulfilment’ is, as it were, one step nearer to the moral agent than Thomas’
‘beatitude’.

His ‘basic human goods’ identify how it is that the objects of human

choosing participate in integral human fulfilment, and his ‘modes of responsibility’
identify how the very process of choosing these objects conducts one towards that
fulfilment. In traditional terms, good and evil may indeed reside to some extent in
the finis and the id quod est ad finem in themselves, but moral responsibility properly
resides in the intending of these, because it is in the intending or choosing, prior to
the acting, that the agent expresses his or her fundamental commitment to moral
truth: to integral human fulfilment (which is represented in every particular moral
object and which underpins every specific moral norm), and to his or her personal
vocational commitments.

The agent’s primary responsibility is toward this

underlying moral truth, and only consequently toward observing particular moral
norms. Therefore the most basic moral question is not ‘what does the law permit me
to do?’ but ‘what does moral truth oblige me to do?’.82
3.1.4.2 Grisez on Cooperation
This structure helps to explain some aspects of Grisez’s treatment of
cooperation in evil.

In Christian Moral Principles he discusses cooperation in the

context of resolving problematic situations of conscience.83

He summarises the

82

‘Like contemplative theology, [moral theology] reflects upon the truths of faith, but it is less
concerned to round out the Christian view of reality than to make clear how faith should shape
Christian life, both the lives of individual Christians and the life of the Church.’ CMP, 6. This is a
problem addressed - with mixed success - by Karl Rahner SJ in ‘On the Question of a Formal
Existential Ethics’ in his Theological Investigations 2: Man in the Church. (London: Darton,
Longman and Todd, 1963) 217-234.
83
The location of his treatment of cooperation in CMP reveals Grisez’s essentially logical
approach to moral reasoning. He moves from natural law to the modes of responsibility (Chapter 8)
and then to voluntariness in choosing (9), moral norms (10) and the binding force of moral norms
(11), reaching an analysis of Moral Judgment in Problematic Situations (12) which also follows a
logical order: doubts of conscience in general (Question A), doubts of fact (B), doubts of norms (C),
probabilism (D), resolving doubts in cases of apparently conflicting responsibilities (E) and where
one seems obliged to do evil (F), and finally cooperation in evil (Question G, pages 300-303). There
are also three appendices to Chapter 12, two dealing with probabilism and one with the principle of
double effect.
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traditional doctrine, noting the modes of cooperation and identifying cooperation
proper as participation ‘in a secondary or subordinate role’.84 There are blemishes:
he appears to confuse the principal with the cooperating agent, and the morality of
cooperation with that of scandal;85 and he seems to distinguish material from formal
cooperation only rather vaguely in terms of whether the cooperator ‘participates in
the immoral act in such a way that it becomes his or her own’.86
A more fundamental difficulty is his assertion that the traditional doctrine of
cooperation created an unnecessary problem:
Apparent difficulties arise mainly because it is supposed that
being involved in unseemly behaviour or bringing about
unacceptable consequences has a moral significance of its own,
apart from the morality of one’s choices and other volitional
principles of personal responsibility. But that is not the case.
One’s responsibilities for what one is involved in is determined
by what one personally chooses, freely accepts, and so on.87
Grisez rightly holds that the assessment of cooperation requires a clear
distinction between effects which one directly intends and produces, and effects
which one does not intend even though one contributes to their production by
another agent:
What one does in the strict sense is what one chooses to do that is, what is sought for its own sake and/or included as a
means in the proposal one adopts . . . What one brings about,
including all foreseen side effects, is far more extensive than
what one chooses to do and ‘does’ in the strict sense. One
determines oneself primarily in choosing.
In choosing one
establishes one’s existential identity by settling one’s personal
priorities among the goods on which the choice bears. One does
not determine oneself in the same way with respect to foreseen
side effects, which are neither sought for their own sake nor
included in the proposal one adopts.88
But in his particular perspective on morality the question of responsibility is
paramount, and this impacts greatly on his approach to cooperation in evil:
84

CMP, 300.
‘The morality of cooperation is clear enough in such cases - one who instigates immorality
gives scandal and cannot be free of guilt.’ CMP, 300.
86
CMP, 301.
87
CMP, 302.
88
CMP, 239-240.
85
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At the same time, one bears responsibility for foreseen side
effects. Since they are foreseen, these effects are voluntary.
One could avoid them by not choosing what one chooses. One
might not want them, but one does accept them. Thus, while
primarily responsible for choices, which directly determine
oneself and shape one’s character, one is secondarily responsible
for the foreseen consequences of carrying out one’s choices.
Since side effects are freely accepted, it makes sense to ask
whether one ought to accept them.89
Grisez believes that circumstances may arise in which ‘accepting foreseen
side effects which it would be wrong to choose’ is permissible,90 but one who
accepts these side effects is still responsible for them.

These side effects, then,

ought not to be accepted at all unless the proposal adopted (the ‘choosing’) not only
excludes these evil effects, but is itself adopted only for an adequate reason:
If a nurse who favours abortion adopts a proposal to kill unborn
babies and participates in abortion procedures in execution of the
proposal, she is killing unborn babies, and it matters not whether
outwardly she does no more than fill out forms. On the other
hand, if a nurse is threatened with loss of employment unless she
assists a surgeon who is doing abortions, she could be assisting
in surgery to keep her job without ever adopting a proposal to
kill any unborn baby. The acts of the nurse herself need be no
different than what she does in any morally good operation.
The acts of the surgeon and the death of the babies not only are
no ends of hers, they are not even means she chooses. They are
only foreseen consequences.91
What Grisez affirms here is the central importance of the cooperator’s
subjective intention and his ‘sufficiently serious reason’: both must exclude
absolutely any willing of the evil effects of the principal agent’s action. His position
is essentially simple: formal cooperation is excluded (since the proposal one adopts
must totally exclude the evil effects - that is, one’s action cannot be not evil in
itself), and material cooperation is likewise excluded except for a sufficiently serious
reason.92

There is little need for the categories ‘immediate-mediate’, ‘proximate-

remote’, and ‘necessary-contingent’.93
89

CMP, 240. Unfortunately Grisez does not explain what ‘secondarily responsible’ might mean.
CMP, 298.
91
CMP, 301.
92
‘The fact that one does not adopt any proposal which is morally excluded, however, does not
free one from moral responsibility - perhaps grave responsibility - for what one helps to bring
about. For example, a nurse who prepares patients for abortion not because this behaviour carries
90
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A second treatment of the question of cooperation is found in Living a
Christian Life in the context of one’s specific responsibilities towards others with
whom one is in community.94

There still seem to be misconceptions about the

traditional principle: he appears to suggest that the ‘formal-material’ classification
of cooperation does not apply when a cooperative action is required by obedience to
legitimate authority,95 and he purports to offer three instances of illicit formal
cooperation, one of which (‘one intends or one’s purpose includes that another
commit a sin’) is clearly a case not of cooperation but of active scandal.96
On the other hand the treatment here has the benefit of emphasising again the
importance of the sufficiently serious reason - ‘adequate reason’ in Grisez’s terms97
- and the need to establish a truly adequate description of the various alternative
actions from which the cooperator must choose.98 Grisez also responds to Häring:
out any proposal of hers but merely as part of her job perhaps ought to look for a different job or
refuse to do these preparations by way of testimony to the truth. The abortions she assists really are
a foreseen and accepted consequence of her own chosen actions; perhaps she is obliged not to
accept this consequence.’ CMP, 302. Emphasis added.
Note that Grisez’s concern is not whether the law permits the nurse to cooperate, but whether her
vocational commitments impose any obligation not to cooperate.
93
See DMQ, 890.
94
The overall context of LCL is vocation understood as ‘the whole of the unique life to which God
calls each Christian’ (LCL, xii) and virtue understood as the graces God gives to aid Christian
response, especially faith, hope, charity, justice and mercy (xvii). Interestingly, at one point in the
Introduction to LCL Grisez espouses an approach to morality remarkably similar to Häring’s
‘paraclesis’: ‘Consequently, at the present time any clear and full articulation of the authentic
requirements of Christian life is bound to seem hard and unrealistic. That impression will be greater
to the extent that those requirements are regarded, wrongly, as a burden imposed, rather than as
necessary implications of sharing with the Lord Jesus in service to his kingdom . . . ’ LCL, xvi.
95
Cooperation ‘often refers to the action of a group of more or less coequal participants, each
making a distinct and appropriate contribution in pursuit of a common end. In such cooperation,
involving the exercise of authority and the practice of obedience, one fulfils one’s responsibilities
toward others by personally doing what is right and avoiding scandal.
Sometimes, though, cooperation refers not to communal action but to the subordinate action of
one who contributes something to the wrongdoing of another, who is the principal agent pursuing his
or her proper good. In this sense, cooperation is either formal or material.’ LCL, 440.
96
LCL, 440. Grisez acknowledges his mistake without comment in DMQ, 872 footnote 457.
97
‘Assuming cooperation is material and the act by which it is carried out otherwise would be
morally good, the question is whether one has an adequate reason to do that act in view of its bad
side effects.’ LCL, 442.
98
Grisez’s method of establishing this ‘adequate description’ is to ask a set of questions
remarkably like that proposed two centuries ago: compare LCL, 442-443 with Alphonsus, de caritate
59.
Unfortunately Grisez then seems to weaken his position on an ‘adequate description’ of moral
alternatives in a comment on Häring’s cases of cooperation in The Law of Christ: ‘The opinions
Häring proposes on most of the examples, considered just as he frames them, seem sound, although
sometimes additional circumstances could be specified in which they would be unsound.’ (LCL, 443,
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‘respect for consciences’ is not an argument for material cooperation because
‘anyone else’s state of conscience is irrelevant to the [cooperator’s] own act’.99
Finally, he

explicitly ties morality to spirituality: the mature and responsible

Christian person asks not ‘what will the law allow me to do’, but ‘what is God
calling me to do’, so there is great need for prudent discernment in choosing which
particular act corresponds with God’s will.100
Grisez’s concern to attain a precise understanding of cooperation is evident in
his third volume, Difficult Moral Questions, his most developed position on the
subject.101 His understanding of material and formal cooperation here sheds light on
his vision of the structure of cooperation, and helps to explain a certain variation
from the tradition.
. . . contributing to another’s wrongdoing is formal cooperation
if, and only if, the act by which one contributes agrees in bad
intending with the wrongful act with which one cooperates.
Any other way of being involved is not involvement in
another’s wrongdoing precisely as wrongdoing. So, material in
this context refers to that about a cooperator’s act which
involves him or her in a wrongdoer’s act in such a way that the
two acts share no bad intending in common. Whatever is badly
willed by the wrongdoer is at most only an accepted side effect,
foreseen but not intended, of the material cooperator’s act.
. . . the material cooperator’s act, if not wrong for some
other reason, is wrong if, and only if, he or she should not accept
the bad side effects of contributing to another’s wrongdoing.102
And Grisez later specifies what he means by ‘bad side effects’:
The basic bad side effect of material cooperation is that one’s
action makes some unintended contribution to another’s
wrongdoing. That wrongdoing itself always has bad effects,
and these often have further bad effects.103

footnote 60). It is obvious that ‘additional circumstances’ will often constitute a new ‘case’ to be
assessed, and naturally a different judgment will be reached. The question may be asked whether this
extraordinary criticism reveals in Grisez an ambivalent attitude toward the concept of ‘adequate
description’ and, a fortiori, toward ‘moral object’.
99
LCL, 441. Compare with Häring 1979, 484-486.
100
LCL, 443. In dealing elsewhere with discernment (LCL, 291-293) Grisez notes that the model
he proposes is to be used only where one has eliminated all evil alternatives and is left only with
several good alternatives. Grisez’s treatment of the practical role of prudence is developed further in
DMQ, 886-889.
101
DMQ, 871-897 : Appendix 2 Formal and material cooperation in others’ wrongdoing.
102
DMQ, 873.
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On one hand Grisez has previously asserted that an agent bears responsibility
for foreseen side effects,104 and here is simply applying this principle specifically to
cooperation.

On the other hand this position highlights two ways in which Grisez

varies from the tradition.
First, the assertion that ‘whatever is badly willed by the wrongdoer is at most
only an accepted side effect, foreseen but not intended, of the material cooperator’s
act’ takes Grisez’s position here much further than Christian Moral Principles.
While it sits happily enough within his own system the impact of this statement, in
terms of the traditional view, is extraordinary: it implies that the evil consequences
of the principal agent’s act are effects (albeit foreseen and unintended) of the
cooperator’s act.105 This seems to cut directly across the ‘boundary of culpability’
defined by Alphonsus - the critical clarification that, in legitimate cooperation, the
evil which is done proceeds not from one’s cooperation but from the principal
agent’s own malice.106 How is Grisez’s position to be reconciled with the tradition?
Only in the context of his criterion of ‘responsibility’ is Grisez’s position
defensible.

The evil effects of the principal agent’s act may be considered as

unintended side effects of the cooperator’s act only if one’s inquiry is restricted to
Grisez’s prior question (raised in Christian Moral Principles) of whether or not the
cooperator ought to accept these evil effects.

His statement on accepting bad side

effects is then seen to refer to the importance of a sufficiently serious reason: since
the First Principle requires that evil is to be avoided, there is a prima facie
responsibility not to accept the evil effects and so not to cooperate at all.

In this

view, the task of the sufficiently serious reason is essentially positive: it is to
establish the rightness of accepting the evil consequences of the principal agent’s
act.

This is to be assessed in the context of the obligations or responsibilities one

bears in light of the basic human goods and one’s personal vocational commitments,
and these may exclude cooperation for any number of reasons.107

On the other

103

DMQ, 879.
CMP, 240.
105
For example, DMQ, 889: ‘. . . the problem of judging whether material cooperation is
acceptable is part of the general problem of judging whether bad side effects are acceptable.’
106
Alphonsus, de caritate 63.
107
DMQ, 879-882 notes a large number of ‘bad effects’ which may preclude cooperation.
104
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hand, in line with Alphonsus, one could argue that this ‘rightness’ can be established
under the order of charity, where the situation may be portrayed as a choice between
two evils: the evil of participating in another’s sin, versus the evil to be suffered if
one does not cooperate.108 The order of charity permits one to choose to endure the
lesser evil.
In order to reconcile Grisez’s position precisely in relation to the tradition, it
is essential to emphasise that the cooperator’s ‘accepting’ of these evil effects in no
way establishes the effects themselves as objects of the cooperator’s volition. It is
not the evil effect itself, but the acceptance of that evil effect, which is present to the
will as an object.109

Because they are excluded from the proposal adopted by the

cooperator, the evil effects themselves are neither directly nor indirectly voluntary
and so the cooperator is not at all morally responsible for them in themselves. But
he is morally responsible for the choice to accept them as an unintended aspect of his
action, and so the acceptance of them is indirectly voluntary.

Thomas establishes

that the indirectly voluntary is attributable to an agent only if he could and should
have acted otherwise.110

Grisez argues that the acceptance of these evil effects is

indeed attributable to the agent unless their acceptance is consistent with the totality
of basic human goods and one’s personal vocational commitments. Alphonsus uses
a different argument: the order of charity establishes grounds for the cooperator to
believe that he need not refrain from cooperating.

108

Alphonsus himself, of course, does not seek to establish the ‘rightness’ of material cooperation,
but only its permissibility. In the context of Alphonsus’s thinking on the legitimacy of material
cooperation, then, any notion of ‘rightness’ could only be analogical : the ‘rightness’ of enduring one
evil rather than another is only analogical to the ‘rightness’ of actively doing an obvious good;
furthermore, this (analogical) ‘rightness’ can only be established negatively by a kind of comparison
and process of elimination, rather than on strictly positive grounds.
109
Grisez has already excluded the evil effects themselves from the proposal which the cooperator
adopts (DMQ, 873), and in his discussion of ‘indirect action’ has stated: ‘Since side effects are freely
chosen, it makes sense to ask whether one ought to accept them.’ CMP, 240.
110
ST I-II 6, 3: ‘. . . non semper id quod sequitur ad defectum actionis reducitur sicut in causam
in agens ex eo quod non agit, sed solum tunc potest et debet agere.’
At times Grisez seems to doubt the validity of his own position on directly and indirectly
voluntary acts, and indeed the certainty of his own judgment. In discussing perplexed conscience,
and particularly direct killing, he writes: ‘While I do not wish to deal with specific normative issues
here, I admit that my analysis points to the permissibility of certain operations which classical
moralists would have excluded. I do not think this position is in significant conflict with received
Catholic teaching. However, if my theory and the Church’s teaching should in a particular case lead
to inconsistent conclusions, I would follow and urge others to follow the Church’s teaching rather
than my theory.’ CMP, 299.
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This difference between Grisez and Alphonsus points to a second way in
which Grisez varies from the tradition.

Throughout Alphonsus’s treatment of

cooperation properly so called in de caritate, the gravity of his ‘sufficiently serious
reason’ (in his terms, the ‘just’ or ‘grave’ cause) is assessed with reference primarily
not to the evil effects which will flow from the principal agent’s act, but to the
principal agent’s sin itself.111

For Alphonsus, the fundamental question of

cooperation is whether or not one may permit one’s neighbour to commit that sin, to
which the order of charity provides an answer: charity alone does not always require
one to prevent the sin.112
In Difficult Moral Questions Grisez leans most heavily on Alphonsus’s
treatment in de caritate, yet criticises Alphonsus because he ‘overlooks [material
cooperation’s] possible secondary bad consequences even on the evildoer’.113 His
initial statement that the ‘basic bad side effect of material cooperation is that one’s
action makes some unintended contribution to another’s wrongdoing’ could be taken
as equivalent to Alphonsus’s focus on the principal agent’s sin in itself; but Grisez
then pays minimal attention to this specific sin, preferring instead to focus on its

111

See for example Alphonsus, de caritate 59: ‘1° quanto gravius est peccatum cujus occasio
datur; 2° quanto probabilius est, te non cooperante, alterum non peccaturum; aut quanto certior est
affectus peccati; 3° quanto propinquius tua cooperatio peccatum attingit.’
It is true that in de caritate Alphonsus does consider the question of ‘further evil effects’: his fifth
condition for assessing the gravity of the ‘just cause’ is ‘how greatly the sin offends the demands of
justice by virtue of the harm it does to third parties.’ (de caritate 59: ‘quanto magis peccatum cum
justitia pugnat, idque propter damnum tertii.’) However, it is clear that even here his primary point
of reference is the evil action of the principal agent: the harmful effects of that action are significant
only as factors in defining the gravity of its sinfulness.
112
Alphonsus, de caritate 66: ‘quando autem alias grave damnum metuis, licite permittere potes
peccatum alterius. Nam ex una parte, caritas te non obligat cum gravi damno peccatum ejus
avertere.’ And in de caritate 47: ‘Caritas enim nos obligat ad vitandum damnum grave proximi,
quotiescumque sine notabili incommodo id possumus.’ The same paragraph makes it clear that this
‘grave harm’ is principally the spiritual harm which the principal agent himself will suffer by virtue of
his sinning. Alphonsus’s sense of ‘grave harm’ would seem to belie Grisez’s criticism of lax
interpretations of the principle ‘caritas non obligat cum gravi incommodo’. DMQ, 877, footnote 463.
Alphonsus’s clear focus on the key question helps to distinguish cooperation from other related
issues. In seduction the question is whether or not one may induce one’s neighbour to sin; in
scandal it is whether or not one may (intentionally or not) influence one’s neighbour to sin; in
cooperation there is no question of induction, so the issue is whether one may merely allow one’s
neighbour to sin. There is also a fourth question: see Alphonsus, de caritate 57: ‘Utrum licet
suadere aut permittere minus malum ad majus evitandum?’ and Peschke 1986, 324: whether or not
one may advise one’s neighbour to commit a lesser rather than a graver evil.
113
DMQ, 877, footnote 463.
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further evil effects.114 He seems not to have noticed that, in de caritate, Alphonsus
deliberately excludes the further harmful effects in order to focus on the primary
moral problem of cooperation: complicity in the principal agent’s sin.
This oversight leads Grisez into some awkward corners.

For example,

concerning the process of establishing the existence of the sufficiently serious or
‘proportioned’ reason, Grisez challenges Alphonsus’s argument in de caritate 63,
proposing instead that ‘if material cooperation is to be morally acceptable, the
reason for choosing to do the act that constitutes it must be proportionate to the
reasons for not making that choice’.115 But he does not recognise the significance
of Alphonsus grounding a proportioned reason in the order of charity: any
‘comparison’ or ‘proportion’ for Alphonsus is, precisely, the proportion between the
evil to which one contributes by cooperating and the evil which one suffers by not
cooperating.116
Grisez argues that the cooperator is responsible for more than he chooses.
This approach seems to lead him at times to confuse physical and moral causality.
This and other difficulties notwithstanding,117 Grisez can be reconciled with the
tradition if he is interpreted strictly: the cooperator is responsible for the acceptance
of the evil effects of the principal agent’s action, but not for the evil effects
themselves.

In itself this accords with the tradition which argues that what the

114

DMQ, 879: ‘The basic bad effect of material cooperation is that one’s action makes some
unintended contribution to another’s wrongdoing. That wrongdoing itself always has bad effects,
and these often have further bad effects.’
115
DMQ, 877.
116
See Alphonsus, de caritate 66. Grisez also claims that Alphonsus’s assessment here does not
account for the ‘further consequences’ which ‘always flow from knowingly doing what constitutes
material cooperation in wrongdoing and accepting those basic bad side effects.’ (DMQ, 877). In the
first place, Grisez has again overlooked the reason for Alphonsus’s primary focus in de caritate. In
the second place, even on his own criticism of proportionalism Grisez would surely concede that it is
extremely difficult or even impossible to account for ‘all of the reasons grounded in the intelligible
goods that may be adversely affected by secondary bad consequences’. (DMQ, 877. Emphasis
added.) Even granting that Grisez’s perspective refers to responsibility rather than causality, he here
seems to require a moral vision of infinite horizon and an ability to predict evil consequences which
occur far from the concrete situation in question. Pope John Paul II himself queries the practicality
(and indeed even the possibility) of such an exhaustive assessment of consequences in Veritatis
splendor 77.
117
There are other apparent misunderstandings: Grisez criticises Alphonsus for not including
three obvious factors when considering the strength of reasons to forgo cooperation (DMQ, 878), but
Alphonsus has listed precisely these factors in de caritate 59; and when Grisez condemns Alphonsus
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cooperator’s act produces is not the evil effects themselves, but a state of affairs
which the principal agent will abuse and so produce those effects.

That ‘state of

affairs’ would in other circumstances be quite innocent - which is what the early
authors meant by an ‘indifferent act’. But even where the principal agent is virtually
certain to bring about the evil by abusing that state of affairs, there remains a ‘causal
gap’ between the cooperator’s action and the evil effect.

It is the principal agent

alone who fills that gap.
Nevertheless Grisez’s analysis offers valuable insights into some traditional
questions.

His emphasis on one’s ‘vocational commitments’ offers a new

possibility: one’s existing commitments will often provide reasons against
cooperating in evil (for example, the danger of scandal), but may also at times
provide reasons in favour of cooperating in evil - although Grisez does not develop
this promising line of thought at any length.118 He not only notes the central role of
prudence in assessing material cooperation, but also suggests how prudence might be
exercised in practice, scrupulously noting every step the prudent person must take;
but then he notes simply that, should the reasons for and against cooperation still
seem equally strong, ‘one should discern . . . [and this] will not be difficult’.119
Finally, he provides typically insightful analysis of several contemporary approaches
to cooperation.120
It is difficult to assess Grisez’s project without being intimidated by its sheer
breadth and depth.

The perspective he brings to Catholic moral theology is

unquestionably valuable, and his greatest achievement lies in developing an
epistemological basis for that perspective. But the value of his treatment of material
cooperation comes at a price: in contrast to Grisez’s complexity, the traditional

for ‘lack of guidance about how to judge whether the reason is proportionate’ (DMQ, 878) he has
clearly overlooked again the argument from the order of charity.
118
DMQ, 882: ‘By the same token, if something must be done to fulfil a responsibility flowing
from a vocational commitment, there is a stronger reason to accept bad side effects in doing it than if
one could forgo the activity without slighting such responsibility.’
119
DMQ, 889.
120
These are the thesis of Charles Curran in his ‘Cooperation: Toward a Revision of the Concept
and its Application.’ Linacre Quarterly 41(1974) 152-167 (see DMQ, 891-893); and the United States
Catholic Conference, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services. Origins
24(1994) 449, 451-462 (see DMQ 893-897). These two approaches are noted later in the present
work.
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doctrine of cooperation seems relatively clear and simple to apply.

As with the

balance of his great project, Grisez’s position on cooperation requires considerable
interpretation.

3.1.5

Conclusions

Modern moral texts display a considerable diversity of approach, each
requiring a ‘key’ to unlock the text and ‘open it out’ to view. This ‘key’ is essential
to grasp not only the author’s concept of the nature and tasks of moral theology, but
also his understanding of legitimate cooperation.
The ‘key’ to Häring’s later text is his ‘profound vision’ of the Christian moral
life: the Christian is to ‘actualise the Truth in love’, to make Christ present and
operative in the world through entering into the ethical ‘stuff’ of the world as salt or
leaven.121 The problem is that this vision is too broad: it is not sufficiently defined
or even grounded in a metaphysics which might permit definition of such important
concepts as ‘toleration’ and ‘respect for consciences’.

A similar problem besets

Peschke’s text, to which the ‘key’ is his eschatological orientation: the Christian’s
obligations in charity are outlined in the context of the ‘covenant’ relationship
between God and man, where there is no separation between the religious and moral
life.122 But Peschke does not explain how this general orientation is to be realised in
the particular case, in concrete issues of material cooperation.
The ‘key’ to Grisez, on the other hand, is the naturalistic fallacy and his
perception of the threat it poses to natural law theory. His achievement is to ground
a positive view of moral obligation (‘what God wants me to do’) in a more or less
traditional metaphysics - albeit augmented by his own value and ethical theories.
The problem with Grisez’s approach lies in exactly the same place: his ‘modes of
responsibility’ serve only to eliminate kinds of intending and acting which offend
integral human fulfilment, leaving a ‘remainder’ of options from which the agent

121
122

See Häring 1979, 419 and 479.
Peschke 1986, 29.
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chooses.

The question Grisez sets out to answer is ‘which option ought I to

choose?’ The answer he offers is disappointingly traditional: one must ‘discern’.123
Grisez’s problem is not that his vision is too wide or ill-defined, but that it
does not reach far enough.

The breadth of his vision, grounded in a brilliant

metaphysics, awaits completion in a spirituality which reconnects the moral subject
with the Author, ground and horizon of moral goodness: God Himself, who is both
‘Father’ accessible to the moral agent’s love, and ultimate Mystery remaining
forever beyond the reach of reason. The agent must therefore seek the will of God
not merely in ‘discerning’, but in the particularly Christian way of discerning: prayer
and contemplation.

123

DMQ, 889.
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3.2

Cooperation in Recent Magisterial Teaching
This section asks whether official Church teaching on material cooperation

since Vatican II has retained or developed any of the orientations identified in the
later moral texts. Specifically: what contribution has the teaching Church made to a
contemporary understanding of the principle of material cooperation?
The volume of magisterial teaching has been enormous in recent years, and it
is a challenge to identify and analyse such a vast amount of material in any logical
order. A cumulative or chronological approach would seem obvious, but documents
from one source do not necessarily build on (or even acknowledge) earlier
documents from the same or other sources. Some statements seek to settle specific
questions, conversations or disputes which developed over a number of years, so the
question of context is also crucial to a correct understanding of each teaching.

It

also seems appropriate to choose an ordering of material which respects the relative
weight to be accorded different levels of curial intervention, and so the order adopted
here is by authority of source: first, recent papal teaching (Pius XII, Paul VI, John
Paul II, in 3.2.1); then documents of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith
(3.2.2); and finally other curial interventions (3.2.3).

The teaching of some

episcopal conferences and the writings of some contemporary theologians will be
studied in the next chapter.

3.2.1

Recent Papal Teaching

Although Pope Pius XII predates the later moral texts, his teaching on social
issues in general and on cooperation in particular prepared the ground for the
approaches they would take. He was certainly conscious of a new order in society
and new challenges to be met by Christians in the world: the task of rebuilding
Europe after World War II was complicated by lack of housing and unemployment,
and by even greater threats such as increasingly negative pressures on family life and
a declining appreciation of the dignity of the human person.124

It is in such a
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See Pope Pius XII, ‘Address Nell’ordine della natura, to ‘The Family Front’.’ (26 November
1951). AAS 43(1951) 855-860. [English text: Catholic Documents Volume VI (London: Pontifical
Court Club (Salesian Press), 1952) 28-32.]
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difficult environment that Christians are called to live their mission (‘apostolate’) in
the world, but Catholics are never to cooperate in ‘perverse tendencies’ such as
contraceptive sterilisation.125 Nevertheless, in pursuing the demands of the common
good it is sometimes permissible to tolerate (‘non impedire’) a lesser evil in order to
avoid an even greater evil or to attain a greater good.126 The concept of a ‘tolerable
evil’ is an important element in subsequent treatments of legitimate cooperation.
Pope Paul VI made an indirect contribution in his watershed encyclical
Humanae vitae.

The manuals had long treated the question of cooperation in

contraceptive practices,127 so Paul VI makes no specific mention of it here.
However, he endorses Pius XII’s teaching on tolerable evil and expands it to
embrace personal ethics, while emphasising the basic rule that evil itself may never
be directly commissioned.128

This position underscores the two conditions for

legitimate cooperation: legitimate toleration of an evil requires a morally good or
indifferent act and a sufficiently serious reason.

125

‘Address Vegliare con sollecitudine, to Members of the Congress of the Italian Association of
Catholic Midwives.’ (29 October 1951). AAS 43(1951) 835-854. [English text: Catholic Documents
Volume VI (London: Pontifical Court Club (Salesian Press), 1952) 1-16.] Four subheadings in the
English text reveal the Pope’s broad vision of the Catholic’s mission in the world: I. Your
professional apostolate is carried out first and foremost through your personal influence. II. Uphold
the value and inviolability of human life. III. Helping the mother in the prompt and generous
fulfilment of her marital duties. IV. Defence of the right order of values and the dignity of the
human person.
126
‘It is plainly true that error and sin abound in the world today. God reprobates them, but He
allows them to exist. Wherefore the statement that religious and moral error must always be
impeded, when it is possible, because toleration of them is in itself immoral, is not valid absolutely
and unconditionally . . . The duty of repressing moral and religious error cannot, therefore, be an
ultimate norm of action. It must be subordinate to higher and more general guiding principles,
which, in some circumstances allow, and even perhaps seem to indicate as the better policy,
toleration of error in order to promote a greater good.’ Pope Pius XII, ‘Address Ci riesce, to the
National Convention of Italian Catholic Jurists.’ (6 December 1953). AAS 45(1953) 794-802.
[English text: Catholic Documents Volume XV (London: Pontifical Court Club (Salesian Press),
1954) 12-18, at 15-16].
127
See Chapter One above, footnote 106.
128
‘Certainly, it is sometimes permissible to tolerate moral evil - when it is the lesser evil and
when one does so in order that one might avoid a greater evil, or so that one might promote a greater
good. It is never permissible, however, to do evil so that good might result, not even for the most
serious reasons.’ Pope Paul VI, Encyclical Letter Humanae vitae. ‘Of Human Life.’ (25 July 1968).
AAS 60(1968) 481-503, n.14. [English text: Janet E Smith (Nebraska: Pope Paul VI Institute Press,
1993).]
Paul VI also applied to contraception the distinction between objective moral fault and subjective
moral culpability, or between ‘peccatum’ and ‘culpa’: this is implicit in Humanae vitae 25 and 29, but
it would be for other curial sources to make this distinction explicit in subsequent years.
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In his major encyclicals Veritatis splendor and Evangelium vitae Pope John
Paul II seeks to establish clear metaphysical foundations for a renewed moral
theology, and to correct some errors which had crept into various efforts at
renewal.129 In these encyclicals he provides clear teaching on both the context and
content of Christian moral life.
Veritatis splendor is a study of moral law, conscience and the moral act
presented against a vast theological and spiritual background. In it the Pope intends
to place morality and its rational demands in the context of a broad vision of
Christian life. His use of the parable of the rich young man (Mt 19:16-21) and the
young man’s central question (‘What must I do to inherit eternal life?’) serve to
establish both the eschatological orientation of morality and the inescapable unity of
faith and life.130 In the text itself the Pope takes great pains to relate ‘what I ought
to do’ with ‘what the commandments permit me to do’, and adopts an ontological
and eschatological stance similar to Peschke’s: who one is and what one does are
essentially related to each other, and both are related to one’s eternal destiny.131
Love of neighbour springs from a loving heart which, precisely
because it loves, is ready to live out the loftiest challenges.
Jesus shows that the commandments must not be understood as a
minimum limit not to be gone beyond, but rather as a path
involving a moral and spiritual journey towards perfection, at the
heart of which is love (cf Col 3:14). Thus the commandment
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Encyclical Letter Veritatis splendor. ‘On Certain Fundamental Questions of the Church’s
Moral Teaching.’ (6 August 1993). AAS 85(1993) 1133-1228; Encyclical Letter Evangelium vitae.
‘On the Value and Inviolability of Human Life.’ (25 March 1995). AAS 87(1995) 401-522. [English
texts: Libreria Editrice Vaticana.] See Veritatis splendor, 4: ‘Today, however, it seems necessary to
reflect on the whole of the Church’s moral teaching, with the precise goal of recalling certain
fundamental truths of Catholic doctrine which, in the present circumstances, risk being distorted or
denied.’
130
Veritatis splendor, 28. The ‘wider dimensions’ of the Christian moral life are explored in
paragraphs 19-24.
131
There is an ‘intrinsic and unbreakable bond between faith and morality’ (Veritatis splendor, 4)
which becomes obvious in light of the experience of God: ‘What man is and what he must do
becomes clear as soon as God reveals himself’ (Veritatis splendor, 10). There is also ‘a close
connection . . . between eternal life and obedience to God’s commandments: God’s commandments
show people the path of life and they lead to it.’ (Veritatis splendor, 12).
However, in contrast to this positive sense of moral imperative the Pope seems to set the document
a more negative goal: ‘In addressing this Encyclical to you, my Brother Bishops, it is my intention to
state the principles necessary for discerning what is contrary to ‘sound doctrine’, drawing attention
to those elements of the Church’s moral teaching which today appear particularly exposed to error,
ambiguity or neglect.’ Veritatis splendor, 30. Emphasis original.
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‘You shall not murder’ becomes a call to an attentive love which
protects and promotes the life of one’s neighbour.132
Nevertheless the commandments do delineate the ‘lower’ limits of the
command to love God, and below these limits a commandment is broken; but there
are no ‘upper’ limits.133

Accordingly, one may never willingly commission

intrinsically evil acts, because they are ‘by their nature incapable of being ordered to
God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image’.134
Defending the good of the person is the central thread of Evangelium vitae.
The task is made more difficult by social, legislative and moral contexts in which
Christian values are not upheld:
The fact that legislation in many countries, perhaps even
departing from basic principles of their Constitutions, has
determined not to punish these practices against life, and even to
make them altogether legal, is both a disturbing symptom and a
significant cause of grave moral decline.
Choices once
unanimously considered criminal and rejected by the common
moral sense are gradually becoming socially acceptable . . . In
such a cultural and legislative situation, the serious
demographic, social and family problems which weigh upon
many of the world’s peoples and which require responsible and
effective attention from national and international bodies, are left
open to false and deceptive solutions, opposed to the truth and
the good of persons and nations.135
The context of Christian life today includes ‘structures of sin’ which mark
society’s ‘moral conscience’.136

The mission of the Christian is to proclaim the

‘Gospel of life’ which is the very person of Jesus,137 to extend that Gospel to people
caught up in these structures of sin and in the ‘messiness’ of life today, so that they
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Veritatis splendor, 15. The ‘goods’ of human life are to be protected in order to protect the
‘good’ of the person himself. The ‘goods’ protected by the commandments are ‘human life, the
communion of persons in marriage, private property, truthfulness and people’s good name.’ See
Veritatis splendor, 13.
133
See Veritatis splendor, 52. This explains why Grisez’s ‘modes of responsibility’ are expressed
in the negative: it is always easier to say what one definitely ought not to do, than what one ought to
do. Unfortunately the same reasoning explains why Grisez’s theory, as well-intentioned as it is, is so
vast and difficult to apply.
134
Veritatis splendor, 80.
135
Evangelium vitae, 4.
136
Evangelium vitae, 12 and 24.
137
Evangelium vitae, 29.
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too may encounter Jesus and see in their own lives ‘a reflection of God himself’.138
This demands a self-giving which is difficult and challenging, but which must occur
if the Church is to allow its witness to be seen and heard even as Jesus allowed his
self-giving suffering to be seen when he was raised on the cross.139
Yet as radical and thoroughgoing as that self-giving may need to be at times,
the same Gospel of life establishes an order of charity which allows one, given
sufficiently serious reason, to prefer one’s own life to that of another.140

The

implication for legitimate cooperation should not be overlooked: if an agent may
observe this order of charity in actions in which he himself causes evil effects, it
would seem to apply a fortiori when he himself does not cause the evil effects but
only participates in the order of legitimate material cooperation. This approximates
the position of Alphonsus.
Cooperation in evil is discussed explicitly in regard to the intrinsic evils of
abortion and suicide. The ‘network of complicity’ which surrounds abortion is not
limited to those who are directly involved, but extends to ‘international institutions,
foundations and associations which systematically campaign for the legalisation and
spread of abortion in the world’.141 The canonical sanction for abortion applies to
‘all those who commit this crime with knowledge of the penalty attached, and thus
includes those accomplices without whose help the crime would not have been
committed’.142

The last clause implies necessary cooperation, but the text as a

whole seems to refer only to formal cooperation:

to choose to proceed ‘with

knowledge of the penalty attached’ would seem to constitute an explicit intention to
commission an act which one knows to be seriously evil.
Similarly the text on cooperation in suicide refers only to formal cooperation:

138

Evangelium vitae, 32-35.
Evangelium vitae, 50-51.
140
Evangelium vitae, 55. The discussion here draws on both Thomas Aquinas (ST II-II 64, 7) and
Alphonsus (Theologia moralis Lib. III De praeceptis decalogi et ecclesiae, Tr. IV De quinto et sexto
praecepto, Cap. I, Dub. III An et quomodo liceat occidere privata auctoritate iniquum aggressorem),
as well as CCC 2263-2269.
141
Evangelium vitae, 59.
142
Evangelium vitae, 62.
139
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To concur with the intention of another person to commit suicide
and to help in carrying it out through so-called ‘assisted suicide’
means to cooperate in, and at times to be the actual perpetrator
of, an injustice which can never be excused, even if it is
requested.143
The fact that the act of suicide is intrinsically evil is beside the point: ‘to
concur with the intention’ of the principal agent will always constitute formal
cooperation, and this is always illicit.

Neither of these texts shed light on the

possibility of truly material cooperation in intrinsically evil acts.
In a particularly incisive passage Pope John Paul II next addresses the
arguments of ‘toleration’ and ‘respect for consciences’, and he draws an important
distinction.144

False tolerance relies on a certain ‘ethical relativism’ which holds

that a rejection of absolute moral norms is necessary to guarantee true democracy
and mutual respect among people.145

True tolerance, on the other hand, accepts

absolute moral norms but recognises that sometimes, in the interests of social order
and the common good, a lesser evil may be permitted in order to avoid a greater
evil.146 However, the Pope teaches that
public authority . . . can never presume to legitimize as a right
of individuals - even if they are the majority of the members of
society - an offence against other persons caused by the
disregard of so fundamental a right as the right to life. The legal
toleration of abortion or of euthanasia can in no way claim to be
based on respect for the conscience of others, precisely because
society has the right and the duty to protect itself against the
abuses which can occur in the name of conscience and under the
pretext of freedom.147
So the ‘non impedire’ approved by Pius XII is grounded in pure social
expedience, not respect for conscience.

Therefore there can be no obligation in

conscience to obey immoral laws; indeed, ‘there is a grave and clear obligation to

143

Evangelium vitae, 66. The supporting text of Augustine also seems to refer to at least implicit
formal cooperation.
144
On these concepts, see 4.1.2.3 and 4.1.2.4 below.
145
Evangelium vitae, 70.
146
Evangelium vitae, 7, referencing the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Declaration on
Religious Freedom Dignitatis humanae. (7 December 1965) 7.
147
Evangelium vitae, 71.
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oppose them by conscientious objection’.148 This sheds a little indirect light on the
question of material cooperation in intrinsically evil actions: if there is no moral
obligation to obey, support or vote for such ‘intrinsically unjust laws’, and indeed if
there is a grave obligation to oppose them, then it would seem extremely difficult to
justify material cooperation in the intrinsically evil actions which these laws
permit.149
But having established the agent’s clear moral duty in the face of intrinsically
unjust civil laws, the Pope then addresses a particular problem. A legislator may in
some cases be justified in supporting a more restrictive law in favour of abortion or
euthanasia if the only alternative is a more permissive law and consequently the
production of even more evil effects.150

One condition is that the legislator’s

‘absolute personal opposition’ to these evils must be well known, which is a guard
against scandal.

This case is not an exception to the general rule against obeying,

supporting or voting for immoral laws because the legislator is in a unique situation.
In the case outlined in Evangelium vitae 73, the legislator has no choice but
to cooperate in bringing about an evil law.

The only options are (i) to vote for a

more permissive law, or (ii) to vote for a more restrictive law, or (iii) to abstain (in
which case the more permissive law would prevail). All three options will help to
bring about an intrinsically evil law, so the legislator has no alternative but to
cooperate in one way or another (either positively or negatively).

Therefore the

legislator rightly turns his attention to the harmful effects which will attend the
passage of the law: he must consider ‘limiting the harm done’ by voting for the
option which will have least negative consequences.
Note that this still technically constitutes material cooperation in evil, since it
helps to bring about a state of affairs which inevitably will be abused by others.
However, on one hand the legislator’s inability to avoid cooperating reduces
personal culpability; on the other hand, the possibility of cooperating with fewer
rather than more numerous evil consequences in this case constitutes a justifying
148

Evangelium vitae, 73.
Evangelium vitae, 73.
150
Evangelium vitae, 73.
149
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reason.151

As the Pope carefully indicates, this is not ‘illicit cooperation with an

unjust law, but rather a legitimate and proper attempt to limit its evil aspects’. To
vote for such a law in these circumstances constitutes lawful material cooperation.
It is important to emphasise that the Pope here does not speak of voting for a
more restrictive law as ‘choosing the lesser evil’.

In regard to abortion or

euthanasia, objectively speaking, there are no degrees of intrinsic evil from which to
choose, and a more restrictive law in favour of abortion is intrinsically just as evil as
a more permissive law. To kill a single innocent human being is an intrinsically evil
act, and to kill 100 innocent human beings is also an intrinsically evil act.

These

acts differ not in how intrinsically evil they are, but in the extent of their evil
consequences.

Obviously, in terms of the amount of evil done, less is better than

more. Therefore the Pope speaks of ‘limiting the harm done’ and limiting the ‘evil
aspects’ of the law - that is, limiting the evil consequences.152
It is also important in this case to define very precisely the ‘sufficiently
serious reason’.

The legislator’s cooperation is justified not because of any

possibility he or she may have to further limit the harm done by abortion through
supporting a still more restrictive law at some undetermined point in the future.
Rather, the legislator’s cooperation is justified solely because this particular law will
limit the harm which other people will certainly bring about. Future possibilities do
not seem to be a factor in justifying cooperation in this case.

This passage of

Evangelium vitae, then, suggests that it is not reasonable to use a possible but
uncertain future benefit to justify cooperation in what is a certain evil in the present.
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The question of acting for a ‘lesser evil’ will be taken up again in the next Chapter, at 4.1.2.2.
In terms of the traditional metaphysics: a legislator may, in these restricted circumstances,
legitimately vote in favour of a law permitting abortion because the legislator’s finis is neither the
lesser nor the greater evil but the restriction of evil consequences; his moral object is not to support a
law permitting abortion, but to support a law restricting the number of abortions which will be
performed. Soto (De justitia et iure (Lugduni, 1582) L. IV, q. 7, a. 3) held that in such a case the
moral agent was not intending the lesser evil, ‘but rather the hindrance of the greater evil’. See E T
Hannigan SJ, ‘Is it ever lawful to advise the lesser of two evils?’ Gregorianum 30(1949) 104-129, at
109.
This is also the interpretation of Klaus Demmer MSC in his ‘Tolerancia y cooperación: Una
pregunta a la ética del derecho’ in Lorenzo Alvarez Verdes and Marciano Vidal, eds. La Justicia
Social: Homenaje al Prof. Julio de la Torre. (Madrid: Editorial el Perpetuo Socorro, 1993) 335. (See
4.1.2 below.) So while the legislator is certainly cooperating in abortion, his cooperation in the evil
(creating conditions favourable to abortion) is material; but his cooperation in the good (limiting the
number of abortions) is formal, and for this he may be commended.
152
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Even in the unique environment of civil legislation, cooperation in evil is to be
justified only on a case-by-case basis according to the concrete circumstances here
and now.
The next passage promises to treat the ‘general principles concerning
cooperation in evil actions’, but again the teaching is limited only to the rules
governing formal cooperation.
Indeed, from the moral standpoint, it is never licit to cooperate
formally in evil. Such cooperation occurs when an action,
either by its very nature or by the form it takes in a concrete
situation, can be defined as a direct participation in an act
against innocent human life or a sharing in the immoral intention
of the person committing it. This cooperation can never be
justified either by invoking respect for the freedom of others or
by appealing to the fact that civil law permits it or requires it.
Each individual in fact has moral responsibility for the acts
which he personally performs; no one can be exempted from
this responsibility, and on the basis of it everyone will be judged
by God himself (cf. Rom 2:6; 14:12).153
Significantly, the next sentence reads: ‘To refuse to take part in committing
an injustice is not only a moral duty; it is also a basic human right.’ Two aspects of
this sentence merit comment.

First, ‘to take part in committing an injustice’ does

not necessarily mean material cooperation, since ‘to take part’ may also mean formal
cooperation; indeed, this reading is more in keeping with the preceding paragraph.
Second, the subsequent sentence makes it plain that the context here is not material
cooperation, but the issue of whether anyone can be ‘forced to perform an action
intrinsically incompatible with human dignity’. This passage concerns not material
cooperation, but coercion to perform intrinsically evil actions.
There are two intriguing aspects of Pope John Paul II’s treatment of
cooperation.

First, he does not seem to comment at all on material cooperation,

even in connection with intrinsically evil acts.

The traditional principle already

makes it plain that formal cooperation in such evils is always illicit, so one could
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Evangelium vitae, 74. At first glance there are remarkable similarities between this statement
and the position of Grisez in DMQ. However, Pope John Paul II differs from Grisez in one very
important respect: to take moral responsibility ‘for the acts which he personally performs’ is an
acknowledgment of the ‘causal gap’ which Grisez seems to overlook.
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reasonably look to John Paul II for guidance on the more problematic question of
material cooperation - but none is offered. Second, his discussion of tolerance of
unjust laws is limited to demonstrating that no-one can be forced to obey such laws.
Yet in most of the examples he offers, these laws are not coercive but permissive
(such as the decriminalisation of abortion) and it may be argued that these already
fall within Pius XII’s teaching on tolerance.154

However, beyond an attack on

‘ethical relativism’, John Paul II offers no further analysis of ‘tolerance’.
Recent papal teaching on cooperation in evil therefore recognises a new
context for Christian life - a world of increasingly secular moral values - but
essentially only repeats existing teaching on cooperation, and principally on formal
cooperation only.

It makes little significant contribution to the question of

legitimate material cooperation in evil.

3.2.2

Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith

Four statements of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith which
touch on the question of cooperation in evil are taken here in chronological order.155
The Replies to Questions (1974) addressed to the Australian Bishops deal
with five related issues concerning practical observance of the Church’s doctrine on
contraception expressed in Humanae vitae.156 The first reply applies the traditional

154

The Pope may be referring to the civil law in Italy concerning access to abortion and the right
of individuals and institutes to refuse to participate in abortion. These issues were raised specifically
in 1978 with the passage of Law 194: Dionigi Tettamanzi’s very lucid analysis of this law is
discussed below, 4.2.1. It is also possible that the Pope may be thinking of the situation in China and
certain other countries in which, in order to control population growth, couples are forbidden by law
from giving birth to more than one or two children.
155
Replies to Questions. Addressed to the Australian Episcopal Conference. (29 July 1974) as yet
unpublished; Declaration Quaestio de abortu. ‘On Procured Abortion.’ (18 November 1974). AAS
66(1974) 730-747; Response Quaecumque sterilizatio. ‘On Sterilization in Catholic Hospitals.’ (13
March 1975). AAS 68(1976) 738-740; Declaration Jura et bona. ‘On Euthanasia.’ (5 May 1980).
AAS 72(1980) 542-552. English texts of the last three are found in Flannery 2 at 441, 454 and 510
respectively. A more recent CDF contribution in the form of dialogue with the US Bishops regarding
their 1994 Ethical and Religious Directives will be discussed at 4.2.2.2 and 4.3.2 below.
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The Replies to Questions were addressed to Cardinal Freeman (and through him to the
Australian bishops), and were accompanied by a confidential letter from Cardinal Seper, Prefect of
the Congregation. This letter bears the Protocol Number 52/63 and remains confidential. The
Replies, which bear no protocol number themselves, were forwarded by Archbishop Cahill and made
public by individual bishops. In personal communication with the author on 25 May 2000, Fr Brian
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doctrine on personal conscience previously affirmed elsewhere.157 The second reply
underscores the doctrinal authority of Humanae vitae, while the third confirms the
teaching of Humanae vitae that couples making decisions in certain (but erroneous)
conscience may be admitted to the Sacraments ‘for proportionate reasons’. The last
two replies address cooperation.
The fourth question asked whether an individual doctor may materially
cooperate by prescribing contraceptive medications for a couple who have reached
their decision in certain (but erroneous) conscience. The reply is revealing:
Here should be applied traditional rules, universally accepted by
theologians, on material cooperation in the moral evil of others.
Let it be noted that the subjective conviction or the good faith of
the couple does not of itself justify material cooperation by the
doctor. So that this latter [may] be lawful it is necessary that:
1) the doctor does not subscribe to nor approve the wrong
intention or action of the couple; 2) the action by which the
doctor gives cooperation be not in itself an immoral act; 3) a
proportionately grave cause constrains him to cooperate; 4) he
does everything possible so that his cooperation is not
interpreted as approval, and that there is no public scandal, or,
should there be such, that it is opportunely removed, in
particular the scandal of the Church’s doctrine on contraception
being obscured before the eyes of society.158
Several aspects of this reply merit attention.

First is the assumption that

there exists a single universally accepted interpretation of rules governing material
cooperation.

The variations noted among the traditional manuals and later moral

texts make this assumption tenuous.

Second, the doctor’s cooperation must be

justified by more than simply the couple’s subjective conviction -

which casts

grave doubt on Häring’s interpretation of ‘respect for conscience’. Then come the
‘conditions’ for legitimate material cooperation: the doctor must not formally
cooperate by ‘subscribing to’ or ‘approving’ the couple’s decision; the cooperative
act itself must not be evil; there must be a proportionately grave reason to cooperate;
and the risk of scandal must be minimised or removed.

Lucas (Archdiocesan Secretary, Archdiocese of Sydney) confirmed that the CDF had issued the
Replies in English.
157
Congregation for the Clergy, The Washington Case. (26 April 1971). L’Osservatore Romano
20(164) 20 May 1971. 6-7.
158
Replies, IV.
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Significantly, a ‘proportionately grave cause’ may ‘constrain’ the doctor to
cooperate. ‘To constrain’ is an apparently more robust term than ‘to permit’. The
implication seems to be that a justifying reason may sometimes lead one to believe
that material cooperation is not only permitted, but positively required.

While the

document does not further address this condition, this seems to be a significant
addition to the usual interpretations of ‘sufficiently serious reason’.
The fifth question is very curious:
Quest. V. - Whether a Catholic Institution vg. the Family
Planning Clinic, consulted by some couple, may continue to
provide them with contraceptive guidance, help and aid in a
manner which is objectively evil?159
Given its exact wording, the obvious answer to this question is ‘no’:
regardless of circumstances, the First Principle of Practical Reason would always
rule out offering ‘guidance, help and aid in a manner which is objectively evil’.
However, the Congregation’s reply indicates that it understands this fifth question as
an extension of the fourth, interpreting it as referring not to the admissibility of
acting in an objectively evil manner, but to the possibility of institutional material
cooperation.
The reply is very guarded.

Because of their Catholic identity such

institutions have a duty to ‘give the world a testimony of the right conception and the
true observance of morality’, and to practice ‘christian charity under the light of the
Gospel, by observing the norms of christian behaviour taught by Christ and his
Church.’
In institutions of this kind it is not admissible that a way of
acting contradict the objective teaching of the Church itself. If
there were to be a general policy of material cooperation in
Catholic institutes, it would damage public morality. Therefore,
so that in these institutes material cooperation may be licit,
motives are required proportionately graver than those required
by the general principles on material cooperation (cf. n.IV).160

159
160

Replies, V.
Replies, V
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Three aspects of this reply are significant.
• First, the public character of Catholic institutions requires a stricter adherence to
Catholic moral teaching.

In the first place, the risk of scandal and damage to

public morality rules out any ‘general policy of material cooperation in Catholic
institutes’. Furthermore a general policy on cooperation in contraception would
amount to official acceptance of a practice which, as the previous Reply implies,
is permissible only as particular circumstances might indicate in individual cases.
• Second, however, and given no ‘general policy’ on cooperation, this response
implies that individual acts of material cooperation may nevertheless be
commissioned in Catholic institutes provided that the reasons for doing so are
significantly more serious than those justifying cooperation by individual Catholic
doctors.161
• Third, by making reference to the general principles listed in the previous reply
the implication is that in this case an institution might view cooperation as a
matter of ‘constraint’ and not merely ‘permission’.
Taken together, these three points are extremely significant.

They indicate

that the Congregation accepts that material cooperation in evil will sometimes occur
in Catholic institutions

-

indeed by logical extension of the fourth Reply,

circumstances in individual cases may sometimes be such that Catholic institutions
161

A variant interpretation of this Reply has been be developed, as follows: the sentence “If there
were to be a general policy of material cooperation . . . ” is followed immediately by “Therefore, so
that in these institutes material cooperation may be licit . . .” This could be construed as suggesting
that an institute may indeed formulate a general policy on material cooperation if there are
‘proportionately graver’ reasons for doing so. In order to support this interpretation it would be
necessary to prove that the ‘material cooperation’ in the second sentence is, or could be, identified
with the ‘general policy of material cooperation’ in the first. But this seems somewhat ‘forced’, and
the fact that such an identification is not immediately evident from the text itself suggests that this
interpretation is untenable.
The interpretation given here is, it is suggested, more supportable. A general policy on material
cooperation in some particular evil amounts to an institutional commitment to facilitate that evil.
Such a policy would become necessary only when it is foreseen that the question of cooperating in
this evil will arise many times, and indeed the very purpose of formulating such a policy is to provide
consistent guidance for repetitive episodes of cooperation. But general policies are, of their nature,
blunt instruments: they prove their value when they permit one to act without having to engage in
close analysis of every fine detail or every particular circumstance surrounding every individual
episode or action. Yet, as has been argued, precise assessment of all relevant circumstances is of the
very essence of the traditional principle of material cooperation. On these grounds the interpretation
of the fifth Reply as given here is more consistent with the tradition: individual episodes of material
cooperation are to be assessed on a strictly case-by-case basis and, given a sufficiently serious reason,
may be lawfully commissioned on the same basis. This interpretation neither contradicts nor ‘forces’
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consider themselves constrained to cooperate in evil. Clearly this is not a preferable
state of affairs, and individual cases can in no way be ‘generalised’ into formal
policies, but the Congregation seems to acknowledge that material cooperation in
evil will be, and on rare individual occasions must be, a legitimate option for
Catholic institutions.

Unfortunately the concise form of the Replies allows no

opportunity for the Congregation to develop these important considerations.
The Declaration on Procured Abortion (1974) accepts that civil law must
sometimes tolerate a lesser evil in order to avoid a greater evil, and that it must
always respect the freedom of individual conscience.

But there are still moral

absolutes: ‘the life of the child takes precedence over all opinions.
invoke freedom of thought to destroy life’.

162

One cannot

The declaration establishes the

teaching later repeated by Pope John Paul II in Evangelium vitae:
. . . a Christian can never conform to a law which is in itself
immoral, and such is the case of a law which would admit in
principle the liceity of abortion. Nor can a Christian take part in
a propaganda campaign in favour of such a law, or vote for it.
Moreover, he may not collaborate in its application.163
However, as noted with the teaching of Pope John Paul II, the reference here
seems to be to formal cooperation only: to campaign or vote for an immoral law is
clearly to consent to it. It is true that ‘[d]ivine law and natural reason . . . exclude
all right to the direct killing of an innocent man’,164 but ‘direct killing’ requires
either an explicit or implicit intention to kill - which would constitute formal and
not material cooperation. The Declaration does not address the latter.
The Response on Sterilisation in Catholic Hospitals (1975) deals with two
issues:

the general question of cooperation in therapeutic sterilisation, and the

specific question of cooperation in sterilisation in Catholic hospitals.

The first

paragraph defines direct sterilisation and prohibits it, according to the tradition. The

the more obvious meaning of the fifth Reply, and it will be argued below that the Response on
Sterilisation (1975) supports this reading.
162
Procured Abortion, 20.
163
Procured Abortion, 22.
164
Procured Abortion, 14.
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second paragraph denies doctrinal authority to contrary theological opinion.

The

third paragraph applies the doctrine to Catholic hospitals.
First, it is important to note that the third paragraph focuses on institutional
cooperation in sterilisation which is ‘officially approved or admitted’,165 and not on
sterilisation as such. The argument is more or less that employed in the Replies to
Questions: official approval or formulation of policy in favour of cooperation in
sterilisation amounts to official and generalised acceptance of an evil practice.
However a second dimension is added: not only ‘official approval’ of direct
sterilisation, but even more so ‘its administration and execution according to
hospital regulations is something of its nature - that is, intrinsically - objectively
evil’.166 The reasoning is sound: it is impossible to officially approve, to administer
and to execute an intrinsically evil deed without intending to do so.

The very

existence of a regulation for this purpose would amount to an institutional
‘intending’ which would constitute at least implicit formal cooperation. The official
approval (administration, execution) itself is intrinsically evil because, as formal, it
shares the same moral character as contraceptive sterilisation.
Second, given that the danger of scandal and of ‘creating misunderstanding’
is avoided, there is a broad statement which some moralists have taken to imply that
material cooperation in therapeutic sterilisation may be permitted in individual cases:
The traditional teaching on material cooperation, with its
appropriate distinctions between necessary and freely given
cooperation, proximate and remote cooperation, remains valid,
to be applied very prudently when the case demands it.167

165

Sterilisation, 3a: ‘cooperatio institutionaliter adprobata vel admissa’
Sterilisation, 3a: ‘Nam officialis approbatio sterilisationis directae, et a fortiori eiusdem
secundum statuta nosocomii regulatio et executio, est res in ordine obiectivo indole sua seu intrinsece
mala, ad quam hospitale catholicum nulla ratione potest cooperari.’
167
Sterilisation, 3b: ‘Traditionalis doctrina de cooperatione materiali, cum opportunis
distinctionibus inter cooperationem necessarium et liberam, proximam et remotam, in vigore manet,
prudentissime applicanda, si casus ferat.’ For a technical discussion on the interpretation of this
text, see Lawrence J Welch, ‘An Excessive Claim: Sterilisation and Immediate Material Cooperation.’
Linacre Quarterly 66:4(1999) 4-25. Also see Matt McDonald, ‘The Limits of Cooperation.’
Catholic World Report (December 2000) 40-51, at 42-44.
166
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Again the Congregation does not specify which variation of the ‘traditional
teaching on material cooperation’ it wishes applied, and again it is clear that there
can be no institutional policies favouring cooperation in sterilisations.
Here the Congregation does not dissemble: firstly, an official policy would
commit the institution to general endorsement of cooperation, whereas evaluation of
cases on an individual basis enables the hospital to formulate a fully reasoned
response to the unique circumstances of each case; secondly, any cooperation which
may be offered on an individual case-by-case basis could only be legitimate material
cooperation, which of its nature is clearly distinct from (that is, remote from and
contingent to) the intrinsic evil of contraceptive sterilisation; thirdly, although it is
not stated here it is reasonable to assume that the Congregation would wish to affirm
the position it first expresses in the Replies to Questions: a justifying reason in these
cases might ‘constrain’ and not merely ‘permit’ the hospital to cooperate.
The Declaration on Euthanasia (1980) acknowledges that while changes in
prevailing culture have influenced the way people view suffering and death, there
has also been fairly universal acceptance of the basic rights of the human person.
Since the question of euthanasia is one of fundamental human rights, no-one should
accept arguments based on ‘political pluralism or religious freedom’ to deny those
rights.168 This is a clear rejection of arguments based on ‘tolerance’ and ‘respect for
consciences’, at least with reference to the defence of human life itself.
Euthanasia is defined as ‘an action or omission which of itself or by intention
causes death, in order that all suffering may in this way be eliminated’.169 It is ‘a
168

Euthanasia, p.511 [Flannery 2].
Euthanasia, p.512 [Flannery 2]. More or less the same definition is used in CCC 2277. But in
Evangelium vitae 65 Pope John Paul introduces a slight variation: euthanasia is ‘an act or omission
which of itself and by intention . . . ’ (Emphasis added.) If the word ‘intention’ in this text means
both the agent’s intention and the intentionality of the action, then the use of ‘and’ rather than ‘or’
makes no material difference to the definition. But if ‘intention’ here means only the agent’s
intention, then this variation represents a significant ‘tightening’ of the definition of euthanasia, for it
then excludes from ‘euthanasia’ actions which only ex fine operis (but not ex fine operantis) bring
about the death of the patient. This ‘tightening’ seems to sit more happily with the existing teaching,
expressed in the Principle of Double Effect, which deals with administration of pain-relief which, in
sufficient quantity, will also hasten the death of the dying patient. See Pope Pius XII, ‘Address Trois
questions religieuses et morales concernant l’analgésie, to the Italian Society of Anaesthesiology.’
(24 February 1957). AAS 49(1957) 129-147.
169
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crime of the utmost gravity’: ‘. . . nothing and no one can in any way permit the
killing of an innocent human being . . . nor can he or she consent to it, either
explicitly or implicitly.’
The interpretation of ‘permit’ here is important. If ‘permit’ is taken only in
an active sense, then the Declaration clearly rules out formal cooperation (that is,
cooperation by actively granting permission); but if ‘permit’ is taken in a passive
sense it could mean that positive steps should be taken to prevent euthanasia (that is,
not even passive permission is tolerable). On the other hand, a moral prohibition on
‘permitting’ an evil is meaningful only when the person prohibited is in such a
position that their ‘permitting’ is morally significant. If one cannot prevent the evil
in any case, it does not seem meaningful to suggest that one should not ‘permit’ it.
The precise meaning of this phrase is unclear, but it may be that in this
passage there is at last an indication that not even material cooperation is permitted
when one is in any position to prevent such a grievous ‘violation of the divine law,
an offence against the dignity of the human person, a crime against life, and an
attack on humanity’.170

If this is the case, the argument seems to be that since

human life is the most basic of all human goods, charity and justice demand that
those who are able to prevent euthanasia can never permit it to occur, much less
explicitly approve it. There is no question here of any ‘balancing’ of goods (my life
against the life of the patient), and the order of charity cannot be invoked in order to
provide grounds for anyone to believe that they may cooperate in any way

-

materially or formally, actively or passively - in a direct attack on the life of an
innocent human being.171

170

Euthanasia, p.513 [Flannery 2].
Thus Alphonsus teaches that one may not kill the innocent in order to save one’s own life (de
caritate 66).
These grounds support an argument that this absolute prohibition on all forms of
cooperation applies to intrinsically evil acts which constitute direct attacks on human life itself
(abortion, euthanasia). But it is not immediately obvious that the same prohibition applies to
intrinsically evil acts which do not constitute direct attacks on human life - acts such as contraceptive
sterilisation. This will be clarified below (4.3.2), but at this stage it is interesting to note that a
comparison of the language and content of these four CDF documents could suggest some distinction
between kinds of intrinsically evil acts.
171
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The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith has made a great contribution
to the development of the principle of material cooperation, on three points in
particular:
•

First, material cooperation is possible where a serious reason ‘constrains’ one to
cooperate.

This is much more than ‘permitting’ cooperation, for ‘constraint’

implies that a different question is asked: not ‘what does the law permit me to
do?’, but ‘what are my obligations under the circumstances in this situation?’
By implication the Congregation appears to concede that, at times, a Christian
person or institution may be obliged to cooperate materially in evil - that is,
cooperation may be an imperative. But it gives little indication of the grounds on
which such a judgment might be reached.
•

Second, a Catholic institution can never establish any kind of policy of
cooperation in evil, since the making of such a policy would be damaging to
public morality and would commit the institution to the acceptance of practices
which the Church believes are evil.

Nevertheless the Congregation apparently

allows that grave circumstances may lead a Catholic institution to judge in a
particular case that it should cooperate materially in evil.

A ‘case-by-case’

approach is necessary, but this does not eliminate all material cooperation in evil.
•

Third, the Congregation seems to teach that when an action is properly defined
as ‘abortion’ or ‘euthanasia’, and when one is able to prevent such evils, then no
cooperation of any kind is permissible because these are offences against the most
basic of human rights, the right to life itself. Pope John Paul II would clarify this
further: because they are offences against such a basic right, actions which are
adequately defined as ‘abortion’ and ‘euthanasia’ are intrinsically evil.172

3.2.3

Other Curial Interventions

172

Evangelium vitae, 62 : ‘No circumstance, no purpose, no law whatsoever can ever make licit
an act which is intrinsically illicit, since it is contrary to the law of God which is written in every
human heart, knowable by reason itself, and proclaimed by the Church.’ However, as noted, the
Pope’s treatment of cooperation in these evils is restricted to formal cooperation. It is not
immediately clear why he did not deal with the question of material cooperation in these acts, nor
take the opportunity to formally extend the Congregation’s exclusion of material cooperation to
embrace other intrinsically evil acts such as contraceptive sterilisation. Possibly these matters would
have required a more detailed analysis than the encyclical genre normally allows.
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The document Dans le cadre (1981) addresses basic ethical issues concerning
the gravely ill and dying.173

It reminds nursing staff (who must follow the

instructions of attending physicians) that it is absolutely forbidden to perform any
action which is, in fact, an act of direct killing: neither the doctor, nor the family, nor
the patient himself can release nurses from responsibility for their own actions.174 A
nurse’s subordinate position may place her in a position of cooperation in evil acts,
but she may never commission such actions on her own initiative, since
. . . hers cannot be anything other than material cooperation
justified only by a necessity which is evaluated according to the
gravity of the act, the degree of participation in the whole
process and in the production of the immoral effect, and the
motives which prompt the nurse to obey [aux raisons qui
incitent l’infirmière à obéir] (fear of personal harm in case of
refusal, an important good to be safeguarded without exposing
herself to the risk of dismissal). Insofar as her position allows,
the nurse who finds herself caught up in practices which her
conscience condemns, will nevertheless seek to give witness to
her convictions.175
Three points to note from this text are that ‘a necessity’ may justify material
cooperation; that this justification is referred to the ‘production of immoral effects’
and not, apparently, to the sin of the principal agent (presumably, the physician);
and the relative weight of the nurse’s motives (sufficiently serious reason) to
cooperate.176
The third section of the Catechism of the Catholic Church (1994)177
summarises the Church’s moral teaching but provides no comprehensive treatment of
cooperation.

It offers a modified form of the traditional modes of cooperation in

n.1868:
173

Pontifical Council ‘Cor unum’, Document Dans le cadre. ‘Some Ethical Questions concerning
the Gravely Ill and the Dying.’ (27 June 1981). This translation taken from Erminio Lora, ed.
Enchiridion Vaticanum 7: Documenti Ufficiali della Santa Sede 1980-1981. (Bologna: Dehoniane,
1985) nn.1234ff.
174
Dans le cadre, 7.4.2 (n.1276). In certain circumstances an action which only indirectly leads
to a shortening of life may be performed - an application of the Principle of Double Effect.
175
Dans le cadre, 7.4.2 (n.1276).
176
By numbering the nurse’s ‘motives’ among factors in the ‘necessity’ which justifies
cooperation, this passage seems to imply that these motives do not of themselves constitute a
justifying reason to cooperate. Unfortunately the text does not develop this point.
177
Although the Catechism was formally promulgated in 1992, the official Latin text was not
prepared until 1994. Since the English version was taken from the Latin text, the 1994 dating is
followed here.
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Sin is a personal act. Moreover, we have a responsibility for the
sins committed by others when we cooperate in them:
- by participating directly and voluntarily in them;
- by ordering, advising, praising or approving them;
- by not disclosing or not hindering them when we have an
obligation to do so;
- by protecting evil-doers.178
While teaching that induction and scandal are to be avoided,179

the

Catechism does not distinguish the unique kind of participation which constitutes
cooperation properly so called. Accordingly it is unclear whether by ‘participating
directly and voluntarily’ the Catechism means formal cooperation, material
cooperation, or participation as a form of induction.

In relation to cooperation in

abortion and suicide it refers to formal cooperation only,180 but makes no comment
at all on material cooperation in these evils, or on the significance of such categories
as proximity and necessity.
The Charter for Health Care Workers (1995) makes reference to the problem
of cooperation only indirectly.181

Physicians who ‘voluntarily contribute to the

establishing and support of a connection between prenatal diagnosis and abortion’
would cooperate formally with abortion;182 and laws which encourage medical staff
‘to cooperate proximately in direct abortion’ must not be obeyed but must be refused
‘politely but firmly’.183 Equally, medical staff ‘cannot cooperate in any euthanistic
practice even at the request of the one concerned’ because such cooperation would
contradict their identity as ‘guardians of life’.184
Finally, the Vademecum for Confessors (1997) returns to the problem of
‘cooperation in the sin of a spouse who voluntarily renders the unitive act
178

CCC 1868. Compare with Alphonsus, de restitutione 557.
See CCC 1789 (induction) and 2284-2287 (scandal).
180
In the CCC, 2272 (‘Formal cooperation in an abortion constitutes a grave offense.’) makes no
reference to material cooperation; and 2282 (‘Voluntary co-operation in suicide is contrary to the
moral law’) could mean either formal or material cooperation, but the context implies the former.
181
Pontifical Council for Pastoral Assistance to Health Care Workers, Charter for Health Care
Workers. Vatican Translation. (Bombay: Pauline Publications, 1995). The preface notes that this
document was ‘approved and quickly affirmed in its entirety’ by the Congregation for the Doctrine of
the Faith.
182
Charter, 61. This would include the connection created by Italy’s Law 194/1978: see 4.2.1
below.
183
Charter, 143.
179
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infecund’.185

It makes an important distinction between cooperation properly so

called on one hand and, on the other, cooperation which comes about as a result of
‘violence or unjust imposition on the part of one of the spouses, which the other
spouse in fact cannot resist’.186 The traditional conditions for legitimate cooperation
are repeated:

the cooperator’s act cannot be itself illicit, and there must be a

proportionately grave reason to cooperate. A third condition, apparently unique to
the conjugal context and drawn from the teaching of Pius XI, is that the cooperating
partner must seek to help the other spouse ‘to desist from such conduct’.187

This

emphasises the primary focus of conjugal cooperation which, in keeping with the
tradition, is the sin of the other spouse rather than the further evil effects of
contraception.

184

Charter, 148, 150.
Pontifical Council for the Family, Vademecum for Confessors concerning Some Aspects of the
Morality of Conjugal Life. (12 February 1997). L’Osservatore Romano 11(1482) 12 March 1997. IVII, n.13.
186
Vademecum, 13.
187
Vademecum, 13. The reference is to Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter Casti connubii. ‘Christian
Marriage.’ (31 December 1930). AAS 22(1930) 539-592, at 561.
185
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3.3

Conclusions: The Principle in Moral Theology Today
The Second Vatican Council’s call for a more positive and person-centred

view of the Christian moral life has prompted numerous attempts to ‘re-invent’
Catholic moral theology.

In the course of this renewal many critical issues have

surfaced: methodological issues such as the use of Scripture and the existence of a
specifically Christian ethics;188

fundamental issues such as the direct-indirect

distinction, conscience, moral norms and natural law;189 and ecclesiological issues
such as the relationship between the magisterium and the theological community.190
The treatment of material cooperation since Vatican II provides a good
example of some aspects of this renewal, and of its ‘unevenness’ in general.

3.3.1

The Contribution of Modern Moral Texts: Context

The treatment of cooperation in post-manual moral texts differs from the
manualist tradition less in structure and content, and more in terms of the context of
cooperation and its meaning in Christian life.
In Häring’s Free and Faithful in Christ, for example, the structure of the
principle has not changed substantially from his first text, but the context has. He
acknowledges that the Christian’s duty to actualise Christ in the world - the mission
to be ‘yeast in the dough, salt to the earth’ - cannot be fulfilled without the risk of
cooperating in evil, since the only way to avoid cooperation completely is to
withdraw from the world.191

This casts significant light on the meaning of the

principle: it is not intended simply to help moral agents avoid personal sin, but also
to help them to fulfil their Christian vocation.

The traditional principle serves to

188

For a summary and assessment of these, see Pinckaers, Sources 95-103 and 315-323.
Josef Fuchs SJ has written a great deal on these issues: see for example his Christian Ethics in
a Secular Arena. (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1984). Most recent histories of moral
theology, and indeed most recent moral texts, attempt a summary of these debates.
190
See for example Josef Fuchs SJ, ‘The Magisterium and Moral Theology’ and ‘The One who
Hears You hears Me: Episcopal Moral Directives’ in his Moral Demands and Personal Obligations.
(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1993) 138-150 and 171-180 respectively. Also the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction Donum veritatis. ‘On the Ecclesial Vocation of
the Theologian.’ (24 May 1990). AAS 82(1990) 1550-1570, passim.
191
Häring 1979, 479.
189
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define the ‘lower boundary’ of the Christian’s response: in living out one’s personal
vocational commitments no formal involvement in evil is permissible, and nor is
material involvement unless this is justified by a serious reason. But the traditional
principle provides no more positive guidance than this, whereas Häring offers a
much richer interpretation of the principle.
Scandal also takes on a particular meaning in this context. It still concerns
‘leading one’s neighbour into sin’, but now it also constitutes a contradiction of
Christian witness: even if one’s cooperative act seems justified on the grounds that
the principal agent will sin anyway, cooperation may still be ruled out if it risks
contradicting the very witness one seeks to give.
Häring acknowledges that the mission of Christian witness is more
complicated today because society is more pluralist than predominantly Christian.192
‘Pluralism’ here does not mean simply ‘non-Catholic’ or ‘non-Christian’ in the sense
of religious affiliation: it means not universally founded on Christian moral values or
directed by Christian virtues - hence Häring’s position on ‘respect for sincere
conscience’ and ‘tolerance’.193

In light of modern pluralism, Häring’s position

might bear this interpretation: if a Christian’s duty is to make Christ present in the
world and to proclaim the saving truth of the Gospel, a Christian certainly needs to
respect the consciences of all persons; but there is an additional reason to respect
those who do not share Christian values, for it is precisely through engaging these
persons that the Christian is able to proclaim the Gospel. Häring can be interpreted
as arguing that an ‘apostolic imperative’ may justify tolerance of others’ erroneous
consciences, and perhaps at times even justify material cooperation in their
objectively evil actions.
Häring’s use of these concepts has met stiff opposition: as noted, both
Germain Grisez and Pope John Paul II refute their validity, at least with regard to
intrinsically evil acts.194

But whether or not one agrees with his conclusions,

Häring’s picture of the Christian’s role in a pluralist society is a valuable
192

Häring 1979, 482.
Häring 1979, 485-486. On pluralism as a context for cooperation, see below, 4.1.
194
LCL, 441; Evangelium vitae, 71.
193
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contribution to what he calls the ‘right vision’ and ‘main perspectives’ of Christian
moral life today.195

But because he does not develop metaphysical underpinnings

for his position, it is difficult to imagine how the traditional principle of cooperation
can be made to fit this new vision in practice.
The ontological and eschatological orientations of Peschke’s interpretation
reveal another perspective on the problem of cooperation.

Moral behaviour

concerns realising one’s nature as human by deciding and actualising the kind of
person one should be, and therefore determining the kinds of actions one should or
should not commission.196 He realises that the obligations of Christian charity create
certain responsibilities but, like Häring, Peschke is unable to provide a structure of
legitimate cooperation to match his vision.
This is the significance of Grisez’s achievement.

He too provides an

overarching vision of Christian moral life: the basic human goods which fulfill the
agent precisely as human, and the personal vocational commitments by which one
lives out the Christian life.

But unlike Häring and Peschke, Grisez develops a

structure to support his vision: the imperative power of these basic human goods and
vocational commitments is captured in the modes of responsibility. This grounds a
new dimension of meaning: the challenge of cooperation in evil is not primarily
about ‘what the law allows’, but ‘what my foundational faith commitment to God
requires of me’. Here Grisez accurately reflects the positive trend in modern moral
theology.
However, his focus on the wider implications of the principal agent’s act, and
on whether the cooperator should accept those implications, makes Grisez’s theory
vast and difficult to manage.

This highlights a fundamental contradiction in his

position: while Grisez has located cooperation within the context of personal
vocation and Christian witness, he effectively emphasises only the Christian’s duty
not to cooperate in evil. A Christian may cooperate only if none of the basic human
goods are offended. His modes of responsibility notwithstanding, what Grisez does

195
196

Häring 1978, 6.
See Peschke 1986, 8.
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not explore sufficiently is the possibility that, in view of the broader social
implications of cooperation, the Christian may at times have a vocational duty to
bring about some basic human goods precisely by cooperating in an evil - albeit
only mediately, materially, remotely and contingently - and even though other basic
human goods may be placed at risk.
Furthermore, Grisez’s ‘modes of responsibility’ are really a complex set of
exclusions which must be applied in toto in order to arrive at a ‘remainder’ of
allowable courses of action.

The question one might pose is: given the complex

structure of social and economic life today, and the plurality of values which come
into play on many occasions, is it really possible in practice to analyse every
situation in as much detail as Grisez demands?

To put it more simply: in today’s

complex world, is Grisez’s interpretation of cooperation any real improvement on the
traditional principle?
It is significant that in developing his theory Grisez takes the standpoint of
the philosopher he is, intent on covering every possibility and clarifying every
shadow of uncertainty. His approach is overwhelmingly objective and logical, even
magisterial.

Alphonsus, in contrast, took the standpoint of the pastor he was: his

concern was to offer authoritative and reliable advice which could be applied in
practice by pastors in their daily dealings with ordinary people in concrete
situations.197

The moral tradition generally followed Alphonsus, for good reason:

the aim of moral theology in the life of the Church is to help ordinary people respond
faithfully to God in the ‘messiness’ of daily life. Importantly, Vatican II’s agenda
for the renewal of moral theology retained this practical orientation.

3.3.2

The Contribution of the Magisterium: Content

197

This point is developed eloquently by Pope John Paul II in his Apostolic Letter Spiritus domini.
‘On the Occasion of the Bicentenary of the Death of St Alphonsus M de Liguori.’ (1 August 1987).
AAS 79(1987) 1365-1375.
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As noted, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith has made a great
contribution in recent years to developing the content of the principle of cooperation.
The fact that this development did not come through the successors of the manualists
(such as Häring, Peschke and Grisez) is curious. It may be that modern moral texts
are still infected with a remnant of the ‘manualist’ tradition which requires them to
attempt to cover the entire field of moral theology. At a time when (as McCormick
notes) moral theology is more concerned with methodological, fundamental and
ecclesiological issues, this means that much of the energy for renewal is put more
into foundational matters and less into specific moral problems such as cooperation.
This seems to be the case at least on the ‘macro’ level of moral texts. At the
local level, of course, the modern moral theologian still grapples with the
‘messiness’ of life in the world and must offer appropriate advice to real people in
real situations. The crucial contributions of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith arose from exactly the same necessity.

In this light the content of the

Congregation’s interventions take on a particular hue: by implying that Catholic
institutions may feel ‘constrained’ in individual cases to cooperate mediately and
materially in an evil, the Congregation recognises the extreme difficulties often
encountered by many individuals and institutions in the daily course of their
Christian lives in the world.
This reveals an aspect of the authentic nature of renewal in moral theology:
it evolves in response to the concrete needs of Christian persons seeking assistance in
responding to the call of God in their lives. Certainly this was its meaning for the
great pastor, Alphonsus, and whatever their shortcomings in preparing confessors,
this was also the intention of the manuals. While it may not have figured as clearly
at the time in the minds of the Council Fathers, the same desire underlies Vatican II’s
call for renewal: that in the midst of the world they engage every day, moral theology
should help the people of God to ‘bring forth fruit in charity for the life of the
world’.198

198

Optatam totius, 16.
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This is also the significance of Häring’s insight into the role of the Christian
person in the world, and the Congregation’s apparent position on the inevitability of
cooperation.

It is not the direction of moral theology which shapes the lives of

God’s people, but the lives of God’s people which shapes the direction of moral
theology.

3.3.3

The Contribution of the Moral Agent: Experience

Germain Grisez, in almost a ‘throw-away line’, hints at the unique and
irreplaceable role of the moral agent in the whole process of moral decision making.
The Christian person wishes to know what it is that God wills. Confronted with the
possibility of cooperation in evil, he or she must weigh all reasons for and against
cooperating, in the light of the integral human goods and his or her fundamental
vocational commitments. However, even after much deliberation, it may be that no
particular option seems imperative.
In rare cases the arguments for and against [cooperation] may be
so well balanced that the perfectly prudent person would find
them equally strong, so that either course would be morally
acceptable . . .
In that case, one should discern. Assuming that one has
already gathered the necessary information and aroused one’s
feelings related to faith and relevant commitments of personal
vocation, this discernment will not be difficult. At this final
moment, though not a moment before, the conscientious person
rightly sees the indication of God’s plan and will in what his or
her better, Christian self feels comfortable with.199
Two aspects of this comment merit attention. First, it could be interpreted to
mean that God has a single intelligible option in mind which it is the agent’s moral
duty to discover.

In this case, when the rational processes have failed to deliver

moral certainty, one must ‘discern’ the one right answer God has in mind

-

presumably through prayer and contemplation, which seem here to be almost in the
nature of a ‘last resort’.
But an alternative initial assumption leads to a different conclusion. It may
be in some cases that, when one is faced with several apparently equally possible
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options, God allows the moral agent to choose any of them with equal liberty. That
is, in this case God may not have in mind a single ‘right’ option which one must
simply discover, but instead chooses a different way to honour the freedom with
which He has gifted each person. This is fitting, and certainly in line with the New
Testament image of God as ‘Father’ and Christians as ‘adopted sons through Jesus
Christ’.200

It reflects a more dignified and ‘elevated’ notion of sonship than one

which demands only blind obedience to the single, certain, fixed and mysterious will
of God. It also honours the dignity of human reason: while it may be imperfect and
ultimately unable to attain the heights of God, reason is part of God’s gift to the
human person and therefore is normally an adequate process by which to direct one’s
moral actions.
Second, however, Grisez’s ‘solution’ - discernment - reconnects moral
theology with the fundamental context of Christian moral decision-making.
Christian leads a moral life as a disciple learning to follow the Master.

The

It is in

prayer and contemplation, and in growing likeness to Christ, that one finds the heart
of the moral life, because this is where the moral agent’s identity as Christian (‘man
redeemed by Christ’) is grounded.201

Practical knowledge of good and evil is had

most profoundly by a kind of ‘connaturality’, a non-discursive ‘self-knowledge in
God’, by which the agent knows ‘what God wants me to do’.202 By Christian moral
discernment, which transcends mere rational analysis, the moral agent discovers not
only the nature and extent of moral obligation (the options one ‘ought’ to pursue) but
also the true nature of the liberty given by God: one is free to choose.

199

DMQ, 889.
Ephesians 1:5; see also John 1:12; Romans 8:14-17; 1 John 3:1;
201
On the role of prayer and contemplation in the moral life, see Edmond Gerard Cullinan,
Contemplation as the Basis of the Christian Life in St Thomas’s Treatise on the New Law. Doctoral
Dissertation. (Rome: Academia Alfonsiana, 1986).
202
Austin Fagothey SJ [Right and Reason: Ethics in Theory and Practice. 4th edition. (St Louis:
C V Mosby, 1967).] describes ‘connatural knowledge’ as ‘nonconceptual, nonlogical, nondiscursive
knowledge, rational in the sense that it is done by the reason or intellect, nonrational in the sense that
it is not argumentative or demonstrative or scientific . . . We should not be disturbed at being unable
to describe it more clearly, for it is the nature of prescientific knowledge to be obscure, unformulated,
and unreflective.’ (52-53). He adds that knowledge by connaturality ‘is not immune from error and
needs the criticism, correction, and development ethics can give it.’ (53). Chapter Five of the
present work will make use of a similar theory of moral knowledge developed by Pinckaers in
Sources, 49-74.
200
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It is only prayerful discernment which enables the Christian to ‘bring forth
fruit in charity for the life of the world’, because moral discernment necessarily
demands attentiveness to the ‘life experience’ which the Christian brings to prayer.
Those who listen to the Word of God openly and in union with the Church will
certainly know that they are called to make moral choices which accord with and
flow from that experience of the Word.203 But there is also a sense in which those
who approach the Word do so through the mediation of their experiences of the
world, experiences of good and evil, experiences of freedom and constraint, and
experiences of apparently inescapable complicity in the sins of others. Consciously
or not, the agent brings these experiences to the process of moral discernment; they
mediate the Christian’s encounter with the Word, and the Word sheds His light on
them. This occurs in the very person of the moral agent, who often thereby becomes
acutely aware of new meanings, new imperatives and new solutions - or new
dimensions of existing solutions.204 This awareness occurs in that ‘most secret core’
and ‘sanctuary’ of the person in which ‘he is alone with God whose voice echoes in
his depths’.205 In its deepest meaning conscience is thus revealed primarily not as a
place but as an encounter; not as a faculty but as a meeting of Word and experience
which bears an imperative character.
The fourth chapter of the present work will examine some aspects of the
Christian’s experience of apparently inescapable complicity in evil, and the attempts
of some contemporary moralists to interpret this experience. The final chapter will
attempt to describe a theological interpretation of institutional cooperation in evil, in
line with the Church’s desire for a renewed moral theology.

203

See Pinckaers, Sources, 322-323. This theme is developed in more detail below, at 5.1.3.
This bears out Fuchs’ insight into the primacy of ‘personal morality’ in the teaching of Vatican
II. See Josef Fuchs SJ, ‘A Harmonisation’, 480-481.
205
Gaudium et spes, 16.
204
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Chapter Four
THE CONTEXT OF COOPERATION

4.0

Introduction
The Second Vatican Council empowered the Catholic Church to rediscover

its mission to be ‘yeast in the dough, salt to the earth’.

Behind this development

was a dawning realisation that ‘the world’ is much more than merely pagan territory
waiting to be converted to the one true faith, and the Catholic Church much more
than ‘the only State religion’.1

Rather, the world is the environment in which the

Church is immersed and with which it must necessarily interact in order to exist and
to fulfil its mission.2
The Church’s need to address real moral problems encountered by Christian
people in this world prompts a re-evaluation of the principle of legitimate
cooperation. It has already been noted that, in the response to the lived experience
of its members, the Church itself seems to hold that a Christian may at times be
required (‘constrained’, rather than merely permitted) to cooperate materially in evil
done by others.3 This marks an apparent development of the traditional doctrine.

1

Among errors condemned in the Syllabus of Errors of 1864 were the propositions that ‘The
Church has no power to define dogmatically that the religion of the Catholic Church is the only true
religion’, that ‘In our age it is no longer advisable that the Catholic religion be the only State
religion, excluding all other cults’, and that ‘Therefore it is praiseworthy that in some Catholic
regions the law has allowed people immigrating there to exercise publicly their own cult.’ See J
Neuner SJ and J Dupuis SJ, eds. The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic
Church. 2nd edition. (Bangalore: Theological Publications in India, 1976) nn.1013/21, 1013/77 and
1013/78 respectively.
2
Gaudium et spes, 40: ‘Thus the Church, at once ‘a visible organisation and a spiritual
community’, travels the same journey as all mankind and shares the same earthly lot with the world;
it is to be a leaven and, as it were, the soul of human society in its renewal by Christ and
transformation into the family of God. . . . Furthermore, the Catholic Church gladly values what
other Christian Churches and ecclesial communities have contributed and are contributing
cooperatively to the realisation of this aim. Similarly it is convinced that there is a considerable and
varied help that it can receive from the world in preparing the ground for the Gospel, both from
individuals and from society as a whole, by their talents and activity.’
3
See 3.2.2 above.
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But far from superseding any traditional exposition of the principle based on
the metaphysics of the human act, this approach demands that the very closest
attention be paid to the concrete conditions surrounding every case of cooperation to the real intentions, actions, and circumstances (including the social, political and
cultural circumstances) in every particular instance. Such detail is necessary if the
Christian person is to be afforded proper respect as the locus of morality.

Human

experience, including actual experience of the culture and society in which one lives,
is much more than merely incidental to moral life: it is the very ‘stuff’ of morality.
This, at its heart, is the meaning of natural law: it is in and through our
human experience that God reveals moral truth. Natural law theory is derived from
reflection on particular moral experiences; this reflection reveals universal values
and generates moral norms; these norms, in turn, are intended to guide moral
responses in particular instances.4

Natural law theory, the bulwark of traditional

Catholic morality, begins and ends in human experience of life in the world.
Therefore how we experience the world - and how human beings structure their life
in the world - are of enormous importance to Christian morality.
The focus of this chapter is the context in which cooperation occurs. This is
taken in three steps:

a brief reflection on the phenomenon of pluralism in

contemporary societies and on various Christian attitudes towards the challenge of
‘evil done by others’ (4.1); a survey of some recent theological writings on material
cooperation which identify and address some of the challenges of cooperation (4.2);
and some observations on the specific problem of institutional cooperation (4.3).
This sets the scene for the final Chapter which proposes a theological framework
within which to view institutional cooperation.

4

See Demmer, ‘Tolerancia y cooperación’, 330.
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4.1

The Contemporary Context
If moral behaviour may be defined as the human person’s manner of

engaging the concrete reality of the world, then the problem of cooperation in evil
marks a significant point of contact between tangible outer reality and the moral
agent’s hidden inner life.

Therefore an accurate assessment of the morality of

cooperation - including institutional cooperation - demands an exact account of the
social, historical and cultural contexts in which it occurs.

There have been

enormous social and cultural changes in the world in the last half of the twentieth
century, so it is not surprising that, after a long period of virtual dormancy following
Alphonsus Liguori and a gradual reawakening of moral theology prior to Vatican II,
there should have been (in some quarters, at least) a considerable reassessment of
cooperation over the last forty years.
It is instructive, for example, to compare Pietro Palazzini writing in 1968
with Dionigi Tettamanzi writing just ten years later.5 Palazzini takes the traditional
line: the nine modes delimit cooperation, which he sees more or less exclusively
through the eyes of the individual moral agent.

Tettamanzi enters his analysis

through a rigorous study of the concrete social and cultural situation of the particular
question he considers (abortion laws in Italy); he makes no reference at all to the
nine modes, but places the problem of cooperation in a much wider perspective.
This contrast in approaches is in some ways typical of the different foci and
processes of contemporary moral theology.
The Fathers of Vatican II realised that the role of the Church with respect to
civil society is evolutionary rather than stationary: whatever the status of the Church
in itself, the world is changing rapidly and it is with this changing world that the
Church must interact.

The implications are enormous.

In questions regarding its

ability to engage the world in moral dialogue the Church can no longer cast itself as
a static entity, an institution preserved untouched by the society which surrounds it.
It must always consider itself in its concrete reality as ‘Church-in-the-world’, an
5

Pietro Palazzini, ‘Cooperatori’ in F Roberti and P Palazzini, eds. Dizionario di Teologia Morale.
2 volumes. 4th edition. (Rome: Studium, 1968) 429-433; Dionigi Tettamanzi, ‘Problemi morali
circa la cooperazione all’aborto.’ Medicina e morale 28(1978) 396-427.
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entity which of its essence is related to - and therefore, in some respects, partially
defined by

-

its social context.

Recent European and Asian history has

demonstrated that even the most autonomous ‘internal’ workings of a local church
can be profoundly affected - and sometimes radically redefined - by the political,
cultural and social context in which the church finds itself.6
The aim of this section is to characterise aspects of the social context in
which contemporary moral decisions must be made, and to outline some attitudes
towards evil done by others.

4.1.1

Pluralism

It is estimated that there were 260 aboriginal ‘nations’ or tribes in Australia in
1788, the year of European foundation.7 The majority of the first white settlers were
British (although other European nations were also actively seeking foundations in
the ‘new’ country),8 but at the end of the second millennium the people of Australia
include migrants or descendants of migrants from some 200 countries.9 There have
been corresponding shifts in patterns of religious belief and practice in the last half
of the twentieth century: in 1993 only 13% of Australians claimed to attend church
on a weekly basis, and overall confidence in churches lagged behind confidence in
schools, business and industry, but ahead of confidence in government, the legal
system and the public service.10

6

One thinks, for example, of the restrictions under which the Church once operated in Hungary,
and under which it still operates in China.
7
Hugh Mackay, Generations: Baby Boomers, their parents & their children. (Sydney: Macmillan,
1997) 8.
8
D F Bourke CM notes that a major factor in Britain’s decision to establish a colony in Western
Australia was a desire to prevent the French from doing so! See Bourke’s The History of the Catholic
Church in Western Australia 1829-1979. (Perth: Vanguard, 1979) 3.
9
Mackay, Generations, 8. Mackay [citing David Day, Claiming a Continent. (Sydney: Angus
and Robertson, 1997)] reports a great public outcry when it was revealed in 1936 that only 97% of
Australian residents were of British stock. See Mackay’s Turning Point: Australians Choosing their
Future. (Sydney: Macmillan, 1999) 37.
10
Philip Hughes et al., Believe It or Not: Australian Spirituality and the Churches in the 90s.
(Kew, Victoria: Christian Research Association, 1995) 14 and 69 respectively. Data are taken from
the National Social Science Survey 1993.
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So whatever it may have been in the past, Australia does not now possess a
single culture or a single set of moral values to guide its institutions and drive its
functioning as a nation.11 Australia today is a pluralist society.
In this context ‘pluralism’ has several meanings.

Taken in its simplest

sociological sense it means ‘multiculturalism’, the bare phenomenon of different
cultural and ethnic groups sharing a single society, as so evident for example in
Australia and the USA.12
Multiculturalism is a factor in a second form of pluralism, the existence of a
multiplicity of moral values and moral priorities within a single society.

Moral

pluralism may manifest itself in the variety of moral values held by different people
(for example, the value of ‘success’ versus the value of ‘charity’).

Alternatively,

moral pluralism may arise between individuals not because they hold differing
values, but because they hold the same values in differing orders of priority: for
example, some may rate ‘success’ more highly than ‘charity’, but others vice versa.
However it arises, moral pluralism seems to be a generational phenomenon:
today’s society seems more open and accepting of behaviours previously considered
immoral or improper. For some this signifies a threat to traditional moral standards,
the collapse of public morality, and a sign of social disintegration. For others it is
no more than a sign of apparently ‘normal’ processes of change which modern
society, and especially civil authority, must simply manage.13

11

Hugh Mackay holds that Australia was always a ‘diverse’ society: ‘The nature of our diversity
may have changed - less religious, more generational, for example; less overtly class-based, more
ethnic - but this has always been a hybrid culture and the idea of a once-homogenous Australia,
based on the ethos of the bush, is largely a myth.’ Mackay, Turning Point, 35.
12
Mackay notes (Turning Point, 40-41) that where the word ‘multicultural’ may convey a certain
negativity arising from discredited policies of assimilation, the word ‘cosmopolitan’ is happily
embraced in celebration of ethnic diversity - a much richer and more pleasing concept.
13
John Kekes, The Morality of Pluralism. (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993) 4-5:
‘We used to see homosexuality as harmful, but we are becoming convinced that homosexuals are no
better or worse than others, and so we are changing our minds about the harm it does. This change,
however, alters our morality no more significantly than Christian morality was altered by the
growing conviction that witches should not be burned . . . To point to some ways in which the moral
values of a period differ from those of the previous one may, therefore, provide evidence for no more
than the most routine moral change.’ This position assumes that a proper moral assessment of
homosexuality is based on its consequences, and that moral change in society is normal. Neither
assumption is necessarily valid.
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But in a third sense ‘pluralism’ refers to a concept of morality itself: not
merely a plurality of cultures or differing moral values, but differing ideas of what
morality is.14

Where monism holds that there is only one valid system of moral

values common to all people, and relativism holds that moral values depend on the
choices of each individual, pluralism holds a position somewhere between the two.
Some moral values are indeed held in common (such as justice, truth, common
good), but human beings are also motivated by ‘non-moral’ values (such as beauty,
well-being, creativity).15

The ‘business’ of ‘morality’ in this view is for each

See also Ronald F Thiemann, Constructing a Public Theology: The Church in a Pluralistic
Culture. (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1991) 38: ‘The deep moral pluralism of our culture
challenges the very notion that there can be a fundamental value orientation that binds a people
together in common action within the public realm. At the same time, to reject the idea that we share
any common human values or virtues is to strike at the very heart of the notion of political
community. We must find a way between the cultural and religious imperialism that would define the
interests and values of one group as the common good, and the moral relativism that would assert
that all values and ethical stances are nothing more than the opinions or personal preferences of
those who hold them. The former position is a denial of pluralism, the latter a denial that we can
share anything in common even as we acknowledge our differences.’
14
Kekes, The Morality of Pluralism, 8-9: ‘Monism is the view that there is one and only one
reasonable system of values. This system is the same for all human beings, always, everywhere.
Human lives are good to the extent to which they conform to this system, and particular values are
better or worse depending on their standing in the system. . . . [Relativism is] the view that
ultimately all values are conventional. Human life would be inconceivable without values, but what
values people accept depends on the context in which they were born, on their genetic inheritance
and subsequent experiences, on the political, cultural, economic, and religious influences on them; in
short, what they value depends on their subjective attitudes and not on the objective features of
values. . . . Pluralism is a theory about the nature of the values whose realisation would make lives
good. The primary concern of pluralism is with the relation in which these values stand to each
other; . . . ’ Emphasis added.
15
‘The key descriptive thesis of pluralism is that central features of good lives, as they are
conceived in contemporary Western circumstances, at any rate, are best understood in pluralistic
terms. These features are, first, that we are motivated by various moral values, such as the common
good, duty, personal ideals, love and friendship, self-development, loyalty, justice, human rights, and
so on. Second, that we are also motivated by nonmoral values of different sorts, for instance, beauty,
playfulness, physical well-being, career plans, creativity, adventure, style, and the like. Third, that
we often encounter conflicts in which we feel the tension between and among moral and nonmoral
values, and these values motivate contrary choices and courses of action. Fourth, a sense of loss
often accompanies the choices and actions our values require because, although we do what we feel it
is, on balance, reasonable to do, we are nevertheless often forced in this process to sacrifice
important values. And last, we often experience conflicts, not merely within morality, but between
morality and such other dimensions of life as politics, aesthetics, intimate personal relationships, or a
reasonably interpreted conception of self-interest.’ Kekes, The Morality of Pluralism, 11-12.
In some respects this explanation of pluralism is not satisfying. In the first place, motivation
by ‘nonmoral values’ occurs when the agent sees some advantage in that ‘nonmoral value’ - which
would seem to make it a moral value, or at least indicative of a drive for a good which expresses a
moral value (in Grisez’s terms, a basic human good). So the ‘conflict’ between moral and nonmoral
values turns out to be a conflict between different moral values. Secondly, then, pluralism becomes
essentially a balancing of moral values within the individual; it can be considered a ‘conception of
morality’ in an inter-personal sense only if it can be shown that moral values are indeed shared among
people, or at least if there are commonly-held beliefs about appropriate and inappropriate ways to
realise moral values. Thirdly, and only if these challenges can be overcome, pluralism could be held
as a universal and objective conception of morality. But Kekes seems to imply that this is a
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individual to resolve the conflicts which inevitably occur between moral and nonmoral values, or between personal and communal values, in such a way that the
individual achieves what he or she (or others observing, for that matter) would
believe to be ‘a good life’.
[Pluralism] concentrates on the possibilities whose realisation may
make lives good, and it thereby wishes for us what we wish for
ourselves. In this respect, pluralism is quite unlike monism. For
what monists wish for us is that we should overcome the obstacles
that prevent us from embracing the one true system of values
through which we could achieve a good life. The pluralist ideal is
that we should make a good life for ourselves. The monistic ideal
is that we should find the one good life that is good for all of us.
The pluralistic view of individuality is that it involves constructing
a good life out of the available plural possibilities. The monistic
view is that individuality involves plurality in the ways of reaching
the one good life for all. Both see living a good life as the goal.
But for pluralists the goal is to achieve what we individually want
to achieve, while for monists the goal is to achieve what all
individuals alike ought to want to achieve.16
But whether one considers pluralism as a deep-seated difference in basic
concepts of morality, or as a more general phenomenon of multiple cultural or moral
values, it concerns the co-existence in a single society of differing ideas about good
and evil, right and wrong.17 These are the differences which give rise to the kinds
of moral dilemmas addressed by the principle of cooperation: a principal agent
believes that his action is good, but the cooperator disagrees.

From one point of

consequentialist concept: the good produced overall must outweigh the evil produced overall.
Pluralism in this sense suffers from the same difficulties as all other forms of consequentialism: it
must show how goods and evils are first to be defined, and then commensurated, and then balanced to
arrive at a surplus of good over evil.
16
Kekes, The Morality of Pluralism, 14. Emphasis original.
17
Patrick Hannon, Church, State, Morality & Law. (Westminster MD: Christian Classics, 1992)
90: ‘Pluralism need mean no more than that there is a factual diversity of belief and practice in
religious or moral matters in the world at large or within a particular community. In this sense there
has always been a pluralism in morals, certainly in the world at large, and even in regions and
countries. If our time is more aware of such diversity the reason is doubtless in modern possibilities
for communication. I need only to allude to the ‘revolution’ in communications technology, and the
relative facility with which a modern may travel the world.
And of course this awareness breeds questions for value systems if only by showing the viability not to mention the rival attractions - of alternatives. In modern experience this combines with the
democratic instinct so as to create a demand for the legitimation within communities of political or
moral viewpoints hitherto looked on as deviant. If formerly the practical implementation of such a
viewpoint was precluded by the law, the demand for its recognition now quite naturally takes the
shape of a call for legal change.’
Note that Hannon is writing out of Catholic Ireland which was at that time in turmoil over reform
to laws governing abortion and divorce.
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view it matters less how these differences arise; what matters more is how they
affect moral decision-making, and the fundamental stances a Christian might adopt.
And both of these depend upon the basic position one chooses to adopt in relation to
the very possibility of moral conflict.

4.1.2

Attitudes to Pluralism

What might be a Christian’s attitude toward this pluralist world?

The

following survey of possibilities is neither exhaustive nor conclusive, but it indicates
some of the wider questions which underlie the problem of cooperation in evil. The
aim here is not to settle on any one approach at the expense of all others, but to open
up a number of perspectives on pluralism to which ‘cooperation’ is but one possible
response.

It will emerge that the principle of legitimate cooperation may in fact

involve all of these attitudes in one way or another.
4.1.2.1 Moral Conflict
The most basic problem of cooperation in evil is a conflict of moral values or
standards:

a principal agent who wills an evil believing it to be good, and a

cooperator who identifies the evil and names it as such.
This raises a fundamental question: are moral conflicts real or only apparent?
Do moral norms or moral values ever really come into conflict because of the
objective condition of the world, or do they only seem to conflict in the mind and
heart of the moral agent because of his (subjective) inability to grasp and resolve
what is undeniably a difficult (but not essentially insoluble) moral problem? This is
a vastly more complex question than can reasonably be addressed here, but some
brief comments will shed light on later discussion.18
Broadly speaking there seem to be three approaches to the question of moral
conflict, and the differences between them may best be illustrated by reference to the
18

For critical discussions of the problem of moral conflicts, see two articles of Charles Robert, ‘La
situation de ‘conflit’, un thème dangereux de la théologie morale d’aujourd’hui.’ Revue des Sciences
Religieuses 44(1970) 190-213; and ‘La Situation de Conflit: Recherche de solutions dans la théologie
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casus perplexus: the situation in which a moral agent is, or believes himself to be,
confronted by a choice only between two or more moral evils.19
Firstly, there are those who hold that moral values and moral norms can
never really come into conflict because all values, norms, rights and duties have their
origin in ‘the perfectly ordered demands of natural law’ - this is, in the mind and
will of God.20 In this view the perfectly-attuned moral agent will always choose the
moral value which is most fully in accord with natural law, and in choosing will not
encounter any real conflicts because there can be no contradictions in the one mind
of God. Therefore there is never any real casus perplexus, but only agents who feel
forced to choose between moral evils and who are therefore always responsible for
the evil they choose (unless excused by invincible ignorance).

After all, any

lingering doubts about moral duties may be resolved by recourse to those of greater
moral knowledge, as required in the moral system of ‘probabilism’.21
Secondly, there are those who hold that even if moral conflicts never actually
occur, they appear to occur because of the human person’s fallibility.22 This affords
the experience of moral conflict a somewhat more objective status: moral conflicts
may never really occur ‘out there’ in the objective world, but they certainly really
occur subjectively ‘in here’, in the heart and mind of the one who faces the moral
choice.

In the casus perplexus, in this view, choice of a lesser evil may not be

strictly objectively justified, but it is understandable and often excusable given the
fallibility of the moral agent.

protestante d’aujourd’hui.’ Le Supplement 24(1971) 150-175; and L Cornerotte CICM, ‘Loi morale,
valeurs humaines et situations de conflit.’ Nouvelle revue théologique 100(1978) 502-532.
19
See for example Davis, vol. I, 72-73.
20
On this discussion see Nicholas Crotty OP, ‘Conscience and Conflict.’ Theological Studies
32(1971) 208-232. At 210 Crotty identifies the manualist tradition as holding this first position.
21
Crotty, ‘Conscience and Conflict’, 212. This position is typified in Davis, vol. I, 72-73.
22
At 212-213 Crotty identifies Archbishop Denis E Hurley among those who hold this position.
See Hurley’s Principle of Overriding Right in ‘A New Moral Principle - When Right and Duty
Clash.’ The Furrow 17(1966) 619-622. Subsequent discussion of this ‘new principle’ is also
revealing: see the critical review of L L McReavy, ‘When Right and Duty Clash - A New Moral
Principle?’ The Clergy Review 52(1967) 213-216; Archbishop Hurley’s letter in response ‘Principle
of Overriding Right.’ The Clergy Review 52(1967) 479-482; and his ‘Note in Defence of the
Principle of Overriding Right.’ Theological Studies 29(1968) 301-309.
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Thirdly, there are those who hold that moral conflicts do actually occur
objectively because of the ‘fallen’ condition of both the moral agent and the world.23
Here the perplexed conscience faces a choice between evils in fact, and not merely
apparently.

But in a fallen world all moral choices involve some degree of

imperfection, so they are more accurately described as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ rather than
as simply ‘good’ or ‘evil’.24

The challenge for the responsible moral agent is to

choose what is ‘right’ in a particular situation. In the casus perplexus this may mean
choosing a ‘lesser evil’. This is not to say that a ‘lesser evil’ can become a ‘good’,
but only that to choose a ‘lesser evil’ is ‘right’, and to choose a ‘greater evil’ is
‘wrong’.25
These different attitudes to the possibility of moral conflict reveal
fundamentally different visions of ‘what is morally possible in human life’.

For

those who hold that moral conflicts are real, doing evil seems inevitable; but for
those who hold that moral conflicts are only ever apparent, doing evil is at least
theoretically avoidable. The controversial question of whether an evil which is done
is truly moral or only physical (‘non-moral’ or ‘pre-moral’ evil) is far too complex to
address here, and is in any event somewhat peripheral to the main point: some
believe that moral innocence is possible in life, while others believe that moral
wrongdoing (or ‘moral tragedy’) is inevitable.26
There is a certain attraction in the possibility of moral innocence: one’s
overriding concern is for the quality of one’s own moral life, and who would not
wish to be morally pure? But such an attitude ‘precludes recognition of the plurality
of potentially conflicting moral responsibilities that ordinarily constitutes a person’s
23

Crotty (‘Conscience and Conflict’, 214-216) attributes this position to Charles E Curran. At
215: ‘In other words, it is not just that the man confronting conflict situations is a sinful man. What
the sinful man confronts is a sinful situation.’ It will be suggested below (4.3.5) that this attitude
toward moral conflict inspires a relatively new attitude toward cooperation in evil.
24
Crotty, ‘Conscience and Conflict’, 216.
25
See also this Chapter, footnote 34.
26
See Christopher W Gowans, Innocence Lost: An Examination of Inescapable Moral
Wrongdoing. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 219: ‘In brief, those who reject the idea of
inescapable moral wrongdoing suppose that moral innocence is possible, while those who accept this
idea think that moral tragedy is possible.’ Gowans presents a stimulating discussion of the concepts
of moral innocence and moral tragedy at 218-228, and the political problem of ‘dirty hands’ at 228234. The latter casts an interesting light on Pope John Paul II’s position on cooperation in
Evangelium vitae, 73.
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life’.27

Since holding an ideal is an a priori condition for the possibility of attaining

the reality, the moral agent who holds from the outset that all moral conflicts are
‘only apparent’ can seek resolution only by trying to eliminate one or other
competing moral duty.

When one’s duty to avoid evil still seems to conflict with

other positive duties, moral principles such as material cooperation or double effect
will be employed in purely permissive ways: the moral agent will use a principle to
look for an ‘escape’ from the apparent dilemma.
On the other hand, it is undeniable that moral conflict is often at least
experienced as real.

Those who acknowledge this experience and the existential

possibility of moral tragedy tend to be less concerned about the objectivity of their
dilemmas, less burdened by a sense of their own fallibility, and more concerned to
discover how best to respond to their apparently conflicting responsibilities.28

In

view of this, when one’s duty to avoid evil (even evil done by others) seems to
conflict with other responsibilities, use of the principle of legitimate cooperation is
more than purely permissive.

The principle here does not merely provide an

‘escape’ from an apparent dilemma: it lights the path toward the greatest achievable
good. To use the principle here is not an admission of defeat but a way of making
the best of an imperfect situation: it is simply a function of ‘the way things are’ in a
pluralist world.

4.1.2.2 Compromise and the Lesser Evil
Clergy and layfolk reluctantly admit that various social factors and
structures seem to force people of goodwill into a situation which,
by usual standards, is considered immoral. They cannot always
cast off the feeling that in many cases these norms are a threat to
the concrete requirements of life and lead to conflicts of conscience
to which there seems to be no solution . . . The question we hardly
27

Gowans, Innocence Lost, 223.
Gowans, Innocence Lost, 223. In discussing prominent ‘tragic-making characteristics’ of moral
conflicts, Gowans at 227 notes that one such characteristic is that ‘[t]he morally best action renders
the agent a tool in the evil projects of others. When we act for the best, and yet in doing so
nonetheless help promote the sinister aims of others - for example, by making a political concession
to a despotic government in order to obtain freedom for a hostage - we feel tarnished by the fact that
we have been used to implement these aims.’ The example Gowans offers might qualify, in terms of
the present study, as immediate material cooperation.
28
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dare ask may be put briefly as follows: are we forced by our
imperfections and the disintegrated society in which we live to
accept a compromise in order to ensure that the Christian life
remains possible?29
The word ‘compromise’ commonly implies a concession made to settle a
dispute between conflicting opinions or positions, a modification or adjustment of
one or other position, or of both.30

In the context of ethics it often has a negative

connotation: in an effort to resolve real or apparent conflicts between competing
norms or values, an agent must in some way modify the demands of these values or
norms, or compromise his own integrity.
God may require us to ‘sin bravely’ (pecca fortiter), in the
assurance that forgiveness is available in Christ, but we must never
lose sight of the fact that all compromise is wrong.31
For one who accepts at least the experience of moral conflict, ‘compromise’
can be conceived as a method not of forsaking moral values but of striving to realise
them as best one can amid the ‘messiness’ of life here and now.32

Indeed, it is

precisely because it seeks to realise salvation through life in the real world that the
Catholic tradition has developed practical principles (such as legitimate cooperation)
to help resolve moral conflict.
For some, moral conflicts can be approached by viewing life as a complex of
competing rights and duties which can be prioritised.33 Compromise here consists in
29

Coenraad van Ouwerkerk CSsR, ‘Gospel Morality and Human Compromise.’ Concilium
5(1965) 5. Emphasis added.
30
“compromise, n., Settlement of dispute by mutual concession; adjustment of (between)
conflicting opinions, courses, etc., by modification of each; . . . (v.i.) make a compromise; bring
(person, oneself) under suspicion by indiscreet action.” Concise Oxford Dictionary. 5th ed. (1964).
See also Helmut Weber, ‘Il compromesso etico’ in Tullo Goffi, ed. Problemi e Prospettive di
Teologia Morale. (Brescia: Queriniana, 1976) 199-219. At 200: ‘. . . almost all agree in seeing in
compromise an attempt at a certain accommodation. It is the effort to reconcile contradictory aims
and desires by reducing and renouncing their full realisation.’
31
D H Field, ‘Compromise’ in David J Atkinson and David H Field, eds. New Dictionary of
Christian Ethics and Pastoral Theology. (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1995) 245-246, at 245.
32
See Field, ‘Compromise’, 245: ‘a compromise may express an intention to discover God’s will
in an ethically ambivalent situation, especially when two or more principles dictate courses of action
which are incompatible.’ Weber, ‘Il compromesso’, 205-206 notes that this is a typically Catholic
attitude to moral compromise. See also Ouwerkerk, ‘Gospel Morality’, 7.
33
This approach is noted by Klaus Demmer MSC, ‘Entscheidung und Kompromiss.’
Gregorianum 53(1972) 323-351, in which he compares Catholic and Protestant lines of thought. At
324: ‘Catholic theology should examine whether it has not preferred to sideline ‘slippery solutions’
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identifying and choosing the greater good or the higher duty, while reluctantly
leaving other goods aside. Conversely, moral conflicts may appear to offer a choice
only between greater and lesser evils. Compromise in this case has the moral agent
seeking to affirm all moral values as far as the concrete circumstances allow: if one
cannot achieve a good, one will at least seek to avoid the greater evils.
Now in situations of this kind, the rule of Christian reason, if we are
governed by the ordo bonorum, is to choose the lesser evil. This
general statement is, it would seem, beyond debate; for the only
alternative is that in conflict situations we should choose the greater
evil, which is patently absurd.34
The ‘principle’ of the lesser evil has an honourable history in the Catholic
tradition, as the manuals attest.35 What is less clear is whether, under this principle,
a moral agent is really and actively ‘choosing’ an evil at all: wouldn’t that be a case
of ‘doing evil to achieve good’, of using an evil means to attain a good end? Further
comment will be made below,36 but with regard to legitimate cooperation two points
can be made here.

and in this way oversimplified decision making. In no way does this mean to assert that with
consideration of the problem of compromise new territory will be entered. It has always known
about the necessity of weighing things up and has borrowed expressions such as ‘ordo caritatis’ and
so on for its moral system.’ [Translation here: Rev Dr Alfonsas Savickas.]
Mark Attard notes that Demmer holds compromise to be necessary because of the limited nature
of norms; but that in any case compromise is a principle of growth: by grace and human effort man
moves forward in hope. See Mark Attard O.Carm., Compromise in Morality. Doctoral Dissertation.
(Rome, 1976) 39-40. The reference is to Demmer, ‘Entscheidung’, 349-350.
On establishing a priority or hierarchy of values, see Jean-Marie Aubert, ‘Hiérarchie de Valeurs et
Histoire.’ Revue des Sciences Religieuses 44(1970) 5-22; and Rene Simon, ‘Critères pour une
Hiérarchie des Valeurs.’ Concilium 120(1976) 93-104.
34
Richard A McCormick SJ, ‘Ambiguity in Moral Choice’ in Richard A McCormick SJ and
Paul Ramsey, eds. Doing Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict Situations. (Chicago:
Loyola University Press, 1978) 38. McCormick apparently sees the choice of lesser evil as the basic
structure of all moral conflict situations. He has also commented extensively on situations of moral
conflict in his Notes on Moral Theology: 1965 through 1980. (Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, 1981) see especially 117-128, 305-322, 747-768. In particular, see his comments at 126128 on Charles E Curran’s concept of compromise in his ‘Dialogue with Joseph Fletcher.’ Homiletic
and Pastoral Review 67(1967) 821-829.
As suggested here, traditional doctrines on perplexed and erroneous conscience can be portrayed
as efforts to resolve the experience of moral conflict. See Bernard Oliver OP, ‘The “Rights” of
Conscience: The Problem of the Misguided Conscience’ in Tolerance and the Catholic: A
Symposium. Translated by George Lamb. (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955) 137-165, at 138.
35
See for example Alphonsus, de conscientia 10; Aertnys-Damen, de conscientia 54; and
Peschke 1986, 224. Note that ‘the principle of lesser evil’ may apply not only in some instances of
perplexed conscience, but also may be suggested to another as a way of minimising the other’s sin or
reducing its evil effects: see Alphonsus, de restitutione 565; Peschke 1986, 324; and especially E T
Hannigan SJ, ‘Is it ever lawful to advise the lesser of two evils?’ Gregorianum 30(1949) 104-129,
where the principle of lesser evil is traced back at least as far as Cajetan in the sixteenth century.
36
See 4.2.2.3.
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First, when it is said that a lesser evil may be ‘chosen’ in conflict situations,
the verb ‘to choose’ is used in a particular way.37

For ‘choice’ is certainly an

activity of the will, but in this case it is an exercise of the ‘permitting will’ rather
than the ‘intending will’ - which is only an idiosyncratic way of expressing the
‘direct-indirect’ distinction in intending.38 In a situation of conflict, the ‘choice’ of a
lesser moral evil could be legitimate only if this ‘choice’ is an action of the
‘permitting will’, an indirect intention.

That is, the direct object of the agent’s

‘intending will’ - one’s direct intention - is a good, but a concomitant evil is
foreseen to accompany this good, in which case this evil may be ‘permitted’ or
‘indirectly intended’. Since it is only indirectly intended, this evil is not the moral
object of the agent’s action, and so the cooperator is not really ‘choosing’ evil as
such.39
But second, as already indicated, cases of material cooperation differ from
the normal pattern of human acts because the permitted evil flows from a principal
agent’s action rather than from the cooperator’s action. So in the case of legitimate
cooperation it is only by analogy that the cooperator can be said to be ‘indirectly
intending’ the evil.

In Evangelium vitae 73, for example, Pope John Paul II

demonstrates that the legislator can ‘licitly support proposals aimed at limiting the
harm done by such a law’. That is, the direct object of the legislator’s act is not an
evil of any kind, but rather the limiting of an evil - which, as the First Principle of
Practical Reason would indicate, is morally required whether or not any good can
actually be ‘done’ or ‘pursued’.

So even here the legislator’s action has its own

legitimate moral object: fewer evil effects, rather than more numerous evil effects.
For this reason the legislator’s action is deemed ‘legitimate and proper’.40
4.1.2.3 Tolerance
Another attitude toward pluralism, ‘tolerance’ or ‘toleration’ properly so
called is a stance adopted toward an attitude or practice with which one disagrees or
37

McCormick, ‘Ambiguity’, 35-38.
McCormick, ‘Ambiguity’, 35-36.
39
This is the essence of the Principle of Double Effect.
40
Evangelium vitae, 73.
38
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which one believes to be evil, but which for various reasons one chooses not to resist
or suppress.41 This last clause is essential. Tolerance is an attitude which is freely
and deliberately chosen, not one enforced by impotence: to endure an evil over
which one has no influence is not toleration as such.
Tolerance may have various justifications: it may be considered a
requirement of prudence, or of rationality, or of morality itself - or indeed of all of
these taken together.42

But each justification has its limits.

Prudence grounds

toleration as a requirement of public order: for example, the interests of public peace
might recommend toleration of houses of prostitution.43 But if public peace would
be better served by the suppression of these houses, then prudence might dictate
intolerance instead. Another ground for tolerance might be the common search for
truth in genuine humility and ‘reciprocity of consciences’.

Here intolerance takes

the form of an ‘intellectual arrogance, a blindness to the possibility that “I may be
wrong and you may be right”.’ 44 In this light tolerance holds up even in the face of
a scepticism which doubts the very existence of truth, and a relativism which holds
that one opinion is as good as another.

But again, if good order required the

elimination of scepticism and relativism, intolerance might be indicated.

41

The classic text on tolerance is probably Arthur Vermeersch SJ, Tolerance. Translated by W
Humphrey Page. (London: Washbourne, 1913). Two other substantial texts are the historical study
of Werner Post, ‘Tolerance’ in Karl Rahner SJ et al., eds. Sacramentum Mundi: An Encyclopedia of
Theology. (London: Burns & Oates, 1970); and Susan Mendus and David Edwards, eds. On
Toleration. The JB and WB Morrell Memorial Addresses on Toleration, University of York. (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1987).
An important commentary on tolerance and the following point (religious freedom and respect for
conscience) is Eric D’Arcy, Conscience and its Right to Freedom. (New York: Sheed and Ward,
1961) 238-248 on toleration, and 248-258 on religious freedom. The notion of tolerance also figures
in the teaching of Popes Pius XII and Paul VI: see 3.2.1 above.
42
This is concisely argued by Susan Mendus in On Toleration, 3-10.
43
This is Augustine’s position as cited in James F Keenan SJ, ‘Prophylactics, Toleration and
Cooperation: Contemporary Problems and Traditional Principles.’ International Philosophical
Quarterly 29(1989) 205-220, at 206.
44
Mendus, On Toleration, 6. Vatican II enshrined reciprocity of conscience (and hence this
concept of tolerance) as a value for the Church’s mission in the world in Gaudium et spes, 16:
‘Through loyalty to conscience Christians are joined to other men in the search for truth and for the
right solution to so many moral problems which arise both in the life of individuals and from social
relationships.’ Thus also Vermeersch holds that humility (understood as a prudent distrust of oneself
and a consciousness of one’s liability to err) is an essential aspect of tolerance. See his Tolerance, 1415.
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Or tolerance may be considered a requirement of morality itself, a right to be
afforded all people simply as human beings.45

If pluralism is conceived not as a

threat to the good of the human community but as a healthy diversity which enriches
a society, then tolerance may be required by morality itself as ‘a direct appeal to
people’s right to lead their own lives in whichever way they think best’.46

Here

pluralism as a concept of morality requires tolerance on the part of all, in order to
achieve its promise of the greatest possible self-realisation for everyone.
This concept of tolerance need not represent promotion of ethical relativism:
. . . the argument has two separate strands, each of which is
compatible with the denial of extreme relativism. The first holds
that since people are essentially diverse creatures, there may not be
any one way of life which is the best for all. Of course, it does not
follow from this that any way of life is as good as any other. . . .
The second strand of the argument insists that, even if there is one
way of life which is best for people, it is more important that they
discover this for themselves than that it be imposed upon them from
without.47
This second strand of argument grounds an attitude of respect for the dignity
of conscience, for it requires that ‘we show respect for persons as autonomous
agents, as agents who have and are entitled to their own plans and projects, which
may differ from our own’.48

In fact it requires not only that one refrains from

offending the rights of other people, but also that one recognises a wider duty of
‘actually helping and encouraging them to pursue the kinds of lives which they
believe to be valuable’.49 This approximates the Church’s duty not only to defend
the dignity of conscience, but also to positively promote religious freedom.

45

Vatican II sees this concept of tolerance as a requirement for the Church in the world in
Gaudium et spes 28: ‘Those also have a claim on our respect and charity who think and act
differently from us in social, political, and religious matters. In fact the more deeply we come to
understand their ways of thinking through kindness and love, the more easily will we be able to enter
into dialogue with them.’ The Council goes on to note that this in no way commits the Church to
approval of the ‘errors’ of others, since tolerance must be extended to the person but not to their
erroneous belief or action ‘which must always be rejected’.
46
Mendus, On Toleration, 8. See also Vermeersch, Tolerance, 31: ‘The tolerance of private life
is practised principally among equals, and is summed up in the respect which one person is bound to
pay to the rights of another.’
47
Mendus, On Toleration, 9.
48
Mendus, On Toleration, 12.
49
Mendus, On Toleration, 14.
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4.1.2.4 Religious Freedom and Respect for Conscience
Investigating the role of the Church in the modern democratic State, John
Courtney Murray SJ noted that the Catholic Church in the United States of America
enjoys a guaranteed measure of self determination under the First Amendment to the
Constitution of that nation.50

But in granting equal freedom to all religions, the

same Amendment denies the Catholic Church’s historical claim (in Europe, at least)
to the right to establishment.51 Murray resolved this tension by demonstrating that
since the beginning of the twentieth century the Church has been effectively recasting its position - or developing its doctrine - on religious pluralism, moving
from a foundation in ‘tolerance’ to a foundation in ‘respect for conscience’.
Historically the Catholic Church had argued that it was the only true religion,
and that the State could only tolerate other religions in the interests of public order.52
It now argues, on the basis of every person’s right to ‘reach his transcendent goal as
best he can’, that respect for freedom of conscience requires both the Church and the
State to actively defend religious liberty.53

From a position of claiming exclusive

50

Murray discusses this at length in We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American
Proposition. (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960). That Murray was the principal architect of the
Second Vatican Ecumenical Council’s Declaration on Religious Liberty Dignitatis humanae. (7
December 1965) is well known: see for example Ralph M Wiltgen SVD, The Rhine flows into the
Tiber: A History of Vatican II. (Rockford, Ill.: Tan, 1985) 242-243, 251-252. Murray puts his own
position in The Problem of Religious Freedom. (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1965); in ‘The
Declaration on Religious Freedom.’ Concilium 5(1966) 3-10; and in ‘The Issue of Church and State
at Vatican Council II.’ Theological Studies 27(1966) 580-606. A concise summary of Murray’s
thinking can be found in Clifford G Kossel, ‘Religious Freedom and the Church: J C Murray.’
Communio 11(1984) 60-74. See also John Courtney Murray SJ, ed. Religious Liberty: An End and a
Beginning. (New York: Macmillan, 1966); and Francis Canavan SJ’s note ‘Murray on Vatican II’s
Declaration on Religious Freedom.’ Communio 9(1982) 404-405.
51
Kossel, ‘Religious Freedom’, 62.
52
See Pope Pius XII, ‘Address Ci riesce’ (6 December 1953). See also Pietro Palazzini,
‘Tolerance’ in F Roberti and P Palazzini, eds., Dictionary of Moral Theology. (London: Burns &
Oates, 1962).
53
Kossel, ‘Religious Freedom’, 68. See Dignitatis humanae 1: ‘All men are bound to seek the
truth, especially in what concerns God and his Church, and to embrace it and hold on to it as they
come to know it.’
This position is developed by Pope John Paul II in his Message to the Signatories of the Final Act
of Helsinki on 1 August 1975 L’église catholique. ‘On Freedom of Conscience and Religion.’ (1
September 1980). AAS 72(1980) 1252-1260. ‘Man is able, on the basis of his own convictions, to
know and to follow a religious or metaphysical concept which engages his whole life insofar as it
concerns fundamental choices and behaviours. Even if it does not arrive at an explicit and positive
affirmation of faith in God, this intimate reflection cannot be other, in any case, than an object of
respect in the name of the dignity of conscience of each person, whose mysterious work of searching
cannot be subjected to the judgment of others. Thus, on one hand, each person has the right and the
duty to commit himself to the search for truth and, on the other hand, other people and civil society
are required to respect the free spiritual development of persons.’ [This translation made from
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possession of religious truth, the Catholic Church has developed a stance of openness
to other religions which requires it to honour - with more than mere tolerance their right to exist and to practise their beliefs freely.
Charles E Curran took up Murray’s argument on freedom of religion and
applied it to moral truth.54 He claimed to identify three points at which Vatican II’s
doctrine on religious liberty sheds light upon the question of legitimate cooperation
in evil.
First, ‘in both cases the dignity of the human person and the rights of the
human person to act with responsible freedom must be taken into account’.55 Under
the older approach based on a notion of objective truth, the Church had attracted
criticism for giving
. . . so much emphasis to the objective and even the physical that it
has not given enough importance to subjectivity and freedom . . .
In the case of cooperation it seems that one must also consider the
right of the individual person to act in accord with one’s own
decision of conscience.56
This raises the question, secondly, of whether it is adequate to define material
cooperation simply in terms of ‘cooperation with an evil action’. Just as the Church
no longer categorises religious practices simply as ‘true’ (that is, Catholic) and
‘false’ (all others), is it adequate to deem cooperation between agents simply ‘lawful’
or ‘unlawful’ on the basis of the objective morality of the principal agent’s act?
Curran argued that,
. . . a more adequate description understands cooperation as
concurring not primarily with a will or with an act but with a
person. . . . The point is that the full understanding of cooperation
must take account of the dignity of the other person and that
person’s right to act in accord with his own responsible freedom.

Erminio Lora, ed. Enchiridion Vaticanum 7: Documenti Ufficiali della Santa Sede 1980-1981.
(Bologna: Dehoniane, 1985) 560.]
54
Charles E Curran, ‘Cooperation: Toward a Revision of the Concept and its Application.’
Linacre Quarterly 41(1974) 152-167, see especially 157-161; an edited version of this article appears
as ‘Cooperation in a Pluralistic Society’ in Curran’s Ongoing Revision in Moral Theology. (Notre
Dame: Fides/Claretian, 1975) 210-228; Curran’s argument is substantially reproduced in Hannon,
Church, State, 90-95.
55
Curran, ‘Toward a Revision’, 159-160.
56
Curran, ‘Toward a Revision’, 160.
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Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the elements of a bad will or a bad
act which have been part of the consideration in the past.57
Respect for the dignity of conscience in matters of religion necessarily
includes respect for the other’s right to adhere to religious practices which one
personally believes to be erroneous.
matters of morality.

Curran held, thirdly, that the same applied in

A principal agent may act in erroneous conscience (that is,

believing that there is nothing wrong with the action he proposes to perform);

in

Curran’s view, a cooperator’s conviction that the principal agent is doing evil does
not prohibit cooperation since ‘[t]here can be no formal cooperation when the
individual involved does not have a bad will’.58
But these arguments are fraught with difficulty. First, Curran suggests that a
modern doctrine of cooperation should take account of the principal agent’s human
dignity, but he does not describe how the principal agent’s state of conscience might
impact materially upon the cooperator’s decision to cooperate or not.

Second,

‘cooperation with a person’ should indeed pay due attention to the elements of ‘bad
will’ or ‘bad act’ as in the past, but Curran does not indicate which elements he
means, nor demonstrate how they might be integrated with ‘respect for persons’.
And third, as noted earlier,59 the fact that a principal agent acts in erroneous
conscience affects the subjective morality of his own action, but the very concept of
‘cooperation’ implies that there is another moral agent who also acts.

This

cooperator may well be aware of the principal agent’s erroneous conscience, but this
awareness in itself does not excuse the cooperator from making his own moral
choice. Even if he were motivated by a desire to cooperate with the person rather
than with the action, a cooperator who intends what the principal agent erroneously
believes to be right would himself be acting in ‘bad will’ and cooperating formally

57

Curran, ‘Toward a Revision’, 160.
Curran, ‘Toward a Revision’, 160.
59
At 3.1.2 in relation to Häring’s position in Free and Faithful in Christ. Curran subsequently
notes ‘the right of the cooperator to act in accord with his conscience so that he cannot be forced to
do something he believes is wrong.’ (Curran, ‘Toward a Revision’, 160). The relationship of this
statement (concerning the cooperator) to the question of the principal agent’s erroneous conscience is
not immediately evident. Finally Curran holds that the rights of the principal agent to follow his
erroneous conscience are subject to limitations similar to those applying to religious freedom; that is,
public order, which is defined in terms of justice, peace and common morality (Curran, ‘Toward a
Revision’, 160-161) - but he does not describe how those limits might apply in practice.
58
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with that evil.

And even if his intending remained good, his material cooperation

would still require a justifying reason.
Curran’s fundamental difficulties seem to be, first, that he has not noticed that
personal morality and religious belief are matters of very different orders, each
possessing its own language and inner logic. It is much easier, after all, to identify a
particular moral action as ‘wrong’, than it is to identify a particular religious action
as ‘wrong’. Pluralism notwithstanding, ‘to harm the innocent’ is commonly held to
be morally wrong, but ‘to worship a tree’ is considered, at worst, merely eccentric.
Second, ‘promoting religious freedom’ requires the Catholic Church to help
create the conditions under which every person is free to worship God as he or she
thinks fit, but it neither requires nor justifies the Church’s participation in that
worship itself.

In the same way ‘respect for conscience’ requires the Christian to

actively promote and defend each person’s right to self-determination; but it does
not necessarily require him to cooperate actively in another person’s deed,
particularly if he believes that deed to be evil.

Neither does it excuse him from

taking responsibility for his own moral choices.
In other words, ‘respect for freedom of conscience’ might well translate into
a ‘duty to defend another’s right to religious practice’, but it does not necessarily
create a ‘duty to assist in that religious practice’: the first ‘duty’ is a necessary
corollary of respect for conscience, but the second ‘duty’ is not. In the same way,
‘respect for freedom of conscience’ may translate into a ‘duty to promote the
autonomy of others’, but it cannot create a ‘duty to cooperate in evil’: the first duty
is a corollary of the principle of respect for conscience, but the second ‘duty’ is not
and may in fact contradict respect for one’s own conscience.

‘Respect for the

dignity of personal conscience’ is certainly a moral duty, but in itself it neither
justifies or excuses cooperation in evil.

4.1.3

Conclusions
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Whether the world is homogenous or pluralist, whether one believes in the
possibility of moral innocence or the inevitability of moral tragedy, it seems that
cooperation in evil is an unavoidable challenge.

Beyond the circumstances of

particular moral conflicts a moral agent may wonder at the rationale or basic attitude
which ‘drives’ cooperation: is it a form of compromise? tolerance? respect for
conscience? all or none of these?
First, it is only by analogy that material cooperation can be construed as a
compromise in which goods and evils are ‘traded off’ against each other.

In

legitimate cooperation the cooperator always directly intends only a good and only in
an analogical sense can be said to ‘indirectly intend’ or ‘permit’ evil, since the evil is
brought about by another agent. From the cooperator’s point of view, and cognisant
of the ‘evils’ which will follow each of his respective options, compromise in the
case of legitimate cooperation could only relate to the balance sought between the
good to be gained by cooperating and the good to be gained by not cooperating or,
alternatively, between the evil brought about by cooperation and the evil suffered by
not cooperating.60
Second, strictly speaking legitimate cooperation in evil may involve an
exercise in tolerance only in some instances, because often the cooperator does not
have the power to prevent the principal agent’s evil deed.

Where the cooperator

does have that power, he requires a much stronger reason to cooperate. And in any
case, if cooperation is ever to be considered a form of tolerance it is essential to be
clear on its structure: the object of tolerance is not primarily the evil done by the
principal agent, but first and foremost the fact that the cooperator’s otherwise
innocent act will be abused.

A cooperator’s decision to cooperate amounts to

toleration of the abuse of his own good or indifferent act.

In many instances the

only power available to the cooperator is the ability to prevent his own act from
being abused - by not acting at all. The very existence of the principle of material
cooperation indicates that Christians have not thought this a reasonable option in
every case.

60

See the earlier discussion on the nature of the ‘sufficiently serious reason’ at 2.3.3 above.
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Third, Charles Curran has highlighted an important point: one who
cooperates with a principal agent certainly cooperates with a human being whose
natural right to act in accord with his or her own decision in conscience must
normally be respected. If freedom of conscience is a natural right, then it imposes
on everyone else a moral duty to permit this person so to act, and normally to refrain
from constraining him or her to act otherwise.61 But the rights attaching to ‘freedom
of conscience’ are not unlimited: harm to the common good or to innocent third
parties are normally held to be immoral. There are therefore grounds to suggest that
while it is reasonable that an individual agent should not be unnecessarily restricted
from acting according to conscience, it is not at all reasonable to demand that third
parties must actively assist or cooperate. Human beings clearly have a ‘right to act
according to conscience’ but there is no self-evident ‘right to be assisted to act’,
especially where the intended act is believed to be evil.62
So neither compromise, nor tolerance, nor respect for consciences provides a
sufficient underpinning for legitimate cooperation in evil, yet each provides some
insight into the functioning of the principle. Clearly it is a principle of action in the
face of evil, a principle of limiting evil done, of living a moral life in a world marked
by evil. In this connection it is well to recall that the principle was not ‘invented’ in
order to solve theoretical moral problems: it was more ‘distilled’ from the practical
wisdom of countless individuals who sensed that cooperation in another’s evil was
appropriate in some instances.63

Whether driven by a need to compromise, or by

prudent tolerance, or by active respect for the rights of others, they sensed that
sometimes one ought to cooperate in an evil in order to bring about some good or
prevent an even greater evil.

61

In the broader context of public and political morality Hannon (‘Church, State’, 94) uses the
same Vatican II doctrine to ground a more modest claim than Curran’s: ‘And so we may formulate a
principle by analogy. In moral matters people should not be forced to act against their consciences
nor should they be restrained from behaving according to conscience - provided that the just
requirements of public order are observed.’
62
One is reminded of the dictum: ‘I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death
your right to say it’, attributed to Voltaire in S G Tallentyre, The Friends of Voltaire. (1907). Cited in
J M & M J Cohen, eds. The Penguin Dictionary of Quotations (1960), 407/19.
63
In a similar vein James F Keenan SJ discusses the ‘taxonomic’ origins and application of
principles in ‘The Function of the Principle of Double Effect.’ Theological Studies 54(1993) 294315, especially 295-300.
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The principle provides insight into a possible course of action in a pluralist
world.

In establishing that cooperation in evil may at times be more than merely

permitted - that an agent may sometimes be ‘constrained’ to cooperate - Catholic
moral teaching has not only accepted that at least the experience of moral conflict is
real, but also that ‘pursuing the good’ in the midst of a pluralist world may
sometimes require one to ‘get one’s hands dirty’.64 The next step is to see how some
contemporary writers have recognised the challenges of pluralism in their account of
the principle.

64

Gowans (Innocence Lost, 228-229) traces the term ‘dirty hands’ to Sartre, but suggests that the
problem itself runs back through Machiavelli to Plato. But note that where ‘dirty hands’ normally
refers to inescapable wrongdoing by the agent himself, here it refers to morally justifiable cooperation
in evil done by others. Catholic teaching does not concede that doing evil oneself in order to achieve
good is strictly justifiable.
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4.2

Some Contemporary Theological Positions
Rapid technological development and ease of communication mean that the

moral textbook is often somewhat dated even as it goes to print. Not surprisingly,
then, moral dialogue today is normally conducted in scholarly journals whose
frequent publication and wide readership ensure that moral issues can be addressed
while they are still unfolding. Another genre with more or less the same immediacy
is, as noted above, magisterial teaching.
This section seeks to outline some ways in which some relatively recent
theological writings on the problem of legitimate cooperation have taken
contemporary social, cultural and theological circumstances into account.

That is,

how the practice of theology today is dealing with cooperation in evil in a pluralist
society: are the traditional categories retained? Do they serve any real purpose, or
have they been abandoned? What new questions or categories of cooperation are
appearing? Do new approaches help, and can their value be verified?
While it would be of great interest to study this material in strict
chronological order, such a vast undertaking is beyond the scope of the present work.
Instead the selection of material here is arranged geographically, which highlights
another aspect of cultural pluralism: European, North American and Australian
theologians do not approach these problems in the same way.

4.2.1

Europe

On 22 May 1978, Italy passed a law governing women’s access to abortion.
Law 194/1978 sought to provide for a woman’s ‘right’ to abortion on one hand
while, on the other, respecting the Church’s opposition to abortion and to any form
of cooperation in it.

In an article published in the same year Dionigi Tettamanzi

recognised that the concrete detail of Law 194 posed considerable challenges for the
Church and for its interpretation of cooperation in evil.65
65

Dionigi Tettamanzi, ‘Problemi morali circa la cooperazione all’aborto.’ Medicina e morale
28(1978) 396-427. In 1978 Tettamanzi was teaching moral theology in Milan. As the present study
is written he is Cardinal Archbishop of Genoa.
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Tettamanzi tackles the phenomenon of cooperation - ‘the fact that persons
work together in order to reach a determined end’

66

- on two fronts.

On the

structural level, cooperation is a datum of the intrinsically social nature of man since
an individual not only works ‘with’ others to achieve ends but also works ‘on’ others
- has an effect on others - by virtue of this cooperative action. On the historical
level cooperation is a datum of human social life characterised by pluralism: not
only are there some individuals who will to do good and some who will to do evil,
but ideological and practical pluralism are often enshrined in social institutions and
cultural actions, including civil legislation.

Here immediately is one development

on the tradition: the problem of cooperation engages the social nature of the human
person and cannot be adequately addressed solely from the standpoint of the
individual moral agent.
In providing for access to abortion, Law 194 created a conflict between civil
law and natural moral law.

Both of these bind the moral agent: insofar as he is

human the moral agent is bound by natural moral law; insofar as he is a citizen of a
given society he is bound by the civil law of that society.67

In view of this ‘dual

citizenship’ the ‘criteria of the morality of cooperation’ in Law 194 must be sought
not in casuistry but in ‘a necessary chapter of existential ethics’.68 In other words,
close attention must be paid to the concrete circumstances of the particular case.
Nevertheless Tettamanzi leans heavily on the traditional metaphysics.

On

the level of intention he holds that a cooperator may act in ‘consonance’ with a
principal agent (sharing ‘the will-intention of the principal agent’) or in ‘dissonance’
with the principal agent (holding a different will-intention).69

Only the latter -

material cooperation - may be morally lawful. On the level of the concrete action
itself, he ties morality both to the objective structure of the moral act, and to its
connection with the evil effects produced: the cooperator’s action must not be evil
either in itself or in relation to the evil done by the principal agent.
66

Tettamanzi, ‘Problemi morali’, 399.
Tettamanzi, ‘Problemi morali’, 400. Compare this with Pope John Paul II’s treatment of civil
and moral law in Evangelium vitae 71-72.
68
Tettamanzi, ‘Problemi morali’, 400.
67
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Up to this point Tettamanzi more or less reflects the tradition, but he then
introduces an apparent conflation of the categories ‘proximate-remote’ and
‘necessary-contingent’:
From this point of view material cooperation may be configured and in fact is configured - as:
- remote and non-determining, when it is limited to providing
some requirement or assistance which only from a distance leads to
abortion, without being a cause of it;
- proximate and determining, when it constitutes the
provision of something which quite closely leads to - or facilitates
- the abortion and without which the abortion would not be
possible.70
The reason for this conflation lies in the concrete case. Law 194 requires a
woman to undergo a thorough medical examination and obtain a certificate of
diagnosis prior to requesting abortion.

Tettamanzi suggests that a Catholic doctor

may conduct this examination (the ‘diagnostic phase’) because it is ‘remote and nondetermining’ with respect to the abortion.71 But he also argues that while issuing the
medical certificate may not of itself (per se) constitute formal cooperation in
abortion, in the concrete situation (per accidens) Law 194 establishes a ‘strict bond’
by which the act of issuing the certificate becomes ‘proximate and determining’.72
The traditional interpretation of ‘proportionate reason’, according to
Tettamanzi, amounts to a situation of physical or moral impossibility of refraining
from cooperation: one has a proportionate reason to act if one cannot reasonably
avoid cooperating.

But he suggests another approach which marks another

significant development in the tradition:
We may ask ourselves if, in the perspective of an ethic which is
more decisively sensitive to the reality of a pluralist and secularised
society, one may not discover a ‘proportionate reason’ in the
69

Tettamanzi, ‘Problemi morali’, 401.
Tettamanzi, ‘Problemi morali’, 402. He continues: ‘It is evident that in the concrete reality of a
vast and articulated network of cooperation, proximity and causality-efficacy are realised in very
diverse ways, and end up being gathered in a very wide spectrum - from remote to proximate, from
non-determining to determining - which means that the precise degree and type of connection
between the means-action of the cooperator and the end-action of the principal agent cannot always
be determined immediately or easily.’
71
Tettamanzi, ‘Problemi morali’, 413 : ‘Cooperation in the diagnostic phase is morally legitimate,
even obligatory.’
72
Tettamanzi, ‘Problemi morali’, 415.
70
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opportunity-necessity of cooperating in order to avoid even worse
situations. In this sense G Perico writes: “As for the sufficient
reasons for these forms of collaboration, which are more or less
proximate to the abortion, they could be recognised in the grave
risk of losing one’s position, in the necessity or opportunity that
Catholics have of being present in public institutions, and in other
analogous motives.” It seems we must certainly respond in the
affirmative: the traditional position is taken up and re-read not
solely in an individualistic sense but also in a social sense, passing
from a reason to avoid an evil or secure a good ‘for me’, to a reason
to avoid an evil or secure a good ‘for others’.73
Tettamanzi’s fourth criterion for cooperation he terms ‘the professional
criterion’, which approximates the traditional treatment of scandal: the medical
profession stands for life, which both direct abortion and cooperation in abortion
clearly contradict.

This is even more true in the case of religious, who ‘have a

special function of witness, that is, of being privileged models of christian life’.74
Finally, and with the backing of the Italian bishops, Tettamanzi notes that
withdrawing one’s services (‘conscientious objection’) is not necessarily the most
morally appropriate answer in every case.75
Law 194 sought to create a legally recognised ‘space’ for freedom of
conscience: no institution may perform abortions unless it is certified,76

and

individual medical personnel in all institutions have a legal right to conscientious
objection in most cases.77

But this ‘space’ is limited:

there is no right to

conscientious objection where medical assistance is required in order to save the life

73

Tettamanzi, ‘Problemi morali’, 404, citing P Perico (sic), ‘Legge sull’aborto e obiezione di
coscienza.’ Aggiornamenti Sociali (1978) 560.
74
Tettamanzi, ‘Problemi morali’, 405.
75
Tettamanzi, ‘Problemi morali’, 406-407: ‘. . . conscientious objection raised regarding
abortion corresponds to both a personal commitment [to avoid evil] and a commitment to
legitimately impede the actions of others, while the boycott of abortion laws ‘as such’ turns out not to
be absolutely legitimate in the democratic system.’ At 407 he also cites the Italian Episcopal
Conference: ‘The right-duty of conscientious objection is not the radical and total solution to every
problem.’ Notificazione, 1 luglio 1978.
76
This is contained in Tettamanzi’s note that where religious superiors had sought a right to
conscientious objection applying to entire institutions, the Italian government preferred to adopt a
system of registration of abortion clinics. The implication is that no Catholic institutions would apply
for registration, and so could altogether avoid the problem of cooperation in abortion.
See
Tettamanzi, ‘Problemi morali’, 408 footnote 12.
77
Tettamanzi, ‘Problemi morali’, 398, citing the Italian Episcopal Conference (7 June 1978):
‘Hospital, medical and paramedical personnel have a grave moral obligation to conscientiously
object, which is foreseen in article 9 of the law in question.’
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of a woman in danger of death - the so-called ‘therapeutic’ abortion.78 This clause
of Law 194 amounts to a legal obligation to cooperate in abortion.

How is the

Church to view this?
Tettamanzi identifies two possible stances toward cooperation: the ‘rigorist’,
for whom no cooperation is ever possible, and the ‘possibilist’ who would permit
remote material cooperation in certain defined circumstances.79 These approximate
the two possible attitudes toward moral conflict previously noted: those who believe
that moral purity is possible, and those who believe that moral tragedy is inevitable.
Both take up positions in respect of the secular state. The ‘rigorist’ holds for moral
purity and refuses to cooperate as a ‘decisive and unequivocal prophecy against the
decision of the State which has over-reached its legitimate powers’ in passing such
immoral laws.80 Tettamanzi suggests a ‘possibilist’ alternative which,
recognising the presence of some positive and acceptable things in
the context of this iniquitous law, focuses in particular on the
opportunity/necessity of an effective presence of Christians in
public structures, or at any rate a presence of those who believe in
the values of life and commit themselves to its defence, and
consequently on the possibility - in a certain manner - of
avoiding greater evils or, more positively, of rescuing some
pregnancies by offering valid alternatives to abortion.81
The possibilist accepts, however reluctantly, the inevitability of moral
conflict and moral tragedy: one unavoidable cost of living in a democratic society is
the challenge of material cooperation in evil.

In some cases remote material

cooperation will seem a lesser evil than a total loss of Catholic presence from the
health system.

This may constitute a sufficiently serious reason to cooperate in

some instances.

78

Tettamanzi, ‘Problemi morali’, 409, citing Article 9 of Law 194: ‘Conscientious objection
cannot be invoked by hospital personnel and auxiliary staff when, in the particular circumstances,
their personal intervention is indispensable in order to save the life of a woman in imminent danger.’
It is very likely that this is precisely the situation addressed emphatically by Pope John Paul II in
Evangelium vitae 89.
79
Tettamanzi, ‘Problemi morali’, 396-397.
80
Tettamanzi, ‘Problemi morali’, 396, citing Carlo Caffarra, ‘Aborto e obiezione di coscienza.’
L’Osservatore Romano 12 May 1978, 1.
81
Tettamanzi, ‘Problemi morali’, 397.
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Tettamanzi has outlined a case for reassessing the structure of material
cooperation in the context of a pluralist democratic society.

He acknowledges the

practical complexity of upholding Christian moral positions in a society which does
not share the moral values of the Catholic community - a community which
paradoxically, nevertheless, relies on that society to supply the very conditions which
guarantee the Church’s flourishing.
Marcellino Zalba SJ also considers the context of modern pluralist society in
which cooperation in evil is a frequent challenge because ‘spiritual and
transcendental values are easily forgotten’.82 Even in the ‘person-centred’ approach
of modern moral theology, these values must be kept clearly in mind and not
abandoned through a misguided sense of ‘respect for erroneous conscience’.83

Zalba judges that to use ‘respect for erroneous conscience’ as a justification
for cooperating in evil does not really serve the dignity of one’s neighbour at all.84
He points out that the normal obligation to avoid cooperation in evil obtains when
there is no substantial threat of inconvenience (incommodum) to the cooperator, but
it does not apply when one has a ‘proportionate reason for tolerating or materially
assisting in the execution of the thing, which is evil only because of the other agent’s
perverse will.’
Consequently, presupposing the immorality of any formal
cooperation in the perverse action, material cooperation, although
per se it may not withstand whatever moral evil, per accidens it
may turn out to be lawful, and on the contrary even obligatory, not
unlike the situation where it is sometimes lawful for a different
reason to provoke indirect scandal.85

82

M Zalba SJ, ‘Cooperatio materialis ad malum morale.’ Periodica de Re Morali Canonica
Liturgica 71(1982) 411-441, at 413.
83
Zalba, ‘Cooperatio materialis’, 417 : ‘There is a great difference between purely passive
toleration of the evil action of one’s neighbour, whether it is done in good or bad faith, and positive
collaboration and personal participation in a work which one knows to be immoral. There is at the
same time an enormous and essential difference between erroneous conscience, which gives a
judgment which permits or commands [‘permittens vel iubens’] a matter which is per se to be
avoided, and correct conscience, which judges this action to be evil in itself, even if it could be done
by another agent, acting inculpably in erroneous conscience, without sin.’ Zalba raises the question
of ‘respect for erroneous conscience’ with reference to Charles Curran’s ‘Cooperation: Toward a
Revision.’
84
Zalba, ‘Cooperatio materialis’, 418.
85
Zalba, ‘Cooperatio materialis’, 419. Emphasis added.
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Zalba applies the principle to the three specific questions of marriage and
divorce, abortion, and the sacrament of confession.

Like Pope John Paul II in

Evangelium vitae 73, he holds that legislators may sometimes vote in favour of
abortion when the only alternatives are even worse laws:86 in this case a politician
‘may and must vote in favour of the lesser evil’:
In this case it is not a question of approving or condemning
abortion, but whether to impede or permit unbridled abortions. It
is an exercise of wisdom to rein in opposing abuses when those
abuses can in no way be eliminated. When there is fear of scandal
of the people, it may be removed by opportune explanation.87

Finally, Zalba agrees with Tettamanzi that a doctor may give ‘merely
informative testimony’ to a woman seeking abortion. But rather than arguing this on
the grounds of ‘preserving a Christian presence in a civil structure’, Zalba reverts to
the traditional justification:
. . . [the doctor] is not prohibited from offering this information in
order to avoid serious harm to his professional practice. In acting
thus he gives occasion or, at worst, remote and contingent
cooperation, to abortion. He may not give this testimony merely of
his own accord or in order to obtain some personal advantage,
either of which would give the appearance of favouring abortion.88
In keeping more with Tettamanzi than Zalba, Klaus Demmer MSC also seeks
to treat the moral act in its fullest context: it is to be understood not as an isolated
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Zalba, ‘Cooperatio materialis’, 426. Zalba here proposes, apparently as a general principle:
‘Laws may not be supported in parliamentary debate except when, according to his prudent political
judgment, the parliamentarian is sure that such laws will result in a diminishing of evil in civil
society.’
87
Zalba, ‘Cooperatio materialis’, 432: ‘poterit et debebit suffragari pro minus mala’. Addressing
cooperation in abortion (at 433) Zalba responds to the question of ‘respect for erroneous conscience’:
‘It is never lawful for a doctor to cause a direct abortion, or to immediately cooperate in an abortion
with a principal agent, even if by doing so he intends either to correct his client with whom he has
entered a professional relationship, or to obey a determination of civil law which admits this concrete
case, or to acquiesce to the conscience of the patient who has a right to seek an abortion in this case.
A healthy civil law cannot heal the immorality of an action which natural law forbids; a moral
professional relationship cannot include immoral medical procedures; the absence of formal evil in
the principal agent by reason of erroneous conscience concerning an action which is in itself evil,
does not free the secondary agent from personal sin when he knows that he wills to concur with an
objectively evil action.’
88
Zalba, ‘Cooperatio materialis’, 433.
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event (as in the traditional metaphysics) but in its existential reality; not solely in its
meaning for the acting person, but also in its interpersonal and social meaning.89
The moral action is inserted not only in an interpersonal context,
but also and perhaps more tangibly in a social and ‘inter-human’
context. . . . Seen in this light, the moral action presents itself as a
network of actions and reactions, of self-determination and othercentredness. Inevitably, to some degree, it slips from the hands of
the agent and so is no longer subject to his evaluation alone but in
some manner enters the public arena.90
The ‘public arena’ today is clearly pluralist: there are manifold values and
value systems, and often conflicting ideas, but they must all cohere in some way in a
single society. It is the task of politics to make possible and to protect the cohesion
of each society, so the socio-political context of the moral act is also of great
significance.91

Intolerance, or unreasonable resistance to the plurality of moral

values, would render the Christian incapable of exercising any influence whatever
on the direction and quality of the moral and political life of society.92
Demmer notes that the traditional principle of cooperation is based upon an
unquestioned assumption that the cooperator is in possession of clear and accurate
knowledge of moral truth, ‘which lowers itself to the level of one’s neighbour only in
order to resolve questions of strategy’ - that is, exactly how to cooperate lawfully.
In this respect the problem today is put in a much more profound
manner. In the cooperator the possession of the truth is not as
secure as one might believe; and it is above all here that one must
take account of the circumstances which are the object of reason,
which not only understands but also interprets them.
This
pinpoints the current problem.
The requirements of one’s
irreplaceable judgment of conscience and the right of my neighbour
to my tolerance must be reconciled in such a way that one cannot
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Klaus Demmer MSC, ‘Der Anspruch der Toleranz: Zum Thema ‘Mitwirkung’ in der
pluralistischen Gesellschaft.’ Gregorianum 63(1982) 701-720. [Translation here: Rev Dr Alfonsas
Savickas];
Interpretare e agire: Fondamenti della morale cristiana. Translated by Mauro
Pedrazzoli. (Milano: Edizione Paoline, 1989); ‘Cooperación’ in Hans Rotter and Gunter Virt, eds.
Nuevo Diccionario de Moral Cristiana. Translated by Claudio Gancho. (Barcelona: Herder, 1993)
90-94; ‘Tolerancia y cooperación: Una pregunta a la ética del derecho’ in Lorenzo Alvarez Verdes
and Marciano Vidal, eds. La Justicia Social: Homenaje al Prof. Julio de la Torre. (Madrid:
Editorial el Perpetuo Socorro, 1993) 329-338. [Translation here: Rev Dr Patrick Russell.]
90
Demmer, Interpretare, 188. See also ‘Tolerancia’, 329.
91
Demmer, ‘Cooperación’, 91.
92
Demmer, ‘Tolerancia’, 329; see also ‘Der Anspruch’, 702.
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speak of a fall into tactical pragmatism or of renouncing one’s own
moral identity.93
So the problem of cooperation for Demmer consists in the challenge of
holding reasonably to the moral values which give direction and meaning to one’s
own life, while simultaneously allowing one’s neighbour to do the same.

It is as

much a social challenge as a personal challenge.
Demmer sees in the democratic ordering of society a ‘room for freedom’ specifically, freedom of conscience - which both constructs and threatens that
society. On one hand freedom of conscience constructs democratic society because
it demands a social structure and a degree of compromise capable of accommodating
radically differing moral views. On the other hand freedom of conscience threatens
society with fragmentation, as differing values compete and sometimes clash headon over fundamental moral issues.94 The principle of legitimate cooperation enables
a conscientious moral agent to steer between Scylla and Charybdis.
Ultimately, freedom of conscience works in both directions.

It is a

requirement of the human being’s social nature that a Christian must respect the
consciences of those who hold other moral values, but it is also a requirement of faith
that a Christian has a right to resist values and actions which would harm basic
human rights, diminish Christian identity, or offend fundamental moral values.95
And this right to resist - a social right to non-cooperation - can be grounded in the
tradition:
The Catholic moral theologian recognises the validity of the
Aristotelian-Thomistic theory of truth - viz. veritas est adequatio
intellectus et rei. For this reason he maintains the principle that
“consensus non facit veritatem”. The agreement that it has been
possible to reach on the practical level does not of itself constitute
the truth, but it does provide an important index of the same.96
93

Demmer, Interpretare, 189.
Demmer, Interpretare, 194: ‘The limits [to tolerance] come to the surface whenever inalienable
rights are under attack, and this all the more so for the principal agent himself than for the
cooperator and third parties who must suffer the consequences.’
95
Demmer, Interpretare, 194-195.
96
Demmer, ‘Tolerancia’, 331. See also ‘Der Anspruch’, 712-713. Demmer also offers a precise
interpretation of Pope John Paul II’s position in Evangelium vitae 73 (see above, 3.2.1): the moral
object of the politician’s act is not the lesser evil at all, even though this will be the immediate
material outcome of his vote. Rather the moral object (the ‘form conceived by reason’ rather than the
94
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4.2.2

North America

Since 1968 there has been no greater centre of foment in Catholic moral
theology than the United States of America.

For example, it is no exaggeration to

state that the shape of moral theology around the world was profoundly influenced
by substantial dissent from Pope Paul VI’s Humanae vitae on the part of some
American theologians, and by magisterial response to this dissent.97
In retrospect, controversy was inevitable.

The Church in the United States

had not only imbibed the spirit of Vatican II very quickly, but also possessed the
will, the resources, and the infrastructure necessary to carry forward theological
debate at a tremendous rate.

Conducted within one of the world’s most

multicultural societies, it is small wonder that the American Church soon recognised
the challenges of pluralism and sought to address them.

At the forefront of the

Church’s exposure to pluralism were Catholic health facilities, and so much of the
theological literature emerging from North America at this time concerned the ethics
of Catholic health care.
The following provides a sample of some influential contributions relating to
the problem of cooperation in evil.

While a strict chronology might be very

revealing, this would necessitate a much more wide-ranging study than is possible
here. Rather, four touchstones are taken in order: the Canadian Bishops’ medicomoral guides of 1970, 1991 and 2000 (4.2.2.1), equivalent documents from the
United States Catholic Conference in 1971 and 1994 (4.2.2.2), some writings of
American theologian James F Keenan SJ who has made material cooperation a major
focus of study (4.2.2.3), and some other recent writings (4.2.2.4).

mere ‘physical form’ of the act) is the avoidance or reduction of greater evil. Thus, given that the
politician has no better alternative in fact, he is justified in voting for less rather than more liberal
abortion laws: the moral object of this act is not an evil, but fewer rather than more abortions. See
‘Tolerancia’, 335.
97
Some crucial magisterial teaching came about as a direct response to this dissent, such as the
Sacred Congregation for the Clergy, The Washington Case (26 April 1971) which provided clear
teaching on the nature and dignity of conscience. It can be argued that other CDF documents (such
as those discussed in 3.2.2 above) were also prompted indirectly by this controversy.
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4.2.2.1 Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops
The Canadian bishops published a Medico-Moral Guide in 1970 to replace
their 1955 Moral Code.98 The 1970 Guide made no reference at all to the principle
of cooperation; it was a simple statement of principles and general norms, to be
received
. . . not as commands imposed from without, but as demands of the
inner dynamism of human and Christian life.
And precisely
because they are that, their application to a particular situation will
usually entail a great deal of prudence and wisdom. There, then,
personal conscience will find its field of competence.
The
Guidelines should serve to enlighten this judgment of conscience.
They cannot replace it.99
A radically revised Health Care Ethics Guide was published in 1991.100
This was a much expanded and developed resource offering both fundamental
principles and ‘a series of articles that serve as formulations of the contemporary
Catholic understanding of how the principles and values are applied in particular
circumstances’.101 It was clearly aimed not only at information, but also at practical
assistance in clinical decision-making. Three aspects of the 1991 Guide merit brief
comment: its sense of the mission of the Catholic hospital; its concept of mutuality;
and its particular understanding of the principle of material cooperation.
The Canadian bishops acknowledge that the ministry of Catholic hospitals is
an aspect of the mission of the Church, even if hospitals are at least partially funded
from the public purse.102 On one hand it may be assumed that persons approaching
Catholic hospitals will know that these operate ‘in accordance with Christian ethical
and spiritual values’. On the other hand the 1991 Guide does not discuss whether or
to what extent public funding gives the secular community ‘rights’ in respect of

98

The text of the 1970 Medico-Moral Guide can be found in John F Dedek, Contemporary
Medical Ethics. (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1975) 201-205.
99
Preamble, in Dedek, Contemporary Medical Ethics, 202.
100
Catholic Health Association of Canada, Health Care Ethics Guide. (Ottawa: CHAC, 1991).
101
CHAC, 1991 Guide, 8 (Preamble).
102
CHAC, 1991 Guide, 10: ‘Catholic health care facilities, as privately owned and managed
institutions that receive public funds for most of their services and programs, form an integral part of
Canada’s health care system . . . Their mission has always been to offer accessible, quality health
care to those in need in accordance with Christian ethical and spiritual values.’ And at 11: ‘The
healing ministry of the Catholic health care facility is an expression of the ministry of Christ and of
the church.’
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medical procedures it may expect to be performed on the premises, or with the
cooperation, of a publicly-funded Catholic institution.
The underlying vision of the human person is not only of an individual with
innate and inalienable dignity but also of a social being.103 This seems to refer not
only to the common good,104

but also to a necessary mutuality or reciprocity

between the individual and the community in which he or she lives.105 There is an
analogous mutuality between health care facility and pluralist society: while the
health care facility has its own identity as Catholic, it often must ‘collaborate’ or
‘cooperate’ with other agencies in the provision of health care. Clearly the bishops
recognise that the pluralist nature of society makes some forms of collaboration or
cooperation necessary if the Catholic hospital is to exercise its ministry in the world.
The 1991 Guide not only views the ‘principle of legitimate cooperation’
simply as a particular application of the principle of double effect,106 but takes quite
a ‘broad-brush’ approach to the conditions which govern its application:
It is unethical to cooperate ‘formally’ with an immoral act (ie
directly to intend the evil act itself). But sometimes it may be an
ethical duty to cooperate ‘materially’ with an immoral act (ie one
does not intend the evil effects, but only the good effects) when
only in this way can a greater harm be prevented, provided (1) that
the cooperation is not immediate and (2) that the degree of
cooperation and the danger of scandal are taken into account.107
This explanation of the principle has both strengths and weaknesses. On the
positive side it acknowledges that cooperation in evil may sometimes be more than
merely permitted - it may sometimes be a moral obligation; and the second
provision neatly compounds ‘necessity’ and ‘proximity’ in the one concept, ‘degree
of cooperation’. But on the negative side it does not make clear whether ‘directly to
103

CHAC, 1991 Guide, 13.
CHAC, 1991 Guide, 14: ‘This means that the autonomy that we respect in a person’s
individual choices should be situated within the context of the requirements of the community.’
105
CHAC, 1991 Guide, 19: ‘While each person is a unique individual, no one could exist for long
or fulfil his/her potential apart from the human community. . . . The individual and social needs of
people must always be kept in balance . . . ’
106
CHAC, 1991 Guide, 15: ‘This principle applies the Principle of Double Effect to the situation
where an act is performed by more than one person who have different intentions.’ As noted
previously, this interpretation is based on a misunderstanding of the structure of cooperation.
107
CHAC, 1991 Guide, 15.
104
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intend the evil act itself’ refers to both senses of ‘intention’ (ex fine operantis and ex
fine operis); and it does not explain the meaning of ‘immediate cooperation’, nor the
reason this should be considered immoral.
This account also offers only a broad justification of cooperation: ‘when only
in this way can a greater harm be prevented’. This risks reducing the ‘sufficiently
serious reason’ to a balancing of harms, but without specifying which harms are
meant: harm caused to specific third parties? to the community in general or the
‘common good’? spiritual harm to the principal agent? the harm suffered by the
cooperator if he does not cooperate? And this is all without considering whether the
harms to be ‘balanced’ are actually commensurable.108
On the other hand the same justification emphasises the hard reality of
cooperation: it is the threat of one impending evil which first prompts one to
consider cooperation in another evil.

So the 1991 Guide sees cooperation as a

principle of compromise, effectively a specification of the more general principle
governing real or apparent moral conflicts: when seemingly faced only with the
choice of several evils, choose the least evil.109 This is, presumably, the meaning of
the only other reference to material cooperation, in relation to contraceptive
sterilisation.110
The Canadian 1991 Guide was not entirely satisfying, and was superseded in
2000 by a new Health Ethics Guide,111

in which an expanded treatment of

cooperation reflects a heightened appreciation of the urgency attaching to this
question in contemporary medical ethics.
The 2000 Guide is a response to contemporary society’s ‘broader concept of
health’: apart from ‘sickness care’, the determinants of health care now embrace
‘biological factors, lifestyle, physical environment, spiritual well-being, housing,
108

As noted in 3.1.4.2 above, Alphonsus would consider it a matter of comparing the evil to which
one contributes by cooperating, with the evil which one suffers by not cooperating
109
CHAC, 1991 Guide, at 11 accepts at least the experience of moral conflict: ‘When rights,
duties or values appear to conflict, . . . ’
110
CHAC, 1991 Guide, 37 Guideline 43.
111
Catholic Health Association of Canada, Health Ethics Guide. (Ottawa: CHAC, 2000).
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income, education, employment and social supports’.112 This is a holistic view: the
health system is seen as one element in a wide network of care services addressing
the needs of the whole person. Inevitably, insertion into such a broad context makes
critical reflection on the question of cooperation only more urgent.
That reflection comes in an appendix to the 2000 Guide.113 Several aspects
of the appendix merit comment.
First, it recognises the importance of the specific social and political context
of Canada, including the history and structure of health care provision in that
country, and especially the role of Catholic health care services and the Church’s
role in influencing the direction of public health policy. Being woven into the very
fabric of life in Canadian society is an aspect of the Church’s ministry:
Today, this ministry continues to provide an opportunity to bring
the values of the Catholic moral and social tradition to bear on
public policy considerations affecting the life, health, and wellbeing of persons, communities and the nation as a whole.
Sustaining a strong Catholic health and social service presence is
particularly important in a society where contrary values such as
individualism and consumerism constantly erode respect for the
dignity of human life.114
Second, it recognises that the necessity of entering new health care
partnerships presents both opportunities and challenges for the Church: opportunities
for the promotion of the common good, social justice and responsible stewardship,
for a Christian presence at critical moments of life, especially birth, chronic illness,
and death; but also challenges:
Promoting justice and the common good in the context of such
partnerships can pose a challenge to the identity, mission and
ethical integrity of Catholic organisations. Such arrangements may
necessitate closer involvement with organisations that do not share
Catholic moral principles, and with practices that the Catholic
tradition finds morally unacceptable. Such situations create ethical
dilemmas that are often difficult to resolve.115
112

CHAC, 2000 Guide, Preamble, viii.
CHAC, 2000 Guide, 88-92: Appendix II The Principle of Legitimate Cooperation. CHAC
acknowledges its reliance on the appendix on cooperation found in the US Catholic Bishops’ Ethical
and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services (1994). See below, 4.2.2.2.
114
CHAC, 2000 Guide, 88.
115
CHAC, 2000 Guide, 89.
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Third, the 2000 Guide grasps the core truth behind the principle of legitimate
cooperation: ‘in some instances, the good that is sought can be achieved only
through cooperation with what we find morally unacceptable’.116

It identifies the

key differentiation between the acts of principal and cooperating agents, and the
distinctions between formal and material cooperation (distinguished on the basis on
intention), and immediate and mediate material cooperation (distinguished on the
basis of moral object). 117 It also notes the need for prudence in assessing the terms
of cooperation (duress, distance, necessity, gravity), and proposes that at times the
Church may need to risk giving scandal in order to take up a ‘prophetic stance’ in the
interests of a greater good.118

And the Guide offers a general suggestion

unfortunately, without further explanation

-

-

on how a ‘broadening of the

boundaries’ of material cooperation may enable the principle to encompass
organisations as well as individuals, and so provide guidance for new partnerships in
health care.119
Overall the 2000 Guide’s treatment of cooperation is more satisfying than
earlier efforts, thanks to a wider context and a tighter focus.

The material on

‘duress’ and immediate material cooperation clearly owes a great deal to the USA’s
1995 Ethical and Religious Directives, which have subsequently proved problematic
on precisely these points.120
4.2.2.2 United States Catholic Conference
In 1971 the American bishops published their Ethical and Religious
Directives for Catholic Health Facilities (ERD).121 In terms of structure this was a
116

CHAC, 2000 Guide, 89.
Interestingly, the CHAC 2000 Guide’s understanding of ‘duress’ is specifically tied to the
principle of the lesser evil: ‘duress’ converts implicit formal cooperation into immediate material
cooperation when, because of duress, ‘the cooperator has lost the freedom to refuse to cooperate lest
a greater evil occur.’ (91) This would seem to eliminate the possibility of any legitimate immediate
material cooperation in intrinsically evil acts, since (as argued at 3.2.1 above in relation to
Evangelium vitae 73) there is no greater evil to avoid than an intrinsic evil. This discussion will be
taken up again in the next section, and at 4.2.4.
118
CHAC, 2000 Guide, 91.
119
CHAC, 2000 Guide, 92.
120
See 4.3.2 below.
121
The text of the 1971 Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Facilities (ERD) can
be found in the Linacre Quarterly 39(1972) 8-12. Anthony R Kosnik (‘The Present Status of the
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very different document from its contemporary, the Canadian Medico-Moral Guide:
a lengthy preamble establishing the normative nature of the document preceded 43
‘directives’ dealing simply with ‘permitted’ and ‘forbidden’ medical procedures.
Coming in the wake of Humanae vitae and following hard upon The
Washington Case, the 1971 ERD provoked considerable controversy among
American theologians.122

Some critics proposed that the style and content of the

directives betrayed an out-moded ecclesiology which considered social pluralism
merely as an extraneous datum with which the Church had to deal, instead of a
constitutive aspect of modern society which radically alters the very nature of
Catholic health care because it carries alternative moral values across the very
threshold of major Catholic institutions.

Because the US bishops had failed to

realise the practical implications of pluralism, said the critics, their concept of
material cooperation was hopelessly out-dated.123
The 1971 ERD made no explicit mention of the principle of material
cooperation.

Perhaps in response to some of their critics, the US bishops in 1994

corrected this oversight in their new Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic
Health Care Services.124

In some ways the 1994 ERD reflected the aims and

Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Facilities.’ Linacre Quarterly 40(1973) 81-90, at
82) notes that the US bishops had voted 232 to 7 in favour of the 1971 ERD.
122
The Linacre Quarterly (LQ) published some of this debate in a series of articles, including (in
favour of the ERD) John J Brennan, ‘Quicksands of Compromise.’ LQ 39(1972) 13-15, and Thomas J
O’Donnell SJ, ‘The Directives: A Crisis of Faith.’ LQ 39(1972) 139-146 and (critical of the ERD)
Richard A McCormick SJ, ‘Not what Catholic Hospitals Ordered.’ LQ 39(1972) 16-20, Warren T
Reich, ‘Policy vs Ethics.’ LQ 39(1972) 21-29, and the ‘Final Report’ of the Catholic Theological
Society of America’s Commission on the ERD ‘Catholic Hospital Ethics.’ LQ 39(1972) 246-268.
Further discussion of some aspects of this debate occurs at 4.3.2 below. The same journal also
published Anthony A Kosnik’s analysis of the implementation of the ERD (see the previous
footnote), and a further note by Vitale Paganelli, ‘The Directives: The Report - Revisited.’ LQ
40(1973) 155-157. Charles E Curran’s ‘Cooperation: Toward a Revision’ seems to have been
prompted by some discussion in the article by Reich and in the ‘Final Report’.
123
McCormick and Reich, in particular, make this case.
124
The text of the 1994 Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services was
published in Origins 24(1994) 449, 451-462. Note that sometimes these are referred to as the ‘1995
ERD’, presumably because they were approved by the US Bishops in 1994 and published in Origins
that year, but not published in their own right until the following year. The earlier dating will be
followed here.
For another assessment of the treatment of cooperation in the 1994 ERD, see The Ethicists of the
National Catholic Bioethics Centre, ‘Cooperating with Non-Catholic Partners.’ Ethics & Medics
23:11(1998) 1-5. More recent responses to the ERD from the Congregation of the Doctrine of the
Faith are addressed below, 4.3.
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structures of the 1991 Canadian Health Care Ethics Guide, yet they also managed to
retain much of the more directive approach of the 1971 ERD.125
In a Preamble to the 1994 document the US bishops sought a balance
between maintaining their authoritative stance and conceding some points to their
critics: for example, there was greater awareness of the pluralistic nature of Catholic
health care facilities in the modern context,126 but at the same time the authoritative
role of the bishop was preserved.

This attempt at equilibrium is no more evident

than in the bishops’ conciliatory approach to ethical decision-making:
In consultation with medical professions, church leaders review
these [new medical] developments, judge them according to the
principles of right reason and the ultimate standard of revealed
truth, and offer authoritative teaching and guidance about the moral
and pastoral responsibilities entailed by the Christian faith. While
the church cannot furnish a ready answer to every moral dilemma,
there are many questions about which she provides normative
guidance and direction. In the absence of a determination by the
magisterium, but never contrary to church teaching, the guidance of
approved authors can offer appropriate guidance for ethical
decision making.127
Three of the six parts of the 1994 ERD were directly relevant to the present
discussion.

The Introduction to Part 1 accepted that ‘within a pluralistic society

Catholic health care services will encounter requests for medical procedures
contrary to the moral teaching of the church’, but in refusing to consider such
procedures ‘Catholic health care does not offend the rights of individual

125

The 1994 ERD reflected the CHAC 1991 Guide not only in their tone, acknowledging that ‘the
directives do not cover in detail all of the complex issues which confront Catholic health care today’,
but also in their structure: after a general theological introduction, each subsequent part consisted of
an ‘expository’ section followed by prescriptive norms. Yet the overall aim had not changed much
from the 1971 US ERD: ‘[F]irst, to reaffirm the ethical standards of behaviour in health care which
flow from the church’s teaching about the dignity of the human person; second, to provide
authoritative guidance on certain moral issues which face Catholic health care today.’ See Origins
24(1994) 451.
126
On pluralism: ‘By virtue of their baptism, lay faithful are called to participate actively in the
church’s life and mission. Their participation and leadership in the health care ministry, through
new forms of sponsorship and governance of institutional Catholic health care, are essential for the
church to continue her ministry of healing and compassion. They are joined in the church’s health
care mission by many men and women who are not Catholic.’ Origins 24(1994) 452. In the same
place the bishops’ role was expanded beyond that of ‘teacher’ and ‘pastor’ to include ‘center of unity’
and ‘priest’.
127
‘Preamble’, Origins 24(1994) 452. It is unclear whether ‘magisterium’ here refers to the
teaching office of the Roman curia or the American bishops themselves.
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conscience’.128 Directive 6 noted that collaboration with other health care providers
can be appropriate. In Part 4 the ERD noted that:
The church’s commitment to life is seen in its willingness to
collaborate with others to alleviate the causes of the high infant
mortality rate and to provide adequate health care to mothers and
their children before and after birth.129
Of particular importance, however, was the analysis of institutional and
corporate cooperation developed in Part 6. The Introduction to this Part noted that
contemporary social circumstances caused Catholic health care providers to be
increasingly involved with other providers through joint purchase of services, cosponsorship of integrated delivery systems or managed care organisations, or other
corporate arrangements.

These partnerships offer new opportunities for Christian

witness, but also make it increasingly difficult to maintain a clear Christian identity
and to implement Christian moral values.

They make cooperation in evil a real

possibility, and the many possible permutations of partnerships make assessment of
cooperation considerably more complex than in the past.130
To meet these challenges the US bishops offered three avenues of assistance:
four directives which focused on cooperation and scandal, an Appendix to the ERD
outlining the Principle of Legitimate Cooperation, and an ad hoc committee of the
National Conference of Catholic Bishops to advise on institutional cooperation.
The first two Directives (67 and 68) noted that church teaching must be
respected whenever partnerships affect the mission and identity of Catholic
institutions, and therefore relevant bishops must be involved in negotiations and
must give appropriate authorisations.

Directive 69 required that Catholic

institutions apply the principle of legitimate cooperation to determine the extent of
128

Origins 24(1994) 453. This was a fairly obvious response to the arguments mounted by Reich
and Curran, but the format of the ERD did not provide an opportunity to explain this refutation.
129
Introduction to Part 4, Origins 24(1994) 456-457. In the same Part 4, Directive 45 (at 457)
specifically prohibited cooperation in abortion and (on the grounds of possible scandal) cautioned
against cooperation with abortion providers; but in comparison with this it is interesting to note that
while Directive 52 stateed that ‘Catholic health institutions may not promote or condone
contraceptive practices . . . ’ it did not specifically prohibit purely material cooperation which may
occur, for example, if doctors who maintain rooms in church-owned hospitals were occasionally to
prescribe contraceptives. It might be argued that this exceptional case would be subject to the
conditions given in the fourth CDF Reply, noted in 3.2.2 above.
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collaboration allowed, while Directive 70 noted the distinct (but related) issue of
scandal:

even where cooperation is ‘morally appropriate’ in itself, the risk of

scandal may mean that cooperation should be refused.
The appendix was entitled The Principles Governing Cooperation.

It

highlighted the central feature of the principle - a distinction between the action of
the principal agent and that of the cooperating agent - and outlined the major
categories of cooperation.

The two kinds of formal cooperation were given equal

prominence: explicit (intending ex fine operantis), and implicit (intending ex fine
operis). The description of the latter was simple:
Implicit formal cooperation is attributed when, even though the
cooperator denies intending the wrongdoer’s object, no other
explanation can distinguish the cooperator’s object from the
wrongdoer’s object.131
A second distinction differentiated immediate from mediate material
cooperation.
Material cooperation is immediate when the object of the
cooperator is the same as the object of the wrongdoer. Immediate
material cooperation is wrong, except in some instances of duress.
The matter of duress distinguishes immediate material cooperation
from implicit formal cooperation.
But immediate material
cooperation - without duress - is equivalent to implicit formal
cooperation and, therefore, is morally wrong.132
The general meaning of this distinction is clear, but the explanation is not: if
the moral object of the cooperator’s act is the same as the moral object of the
wrongdoer’s act, then they would seem to be performing the same action and the
basis of differentiation disappears. So exactly what constitutes ‘duress’? and how
does ‘duress’ function so that the cooperator’s act qualifies as ‘immediate material
cooperation’ rather than ‘implicit formal cooperation’?

The Appendix does not

explain, but some observations from the tradition may be helpful.
In his example of immediate material cooperation, Henry Davis referred to
‘cooperation in the sinful act of the other, as to help a burglar to empty the jewels
130
131

Origins 24(1994) 459-460.
Origins 24(1994) 461. Note the similarity to the later CHAC 2000 Guide, at 90.
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that he is stealing into the burglar’s wallet’.133 In an exercise of classical casuistry
he notes:
Immediate material cooperation in another’s sinful act is always
wrong, though there are many apparent exceptions, especially in
matters of justice.
Thus, under threat of death, I may, very
probably, help another to destroy the property of a third person,
because if in extreme hunger it is permissible to take food that
belongs to another not in extreme need, it would seem that an
analogous method of saving one’s life is not sinful. The owner of
the property destroyed is, it is alleged, not reasonably willing that
his property should be preserved at the cost of my life. . . . [under
the circumstances] this is not using a bad means to compass a good
end: the means are not bad, for nobody’s rights are invaded.134
First, duress - the threat of death in this case - could work in two ways:
either it could alter the moral species of the cooperator’s act by providing the
cooperator with a different moral object; or it could leave the moral species
untouched but diminish the cooperator’s culpability.

Second, however, the way in

which duress works depends to some extent on the cooperative act itself and the kind
of evil in which the cooperator participates. This will emerge more clearly below.

In Davis’s case, duress works by altering the moral species of the
cooperator’s act. The severity of duress in his example means that the cooperator,
when viewed objectively, is not participating in the unjust destruction of property: to
be sure, property is destroyed - but not unjustly, for no-one could justly value
private property above life itself. Therefore Davis can conclude that ‘the means are
not bad, for nobody’s rights are invaded’:135 because of the duress the moral object
of the cooperator’s action is ‘to save his own life’ - he is ‘preserving a great good’.
But in the Appendix, immediate material cooperation occurs when the cooperator’s
object is the same as the wrongdoer’s object; but if the moral objects are still the
same even in the presence of duress, then duress cannot be operating here as it does
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Origins 24(1994) 461.
Davis, vol. I, 341. See above, 1.2.3 and 2.1.3.
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Davis, vol. I, 342-343.
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This is an example of the point made in 2.3.2 above: the circumstances of this case are such
that, when it is adequately described, the cooperator’s action is not ‘destruction of property’ but
‘preservation of life’.
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in Davis’s case. Therefore in the ERD duress can only function in the other way: by
restricting the cooperator’s freedom and so diminishing personal responsibility.
With regard to the manner of functioning, two points are immediately
evident. First, duress can be a morally-determining circumstance only if the moral
species of the cooperator’s action is not already fully determined by its own
intentionality (finis operis, as distinct from the finis operantis): that is, only if the
cooperator’s action is not itself intrinsically evil.136

But where the action of the

principal agent (whose moral object the cooperator shares) is ‘incapable of being
ordered to God’,137 then no amount of duress alone could ever provide the
cooperator’s act with a legitimate moral object:

it is difficult to imagine how

immediate material cooperation in an intrinsic evil could ever be ‘preferable’ as a
‘lesser evil’ since, if the ERD account is true, this cooperation will always share the
principal agent’s (intrinsically evil) moral object.
Hence, as noted, the way in which duress works depends to some extent on
the kind of action in which the cooperator participates. However, it seems that even
in the case of intrinsically evil acts, the second manner of working remains open:
‘duress’ may so adversely affect the freedom of an individual cooperator that it
reduces personal culpability.138
Second, as the Appendix implies, even for actions which are not intrinsically
evil, not all forms of duress will be so grave as to alter the species of the cooperator’s
act or excuse the cooperator’s choice to cooperate. In order to function in either of
these ways the duress would have to be of such significance, and directed against
such a superior good, that the harm threatening that good would be greater than the
evil to which one would contribute by cooperation.

So except in cases of

intrinsically evil acts, duress may be able to justify immediate material cooperation,
136

See 2.3.2 above.
Veritatis splendor, 80.
138
On this point, see Welch, ‘An Excessive Claim’. See also 4.3.3 below and Kevin O’Rourke
OP, ‘A Brief Response to Father Keenan.’ Ethics & Medics 23:9(1998) 4: ‘If duress were to impair
all freedom, then it might remove subjective culpability, but it would not change the objective nature
of an act which is intrinsically evil.’ O’Rourke is technically correct on the question of objective
morality, but Keenan apparently also holds this position: see ‘Cooperation and “Hard Cases”.’ Ethics
& Medics 23:9(1998) 3-4, points 3 and 4.
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but only ‘if this is the only means of saving life or preserving a great good’ 139 - that
is, a good greater than that threatened by the evil action of the principal agent.
Hence Alphonsus holds that in order to save one’s own life one may assist a thief,
but one may never cooperate in killing the innocent.140
The next question is: is ‘duress’ the only factor which might excuse
immediate material cooperation or provide the cooperator with an alternative moral
object? Can any other factors work in either of these ways? And can ‘duress’ be
taken to embrace not only fear of harm to a substantial present good (such as one’s
own life), but also fear of harm to a substantial future good?

Some of these

questions will be taken up again in the final chapter of the present work.
The third paragraph of the Appendix was disappointing, for it further
confused the question of objects by introducing yet another: ‘the object of material
cooperation’. It is far from clear whether this refered to the cooperator’s subjective
intention, or the intentionality of the cooperator’s act.
Finally, the Appendix rightly emphasised the role of prudence in estimating
questions of cooperation, indicating (in line with the tradition) that assessment of
cooperation depends more on the exercise of practical wisdom than on any
mathematical application of metaphysical principles.141

It is presumably in this

‘taxonomic’ use of the principle that an ad hoc advisory committee would find its
role.142

The danger of scandal should also be avoided as far as possible (the

Appendix would have it eliminated altogether). And an interesting possibility was
opened up: assessment of cooperation should include ‘appropriate consideration’ of
‘the church’s prophetic responsibility’.

Here one senses the beginnings of an

answer to an earlier question: adequate assessment of material cooperation should
include consideration of the risks to goods both present and future.
139

Davis, vol. I, 343.
Alphonsus, de caritate, 66: ‘. . . non licet occidi innocentem, ut tu mortem vites.’ On
balancing harms and on his definition of an intrinsically evil act of cooperation, see de restitutione,
571.
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As they stood, the 1994 ERD made a substantial contribution to
contemporary interpretation of cooperation in evil.

They struck a certain balance

between the traditional metaphysics and a more personalist approach, and they raised
some key questions for ecclesiology and missiology, particularly concerning the
church’s role in a pluralist world. The Appendix to the ERD was probably then the
most complete contemporary framing of the principle of cooperation.

However,

some of the difficulties noted here returned to haunt the 1994 ERD, and the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith subsequently required the US Bishops to
amend them - in particular Part Six and the Appendix, both dealing with the
principle of legitimate cooperation.

The bishops’ response was to omit altogether

the appendix on cooperation from its 2001 ERD.

A fuller discussion of these

developments will follow below.143

4.2.2.3 James F Keenan
Similarities between the Appendix and his own published works suggest
American theologian James F Keenan SJ as one of the key contributors to the 1994
ERD.144

The extent of Keenan’s corpus, and the fact that much of it addresses

specific contemporary issues, make it worthy of detailed study in itself. This would
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My thanks to Rev Dr Gerald Gleeson for drawing my attention to a summary of these
developments provided by the President of the Catholic Health Association of the United States of
America, Rev Michael D Place, in memoranda dated 20 and 26 September 2000. These memoranda
are available to members of CHAUSA via its website, www.chausa.org. See 4.3.2 below for further
comment.
144
Works of James F Keenan SJ consulted for this section include: ‘Prophylactics, Toleration, and
Cooperation: Contemporary Problems and Traditional Principles.’ International Philosophical
Quarterly 29(1989) 205-220; ‘The Function of the Principle of Double Effect.’ Theological Studies
54(1993) 294-315; in Judith A Dwyer, ed. New Dictionary of Catholic Social Thought. (Collegeville,
Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1994) articles on cooperation (at 232-235), double effect (300-303) and
toleration (951-953); ‘The Return of Casuistry.’ Theological Studies 57(1996) 123-139; with M
Cathleen Kaveny, ‘The Revised Ethical and Religious Directives.’ Theological Studies 56(1995)
144-150; with Thomas R Kopfensteiner, ‘The Principle of Cooperation.’ Health Progress (April
1995) 23-27; ‘Institutional Cooperation and the Ethical and Religious Directives.’ Linacre Quarterly
64:3(1997) 53-76; and ‘Cooperation and ‘Hard Cases’.’ Ethics & Medics 23:9(1998) 3-4.
In
response to the last two see Welch, ‘An Excessive Claim’.
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be beyond the scope of the present work, which will limit itself to observations on
two foci of Keenan’s writing.
a) The object of cooperation
Keenan’s basic insight into cooperation is put in an article on the vexed
question of AIDS and condoms: is it morally lawful to advise the use of a condom to
a person who, being HIV-positive, is determined to continue to engage in frequent
acts of sexual intercourse?145

On the surface this appears similar to Alphonsus’s

classic case concerning cooperation with one who is determined to sin,146 with an
additional emphasis on tolerating a lesser evil.147
[The US Bishops’ letter] . . . permits counsel concerning the use of
prophylactics but only after counsel concerning abstinence has
failed. If a person is already resolved to perform the illicit act,
whether or not counsel is given, he will commit the act; the
counsellor plays no part in it. This person is thoroughly selfsufficient. He needs no accomplices . . . to commit this act. I
have not found any case that better illustrates the ‘dispensability’ of
cooperation than this case. Thus, we see that the letter’s proposals
of cooperation in no way assist the person to commit the act.148
This position requires a clear distinction between the evil action of the
principal agent (unchaste sexual activity) and the evil affects of that action (likely
spread of HIV to innocent third parties).

Because the principal agent is already

determined to commit his sin, Keenan’s argues that the US bishops exercise no moral
causality in the action itself insofar as it is sinful, but only participate in reducing its
harmful consequences.

In this regard their position is analogous to that of the

politician in Evangelium vitae 73.

Alphonsus would agree: because the sin is

inevitable the bishops do not concur in the principal agent’s fault, but only in his
material action.149
145

Keenan, ‘Prophylactics’.
This article is a commentary on reaction to the US bishops’
document ‘The Many Faces of AIDS: A Gospel Response’ Origins 17(1987).
146
Alphonsus, de caritate 47. See 1.1.4 above.
147
Keenan demonstrates that in their teaching on this question the US bishops employed the
principle of ‘toleration’ only in relation to public education programs (‘institutional activity’) which
contain information about prophylactics, but they used the principle of ‘cooperation’ proper in
relation to offering private moral guidance (‘personal activity’) concerning use of condoms to
minimise the risk of transmitting HIV.
148
Keenan, ‘Prophylactics’, 217. Emphasis original. The US bishops’ teaching seems to stand
on safe ground, as their argument is virtually identical to a position held widely in the tradition. See
Hannigan, ‘Is it ever lawful?’
149
Alphonsus, de caritate 63.
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The bishops’ ‘cooperation’ is therefore that one form of participans without
induction which constitutes ‘cooperation properly so called’, so the next test is
whether this cooperation is justified: do Alphonsus’s three key conditions apply?
These are that (1) one’s own action must be good or indifferent in itself; (2) it must
be for a good intention and a reasonable cause, and not in order to assist the sin; and
(3) one is unable to impede the other’s sin.150
The last two conditions are clearly met:

counsel is offered in order to

minimise harm to third parties and not to assist the inevitable sin, which in any case
the counsellor is powerless to prevent. The first condition, however, requires one to
show that advising use of a condom for unchaste sexual activity is not an evil action
in this case, that is, an action which is evil by virtue of its moral object.

Keenan

argues that in this case, since the unchaste (and unsafe) sexual activity is inevitable,
the cooperator’s action (advising use of a condom) is morally distinct from the
principal agent’s action (actual use of a condom) because the moral object of the
former (minimising risks to others) is distinct from the moral object of the latter
(unchaste sexual activity).151
In this case and under these circumstances, ‘advising use of a condom’ stands
within the moral tradition on advising the lesser evil: given the inevitability of the
sin, prudent advice to sin less grievously rather than more grievously ‘is not only
lawful, but holy, nay more, it is the office of the Angels’.152
150

See Alphonsus, de caritate 59.
Keenan, ‘Prophylactics’, 209-214. It must be remembered that ‘moral object’ refers not to the
physical form of the activity being performed but to its ‘form conceived by reason’, the ‘moral matter
which the act aims to attain or with which the act deals’, its meaning in genere moris. See above,
2.1.2, point 9.
Keenan argues elsewhere (on the question of cooperation in direct sterilisation) that ‘In judging
the morality of cooperation a clear distinction should be made between the reason for the sterilisation
and the reason for the cooperation . . . If the cooperation is to remain material, the reason for the
cooperation must be something over and above the reason for the sterilisation itself.’ ‘Institutional
Cooperation’, 69. Keenan is here apparently citing the US bishops, ‘Sterilisation Policy for Catholic
Hospitals.’ Origins 7(1977) 399-400.
152
Cajetan (Opuscula Omnia Tom. I, Tract. 31, Resp. 13, ad tertium) cited in E T Hannigan SJ, ‘Is
it ever lawful?’, 108. The precise position of Cajetan, as related by Hannigan, is significant: if the
principal agent is already determined unto sin, one may not induce him to a lesser sin of a different
kind or against a different person, but only to a less serious sin of the same kind against the same
person: ‘And hence it is, that if we cannot withdraw an adulterer any other way from committing
adultery, we may lawfully provoke him to simple fornication, not by urging him to commit fornication,
151
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Keenan implies that, because it concerns personal activity, such advice can be
offered only in individual cases: it may be the most prudent option in a particular
instance, and it is the act of ‘offering’ the advice which establishes it as cooperation
rather than tolerance.153 Therefore the bishops are not establishing a general policy
of counselling the use of condoms to restrict the spread of AIDS, which could
constitute unjustified cooperation in evil and would certainly offend the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s veto on such policies. They are, rather,
recognising that it may sometimes be more prudent in individual instances to counsel
the use of condoms (that is, to cooperate only materially) if this is the only way to
minimise the harmful effects of inevitable immoral sexual activity in the particular
case.
Another test of the bishops’ position further strengthens Keenan’s position:
(1) this cooperation gives occasion to a less serious rather than a more serious sin
(because it will have fewer or less serious effects); (2) the principal agent’s sin is
inevitable in any case; (3) at best, this advice bears only very remotely on the
principal agent’s sin as sin; (4) there is a positive duty to minimise harm to others;
and (5) far from offending the demands of justice, counselling the lesser evil reduces
injustice by minimising harm to third parties.154
The basic distinction between the evil action itself on one hand, and the evil
effects of the action on the other, is found in the Alphonsian tradition which
distinguished cooperation in de caritate from cooperation in de restitutione. Keenan
but by saying to him, ‘If you are determined on gratifying your passions, at least don’t violate the bed
of another’ . . . And this is not to induce to a greater or a lesser evil, but it is ‘secundum rem’
objectively to withdraw from a greater evil.’ Note that this ‘counselling of evil’ is not absolute but
conditional (‘If you are determined . . .’), and this condition is held to be an essential quality
(whether or not it is explicitly stated at the time) if counselling a lesser evil is to be considered lawful.
This condition may be taken as understood in Keenan’s case of the ‘belt-offering wife’ (Keenan,
‘Prophylactics’, 207).
Cajetan’s position found an honoured place in the manualist tradition: see for example Davis, vol.
I, 339: ‘It is held as probable by an impressive number of authors that it is not sinful to advise a
person, already fully determined to commit a sin, to commit a lesser one in the same category or
against the same person, or even if the sin, such as injustice, affects a third party. To give such
advice is consistent with charity.’
In view of these distinctions it might be more accurate to entitle it not the ‘principle of lesser evil’
but the ‘principle of less sinning’, or the ‘principle of less evil effects’.
153
Keenan, ‘Prophylactics’, 206-207.
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proposes that ‘cooperation in favour of less evil effects’ should play a positive role in
moral deliberation.
More importantly, there are cases in which A cooperates precisely
to diminish the physically evil effects of B’s illicit or morally
wrong actions. Here, rather than a question of options or rights,
cooperation is a means of determining whether potential
catastrophes can somehow be averted. . . . Effectively, in each
case the agent asks at some point in his deliberations whether more
harm than good could occur by his failure to cooperate
materially.155
This casts the principle of legitimate cooperation as a principle of
compromise,156 in which (in some cases at least) material cooperation may be
positively required if it is the only way of minimising harmful effects. Thus Keenan
argues that the principle of cooperation is a ‘guiding principle’ rather than merely a
‘permitting principle’ because it helps the cooperator positively to ‘contain
involvement in the wrongdoing’.157 Perhaps the principle often seems otherwise, but
this insight sits well with Keenan’s insistence on the ‘taxonomic’ rather than
‘geometric’ function of moral principles in casuistry.158

It may also shed light on

the magisterium’s position on moral agents being ‘constrained’ to cooperate.159
b) Immediate material cooperation
Keenan argues that cooperators are not always entirely ‘free agents’ making
moral choices completely unimpeded by other factors:160 sometimes they are, or
consider themselves to be, acting under some form of ‘duress, constraint or
pressure’.161

The question of duress is central to another contentious aspect of

Keenan’s position, his defence of immediate material cooperation in an extended
dialogue with Russell E Smith.162
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On these five conditions see Alphonsus, de caritate 59.
Keenan, ‘Prophylactics’, 208.
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At least, compromise in the analogous sense discussed above at 4.1.2.2.
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Keenan, ‘Principle’, 27. Keenan makes the same point in ‘Revised ERD’, 146; and
‘Institutional Cooperation’, 56-57 and 60-61.
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See Keenan, ‘Double Effect’, 295-300.
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See 3.2.2 above.
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Keenan, ‘Institutional Cooperation’, 62.
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Keenan, ‘Institutional Cooperation’, 69.
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Keenan’s dialogue with Russell E Smith includes the following (in chronological order):
Russell E Smith, ‘Formal and Material Cooperation.’ Ethics & Medics 20:6(1995) 1-2; Smith,
‘Duress and Cooperation.’ Ethics & Medics 21:11(1996) 1-2; (these two articles appear substantially
also in Smith, ‘Ethical Quandary: Forming Hospital Partnerships.’ Linacre Quarterly 63:2(1996) 87155
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The case concerns a Catholic hospital threatened with loss of its obstetrics
department unless it allows some surgeons to perform (rare) direct sterilisations.
Can hospital authorities offer immediate material cooperation (with the surgeons’
actions, presumably) in order to save its obstetrics services?
Smith maintains that, given the intrinsically evil nature of direct sterilisation,
duress can function only as a modifier of responsibility: it cannot alter the moral
species of direct sterilisation but may diminish the cooperator’s culpability.163
Therefore he concludes that immediate material cooperation in direct sterilisation is
never strictly lawful.
Theologians maintain that in the objective order, immediate
material cooperation is equivalent to implicit formal cooperation
because the object of the moral act of the cooperator is
indistinguishable from that of the principal agent. Those who use
the term ‘immediate material cooperation’ have understood this as
ethically unacceptable behaviour.164
Keenan holds a similar position on the question of culpability,165 but cites
Davis to argue that immediate material cooperation in some evils can be lawful.166
He does not indicate that Davis’s case does not concern an intrinsically evil act,
where his own case does, nor does he advert to the significance of this difference.
But Keenan doesn’t question whether direct sterilisation is intrinsically evil: he only
asks whether circumstances might arise in which cooperation in direct sterilisation
would be justified.167

96.) Keenan replied to Smith in ‘Institutional Cooperation.’ Smith responded in ‘Immediate Material
Cooperation.’ Ethics & Medics 23:1(1998) 1-2; Keenan replied again in ‘Hard Cases’. The next
article in the series is attributed to The Ethicists of the National Bioethics Center, ‘Cooperating with
Non-Catholic Partners.’ See more recently a critique of Keenan’s position in Welch, ‘An Excessive
Claim’.
163
See Smith, ‘Formal and Material Cooperation’, 1; ‘Ethical Quandary’, 92-93; ‘Duress and
Cooperation’, 1-2.
164
Smith, ‘Formal and Material Cooperation’, 1-2. Emphasis added. Smith’s argument here leads
him to conclude that the action condemned in 1679 (see 1.1.3 above) was an example of immediate
material cooperation. See Smith, ‘Ethical Quandary’, 92-93. For Alphonsus’s position on the same
case, see 1.1.4 above.
165
Keenan, ‘Hard Cases’, 3.
166
Keenan, ‘Institutional Cooperation’, 62.
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Keenan cannot argue here, as he does in the ‘AIDS and condoms’ case, that
direct sterilisations are inevitable, for they will not proceed at all without the
hospital’s compliance. Therefore he cannot argue that the sole aim of the hospital’s
action is to minimise the harmful effects of an inevitable evil action.

Instead, he

argues that the threat of losing medical services constitutes an evil, and this may be
greater than the evil of cooperating in direct sterilisations.168 His position seems to
be that, in the circumstances, it is a lesser evil for the hospital to cooperate positively
in direct sterilisations and a greater evil for it to cooperate negatively in the loss of
services.

In his view the hospital’s action does not constitute implicit formal

cooperation in the surgeons’ actions: ‘duress’ makes it immediate material
cooperation.
It will also be noted that these two evils are logically distinct: there is no
connection per se between loss of obstetric services and cooperation in contraceptive
sterilisations, but it is the surgeons’ attitude which establishes a connection per
accidens. It is the surgeons’ ultimatum alone which creates the moral dilemma, and
the evil which is done in either case will come about solely by virtue of the surgeons’
wills.

The desire to argue this case on the grounds of cooperation is very

understandable. But it is also important to recall that a moralist like Grisez would
hold Keenan’s position to be invalid because the unquestionably good finis operantis
(preservation of obstetrics services) is only achieved by way of an evil finis operis
(cooperation in direct sterilisation) - and a good end may never be compassed by an
evil means.
One difficulty throughout this debate is that ‘duress’ has not been adequately
defined.169

Smith suggests two elements: it is coercion or compulsion directed

against the cooperator, and it is ‘episodic’ rather than ‘systemic’.170

He does

acknowledge that institutions may be subject to ‘systemic duress’, but judges that if
167

Indeed, in ‘Hard Cases’ at 3 Keenan states clearly that ‘to apply the principle of material
cooperation to sterilisation is not to claim that sterilisations are right, but that they are actually
intrinsically wrong.’
168
This seems to be a reasonable interpretation of Keenan’s conclusion in ‘Institutional
Cooperation’, 72-73.
169
Smith sees this problem in ‘Duress and Cooperation’, 2; see also William J Buckley’s letter
under the heading ‘Ethical and Religious Directives’ in Health Progress (July-August 1995) 8.
170
Smith, ‘Ethical Quandary’, 94.
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systemic duress is foreseeable, an institution should ‘consider both negotiated
dispensation from the requirements of law and/or the possibility of modification of
the apostolate’.171

Keenan finds this distinction ‘curious’ on the grounds that all

duress is episodic: it affects moral choices only for as long as it lasts, and it may last
for as long as a particular arrangement is in place.172

But Smith’s argument and

Keenan’s response on this point both seem unnecessary.

It is surely sufficient to

agree with the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: material cooperation in
evil cannot be a matter of policy (systemic) for any institution, but may be permitted
for serious reasons in individual (episodic) instances according to prudent
application of the traditional principle.173
Furthermore, only if one holds for the possibility of moral purity is it even
necessary to develop an argument that ‘duress’ makes immediate material
cooperation lawful.

For those who accept the possibility of moral tragedy it is

sufficient to argue for the alternative, that ‘duress’ acts to diminish subjective
culpability - as it seems to do in the principle of lesser evil. The realist in Keenan
does not enter into any ‘geometric’ application of the principle in order to argue that
immediate material cooperation may be legitimate; rather he entrusts ‘taxonomic’
use of the principle to the prudence of the appropriate authorities, who may in some
cases judge cooperation to be a lesser evil.
But he insists on clarity. Moral objects must be carefully described,174 and
reasons for cooperation must be carefully distinguished from reasons for the evil
deed itself.175

The sufficiently serious or ‘proportionate’ reason which justifies

material cooperation must be strong since it concerns a good which is to be protected
against harm.176

Keenan also identifies that a proportionate reason may be

sufficiently serious because it excuses the cooperator from blame (as in the case of
171

Smith, ‘Ethical Quandary’, 95. The latter phrase would seem to include abandoning this
particular apostolate altogether.
172
Keenan, ‘Institutional Cooperation’, 69.
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See the CDF Replies to Questions noted in 3.2.2 above.
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Keenan, ‘Prophylactics’, 210.
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Keenan, ‘Institutional Cooperation’, 69.
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Keenan, ‘Institutional Cooperation’, 59.
Keenan holds that in the case of cooperation,
proportionate reason functions ‘solely to protect a value, like life or property, that is being
threatened; it is not invoked to simply promote something, but rather to protect something that is
endangered.’
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cooperation by subordinates), or because it minimises harmful effects (for example,
in cases where the common good is at stake);177 or indeed, an agent may hold
multiple reasons which work together to justify a single instance of cooperation.178
Overall, James F Keenan has made a significant contribution to a
contemporary understanding of legitimate cooperation.

He reassesses some of the

traditional categories in light of contemporary social and political realities, in
keeping with his insistence that moral principles must be applied ‘taxonomically’
rather than ‘geometrically’, and this is a valuable insight. At the same time, despite
his best efforts, he does not seem to have proposed a conclusive solution to the
problem of ‘immediate material cooperation’ in intrinsically evil acts.

But every

moralist concedes that cooperation in evil lies among the most complex of moral
problems, and modern pluralist cultures make it only more so.
4.2.2.4 Other Writers
A number of other writers have also recognised the significance of the
principle of legitimate cooperation in modern, pluralist America. For some, interest
in cooperation springs as much from their experience of the complex American
medical insurance industry as from their Catholic backgrounds. It is not surprising
that their assessments of cooperation are somewhat uneven.
Judith Lee Kissell takes the general concept of ‘complicity’ as a model: in
relation to the evil brought about, the cooperative act itself is ‘non-violating and
incomplete’ since it neither offends a moral norm nor causes the evil itself.179 She
recognises the principle as a ‘conflict-resolving strategy’,180 and correctly identifies
that the ‘wrongness’ of a cooperative act lies precisely in its circumstance as
cooperative.181

Like Keenan she holds that the principle applies taxonomically

rather than geometrically, and the operative virtue is prudence.
The role of prudence is to perceive the connection between the
moral evil, the non-violating act and its circumstances. We usually
177

Keenan, ‘Institutional Cooperation’, 61.
Keenan, ‘Institutional Cooperation’, 62-63.
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do not need such insight for the immediate and blatant offence.
Further, the very nature of casuistic reasoning in these cases means
that each situation is only analogous to the others because so many,
and such varied, possibilities for collaboration exist. The ability of
prudence to detect and articulate the ambiguous and analogous
relationship is critical.182
If only because it does not merely repeat traditional categories and
definitions, Kissell’s is a refreshing view.

But the use of external models is not

always helpful: Kissell dismisses ‘immediate material cooperation’ because it
resembles the legal concept of ‘conspiracy’, with implications of co-agency and
equal culpability.183

Yet Davis’s example illustrates that the ‘moral reflex’

identifies immediate material cooperation as, in some way, quite distinct from
implicit formal cooperation.184
An unsigned article in The Catholic World Report relates the experience of
Cardinal Jean Margéot of Mauritius, who resisted government moves to legalise
abortion by providing instead a network of natural family planning agencies.185 The
results speak for themselves: 20% of women came to use NFP (62% of these being
Hindu and Muslim), and the effectiveness of the program convinced the government
not to proceed with its abortion law reform.

However, to promote a similar NFP

program more widely in Africa would require the financial support of international
organisations, many of which would demand that Church agencies must also offer
referrals to other family-planning centres.

Cardinal Margéot recognises here the

challenge of cooperation in evil.
Consulted on the morality of cooperating in these circumstances, John Haas
suggests that ‘if you substitute ‘abortion’ for ‘contraception’ in this argument, you
see immediately why it wouldn’t work . . . You wouldn’t want to cooperate in any
way, facilitating people to carry out a gravely immoral act’. He reportedly adds, as
another example, that ‘a surgical nurse could in no way prepare for an abortion

182

Kissell, ‘Contemporary Relevance’, 42.
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procedure, or a tubal ligation even if she did not take part in the action or agree with
its purposes. That cooperation would be immediate and too proximate’.186
These arguments are clumsy. In the first place, comparing ‘abortion’ with
‘contraception’ is valid casuistry only if referring a woman for ‘family-planning’
advice includes the element that this an ‘illicit act’; but if there are valid medical
grounds for a woman to be prescribed anovulants, then the act of referring her for
‘family-planning’ advice may not be cooperation in evil at all.

(On the same

grounds, of course, there could never be valid grounds for referring a woman for an
abortion.)

In the second place, some would disagree with Haas’s reading of the

surgical nurse’s position: Gerald Kelly, for example, argues the contrary where the
nurse has a proportionate reason to justify cooperation.187
In another article in The Catholic World Report, Philip F Lawler tells of
efforts in the US Diocese of Peoria to maintain an important health care system.188
In the absence of ‘an adequate supply of doctors who would accept the system’s
ethical standards’, the sponsoring religious order reluctantly accepted that doctors
could prescribe birth-control devices, but only in their private practices and not as
representing the Catholic hospitals.

To place further distance between itself and

contraception, the hospitals required that prescribing doctors personally inform their
patients that they are acting as private physicians, that they place signs to that effect
in waiting rooms, and that hospital prescription pads are not used for prescribing
contraceptives.189
Lawler notes that even the architect of this solution was not entirely happy
with it. However, his concession that this ‘remote material cooperation’ is entered
only ‘under duress from the marketplace’ illustrates the significance of ‘systemic
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John Haas, cited in the column ‘On Material Cooperation’ in Catholic World Report (February
1995) 46.
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Gerald Kelly SJ, Medico-Moral Problems. (St Louis: Catholic Hospital Association of the
United States and Canada, 1957) 332-335. To his credit, Haas adds: ‘That’s my judgment . . .
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Philip F Lawler, ‘Playing in Peoria.’ Catholic World Report (February 1996) 40-42, at 40.
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duress’: in some cases cooperation is preferable to closure of institutions because it
is, apparently, a lesser evil.190
In a survey of factors complicating medical decision-making in the USA,
Charles E Millard and Robert McManus offer a simplified treatment of
cooperation.191 Of particular note are their acknowledgment of the American health
care system and pluralism itself as major factors contributing to the challenge of
cooperation, and their acceptance of ‘immediate material cooperation’ in situations
marked by ‘compulsion or force’.

Unfortunately, their interpretation of

‘proportionate reason’ overlooks the difficulties inherent in the ‘weighing or
balancing of good and bad effects’.192
Two other papers discuss the question of cooperation in connection with
physician-assisted suicide (PAS). Patrick Norris OP notes that some physicians feel
happier collaborating with ‘physician-assisted suicide’ than with ‘euthanasia’ on the
grounds that the latter requires their direct involvement in ending life, while their
involvement in the former is more remote.193

He rightly argues that while these

actions ‘require two different types of physical and moral cooperation by the
physician . . . neither type of cooperation is acceptable’.194 The reason is that there
is no greater good to be attained or evil to be avoided: neither ‘avoidance of pain’
nor ‘respect for patient autonomy’ can provide a reason to justify cooperation in
these actions.
Less satisfying is the contribution of Ralph P Miech.195 He correctly notes
that duress plays a central role in immediate material cooperation, but in relation to
intrinsically evil acts it can never provide grounds for choosing ‘cooperation as a
lesser evil’. Unfortunately the example offered does not prove his case:
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. . . if a physician were to allow his name to appear in an
advertisement for a Health Maintenance Organisation that
advertises PAS as one of its ‘services’, then even if he may refuse
to participate in PAS himself, the use of his name in the
advertisement would be a case of immediate material
cooperation.196
It is not immediately obvious why use of one’s name in advertising should
constitute immediate material cooperation in physician-assisted suicide, unless PAS
was the only service advertised.

4.2.3

Australia

In recent years several Australian theologians have also considered the
problem of material cooperation.

In general their studies emerge from analysis of

cases encountered in concrete practice - usually hospital and medical ethics.
Anthony Fisher OP offers a much simplified account of cooperation which
nevertheless manages to raise several important issues.197 He locates the complexity
of cooperation in the myriad relationships within which moral decisions must be
made,198 and identifies moral purity as an underlying concern for moral agents. But
cooperation with others is ‘essential to community and to any human life’, and so
cooperation with evil is ‘unavoidable, especially for those who live ‘in the world’,
and sometimes it is our duty’.199
In an interesting twist Fisher labels formal and material cooperation simply
‘intentional’ and ‘unintentional’ cooperation, drawing on Grisez’s theory of intention
to explain that the former includes the cooperator intending evil either as means or as
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end, while the latter extends to responsibility also for ‘undesired side-effects’.200
And among his comments on intentional cooperation Fisher makes what is, in the
literature in general, a very rare reference to the ‘ontological’ significance of
cooperation:
. . . it is very much a matter of what one chooses, what one makes
one’s own purposes or means to those purposes, and thus what one
makes oneself. The self-creative effects of choices, which are
central to the whole moral life, are crucial here: what is what I am
doing making me and what is it saying about me?201
Several other aspects of Fisher’s study stand out. For example, his analysis
of possible benefits of cooperation include apparent future and positive goods such
as ‘the opportunity to serve, to heal, to save and nurture life and health’.202

This

seems somewhat at odds with Evangelium vitae 73, in which justification of
cooperation appears to be limited to a consideration of present good only.203

A

prudent rule which respects both positions might be: ‘A good which is already being
done, or which is foreseen as very probable in the future, is more compelling than a
good which may only possibly be done in the future’.

This opens an interesting

question about the nature of the cooperator’s moral object.
Further, the idea that ‘we are obliged as far as possible to avoid or minimise
the harms’ suggests that the principle of lesser evil may play some role in assessing
one’s ‘proportionate reason’.204

Like most commentators, Fisher’s idea of

‘proportionate reason’ seems to refer to a balance of benefits and harms in the sideeffects of the principal agent’s evil action, rather than to the evil of that action in
itself.

And it is unfortunate that his article concludes with a listing of ‘typical
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cases’: such a bald and unnuanced approach to the complexity of cooperation risks
downplaying the significance of the specific circumstances which define or fill out
the morality of concrete instances.205
Brian Lewis also notes that assessing the morality of cooperation is more
difficult today than in the past:
First of all, in a pluralistic society there is considerable divergence
of view about what is to be considered morally evil.
Older
theologians realised that sometimes people do the wrong thing out
of ignorance and in good faith. They called this material sin and
tended to regard it as the exception rather than the rule. Such a
viewpoint is based on the conception that the moral order is
basically stable and readily recognisable, at least in broad outline,
by all. There was thus a presumption in favour of wrongdoing
being formally sinful. Today we cannot be so sure. The old
certainties have gone and disagreement about quite fundamental
moral issues is a fact of everyday experience, even within the
Catholic Church.206
The implications of this position quickly follow: one must respect the dignity
of everyone’s conscience and their right to act in freedom, as long as the rights of
third parties or the interests of the common good are not offended. But here Lewis
falls at the same hurdle as Curran: he seems to demand that the cooperator attend
more to the dignity of conscience of others than to the dignity of his own conscience.
To claim that there is ‘considerable divergence of view about what is to be
considered morally evil’ does not materially alter the fundamental challenge of
cooperation. Before a cooperator can perform a particular act he has to settle on his
proposed action as ‘right’ and his moral object as ‘good’. In order to do this he must
first judge the morality of the principal agent’s act.

The morality of the principal

agent’s act therefore influences the cooperator’s assessment of his own action, but it
is not determining: the cooperator still bears moral responsibility for his own action.
Whatever its validity in itself, Lewis’s view of the objective moral order does not
205

This leads Fisher into some interesting conflicts with the tradition. For example, counselling
use of contraceptives as a ‘lesser evil’ is here labelled simply ‘intentional and forbidden cooperation’.
There is no apparent appreciation of the legitimacy of ‘advising the lesser evil’ in certain
circumstances.
206
Brian Lewis, ‘Co-operation in Immoral Acts or Procedures.’ Reflections (St Vincent’s Hospital
Bioethics Committee) 2:1990. 3-4, at 3.

232

affect the functioning of the principle of cooperation.

Nevertheless the tradition

would agree with Lewis that ‘each case must be judged on its own merits’.207
In discussing moral aspects of cooperation in abortion, Norman Ford SDB
draws together the principles of double effect and material cooperation to illustrate
their common features.208

He discards the category ‘immediate material

cooperation’ altogether, preferring instead simply ‘proximate material cooperation’:
It would be proximate material cooperation for a passer-by to
volunteer to comply with a request from a thief to load stolen goods
into a getaway vehicle. . . . However, proximate material
cooperation which causes damage to property may be morally
justified if the cooperator is forced to do so under a threat of death
or serious injury.209
Ford’s second example of ‘proximate material cooperation’ seems to fit
Davis’s case of ‘immediate material cooperation’. However, the first example does
not seem to represent either traditional ‘proximate material cooperation’ or
‘immediate material cooperation’, but rather formal cooperation (either implicit or
explicit): if his help is freely given, it would seem that the only way the passer-by’s
action could escape formal complicity would be if he did not know that the goods
were stolen - but in that case his action would not constitute cooperation in evil at
all, at least not in any morally significant sense.
Ford views ‘proportionate reason’ as a balance of benefits over harms, and
this apparently grounds his objection to any ‘proximate’ cooperation in abortion.
But his claim that ‘the material assistance provided by the anaesthetist and the
theatre nurse would, in a moral sense, be practically indistinguishable from the
abortion itself’ is at odds with other interpretations of similar cases.210
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Unfortunately the form of the article prevents Ford from offering a fuller
explanation of the stances he adopts toward therapeutic use of foetal tissue (only
tissue from spontaneous abortions may be used) and the morality of prenatal
diagnosis.

In regard to the latter he takes a line similar to Tettamanzi: there is no

formal link between prenatal testing and any subsequent abortion, except where
prenatal diagnosis is undertaken with this firm intention; and there is no material link
either except in cases in which abortion actually occurs.211

The implications for

Catholic hospitals are clear: all prenatal care must be ‘guided by ethical principles’,
so that they ‘do not in practice become search and destroy missions’.212
Gerald P Gleeson has written several times on the principle of cooperation in
the context of bioethics and institutional cooperation.213 While his debt to James F
Keenan is acknowledged, Gleeson brings his own philosophic insight to both
speculative and practical investigation of the principle.
His commentary on the US bishops’ 1994 Ethical and Religious Directives
rightly identifies the minimising of evil and wrong-doing as a fundamental reason for
even considering cooperation in evil.214

He offers a vivid explanation of

cooperation ex fine operis: if an intention to assist the wrongdoer in his wrongdoing
is ‘implicitly embodied’ in an action, then that action is either immediate material
cooperation or implicit formal cooperation.
‘duress’.215

The difference between these lies in

Gleeson correctly locates ‘scandal’ within the whole question of

cooperation: scandal is not merely an ‘additional’ moral question but must also be
considered as one of the harms which may follow from cooperation itself, to be
balanced against the harm of not cooperating at all.
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One point of obscurity occurs in a passage in which ‘immediate material
cooperation’ seems to fall somewhere between formal and material cooperation:
The very existence of the Catholic facility may be threatened if it is
unable to cooperate with others, or if it is unable to provide services
required of it as the sole provider of health care services in a
particular area.
Under such duress, what would otherwise be
immediate (and so implicitly formal) cooperation, may become
material cooperation.216
The 1994 ERD had it otherwise: implicit formal cooperation becomes
immediate material cooperation when it is offered under such duress as provides the
cooperator with a sufficiently serious reason.
In an initial letter to The Catholic Weekly concerning needle exchange and
condom distribution programs as harm-reduction strategies, Gleeson succinctly puts
his underlying attitude toward cooperation in evil:
Nonetheless, the strength of the Catholic moral tradition at its best
is that while on the one hand, it refuses to compromise the demands
of moral truth, on the other hand, it recognises that in an imperfect
and sinful world, it is often necessary both to tolerate wrongdoing
and even, at times, to actively ‘cooperate’ with it in order to
minimise its harmful effects.217
Reaction to Gleeson’s letter highlights both the complexity of the problem of
cooperation, and the depth of disagreement between moralists.

The origins of the

principle itself might indicate why such disagreement persists: it evolved not from
any theoretical application of the metaphysics of human action but from the
prudential assessment of concrete circumstances in individual cases.

Therefore

there is, as Gleeson argues elsewhere, ‘scope here for the prudential judgments of
practical wisdom, and even for the diversity of judgments that good and wise people
reach at times’.218
Germain Grisez’s response in The Catholic Weekly indicates an apparent lack
of attention to the concrete details of the cases under discussion.
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. . . offering needles or condoms will at most reduce a potential bad
side-effect, but will do nothing to reduce the direct injuries to self
and others always involved in drug abuse and unchaste sexual
behaviour.219
This is certainly true but, as was noted in regard to Evangelium vitae 73, it is
precisely the possibility of reducing bad side-effects which may justify cooperation
in some instances.

It is legitimate to ask whether, even if some harms (‘direct

injuries’) are truly unavoidable, one is not morally obliged to minimise other harms
which are avoidable?

Grisez seems to misread the case.

He says that the youth

counsellor’s clientele are ‘presumably sexually active’, and the ‘presumably’ here
allows him to suggest that provision of needles or condoms may in fact induce the
client to sin.

But Gleeson’s argument is that this harm reduction strategy is

legitimate because the client is already sinning or is certain to sin in the future - an
exact parallel to Alphonsus’s position.220
Gleeson’s approach stands clearly within the moral tradition.

It answers

Grisez’s objection that ‘there is something far worse than a person dying of AIDS . .
. the sins of themselves, which if mortal and unrepented, will send those who commit
them to hell.’

If the sin is inevitable whether or not a condom is used, it is surely

better to cooperate in minimising the avoidable effects of that sin rather than to
tolerate these effects even though they are avoidable.

Here again one notes the

significance of Alphonsus’s distinction of cooperation in de caritate from
cooperation in de restitutione.
In his reply Gleeson rightly notes that there is a duty not to compound any
harm done by a wrongdoer, but in fact to minimise it.221 In doing so the cooperator
is not ‘choosing the lesser evil’ because he is not doing an evil of any description:
the moral object of the cooperator’s action is not the evil itself, nor the effects of the
evil, nor to assist the wrongdoer. As Pope John Paul II teaches in Evangelium vitae
73, the moral object here is the minimising of evil effects. The wrongdoer’s action is
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neither a means nor an end for the cooperator; it is, rather, an unavoidable evil event
which makes the cooperator’s action permissible and even necessary.
In order to verify that this is the case, and so to establish that material
cooperation might be warranted, Gleeson suggests that the cooperator should ask:
Am I morally certain that dangerous wrongdoing will occur? Is
repentance and a change of lifestyle foreseeable? Will others be
led into wrongdoing? Will assistance in this instance facilitate
wrongdoing or simply lessen its harmful effects? Will the church’s
teaching be misunderstood? Is a prophetic responsibility being
ignored?222
In the same spirit Gleeson addresses the question of cooperation in pre-natal
diagnosis, mounting a very clear and reasoned defence of the traditional principle.223
The key point is, again, that while the principle provides guidance, each case must be
judged on its own merits.

If provision of prenatal testing is not tied to abortion

either per se or per accidens, then ‘pro-life’ doctors need not automatically refrain
from offering a test in the particular case.
In a third place Gleeson sets out to ‘extend the limits of material cooperation’
on the dual basis of re-examining the goods at stake in cooperation and applying
appropriate descriptions of cooperative activity.224

This is a more technical

discussion of questions underlying cooperation in general, and it is somewhat less
satisfying.
For example, while his explanation of ‘respect for conscience’ is more
complete than Curran’s, Gleeson’s statement that Catholic hospitals have a moral
duty ‘to enable people to implement their own moral decisions about medical
treatments’ cannot mean a duty to provide ‘value-free’ medical care.225 He argues
that a hospital has a duty to encourage others to make ‘responsible conscience
judgments’,226 but one may wonder whether a responsible cooperator can do this
222
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without at the same time providing formation in conscience - that is, providing
value-laden information.

When all of its complexity is taken into account, the

exercise of conscience remains a practical judgment of both intellect and will - not
of will alone. It would not seem reasonable to encourage greater liberty in choosing
without at the same time providing for more informed choosing.
Gleeson rightly argues that moral acts and moral objects must be adequately
described, and that the actions of a hospital must be distinguished from the
subsequent (presumably immoral) actions of a patient. But there are some curious
inconsistencies as well. For example, he argues (after G E M Anscombe) that if an
‘intrinsic evil’ like ‘mutilation’ may be justified in exceptional circumstances (such
as life-saving amputation), perhaps an intrinsic evil like ‘sterilisation’ may be
justified in some circumstances.227 But he also claims to stand with St Thomas on
the ground that ‘sound moral reasoning grasps a distinction here between two kinds
of action in genere moris; it does not recognise the same action kind realised in
different circumstances’.228

Now if ‘mutilation’ is indeed intrinsically evil, and

‘amputation’ in Anscombe’s case is clearly a good, then it is clear that ‘amputation’
in this case cannot be adequately described as ‘mutilation’ at all.
Gleeson also wishes to assess the question of cooperation per se and not
whether the specific actions in question (semen collection, contraceptive sterilisation,
and so on) are in fact evil - yet he proceeds to ask whether Catholic institutions can
diverge from official teaching based on claims of ‘liberty in disputed questions’ and
‘the possibility of dissent from non-definitive Church teaching’.229 It is difficult to
interpret these other than as questioning the actual moral status of the actions in
question.
These apparent difficulties do not detract from Gleeson’s contribution in
clarifying the principle of cooperation.

Of particular value is his view of

cooperation as a harm-minimisation strategy in the face of inevitable evil, and his
227
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insistence that appropriate assessments of cooperation cannot be ‘pre-packaged’ but
must proceed from prudent deliberation on concrete circumstances in individual
cases.

4.2.4

Conclusions

In general terms the traditional categories of cooperation seem to have been
retained by most modern moralists, although there is some divergence over the exact
meaning of some categories, in particular ‘duress’ and ‘immediate material
cooperation’.

These more or less traditional concepts help to make the complex

question of cooperation in evil somewhat more manageable, even if they do not
necessarily make it easier to arrive at clear and uncontroverted solutions to difficult
cases.
But while this link with the tradition has been maintained, there have also
been some noticeable emerging trends in recent theological opinion on cooperation.
First, there is general acceptance of the reality of existential moral conflict.
Even if it is true (as some believe) that moral conflicts have no objective basis, it is
undeniable that they are experienced as real challenges in moral decision-making.
As Keenan and Gleeson might have it, the principle of cooperation provides
guidance in minimising moral tragedy.
Second, in this period of renewal many aspects of moral theology are under
review, and there is not yet a common vision of the nature and structure of legitimate
cooperation.

In general terms the Europeans have sought to understand it in an

‘interpersonal’ or ‘relational’ sense: human beings are bound by the moral law on
one hand, and at least partially conditioned by a pluralist democratic society on the
other. In this light cooperation is less a question of discrete moral actions and more
a matter of expressing and constructing one’s moral identity in a social environment
of often-conflicting moral values.
229
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‘person-centred’ approach to cooperation seems to be in keeping with the Vatican
Council’s agenda for renewal in moral theology.
Despite a few tentative moves in the same direction, however, the Americans
have generally continued to work out of the traditional categories based in an
essentialist metaphysics:

cooperation is still predominantly a question of the

morality of discrete actions.

One result of this (following the 1994 ERD) was the

extended dialogue over the nature and function of ‘duress’ and the moral status of
‘immediate material cooperation’. Furthermore, because Curran’s point on ‘respect
for consciences’ has been argued on the same metaphysical basis, there seems to
have been little exploration of other potentially significant aspects of his basic
insight. It may be fruitful, for example, to ask a question in public ethics: whether
and to what extent a Christian person may cooperate with evil-doers in order to build
a more moral society overall.
Third, and despite these different interpretations of the structure of
cooperation, there seems to be universal recognition that assessment of cooperation
requires close attention to the context and circumstances of each case, and that
conclusions reached in one context will not automatically apply in others.

For

example, some moral problems arise from laws specific to a particular context (such
as Italy’s Law 194), and often the most obvious solution is simply to amend those
laws.

In the case of pre-natal testing, cooperation will be more or less justifiable

depending on whether the testing is connected per se or per accidens to the
outcomes; of particular significance are the individual mother’s professed intentions
in the event that she receives an unfavourable diagnosis.

It is only by paying due

attention to context and circumstances in each particular case that one can
accurately assess the morality of cooperation.
Ongoing debate on these and other matters highlight on one hand the
essential complexity of the problem of cooperation and, on the other, the differing
moral stances of those who engage in dialogue.

It has been suggested that, in the

case of cooperation by individual moral agents, these different stances may represent
different points on the spectrum between the ‘moral purity’ and ‘moral tragedy’
240

positions. In the case of cooperation by institutional moral agents, differing moral
stances may also arise from differing ecclesiologies. This is a subject for the final
chapter of the present work. First, however, it is necessary to examine more closely
the specific question of institutional cooperation, and to draw some general
conclusions on the status of the principle in moral theology today.
4.3

Institutional Cooperation
In a controversial 1995 article Germain Grisez posed the question, ‘How far

may Catholic hospitals cooperate with non-Catholic providers?’230

Having

provoked considerable correspondence, Grisez in 1998 published a ‘revised, final
version’ in which he redefined the question in terms of cooperation with ‘providers
of immoral services’.231 This final response, and the case study which prompted it,
offers a framework for surveying some aspects of institutional cooperation.
The case concerns a religious institute of women who operate a number of
Catholic hospitals.

Several factors now place them under pressure to recast their

ministry: ever-increasing complexity in delivering health care; the need to eliminate
unnecessary duplications and so contain escalating costs;

the demands of

governments and health insurers who would impose restrictions on benefits payable
(and therefore dictate which medical procedures are economically viable to offer);
and resistance to the US Bishops’ 1995 Ethical and Religious Directives.

Their

dilemma, in short, is either to enter ‘mutually agreeable cooperative relationships
with those who do not share our faith and ethical views’, or to close their hospitals
altogether.232
An adequate study of this case would require substantial analysis of both its
specific details and its wider context, in particular the crisis facing health care in the
USA at the end of the twentieth century. For example, from his experience as pastor
Cardinal Joseph Bernardin noted four contemporary challenges to the Catholic health
230
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care apostolate in America:233

declining numbers among the religious who

traditionally operate hospitals, and the consequent challenge to maintain the Catholic
identity of these institutions; the problem of coordinating national Catholic health
systems with the structures and needs of local churches; the ‘commodification’ of
health care, which exposes it to typical market imperatives of lower costs, greater
efficiency and higher profits; and the general right to health care, and the Church’s
public role in advocating on behalf of ‘the unserved and the unborn, the uninsured
and the undocumented’.234 Many of these issues are critical in their own right but
stand outside the scope of the present observations, which attempt only to outline
some issues in the assessment of institutional cooperation.

4.3.1

Institutions as Moral Agents

The first issue is provenance, and it may be raised in the form of several
questions: are institutions as such moral agents? Are they moral agents in the same
way that individuals are moral agents? How do institutions as moral agents differ
from individual moral agents?

What are the implications for institutional

cooperation?
James F Keenan argues that the Vatican’s long-running system of concordats
and its involvement with international agencies such as the United Nations
Organisation are examples of cooperation by an institution (the Vatican itself) rather
than by any particular individual moral agent.235 On the other hand, while Germain
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Grisez accepts that institutions as such can cooperate in evil, he holds that a different
logic applies:
Moreover, other things being equal, a Catholic institution’s material
cooperation is much more likely to be scandalous than an individual
Catholic’s.
The institution’s acts are presumed to be fully
deliberate and free, not the product of ignorance or weakness, as an
individual’s might be.
And since the institution claims to be
distinguished from others by being Catholic, whatever it does is
taken by many non-Catholics and even unsophisticated Catholics to
be the Church’s own act.236
Here Grisez touches on three major issues, each of which casts some light on
the question of institutional cooperation.
• First, the issue of scandal: as the CDF itself teaches in its Replies to Questions, an
individual physician may cooperate materially in evil by prescribing
contraceptives under certain circumstances, but it would damage public morality
if a Catholic institution were to be seen to contradict Church teaching by
establishing a general policy of material cooperation in evil.237 This suggests that
whatever their objective nature, institutional acts will be, and must be, interpreted
differently from individual acts.
• Second, the issue of moral deliberation.

An individual moral agent makes an

assessment of the legitimacy of cooperation knowing that he alone is responsible
to make the final decision to cooperate or not, and so he alone will bear the
immediate consequences of that decision. (Note that this is true regardless of any
duress which may influence the decision.) Grisez holds that a hospital’s acts ‘are
presumed to be fully deliberate’ precisely because its actions are governed either
by general policy or by particular management decision. Furthermore, as Grisez
argues, a board of management is employed precisely so that the burden of
decision-making will not fall on any one frail moral agent who would be more
prone to ‘ignorance or weakness’.

But regardless of which individuals make

commitments on behalf of the institution, the consequences of their actions are
borne by a much wider constituency: it is not only the board of management, or
the chief executive officer, but the institution as a whole, and all of its employees,
236
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and even the Church itself which must bear the consequences.

The reason for

this emerges in Grisez’s next point.
• Third, the issue of the meaning of institutional acts.

Grisez argues that an

institution is ‘a community whose corporate identity and character depend on the
people who make it up’.238

This opens up the prospect of two identities: one

based in the formal institutional structure and expressing itself in institutional
policies and actions, and the other grounded in the particular material actions of
individuals who work in and for the institution. Ideally, of course, there will be
complete harmony between these two identities, but there remains the possibility
of contradiction.239 Now just as the actions of employees can be identified with
those of the employing institution, so the actions of a Catholic institution can be
identified with those of the Church. And this identification is more than a matter
of subjective interpretation: a hospital ‘acts’ primarily through the actions of its
medical and administrative staff, so the actions of these employees are the actions
of the hospital; likewise if the Church can be said to ‘act’ in health care in and
through Catholic hospitals, then the actions of a Catholic hospital - including
actions of employees - are in some sense the actions of the Church.240 Indeed,
representatives of Catholic health care institutions often emphasise that their
ministry ‘continues in our day an essential part of Jesus’s own ministry’.241
So are institutions as such moral agents? It seems so, or at least they behave
like moral agents in many respects.

Are they moral agents in the same way that

individuals are moral agents? Apparently not. In their manner of reaching moral
decisions and in the meaning of those decisions an institution is subject to a different
inner logic - and so, perhaps, to different rules of procedure. How do they differ
238
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from individual moral agents?

The moral actions of institutions are not only

interpreted by others as though they were the actions of the Church itself (which is
why they can give scandal): in a real sense they are the actions of the Church.
Many Catholic institutions rightly and proudly claim to act in the name of the
Catholic community, and so extend into our day the very ministry of Christ, but this
wider moral import also demands of an institution a different kind of responsibility
for its actions.
Finally, what are the implications for institutional cooperation?

In general

terms, precisely because their decision-making structures and ecclesial roles differ
from those of individual moral agents, institutions would not normally be expected to
be open to the same subjective influences as individual moral agents.

It may be

asking too much of an individual person to possess a sufficient knowledge of ethics,
law, business, and economics, as well as sufficient poise and prudence to guide every
assessment of complex cases of cooperation. But a major corporate institution such
as a Catholic hospital could reasonably be expected to have access to precisely such
expertise and virtue, and to make considerable use of them in assessing its
institutional commitments.

Whether or not its acts are always as ‘fully deliberate

and free’ as Grisez claims, the institution’s corporate structure, its decision-making
processes, its access to greater resources, and the ecclesial significance of its actions
all seem to place it in a class apart from the individual moral agent.

4.3.2

Duress and Immediate Material Cooperation

The US Bishops’ 1994 ERD attracted the attention of the Congregation of the
Doctrine of the Faith, particularly on the questions of duress and immediate material
cooperation.242

These are complex issues because they encompass a number of

variables, including the ways in which duress might function, the question of
intrinsically evil acts, and the differences between individual and institutional
cooperation. The following comments may help to clarify some of this complexity.
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Grisez, ‘In Answer to Critics’, 60.
See this chapter, footnote 143.
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As noted above, duress may alter the moral species of some cooperative acts,
and/or it may restrict the cooperator’s autonomy and thereby reduce his
culpability.243

In order to alter the moral species, duress must so touch the moral

object of the cooperative act that it cannot be considered an act in the same moral
species as that of the principal agent.

For example, Davis’s cooperator is not

cooperating in theft so much as preserving his own life: duress means that he
confronts a different (and greater) evil than the mere theft of property - loss of his
own life - and this constitutes a different moral object. So this particular physical
act of ‘helping a burglar place stolen jewels in his wallet’ has a different moral
meaning: it doesn’t mean ‘theft’, but ‘preservation of his life’.
But when cooperation is immediate and the principal agent’s action is
intrinsically evil, duress cannot function in this way.

Because the cooperation is

immediate, the cooperator’s act has, prima facie, the same moral object as the
principal agent’s act; and this can never be a legitimate object of moral choice
because it is of its nature ‘incapable of being ordered to God’. As argued earlier, if
duress can provide a distinct and legitimate moral object, then immediate material
cooperation in an intrinsically evil act may be justified on the grounds of being
preferable as a ‘lesser evil’. But an intrinsic evil can never be preferable as a lesser
evil - hence Alphonsus taught that in order to save one’s own life one may assist a
thief, but one may never cooperate in killing the innocent.244 Now, if there can be
no legitimate immediate material cooperation in an intrinsic evil, then the ERD’s
cannot be interpreted as allowing such cooperation if ‘allow’ implies that immediate
material cooperation in intrinsically evil acts is objectively justified.
But it has also been suggested that duress can function in a second way: it can
diminish the cooperator’s culpability.
Responding to Keenan’s discussion of immediate material cooperation in the
1994 ERD, Kevin O’Rourke OP writes:
The prohibition concerning immediate material cooperation in
actions which are intrinsically evil applies even if duress is present.
243
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See 4.2.2.2 above.
Alphonsus, de caritate 66.
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. . . Thus, it is erroneous to interpret the Appendix of the ERD in
such a way as to allow immediate material cooperation with actions
which are intrinsically evil. . . . If duress were to impair all
freedom, then it might remove subjective culpability, but it would
not change the objective nature of an act which is intrinsically
evil.245
There is a distinction between objective and subjective morality which must
be maintained, and this is apparent even in the critical text of Veritatis splendor 81:
‘If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can
diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it.’

If intrinsically evil acts remain

intrinsically evil (that is, their objective morality remains unaffected), how else can a
good intention or particular circumstances ‘diminish their evil’ except by affecting
their subjective morality - that is, by diminishing personal culpability? Even if the
ERD’s cannot objectively ‘allow’ immediate material cooperation in intrinsically
evil acts, yet one may agree with O’Rourke that, subjectively, immediate material
cooperation in intrinsically evil acts may at times be excusable.
The focus of this discussion is ‘intrinsically evil acts’.

One complicating

element in the dialogue with the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith seems to
have been precisely the objective status of ‘direct sterilisation’ and, consequently,
the morality of cooperation in sterilisation.

Neither the US Bishops nor the

Canadian Bishops doubt that abortion and euthanasia are intrinsic evils, but in their
2000 Guide the Canadian Bishops seem to hold open a possibility of cooperation in
direct sterilisation.246

However the CDF has proposed that ‘[t]he principles

governing cooperation cannot justify Catholic health care institutions’ engaging in
immediate material cooperation in intrinsically evil actions such as abortion, direct
sterilisation, and euthanasia’.247

This would seem to settle the moral status of

contraceptive sterilisation.
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O’Rourke, ‘A Brief Response to Father Keenan’, 4. Emphasis added.
CHAC 2000 Guide, Article 52: ‘Concerning the conditions of material cooperation regarding
sterilisation procedures, one should consult the values and principles in the Introduction.’
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This is the CDF’s proposed new Directive 70: see ‘ERD Text Revisions (September 8, 2000)’
included in Rev Michael D Place’s memorandum of 26 September 2000. Full citation given in
footnote 143 above.
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But even accepting the objective status of direct sterilisation and the fact that
duress cannot strictly justify immediate material cooperation in an intrinsically evil
act, may a hospital sometimes be excused if it opts for immediate material
cooperation in direct sterilisation rather than (say) complete loss of obstetric
services?

Even if duress cannot provide a Catholic institution with a legitimate

moral object and so strictly ‘justify’ immediate material cooperation in direct
sterilisation, can duress ‘excuse’ such cooperation by an institution in the same way
that it sometimes seems to ‘excuse’ cooperation by individual moral agents?
An answer might be sought by exploring the manner in which duress affects
individual culpability, and in the difference between individual and institutional
moral agents.
One aspect of duress which has not been sufficiently canvassed is its
character as an ‘inner conflict’: duress or constraint has to be experienced as a
conflict if it is to influence the behaviour of a cooperator.

Duress can be said to

exist when extreme circumstances cause a cooperator to experience a number of
‘pressures’, some pushing in one direction and others pulling in other directions.
Often these ‘pressures’ will be experienced when a moral agent sees the need to
protect simultaneously several apparently comparable goods (or to avoid
simultaneously several apparently comparable evils). There is a choice to be made,
as a result of which some goods must be sacrificed (or some evils brought about). In
Davis’s case, for example, the cooperator experiences a conflict between the need
not to assist the burglar, and the need to preserve his own life.

In the case of

immediate material cooperation, of course, the moral agent does not merely ‘endure’
the loss of goods or the effecting of evils - he actively participates in bringing them
about.

It is the combined, compounded and opposing effects of these ‘pressures’

which causes ‘inner conflict’ and effectively constitutes ‘duress’.
In some circumstances then, as O’Rourke suggests, ‘duress’ might be
considered to approximate ‘force’ or ‘fear’ in the traditional terminology.

These

restrict an individual agent’s moral freedom by limiting his legitimate options for
action (in the case of force) or by compromising free exercise of the will (in the case
248

of fear).

As always, the final moral judgment is prudential - an exercise of that

practical wisdom which ‘transforms moral truth into specific virtuous action’.248
The traditional moral wisdom has it that because force and fear affect the agent’s
ability to perceive moral truth and/or to act in accordance with it, the agent’s
culpability may be diminished, even to the point of complete exoneration.249
As a more difficult example: an individual moral agent may believe his
moral choices are reduced to ‘cooperate in this abortion or die’.

Moralists have

long held that immediate material cooperation is excusable if it is commissioned
under threat of a harm greater than that threatening the third party.250 The reasoning
is plain: the ‘threat of greater harm’ will often provide the cooperator with a
legitimate moral object.

The problem in the present example is that the harm

threatening the cooperator (death) is equal to the harm threatening the unborn child.
Objectively, then, immediate material cooperation in abortion is not strictly justified;
but subjectively, to the extent that fear clouds perception and sways the will, this
individual agent’s culpability may be reduced.
But for several reasons it does not seem reasonable to suggest that duress can
operate in the same way in the case of an institutional moral agent. First, as noted
above, an institution’s structures and processes of moral deliberation are
considerably different from those of an individual agent, and institutions are not
normally expected to be as prone to unanticipated external pressure.

Indeed,

corporate management structures are usually designed precisely to ensure that even
the most difficult decisions will be made reasonably and responsibly. Second, it is
difficult to imagine what magnitude of pressure could be brought to bear on an
institution that would compare with the threat of death to an individual cooperator.
The threat of annihilation may sometimes presents the individual cooperator with a
distinct moral object, but what duress could threaten an institution’s existence as
completely as death threatens that of an individual person?

Third, a Catholic
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Romanus Cessario OP, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics. (Notre Dame, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1991) 80. At 86 Cessario explains that prudential judgment
involves the special virtues of synesis (which ‘ensures sound judgment in ordinary matters’) and
gnome (which ‘provides the wit to judge the exceptional cases’). Making a moral choice under duress
probably requires the latter more than the former - see 5.1.6 below.
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See for example Davis, vol. I, 19-20 (violence) and 27-30 (fear).
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institution should always be aware that its actions are, in some way, not just its own
but also actions of the Church.

Therefore, especially in the case of institutional

moral agents, the CDF indicates that ‘it is not admissible that a way of acting
contradict the objective teaching of the Church itself’,251 for that would amount to
radical self-contradiction.
Even in the presence of duress, then, it seems that a Catholic institution’s
immediate material cooperation in an intrinsically evil act can never be either
objectively justifiable or subjectively excusable.

4.3.3

The Context of Institutional Cooperation

Since institutions often have quite unique management structures, and since
possibilities for cooperation vary according to circumstances particular to each
context, there are an almost infinite number of ‘cooperative relationship’ structures
which can be devised between a Catholic institution and other institutions or
individuals.

In the context of corporate structures in the USA, the present case

suggests four possibilities:
(1) simple contractual arrangements with other hospitals, diagnostic
facilities, individual physicians, and so forth; (2) integrated
delivery networks, that is, broad affiliations with other institutions
and providers to deliver the complete spectrum of health care in a
particular locality;
(3) cosponsored health maintenance
organisations or similar deliverers of health care to certain groups
of insured people; and (4) arrangements assuming responsibility
for a purchased portion of the practices of a group of physicians
and/or other providers who, at the same time, will remain free to
offer the same or other clientele services in which we feel we
cannot participate.252
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See for example Aertnys-Damen, de restitutione, 783.
Replies, V. See 3.2.2 above.
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Grisez, ‘In Answer to Critics’, 60-61. There are many other possible cooperative
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Progress.’ America (28 September 1996) 16-21; Peter J Cataldo notes at least six in ‘Models of
Health Care Collaboration.’ Ethics & Medics 23:12(1998) 3-4; and four detailed case studies are
offered in Carol S Weisman et al., ‘The Implications of Affiliations Between Catholic and NonCatholic Health Care Organisations for Availability of Reproductive Health Services.’ Women’s
Health Issues 9 (May-June 1999) 121-134.
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As with individual cooperation, assessment of institutional cooperation
requires careful attention to the precise details of each case. Some health-service
problems will be specific to the American context alone: its health insurance system,
its laws regulating companies and corporations, and the particular challenges of
public health provision in that country create a unique environment for the
structuring of cooperative ventures, so some corporate solutions may be possible
there but not elsewhere.253

An arrangement which constitutes legitimate material

cooperation in one situation may not be morally acceptable in another.254

Each

social, cultural, political or industrial context will pose its own challenges and offer
its own range of possible solutions. Circumstances which obtain in one country, or
even in one region of a country, may pose quite unique challenges but also suggest
quite unique solutions. And when circumstances change, solutions change. In the
case of the Diocese of Peoria cited above, for example, limited material cooperation
in contraception was deemed acceptable because of a lack of suitably trained
physicians, but that cooperation will no longer be morally acceptable when
appropriate staff become available.255

Different circumstances and different

contexts call for different solutions.
There is a certain universality, however, in the forces driving the trend
toward cooperative ventures.

Among these are a common underlying economic

philosophy and a changing vision of health care.
A third challenge involves the new cutbacks in public funding and
aggressive cost containment by both public and private health care
purchasers. This fiscal crisis has led to less financial solvency for
health care institutions and sharply reduced the historic cost sharing
by which health providers subsidised uncompensated care. Within
this fiscal environment, Catholic hospitals are less and less able to
oppose the prevailing trends and maintain a commitment to the
sponsor’s values, such as providing health care to the poor and the
uninsured.256
253

For example, in the USA the Catholic health care system has become a ‘safety net’ for those
who do not hold health insurance - see Bernardin, ‘Crossroads’, 410; ‘Not-for-Profit Health Care’,
538. In Australia, on the other hand, the national Medicare system has taken much of the ‘safety net’
role from the shoulders of Catholic health care providers.
254
Hence the position attributed to William Daniel SJ: ‘Once you permit material cooperation in
principle, it is then simply a matter of what the local situation will tolerate in practice.’ Cited by Fr
Michael Prieur in personal correspondence with the author, 29 June 2000.
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See above, 4.2.2.4. The case is cited in Lawler, ‘Playing in Peoria.’
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Bernardin, ‘Crossroads’, 410, speaking from the American experience. For parallel
observations made in Australia (on the question of religious bodies accepting government contracts to
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A Catholic hospital is an historical entity founded by particular individuals
and operating according to a particular vision or charism, in order to meet specific
health-related goals. The history and guiding vision of an institution give it a certain
identity and dictate particular institutional traditions, values and modes of operation
which further define the institution.

These institutional elements are distinct from

other values or modes of operation which individuals within the institution may
implement from time to time.257 If a Catholic hospital enters a cooperative venture
which renders it less able (or even eventually unable) to maintain its commitment to
the values underpinning Catholic health care in general and its own charism in
particular, then its very identity becomes problematic. This is a universal challenge
for Catholic institutions considering cooperative ventures.
No committed Catholic health care provider wants to dilute or
surrender institutional Catholic identity by way of accommodation
to unacceptable realities (moral or cultural) in partnerships that
might assure institutional survival. The objective is to survive as
Catholic through acceptable partnerships. And the principle of
mediate material cooperation is there to make some less-thanperfect partnerships acceptable.258
Thus, for example, in 1996 the National Coalition of Catholic Health Care
Ministry in the USA issued a ‘strong public statement regarding partnership
arrangements’:
We believe that ownership arrangements between Catholic Health
ministry organisations and publicly traded, investor-owned hospital
chains compromise the church’s mission to an unacceptable degree.
The primary motivation of publicly traded, investor-owned hospital
chains is to provide a return to shareholders. The first commitment
of our ministry is to render service to all in the name of Jesus.259

provide welfare services) see Samuel Gregg, ‘Playing with Fire: Churches, Welfare Services and
Government Contracts.’ Issue Analysis 14 (14 August 2000) 1-8. It could be suggested that
something similar applies to Catholic hospitals in Australia which accept government funds either
through Medicare, or as grants or loans for capital works.
257
On this insight, see Stanley Joel Reiser, ‘The Ethical Life of Health Care Organisations’, 32:
‘The traditions of an organisation set it apart from the individuals who work in and direct it. The
accumulation of traditions as ways of doing things constructs the identity of the organisation.’
258
Byron, ‘Catholic Health Care’, 21.
259
Cited in Maryanna Coyle sc, ‘The Future of Catholic Hospitals.’ Chicago Studies 35(1996)
249-259, at 252.

252

4.3.4

Cooperation and Institutional Identity: Three ‘Principles’

The heart of the problem is the risk that ‘Catholic hospitals that avoid all
wrongful cooperation and maintain their identity may not be economically viable’.260
For Germain Grisez, institutional cooperation could only be lawful if two conditions
are met: the choice to cooperate must not only exclude the wider evil effects of the
principal agent’s action, but it must also be a positive obligation flowing from the
institution’s basic ‘vocational commitment’

-

in other words, its identity and

mission.261 The first condition means that if the materially cooperative institutional
act is not strictly justified in itself then it can never be excused - and it has been
noted that the circumstance of ‘duress’ cannot strictly justify an institution’s
immediate material cooperation in an intrinsically evil act.

The second condition

means that if a proposed action jeopardises the institution’s identity and mission,
then that action cannot be morally justified.
In what ways can a cooperative action jeopardise institutional identity?
First, there is the public or existential character of the action which can pose the risk
of scandal in the strict sense.

Insofar as they express its particular charism and

traditions, institutional actions express an institution’s identity. Hence institutional
actions can easily give scandal if they publicly contradict the Catholic identity of the
institution itself.

Second there is the constitutive or ontological character of the

action. Grisez holds that free and deliberate actions constitute identity,262 so actions
which contradict that identity are morally unjustified even if they are not, and are in
no danger of becoming, scandalous in the strict sense. This sheds light on his view
that a Catholic hospital’s ‘vocational commitment’ could never make legitimate any
kind of cooperation in intrinsically evil actions such as abortion or sterilisation. It
would not matter whether this cooperation became public knowledge or not: in
Grisez’s view, cooperation in such intrinsic evils would be so contradictory of the
260

Grisez, ‘In Answer to Critics’, 62.
DMQ, 882: ‘By the same token, if something must be done to fulfil a responsibility flowing
from a vocational commitment, there is a stronger reason to accept bad side effects in doing it than if
one could forego the activity without slighting such responsibility.’ See above, 3.1.4.2.
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CMP, 55-58.
This accords with Reiser’s insight (‘The Ethical Life of Health Care
Organisations’, 32) that because they are historical entities, institutions such as Catholic hospitals
must not only remain faithful to their original charism but must simultaneously adapt to contemporary
health care needs.
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institution’s own identity that it would be preferable to close the hospital altogether
and seek other ways to carry on Jesus’ ministry of mercy.263
Often a hospital will have no influence whatever over external pressure
which is brought to bear upon it, yet it can and must exercise great care in discerning
an appropriate response or ‘resistance’ to this pressure. As noted, it is the combined
opposing effects of pressure and resistance which may constitute ‘duress’.

For

example, a Catholic hospital might experience an external financial pressure to enter
a dubious cooperative relationship purely in order to survive as an institution, and a
resisting internal pressure to retain its identity as ‘Catholic’. Several points become
obvious.
First, this could be portrayed either as a clash of identities (plural):
‘corporate’ versus ‘Catholic’; or as a conflict between different aspects of a single
identity: ‘Catholic corporation’.

In either case the choice may come down to a

preference for one identity (or aspect) over another: where a hospital’s identity as a
corporate body might prompt it to enter any financially beneficial venture, its
identity as Catholic will prompt it to avoid any ventures which contradict or diminish
its Christian integrity.

The clash of corporate and ecclesial identities is familiar

ground for many Church-sponsored institutions. Since it seems impossible for any
institution to honour only one aspect of its identity in isolation from other aspects of
263
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mercy (‘In Answer to Critics’, 63). But his view of the significance of this mission is quite narrow:
he claims that since ‘Jesus’s principal intention in healing people was to provide signs and foretastes
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‘does not carry on an essential part of Jesus’s ministry’ (‘In Answer to Critics’, 62). But he seems to
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Second, Grisez holds that ‘doing God’s will and entirely avoiding wrongdoing are at the heart of
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it, one general ‘principle’ for cooperative ventures might be: ‘A Catholic institution
should always give priority to uniquely constitutive aspects of its identity or mission’
- that is, to those aspects of its identity which define it and which set it apart from
other similar institutions.
Second, when facing a range of possible cooperative relationships, a Catholic
hospital quickly realises that some collaborative options will better permit it to
preserve its Catholic identity, but other options will make that identity more difficult
to maintain. A second general ‘principle’ for cooperative ventures, therefore, might
be: ‘A Catholic institution should always give priority to collaborative options
which allow it to express more authentically its unique identity’.
Third, as Keenan suggests, the challenge of legitimate cooperation sometimes
presents itself as a need to protect an important good or value.264 In the Peoria case,
for example, cooperation in evil was reluctantly approved (at least temporarily) in
order to maintain significant health services in a large rural community.265
Provision of health services to that community had been a core element in the
hospital’s identity for over a century.

Another general principle for cooperative

ventures, then, might be: ‘In particular instances of institutional cooperation, a
‘good to be protected’ will carry greater weight the more closely it expresses or
flows from uniquely constitutive aspects of an institution’s identity or mission.’ 266

4.3.5

Institutional Cooperation: Some Conclusions

The present work does not pretend to offer a comprehensive or conclusive
study of the very complex question of institutional cooperation.

The following

observations not only highlight this complexity but also indicate some avenues for
future research.

They are intended to summarise some of the main points of the

constrained, at times and on individual occasions and for proportionately grave reasons, to cooperate
mediately and materially with others who are doing evil. See 3.2.2 above.
264
See Keenan, ‘Institutional Cooperation’, 59.
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Lawler, ‘Playing in Peoria’, 40.
266
Further reflection on the challenge of institutional cooperation will undoubtedly prompt other
‘guiding principles’ to emerge. Because they relate institutional action to institutional identity,
however, these three ‘principles’ seem very relevant to the specific question of cooperation by
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present study, and to open the way for the final chapter which will explore a
theological ‘background’ or context for institutional cooperation.
In the first place, as has been noted repeatedly, accurate assessment of
institutional cooperation requires that close attention be paid to the concrete
structures and contexts of each case.

Tettamanzi has highlighted the need to take

careful account of the social and legal environment in which an instance of
cooperation occurs; Keenan, Grisez and Gleeson have argued for similar vigilance
regarding the precise structures of cooperative arrangements.
The structure and functioning of institutions reveal that they, like individual
moral agents, are essentially social and relational in character.

Institutions do not

exist apart from one another any more than human beings exist in isolation; rather,
each lives and works in conjunction with others.

This parallel suggests that (a)

adequate approaches to institutional cooperation must take account of the essentially
‘intersubjective’ nature of each institution, and (b) there may be multiple concurrent
duties to be ‘factored in’ to the assessment of cooperation.

For example, an

individual may have duties arising from familial bonds on one hand, and professional
duties on the other. Similarly, as a corporation a Catholic hospital may be bound by
contract to other health-care institutions, while as Catholic it is bound to the Church
as a whole.
It is the relational nature of institutions which raises the possibility of
conflicting duties. By virtue of receiving public funding (relationship with secular
authority) a Catholic hospital may be bound to provide a full range of obstetric and
gynaecological services, but by virtue of its religious identity (relationship with
Church) it would be expected not to provide services judged to be immoral - such
as abortion and contraceptive sterilisation.

These opposing pressures may

sometimes create a kind of duress, the goods at stake being (a) the institution’s
continued existence as a hospital, and (b) its Catholic identity. However this

Catholic institutions: as the following Chapter will explain, they refer the meaning of institutional
actions to the sacramental structure of the Church itself.
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conflict might be resolved in practice, it is clear that no accurate evaluation of
options can be made until all institutional duties are taken into account.
This focus on the ‘inner structure’ of the moral agent - which, in the case of
an individual, would be an aspect of ‘personalism’ - is a sign that analysis of
material cooperation since Vatican II has moved beyond the traditional metaphysics
of the human act. As the Council called for greater openness to others in a mutual
search for truth267
person,268

and for a clearer appreciation of the nature of the human

so the efforts of moral theologians to understand the complexity of

cooperation in evil have prompted them to expand the horizon of their inquiries.
Increasingly today the question of cooperation in evil is framed in terms of respect
for the dignity of the human person, the essentially social and relational nature of the
moral agent, both the ontological and existential meanings of moral acts, and the role
of Christian persons and institutions in a pluralist and continually evolving world.
The present work will add a ‘theological’ reading of legitimate cooperation to this
spectrum.
On one hand the traditional metaphysics cannot be abandoned, because it
provides a useful framework within which to consider these complexities.

But on

the other hand questions of cooperation cannot be resolved by a merely ‘geometric’
application of metaphysical principles without reference to the ‘person’ of the
cooperator. In many respects analysis of material cooperation represents a frontier
for modern moral theology, a challenge to move forward in the spirit of Vatican II
while preserving the richness and wisdom of the tradition.
In this sense the question of cooperation in evil is something of a ‘boundary’
question in which the objective and subjective aspects of morality sometimes seem to
lose their sharp edges and ‘blur’ into one another.

It has been seen this way from

the beginning: Sanchez’s distinction of direct and indirect cooperation, and
Alphonsus’s distinction of formal and material cooperation, represent efforts to
‘untangle’ the objectively evil from the subjectively imputable. Recent discussions
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concerning ‘duress’ have the same aim: at times ‘duress’ seems to alter the moral
species of acts (their objective morality), at other times it seems to excuse the
cooperator’s collaboration (subjective morality) - and sometimes it seems to do
both, and often it does neither. Keenan’s insight that the principle is to be applied
taxonomically is a function of the same complexity: reliable use of the principle
rests ultimately not simply on a mechanical application of objective metaphysics, but
on one’s subjective exercise of that prudence which is both a natural and
supernatural virtue.
In any event it may sometimes be virtually impossible for a moral agent to
provide a logical and completely satisfying explanation of why a particular act is, in
his prudent judgment, morally justified.

Metaphysical distinctions can help, and

have indeed proven to be an essential tool in analysing paradigm cases, but a truly
‘complete’ grasp of one’s actions may lie more in the realm of ‘moral sense’ ‘connatural knowledge’, perhaps - than in any surgical dissection of intentions and
circumstances. In the following chapter it will be suggested that conceptual moral
knowledge is often consequent upon, and not prior to, one’s inner, non-discursive
conviction that one is simply ‘called’ to act in a particular way.

But faith seeks

understanding, and being essentially relational, the human person must enter into
dialogue with others;

therefore moral theology is driven to provide, as far as

possible, conceptual explanations of the nature and boundaries of cooperation in evil.
Some moralists have argued that an institution’s identity may not only
impose limits on cooperation (for example, for fear of giving scandal) but may
sometimes impose a positive duty to cooperate. On these grounds Keenan offers an
argument for the involvement of Catholic institutions in in vitro fertilisation
research, and a case study on permitting occasional sterilisations in a Catholic
hospital if the alternative would deprive a community of its only obstetrics
services.269

Whether or not these positions are objectively defensible, it might be

argued that they represent an emerging new attitude toward cooperation in evil.
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Keenan, ‘Institutional Cooperation’, 64-65 and 71-73 respectively.
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Two attitudes have already been noted: the ‘rigorist’ who would avoid all
cooperation as far as physically possible, and the ‘possibilist’ who would allow
cooperation when this is morally difficult to avoid. This third attitude, which might
be termed the ‘essentialist’, would not merely permit cooperation in evil but actively
require it when cooperation is essential for an institution to fulfil its Catholic identity
and mission.

Keenan seems to argue that Catholic institutions may sometimes be

morally required to cooperate in evil.
General attitudes toward cooperation in evil more or less echo general
attitudes toward moral conflict.270 As noted, the rigorist rejects the very existence
of objective moral conflict and believes that the moral life consists primarily in
avoiding evil: for the rigorist the world is an environment marked by evil, to be
strenuously resisted in order to preserve personal moral purity.

But the possibilist

accepts that at least the experience of moral conflicts are real, and believes that
therefore the moral life sometimes involves ‘getting one’s hands dirty’.

He views

the world with something akin to resignation: whether one likes it or not, moral
tragedy happens, and material cooperation is regrettable but sometimes unavoidable.
The essentialist, on the other hand, accepts the world as the locus in which
the moral agent both expresses and constitutes his identity as a fundamentally
relational being.

For the Christian essentialist, the pluralist world is where one

‘works out’ one’s salvation. Existential moral conflicts do actually occur because of
the fallen nature of both the world and the moral agent.

In order to live a truly

human life at all one must enter into relationships with many other subjects, and
these inevitably include some who do evil. One’s particular mission or work in life
expresses one’s very identity and, in the moral life, faithfulness to one’s Christian
identity must be preserved over any purely abstract sense of ‘doing good and
avoiding evil’. In the concrete it may often be possible to fulfil one’s mission while
avoiding evil altogether, but sometimes it is precisely a sense of fidelity to oneself, to
one’s most basic identity and to one’s mission, which leads one to collaborate sometimes very closely - with others who do evil.
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In some cases this may be a

See 4.1.2.1 above.

259

cause for regret, but in other instances it is recognised as simply the most authentic
path of faithfulness to self and to God.
In its favour, the ‘essentialist’ position seems attuned to a certain
ambivalence toward the world which has marked Christian life from earliest times.271
The world provides the conditions which guarantee the Church’s continued existence
and flourishing, but it is clear that at times this same world conflicts with and
threatens to overcome the Church’s moral values.272 Vatican II recognised that this
ambivalence is not extraneous but is, as it were, ‘inscribed’ in the very ‘stuff’ of the
world. The Council’s ideal of religious liberty means that the Church can no longer
simply condemn those outside its walls, but must find a workable balance between
holding firmly to its own religious beliefs and defending the right of others to do the
same.

Even in moral matters the Church is engaged with others in a mutual and

reciprocal ‘search for truth and for the right solution to so many moral problems
which arise both in the life of individuals and from social relationships’.273
One may question whether the ‘essentialists’ have proved their case, and this
would certainly be fertile ground for further research. But in any event, those who
propose the essentialist position seem to have a point: immersed in a world in which
evil is frequently done, Catholic institutions are often challenged to maintain their
Catholic identity while working with others who do not share the same moral views,
and Catholic institutions sometimes do feel constrained by their sense of mission to
cooperate with others who do evil.

The final chapter will seek to develop a

theological background against which to view the relationship between an
institution’s Catholic identity and the challenge of cooperation in evil.

271

Both Saint John and Saint Paul exhibit elements of dualism toward the world: the Christian is
called to be in the world but not of the world, to be light in the surrounding darkness, to follow the
way of life rather than the way of death. See for example 1 John 2:15f; Philippians 2:15; Matthew
5:14; John 3:19-21.
272
Gaudium et spes, 44: ‘Whoever contributes to the development of the community of mankind
on the level of family, culture, economic and social life, and national and international politics,
according to the plan of God, is also contributing in no small way to the community of the Church
insofar as it depends on things outside itself. The Church itself also recognises that it has benefited
and is still benefiting from the opposition of its enemies and persecutors.’
273
Gaudium et spes, 16.
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Chapter Five
A THEOLOGICAL CONTEXT FOR INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION

5.0

Introduction
The principle of legitimate cooperation exists because a basic truth has been

perceived: on some occasions one is justified in cooperating with those who do evil,
while on other occasions cooperation is not justified.

A history of the principle

uncovers data which are significant not only for this particular moral insight, but also
for moral theology more generally.
The principle’s critical early phase of evolution (from Sanchez to Alphonsus)
saw a substantial clarification of fundamental concepts, in particular the significance
of moral causality: if a cooperator exercised no moral causality and held a
sufficiently serious reason to act, he could not be held responsible for the principal
agent’s evil deed.

In the second phase (embracing virtually the entire manual

tradition) the traditional metaphysics was employed in order to conceptualise and
explain this basic insight: a cooperator’s action may be legitimate if it has its own
legitimate moral object and is justified in the particular circumstances.
Paradoxically, the achievement of this second phase seems to have complicated the
agenda of the third phase (from Vatican II to the present day) which, without
sacrificing the benefits of the traditional analysis, seeks to ground an understanding
of legitimate cooperation in a broader theology of the Christian moral life.
It has been suggested that while the principle of material cooperation
achieved a certain analytical clarity, it was rarely able to deliver absolutely definitive
solutions in problematic situations.

This is typified by the concept of ‘sufficiently

serious reason’: every manualist knew the importance of holding a strong reason to
cooperate, but none was able to strictly define ‘sufficiently serious’ beyond listing
some of the variables to be considered.

The strength of one’s reason to cooperate

remains essentially a matter for individual assessment.
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The history of the principle on one hand and its inherent limitations on the
other prompt a number of observations on the nature of moral theology.
First, the principle of legitimate cooperation evolved because Christians,
conscious that good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided, needed to express
and explain a basic moral insight in a form suitable to guide moral deliberation.
The history of moral theology reveals that moral principles generally emerge
from careful comparison of similar cases and identification of common features.1
The critical first step, however, is recognition that morally right solutions have
already been reached, and this is grasped initially more by a non-conceptual ‘moral
sense’ or ‘fontal knowledge’ than by any strictly logical deduction.2

It is only

subsequently that comparison of similar cases identifies (that is, conceptualises and
names) distinctive common features which may become the terms of a principle.
Generally, then, a moral agent’s or moral community’s sense of moral rightness
precedes its ability to conceptualise and explain the reason for that rightness.
But both this initial ‘fontal knowledge’ and the subsequent analytical
reflection are conditioned to some extent by the world-view of the moral agent. On
one hand a moral community strives to reach a degree of certainty about moral
rightness which transcends subjective individual perceptions - what may be called
‘trans-subjective’ objectivity.3

But on the other hand, whether one refers to

individual moral agents or to entire moral communities, one’s vision of what here
and now is ‘to be done’ or ‘to be avoided’ depends on one’s moral world-view: that
is, on one’s sense of what is, or at least ought to be, morally achievable or avoidable.
As suggested earlier, this is a function of the moral agent’s fundamental stance in

1

See Keenan, ‘The Return of Casuistry’, especially at 134-139. Keenan makes ample use of
Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning.
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
2
For a developed reflection on the nature of moral knowledge, and the relationship between its
non-conceptual and conceptual aspects see Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, especially 4957.
3
Pinckaers, Sources, 65-66.
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regard to moral conflicts and their resolution:4 those who hold moral conflicts to be
inevitable and those who hold that moral conflicts are avoidable will hold different
views on what is morally permitted or required. It is not uncommon for both views,
and many others on the spectrum between them, to co-exist in a single moral
community.
Second, the history of the principle of legitimate cooperation demonstrates
that while the evolution of principles obtains for some moral terms the status of
objective definition (such as ‘intrinsically evil acts’), it also necessarily involves a
good deal of subjective interpretation (such as ‘what constitutes a sufficiently serious
reason’).

This helps to explain why, having been identified as critical in the early

stages of the evolution of the principle, these terms proved difficult to define with
precision.
As the limitations inherent in an ‘objective’ metaphysical approach to
morality have come into view, recent moral theology has developed a corresponding
appreciation of the role of human experience.

Central terms of the principle of

legitimate cooperation (such as ‘intrinsically evil acts’ and ‘sufficiently serious
reason’) demonstrate that both objective moral truth and subjective human
experience play essential roles in balanced moral deliberation.

On one hand, only

reflection on subjective human experience enables one to ‘put words to’ one’s nonconceptual moral knowledge; it is precisely this reflection which converts the ‘world
of immediacy’ into the ‘world mediated by meaning’.5

On the other hand moral

objectivity belongs as much to the latter world as to the former: for example, if moral

4

See above, 4.1.2.1. In the case of individual moral agents, another element shaping this worldview is the agent’s level of moral development or moral reasoning ability.
5
See Kenneth R Himes OFM, ‘The Contribution of Theology to Catholic Moral Theology’ in
Charles E Curran, ed. Moral Theology: Challenges for the Future. Essays in Honour of Richard A
McCormick SJ. (New York: Paulist, 1990) 48-73. At 56: ‘Objectivity in the world of meaning asks
of us to wed sense data with intelligence and reason. Thus, to obtain moral meaning it is insufficient
to rely upon the immediacy of sense data alone. Meaning comes to be in the encounter of the subject
with the object of the world of immediacy.
The criteria for an authentic encounter are the
transcendental precepts: Be attentive! Be intelligent! Be reasonable! Be responsible! . . . What is
being proposed is a more critical epistemological method that requires taking into account the role of
the subject in discovering the meaning of the objective order. This way of thinking about the matter
echoes Lonergan's idea that “objectivity is simply the consequence of authentic subjectivity.”’ The
reference is to Lonergan, Method in Theology, 265.
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dialogue is to be meaningful, then the ‘world mediated by meaning’ requires a
degree of objectivity about the meaning of such concepts as ‘good’ and ‘evil’.
Third, reflection on human experience also reveals the central role of
‘context’ in moral deliberation.

The problem of legitimate cooperation is, in

essence, the problem of one moral agent’s interaction with other moral agents in a
pluralist society. The concrete and particular givens of that society are often central
to the assessment of particular instances of cooperation, so it is not at all
unreasonable to hold that an action which constitutes legitimate material cooperation
in one set of circumstances may not be justifiable in a different set of circumstances.
The difference, of course, is in the way that the particular circumstances which
surround each instance impact upon its ‘adequate description’.
The concern for context finds an honoured place in the traditional
metaphysics, which understood the need to appreciate the concrete circumstances
surrounding an act; the same concern underlies Keenan’s insight into the importance
of ‘particular assessment in particular instances’ of cooperation. But as noted, there
is still a certain objectivity in moral knowledge which is ‘trans-subjective’ in nature.
Therefore the pitfalls of moral solipsism or ‘situation ethics’ can be avoided by
insisting on the objective meaning and value of both the original moral insight and
the principle which seeks, however imperfectly, to express it.

So the present

movement toward a ‘person-centred’ moral theology need not necessarily entail any
destructive individualism or relativism.

If anything, some recent analysis of the

principle of legitimate cooperation tends to highlight the fact that the moral agent is
always essentially in relationship with the entire moral community, which would
seem to guarantee a certain ‘trans-subjective’ objectivity.
Fourth, therefore, an adequate anthropology must go beyond overly simple or
individualistic definitions of the human person, and embrace this essentially
relational nature of the moral agent. After all, it can be argued that it is only through
interaction with others that moral agents are able to express and constitute their
identity as persons and as Christian.
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The present study has noted that while individual moral agents and
institutional moral agents share some attributes in common, they also differ markedly
in many respects. It has been suggested that an institution’s corporate structure, its
decision-making processes, its access to greater resources, and the ecclesial
significance of its actions all seem to place it in a class apart from the individual
moral agent.6

If (from the objective point of view) much depends on the

circumstances and social context surrounding a particular instance of cooperation,
likewise (from the subjective point of view) much depends on the specific identity,
structure and deliberative processes of the particular institution.

This is where the

identity of the particular moral agent touches the very heart of moral deliberation which, in the case of individual moral agents, is the essence of a person-centred
moral theology.
In summary, this investigation into the principle of legitimate cooperation in
evil has begun to reveal the significance of, and interaction between, (i) the moral
community’s fundamental apprehension of moral truth, (ii) the prevailing ethos and
world-view of the culture in which that moral community is located, and (iii) the
world-view, identity and moral experience of the particular moral agent.
In this final chapter some of these themes are taken up and woven into a
‘theological background’ to the question of institutional cooperation.

The

inspiration for this lies in the Second Vatican Council’s call to a general renewal of
moral theology. Elements of this renewal shed some light on traditional accounts of
the principle of legitimate cooperation (5.1), but an underlying assumption here is
that fidelity to the agenda of Vatican II must carry this discussion beyond the horizon
of a philosophical (essentially metaphysical) ethics and into a truly theological vision
of the moral life of Catholic institutions (5.2).
Throughout this chapter the ‘moral subject’ or ‘moral agent’ in focus is the
Catholic institution, and specifically the Catholic hospital.

There are undoubtedly

differences between individual and institutional moral agents, but there are also

6

See 4.3.1 above.
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sufficient similarities to draw an analogy between a Christian anthropology of the
human person on one hand, and the Christian identity of the Catholic institution on
the other. One aim of this chapter is to recast the moral life of Catholic institutions
against a theological - in particular a Christological and ecclesiological background. It will be suggested that the most significant distinguishing mark of the
institutional moral agent is the ecclesial meaning of its institutional acts.
In some senses what follows is a reflection on one possible interpretation of
‘sufficiently serious reason’. Notwithstanding Alphonsus Liguori’s achievement in
distinguishing the evil of cooperation per se (in de caritate) from the related question
of responsibility for the further effects of that evil (in de restitutione), subsequent
treatments generally persisted in interpreting ‘sufficiently serious reason’ as a
balancing of good and evil effects - a more or less consequentialist approach. This
chapter proposes a more fundamentally ontological and existential interpretation,
focussing less on ‘the effects of cooperation on others’ and more on ‘the meaning of
cooperation for the Catholic institution itself.’ It will be suggested that sometimes
an institution’s Catholic identity might justify mediate material cooperation in evil.
While the intention is to ground this possibility within a theology of moral
life, the present approach makes no claims to be either comprehensive or exclusive.
It is offered as a theological reflection, a tentative contribution to a much greater
project, rather than as a fully developed or definitive position. Neither does it aspire
to construct a complete theology of Christian moral life, but only to identify some of
its touchstones.

It will have achieved its purpose if it prompts further reflection,

which in turn may shed light on this complex question in contemporary moral
theology.
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5.1

Institutional Cooperation in a Renewed Moral Theology
5.1.1

Introduction: Terms of Renewal

The Second Vatican Council’s call for renewal in moral theology sketched
only the broadest outline of what must be, inevitably, an intensely searching longterm project.7 This is to be no mere restoration of an ethics of law or rediscovery of
a traditional ethics of virtue, but a radical refoundation. It is to be much more than a
search for a new hermeneutic which would simply offer a re-interpretation of the
traditional metaphysics.

It must not only place moral theology in a new and more

vital relationship with other theological disciplines, but must also bring new light to
bear on questions which have, under traditional approaches, become only more
complex and obscure.

Its aim is that moral theology should ‘have a place as

authentic theology’,8 and to that end it is to be deeply rooted in a truly Christian
anthropology, in sacred Scripture, systematic theology, philosophy, pastoral practice
and spirituality.9 It is to be a discrete theological discipline in its own right, yet it is
also to be considered a part of
. . . a unified scheme of systematic theology . . . a part that
concerns the process by which man, created in the likeness of
God and redeemed by the grace of Christ, tends towards his full
realisation, according to the demands of his divine calling, in the
context of the economy of salvation historically realised in the
Church.10
The present study of legitimate cooperation has retraced the evolution of the
principle and its current status in Catholic moral theology.

This fifth and final

chapter seeks to outline a theological interpretation of a Catholic institution’s
legitimate cooperation in evil, an interpretation which is faithful not only to the

7

See Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Decree on the Training of Priests Optatam totius. (28
October 1965) 16.
8
Congregation for Catholic Education (CCE), The Theological Formation of Future Priests. (22
February, 1976) 96.
9
CCE, Future Priests, 97-101.
10
CCE, Future Priests, 97. The natural and human sciences also have a role to play: indeed, the
data of these disciplines have the potential to help moral theology articulate the critical distinction
between universal moral principles and concrete moral decision-making: ‘. . . they can throw much
light on the situation and on the behaviour of man, encouraging research, revision, the profound
understanding of doctrine which lies between the sure and certain principles of reason and faith, and
their application to the concrete facts of life.’ CCE, Future Priests, 99. For a fuller discussion of the
Council’s agenda of renewal, see Pinckaers, Sources, xvii-xxi and 298-305.
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moral tradition but also to the Council’s call to renewal.

The last section of this

chapter will revisit the Bunbury case in light of this theological interpretation, but it
is necessary first to elaborate this view by outlining five themes which reflect
Vatican II’s agenda for the renewal of moral theology:
• First (5.1.2), a theological vision of the moral agent as human person.

A

renewed moral theology calls not merely for a philosophical anthropology but for
a genuine theology of the human person ‘created in the likeness of God and
redeemed by the grace of Christ’.11

The foundational analogy between the

individual and the institution as moral agents permits certain conclusions to be
drawn regarding a Catholic institution’s commitment and responsibilities to moral
truth.
• Second (5.1.3), the apprehension of moral truth.

The Church as moral

community has a particular insight into moral truth because of its unique
relationship with Jesus Christ, the Word made flesh who is himself Truth (John
14:6). The central question here is how the institutional moral agent apprehends
this Truth, and how a relationship with Christ can ‘inform’ its moral decisions.
• Third (5.1.4), a vision of the meaning of moral actions.

A Catholic institution

shares the individual Christian’s obligation to ‘bring forth fruit in charity for the
life of the world’.12 Institutional moral actions take on particular meaning when
viewed in the context of a fundamentally sacramental Christology, and an
ecclesiology which recognises in the life of the Church both God’s invitation and
humanity’s response.
• Fourth (5.1.5), continuity with the Catholic moral tradition within which the
principle of cooperation emerged and evolved to its present standing.

A

theological ‘re-visioning’ of the principle of legitimate cooperation must stand in
continuity with the wisdom of the tradition or risk radical disconnection from its
own roots.
11

CCE, Future Priests, 97.
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• Fifth and finally (5.1.6), the relationship between action and identity.

This

interpretation of the relationship between an institution’s ecclesial identity and the
moral significance of its actions requires an explanation of the ‘mechanism’
which connects the two.

An appropriate mechanism can be found squarely

within the Church’s moral tradition, in the theory of virtue.
This is an enormous undertaking.

The following observations aim only to

outline some key themes and lay general foundations.

5.1.2

The Human Person

At the heart of Vatican II’s vision of a renewed moral theology is the person
of the moral agent, created in God’s image and likeness and redeemed by Christ.13
A genuine theology of moral life will affirm the essential unity of the moral agent’s
faith and action, since there is an intrinsic relationship between the person of the
moral agent and his moral behaviour: it is by deliberate actions that the moral agent
both expresses and constructs his identity.14 This insight requires investigation.
On the question of the regulation of births, the Vatican Council reminds the
Church that subjective elements of moral deliberation (good intention, evaluation of

12

Optatam totius, 16.
See CCE, Future Priests, 97. Moral theology is ‘a reflection concerned with ‘morality’, with
the good and evil of human acts and of the person who performs them’ (Veritatis splendor, 29).
Indeed the Council’s great Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et spes
(7 December 1965) dwells at length on the nature and dignity of the human person in nn. 12-19.
14
See for example Veritatis splendor, 71: ‘Human acts are moral acts because they express and
determine the goodness or evil of the individual who performs them. They do not produce a change
merely in the state of affairs outside of man but, to the extent that they are deliberate choices, they
give moral definition to the very person who performs them, determining his profound spiritual
traits.’ It was also noted above (3.1.4.2) that Germain Grisez insists upon the importance of
choosing, precisely as such, because it is in choosing that the moral agent first and most responsibly
honours (or dishonours) both that integral human fulfilment which he shares with all moral agents and
his personal vocational commitments. It is in the elicited acts which precede and accompanying the
imperated acts that ‘one establishes one’s existential identity by settling one’s personal priorities
among the goods on which the choice bears.’ CMP, 240.
13

270

motives) are not sufficient in themselves to lead the agent to moral truth.15 Rather,
‘the objective criteria must be used, criteria drawn from the nature of the human
person and human action’.16 Louis Janssens holds that the official commentary on
Gaudium et spes makes two important points: first, by insisting that objective
criteria can be drawn from ‘the nature of the human person and human action’ the
Council teaches that human acts cannot be considered solely from the point of view
of an abstract metaphysics but must be referred back to ‘the human person integrally
and adequately considered’; and second, this criterion for assessing moral actions is
to be considered a ‘general principle’.17
It is clear, then, why a truly Christian anthropology must stand at the centre
of a renewed moral theology. If the fullest meaning of moral actions is to be found
only with reference to the authentic nature of the one who acts, then moral theology
must develop an ‘integral and adequate’ vision of the human person.

This is the

essence of the ‘personalism’ which Catholic theology has sought to elaborate in
recent years.18 The next question is: of the many dimensions of the human person,
which should be included in an integral and adequate vision of the moral agent? If
moral reasoning must deal with ‘the whole range of feeling, perceiving, valuing that
each individual has come to experience’,19 then the horizons of personalism would
seem very wide indeed.20

15

This argument is drawn from Louis Janssens, ‘Personalism in Moral Theology’ in Charles E
Curran, ed. Moral Theology: Challenges for the Future. Essays in Honour of Richard A McCormick
SJ. (New York: Paulist, 1990) 94-107, at 94.
16
Gaudium et spes, 51.
17
Janssens, ‘Personalism’, 94. At 106-107 Janssens cites the Schema Constitutionis Pastoralis de
Ecclesia in mundo huius temporis. Expensio Modorum Partis Secundae. (Vatican: Polyglot Press,
1965) 37, in answer to modi 104.
It will be noted that this approach is more or less implicit in the ethical theory of Thomas Aquinas,
who insists that actions must be understood according to their ‘form conceived by reason’ (materia
circa quam) rather than their natural or physical form (materia ex qua) - ST I-II 18, 2 ad 2. See also
2.1.2 above: the moral object of an action is ‘that moral matter which the act aims to attain or with
which the act deals - the materia circa quam, the ‘intelligible subject matter upon which the will’s
act of choice bears’, which is the ‘intentional object’; not the physical form, but the ‘form conceived
by reason’.’
18
See for example Pope John Paul II’s Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Christifideles laici.
‘On the Vocation and the Mission of the Lay Faithful in the Church and in the World.’ (30 December
1988). AAS 81(1989) 393-521, nn.37-39.
19
Himes, ‘The Contribution of Theology’, 55.
20
Janssens (‘Personalism’, 94) discerns eight essential dimensions of the human person:
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Three aspects of human personhood seem particularly pertinent to the present
discussion:
• the human person is created and graced by God and redeemed by Christ,
• the human person is free and self-determining, playing an active role in coming to
knowledge of objective moral truth, and
• the human person is relational, being essentially directed towards others.
First: it is a fundamental datum of Christian faith that human beings are
created in the image and likeness of God (Genesis 1:27). ‘Creation by God’ relates
the human person in essence to the whole of created reality while, on the other hand,
‘being in God’s image and likeness’ is the principle of uniqueness which
distinguishes humanity from the rest of creation.

In the Christian understanding,

furthermore, the proper moral subject is not simply ‘man’ but ‘man redeemed by
Christ’, and ‘redemption’ means that humanity has ‘the possibility of realising the
entire truth of our being’.21

It is by the saving action of Christ that the human

person possesses this possibility, but it is only in responding personally to God in

‘1. The human person is a subject, not an object as are the things of the world. Since a
person is called to self-determination, he or she is a moral subject, deciding on all his or her
doings in conscience and consequently in a responsible way.
2. The human person is a subject in corporeality. Our body forms part of the totality that we
are: what concerns our human body affects our person.
3. Because of the materiality of our body, our being is a being-in-the-world.
4. Human persons are essentially directed toward each other.
5. Not only because of our openness to one another are we social beings, but also because we
need to live in social groups with appropriate structures and institutions.
6. Human persons are fundamentally open to God, and it is the task of moral theology to
explain how, according to our Christian revelation, our relationship to God affects us in all
the dimensions of our person.
7. Human persons are historical beings since they are characterised by historicity.
8. All human persons are fundamentally equal, but at the same time each is an originality, a
unique subject.’
21
Pope John Paul II, ‘Address to Priests Participating in a Seminar on ‘Responsible Parenthood’.’
L’Osservatore Romano 14(828) 2 April 1984. 7+16. See also Veritatis splendor, 38-39. Edward
Schillebeeckx OP eloquently states the significance of being created by God: ‘The dogma of creation
(supported by our own experience of our contingency) informs us that, in spite of his bodiliness and
his essential involvement in this world, man comes from the hand of God as a person and therefore
under all aspects possesses an immediate relationship to God which calls him forth as a person - a
situated freedom - into existence. Man belongs ‘first’ to God and only secondly to himself. He
exists for God. This is his metaphysical and moral significance. The relationship with God is not
something added, it is constitutive of man.’ Edward Schillebeeckx OP, God and Man. (London:
Sheed and Ward, 1969) 215.
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Christ that the moral agent realises or actuates that possibility.22

So it is that a

human being both ‘expresses’ and ‘constructs’ his identity: his deliberate moral
actions represent his response to God’s redemptive initiative, and it is by them that
he realises the possibility of becoming all that God has created him to be.
The human person’s origin and destiny in God is therefore :
• the basis of human freedom: by his deliberate actions the moral agent chooses to
form himself more fully or less fully in the image and likeness of God;23
• the basis of moral responsibility: one takes most responsibility for one’s own
identity when one is ‘moved and drawn in a personal way from within’ to express
one’s response to God through moral actions;24
• the basis of moral rightness: the moral worth of a person’s actions is defined in
terms of that which ‘strengthens, develops and consolidates within himself his
likeness to God’.25
Second: the full meaning of moral actions is found only in reference to
personhood. The individual moral agent does not determine what constitutes good
or evil in moral action, but rather discovers it in the very nature of God and in his
own nature created in God’s image and likeness. This is the essence of natural law:
At this point the true meaning of the natural law can be
understood: it refers to man’s proper and primordial nature, the
‘nature of the human person’, which is the person himself in the
unity of soul and body, in the unity of his spiritual and biological
inclinations and of all the other specific characteristics necessary
for the pursuit of his end.26
So the moral agent’s apprehension of moral truth is also a question of selfknowledge. But this knowledge is not a given, to be received passively: it must be
sought actively, particularly if one is to be responsible not only for the content of

22

Hence the Australian Catholic Bishops’ Conference describes redemption in this way:
‘Redemption means that the dominance of human limitations and failings has been broken. This was
achieved for all who follow him when Jesus broke the power of the greatest of all human limitations,
death itself.’ See The Word Dwells Among Us. (Melbourne: Collins Dove, 1990) 7.
23
See Gaudium et Spes, 17; Veritatis splendor, 34.
24
Gaudium et spes, 17.
25
Veritatis splendor, 39.
26
Veritatis splendor, 50. Emphasis original. See also the following section.
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one’s moral choices but also for the quality of inner motivation which prompts those
choices.
The quest for moral truth leads one beyond the immediacy of sense
perception and into the realm of ‘meaning’.27

Thomas hints at this in his

understanding of ‘moral object’ in terms of the act’s ‘form conceived by reason’,28
and it is upon this insight that Bernard Lonergan built his theological epistemology:
knowledge of the real nature of things, of their meaning beyond their outward
appearances,

requires

responsibility.29

active

attention,

intelligence,

reasonableness

and

This activity occurs most profoundly when the moral agent

confronts particular concrete situations which call for a considered response. At the
heart of natural law theory is an understanding that universal and objective moral
truth ‘stands behind’ every particular moral choice, awaiting realisation by the
attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible moral agent.
Thirdly: it is this realisation which leads to ‘trans-subjective’ moral
objectivity.

The meaning of moral experience is known to be objective when it is

grasped deeply and personally by moral agents in a manner which transcends their
individual subjectivity:
It is manifested as an exigency of truth, which informs and
governs the desire for good, at the source of the action, in choice
and decision. It is at the very heart of personal action that our
guiding light touches us, especially on the level of prudential
judgment. This objectivity will be the work of the practical
reason penetrating our free will. It will be the truth of goodness.
Such objectivity can be called ‘trans-subjective’, for truth and
goodness move moral persons to go beyond themselves and
overcome the singularities that stand in their way. They provide
the only solid basis for moral communion and collaboration.30

27

See Gaudium et spes, 15.
See ST I-II 18, 10; and 2.1.2 above.
29
See Lonergan, Method in Theology, 53: ‘Progress proceeds from originating value, from
subjects being their true selves by observing the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent,
Be reasonable, Be responsible. Being attentive includes attention to human affairs.
Being
intelligent includes a grasp of hitherto unnoticed or unrealised possibilities. Being reasonable
includes the rejection of what probably would not work but also the acknowledgment of what
probably would. Being responsible includes basing one’s decisions and choices on an unbiased
evaluation of short-term and long-term costs and benefits to oneself, to one’s group, to other groups.’
28
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An individual moral agent grasps the truth of his personal moral experience,
and in so doing uncovers two facts: first, that there remains an unbridgeable ‘gap’
between the experience itself and the ability to conceptualise and communicate it;
and second, that other moral agents have their own moral experience of the same
truth.

In the former is recognised the incommunicable uniqueness of moral

experience that grounds a responsibility which is truly personal, for fidelity to this
moral truth constitutes fidelity to one’s very self.

In the latter is identified the

essential objectivity of the truth encountered in that experience: ‘the more profound
the personal truth . . . the deeper [its] resonance and the wider [its] audience’.31
For example, a moral agent recognises that a central aspect of Christian
identity is ‘love of neighbour’ (see Mt 5:43-48).

This is actively expressed when

one actually seeks to do good for another; at the same time, it is by doing so that the
Christian actually becomes what God has called him to be. But it is only in making
this choice and in acting this way that one uncovers the essential moral truth which
stands behind the command to love - the Truth expressed uniquely and completely
in Jesus Christ. As the attentive moral agent recognises the presence of Christ the
Truth in and through his moral choices, he recognises also his own authentic
Christian identity.

Choosing to love one’s neighbour is, therefore, choosing to

conform oneself more fully to the image and likeness of God in which one is created,
and this reveals one’s own authentic identity.

Finally, the relationship between

moral truth, Christian identity and moral choosing is not individual but ecclesial: the
attentive moral agent recognises that growing conformity to Christ necessarily draws
one more deeply into the life of the Christian community.
So it is that the moral agent not only plays an active role in coming to know
moral truth, but does so only in communion with other moral agents.

The human

person is an essentially relational moral subject. It is this characteristic which also
allows the human person to be an object in morality:
In moral theory the object stands over against the acting subject
(obiectum, placed in front of) as a determining element of the

30
31

Pinckaers, Sources, 65-66.
Pinckaers, Sources, 66.
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subject’s knowledge and action.
The object, being known,
awakens love and desire, elicits respect, wins friendship, and
initiates relationships of justice and truth. Thus understood, the
object can obviously be a person, recognised as such. I can talk
about the object of my love, my hope, or my faith. This is what
Christ is for Christians, married spouses for each other. In fact,
human persons are the chief object of moral theory, for only in
the context of persons can we conceive of morality at all.32
If ‘human persons are the chief object of moral theory’, then the problem of
cooperation in evil cannot adequately be cast solely in terms of the outward actions
of principal agent and cooperator. In some sense the personhood of the moral agent
must be central to the equation. It has already been argued that it is insufficient to
use vague terms like ‘cooperation with persons’ or ‘the dignity of personal
conscience’ with little or no explanation.33
fundamental:

What is proposed here is more

the claim is that the personhood of the moral agent enters the

assessment of cooperation not primarily as modifying the objective moral status of
the cooperative act, but primarily in relation to the meaning of this particular action
for this particular cooperator.
At its heart the problem of cooperation in evil is this: that an otherwise
innocent action, which ordinarily ought not to be commissioned because it lends
assistance to another in his evil design, may in a particular instance be legitimately
commissioned if the cooperator holds a sufficiently strong reason for doing so. In
this case, since it is not morally pre-determined, the cooperative action awaits final
moral definition in the cooperator’s intention or reason for acting, and in the
surrounding circumstances.

Traditionally the justifying power of the cooperator’s

reason depends upon factors such as the evilness of the principal agent’s deed, the
proximity and necessity of the cooperation, and the evil effects which will result.34
But taking account of the personhood of the moral agent means that the cooperative
act must also be assessed in relation to the person of the cooperator himself: whether
and to what extent this instance of cooperation is consistent with the cooperator’s

32

Pinckaers, Sources, 67.
See above, 4.1.2.3 and 4.1.2.4.
34
See Alphonsus, de caritate 59.
33
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core identity as a person created in the image and likeness of God and redeemed by
Christ.
In a sense this is simply a re-statement of natural law theory, but it has two
advantages over more traditional approaches to cooperation: it accounts for the
acting person as well as for the action itself, and it relates the moral assessment of an
action explicitly to the ultimate objective norm of morality, which is God.

This

view of moral agency is based in a truly theological anthropology which reveals that
the most fundamental question for Christian moral behaviour is not ‘what am I to
do?’ but ‘who am I called to become?’ Beyond the moral object of the action there
lies the object of the moral agent, a finis beyond id quod est ad finem, and in its
perfect form that finis is ever the same: to become all that God has created one to be.
In a theological perspective, then, assessment of cooperative actions begins in one’s
knowledge of self as a person created by God and redeemed by Christ, and
terminates in a prudential judgment that fidelity to self demands fidelity to God, and
vice versa.

5.1.3

The Apprehension of Moral Truth

Both questions - ‘what am I to do?’ and ‘who am I called to become?’ - are
questions of moral truth: the former concerns truth in ‘doing’, the latter concerns
truth in ‘being’. The relationship between human nature and human action is central
to a Christian understanding of morality and provides ‘objective criteria’ which
guide assessment of particular moral acts.35

The questions in this section are,

‘where is moral truth to be found?’ and ‘how is moral truth apprehended?’
As noted, traditional Catholic morality seeks moral truth in natural law.
Grisez’s justifiable concern to resolve the so-called ‘naturalistic fallacy’ is
symptomatic of the fact that some had come to see natural law theory as flawed by a
kind of ‘biologism’ in which the data of ‘raw nature’ is supposed to provide criteria

35

Gaudium et spes, 51; Veritatis splendor, 71.
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for moral judgment.36

This locates moral truth within nature, which reduces the

order of morality to a mere reading of empirical phenomena. In this interpretation,
moral truth is fully accessible because natural law theory rests on ‘pure - that is,
non-religious - reason’.37
But an authentic Christian understanding of morality holds that while moral
truth ‘speaks’ to humanity through external phenomena, it is not located ‘in’ those
phenomena.

Historically, natural law theory is not rationalistic but genuinely

theological:
. . . the philosophy of nature on which the scholastics drew in
developing their concept of the natural law was itself motivated
by specifically Christian concerns, and was developed in part
through a process of scriptural interpretation. Moreover, natural
philosophy in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries tended to see
nature as an expression of divine, transcendent wisdom. For both
these reasons, we cannot draw a sharp line between the
philosophical and theological aspects of the scholastic concept of
natural law; even its philosophical components are more
theological than is generally realised.38
Primarily, then, the Christian tradition of natural law locates moral truth in
the mind and will of God, that Eternal Law which is ‘the ruling idea of things which
exists in God as the effective sovereign of them all’.39 Natural law is ‘nothing other
than the sharing in the Eternal Law by intelligent creatures’.40

The note of

‘intelligence’ is critical: as rational creatures, human beings participate in Eternal
Law ‘intelligently and reasonably’, and not merely physically and biologically.41

36

This fallacy is addressed in Veritatis splendor, 46-50. See also the Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction Donum vitae. ‘On Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the
Dignity of Procreation.’ (22 February 1987). AAS 80(1988) 70-102. At 74 (Introduction n.3): ‘. . .
this law cannot be thought of as simply a set of norms on the biological level; rather it must be
defined as the rational order whereby man is called by the Creator to direct and regulate his life and
actions . . . ’
37
Jean Porter, Natural and Divine Law: Reclaiming the Tradition for Christian Ethics.
(Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1999) 140-141.
38
Porter, Natural and Divine Law, 122.
39
ST I-II 91, 1.
40
ST I-II 91, 2.
41
ST I-II 91, 2 ad 3: ‘. . . etiam animalia irrationalia participant rationem aeternam suo modo,
sicut et rationalis creatura. Sed quia rationalis creatura participat eam intellectualiter et
rationaliter, ideo participatio legis aeterna in creatura rationali proprie lex vocatur: nam lex est
aliquid rationis . . . In creatura autem irrationali non participatur rationaliter: unde non potest dici
lex nisi per similitudinem.’
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This takes natural law out of the world of immediacy and places it squarely in the
realm of meaning: what is ‘moral’ in human acts relates not to the materia ex qua
but to the materia circa quam, and the ‘reason’ which conceives the moral form of
an act is not ‘pure’ reason but ‘ratio recta’.42

Natural law is known first and

foremost as ‘a reflection of the image of God within the human person’,43 so moral
truth is in some sense an essential characteristic of one created in God’s image and
likeness.
But in order to provide practical guidance in the moral life, this truth in the
human person’s ‘being’ demands specification in actual ‘doing’. Not surprisingly,
then, the tradition also developed its concept of natural law from an interpretation of
the Scriptures which provide both general and specific moral rules.
[Augustine] identifies the natural law with the Golden Rule and
the Decalogue, a view which is also a patristic commonplace.
The former, he says, is a basic moral norm that is known to all,
and from this rule, it would theoretically be possible to derive at
least the fundamental principles of morality. At the same time,
given the pervasive effects of sin, our moral knowledge is at best
limited and corrupt.
For this reason, God has mercifully
formulated the fundamental precepts of the natural law in the
Mosaic law, particularly in the Decalogue. Hence, the latter can
be considered to be a written formulation of the natural law.44
Although the Scriptures also contain precepts which do not belong to natural
law (such as the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law), the scholastics considered
Scripture and nature as
. . . two complementary modes of access to God’s wisdom and
God’s providential will for humanity. The knowledge of God
and of God’s law provided through nature is bound to be
incomplete and even corrupt; that is why it was necessary for the
basic precepts of the natural law to be formulated anew through
the Mosaic law. Nonetheless, there can be no fundamental
contradiction between natural law and Scripture. These are two
different yet mutually complementary ways in which God’s will
is expressed to human beings.45
42

See 2.1.2 above.
Porter (Natural and Divine Law, 126) traces this view to Augustine.
44
Porter, Natural and Divine Law, 127.
45
Porter, Natural and Divine Law, 132-133. Porter indicates that Thomas teaches the same in ST
I-II 94, 4 ad 1. Her point seems to be that traditional natural law theory is both philosophical and
theological in nature, but because the order of nature is itself grounded in God’s creative will, even a
43
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It is not surprising then that, as Servais Pinckaers OP suggests, some
moralists ‘having come to treat moral theology from the viewpoint of commandments
and obligations

. . .

are primarily interested in strictly normative texts and

imperatives’ in the Scriptures.46 In this view the Scriptures are treated principally as
a source of moral content, for the discovery of which the science of exegesis is an
indispensable tool.

Pinckaers rightly notes, however, that an overly scientific

approach to the text would deny access to the Scriptures to all but the most expert of
readers.47
But the Vatican Council teaches that, because they are the primary locus of
revelation for the Christian, the Scriptures are also ‘the principal source of Christian
theology’.48 So while they do provide normative content, the Scriptures have much
more to offer moral agents in their quest for moral truth: as Pinckaers argues, it is in
a direct and personal reading of the Scriptures that the Christian pierces through the
written word to encounter the ‘Word who is Life’.
Scripture does not merely offer human knowledge and
experience, which the reader could reproduce with the aid of the
text. Scripture is an instrument used by God to communicate
with a human person, to manifest himself as a word spoken, and
to produce in the reader’s inmost being the experience of an
encounter with a Person who is unique. . . . This obviously calls
for personal reading, comparable to an intimate conversation,
where one’s first care is to listen.49
This encounter is indeed personal and intimate, but it is ecclesial rather than
merely individual for it occurs ‘under the guidance of the Church’s magisterium’:

philosophical-rationalistic reading of natural law will find its fullest meaning only in relation to an
essentially theological apprehension of the unity which exists between the origin and the destiny of all
creation, including humanity.
46
Pinckaers, Sources, 316. A good example of this approach might be Rudolf Schnackenburg’s
The Moral Teaching of the New Testament. Translated by J Holland-Smith and W J O’Hara.
(London: Burns & Oates, 1965).
47
Pinckaers, Sources, 317: ‘Here again the question arises: must the scientific biblical exegete
stand between the moral theologian on the one hand and the inspired author on the other, whether he
be prophet or evangelist? Can nothing worthwhile be understood without him?’
48
Pinckaers, Sources, 315; Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dogmatic Constitution on
Divine Revelation Dei verbum. (18 November 1965) 24. Therefore moral theology must ‘draw more
fully on the teaching of Holy Scripture’. Optatam totius, 16.
49
Pinckaers, Sources, 319.
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Clearly this kind of reading is demanding, and cannot remain
individual. The Word of God calls for meditation and prayer; it
must be put into practice, and this is the principal key to
profound, sapiential understanding.
We may not isolate
ourselves in our own personal interpretation. We must broaden
our ideas by entering into a communion of mind and faith with
the sacred authors and the entire Church. It is, therefore, an
ecclesial reading, done in intimate union with the living tradition
and the liturgy, that we must practice.50
This approach to the Scriptures raises a number of important questions for
moral theology in general, but two in particular bear directly on the present study.
First, Pinckaers is right to suggest that the moral value of the Scriptures does
not stop at normative moral content, that ‘substantial’ or ‘ontological’ moral truth
exists beyond the ‘wrappings’ of the text,51 and that this moral truth may be found
‘through’ the text.52 For moral truth is not primarily a datum to be understood, but a
Person who is to be encountered.53 Moral truth is found not primarily in the words
on the page, but in the Word whom the writers had themselves encountered (1 John
1:1-3), the Word who is grace and truth (John 1:14).

Consequently, the Christian

grows in moral goodness not primarily by conforming his actions to the content of
the written word, but primarily by conforming himself to the Word (John 14:23) and
finding in that relationship a source of life (John 6:53-58). Here again one notes the
essential connection between ‘being’ and ‘doing’ in the Christian moral life.
Moral theology must certainly attend to the scriptural texts and to particular
passages which provide ‘moral content’

-

the ‘strictly normative texts and

imperatives.’ But what Pinckaers suggests is both prior and subsequent to exegesis.
In a direct and personal reading of the Scriptures one encounters the ultimate norm of
morality, the creating and redeeming God in whom one finds an answer to the basic
50

Pinckaers, Sources, 322.
Pinckaers, Sources, 317.
52
Pinckaers, Sources, 318-319.
53
See Pope John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation Catechesi tradendae. ‘Catechesis in Our Time.’
(16 October 1979). AAS 71(1979) 1277-1340, n.5: ‘. . . at the heart of catechesis we find, in
essence, a Person, the Person of Jesus of Nazareth, ‘the only Son from the Father . . . full of grace
and truth’ (Jn 1:14), who suffered and died for us and who now, after rising, is living with us forever.
It is Jesus who is ‘the way, the truth, and the life’ (Jn 14:6), and Christian living consists in following
Christ, the sequela Christi.’
51
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moral question: ‘who am I to become?’

The written text is logically and

chronologically secondary to the Church’s experience of Christ himself, the
incarnate Word of God who as it were stands ‘behind’ and ‘within’ the written word.
The encounter takes place in the innermost core of the Christian person and is the
heart of Christian moral experience, for Christ is that Truth who awaits discovery by
the attentive moral agent, the living God who is experienced in ‘the depths of human
reality

. . .

within the trauma of conversion’.54

The moral agent’s role in

discovering moral truth is not passive but active: the Word is accessible only to
those who personally take up the Scriptures for direct and active reading.55
Secondly, this encounter with the Word provides a fundamental motivation
for particular moral choices.

The encounter with Christ does not leave the moral

agent unaffected but demands a personal response, so particular moral choices are no
longer a matter of ‘what am I to do’ but ‘who am I to become because of this
encounter’.
57

Christ’s invitation to ‘follow me’

Christ’ or to ‘put on Christ’

58

56

is an invitation to ‘become

- not merely in one’s external actions but, through

them, in the depths of one’s very being and identity. In the ‘trauma of conversion’
the Christian’s choice to become more fully the image and likeness of God is a
choice to be converted more and more into the Christ he has encountered.

The

Christian’s choice to ‘follow Christ’ by loving one’s neighbour as Christ commands
(John 15:12) is a choice to conform oneself, or to be converted more and more, to the
image and likeness of the Christ one experiences in and through the Sacred
Scriptures.
This encounter with the Word, this invitation to become Christ more and
more, occurs in the context of the ecclesial community. Therefore the moral actions
of Catholic institutions find their fullest meaning only in the context of the nature
and mission of Christ and of the Church.
54

Pinckaers, Sources, 323.
Pinckaers, Sources, 321.
56
John 8:12; 10:4; 12:26; Matthew 4:19, 21.
57
St Augustine, In evangelium Johannis Tr. 21, 8 (PL 35, 1568): ‘non solum nos Christianos
factos esse, sed Christum. Intelligitis, fratres, gratiam Dei super nos capitis? . . . Christus factus
sumus.’
58
Romans 13:14; 1 Corinthians 2:16.
55
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5.1.4

The Meaning of Moral Actions

Just as the Scriptures are intended not merely to communicate moral content
but to mediate an encounter with the Person of the Word, Christian theology has a
vastly more noble and expansive task than merely to articulate the data of faith. At
its inception the Second Vatican Council was reminded that the Church’s teaching
office - and, it is suggested, a fortiori theology itself - is ‘predominantly pastoral
in character’.59 Christian theology aims to enable individuals and the Church as a
whole to give ‘an accounting for the hope that is in you’,60 and so to make a more
conscious and complete response to Christ in the concrete particulars of life in the
world.
The problem of cooperation in evil constitutes a challenge to Christian
identity because it requires a moral agent to discern whether cooperation will enable
one to ‘bring forth fruit in charity for the life of the world’ - that is, whether
cooperation will promote or diminish one’s likeness to Christ.61 This challenge has
an essentially theological aspect since, for the Christian, the basic moral question
‘who am I to become?’ is a theological question.62 To put it another way: if, in the
matter of legitimate cooperation, questions such as the moral status of the
cooperative act and the definition of ‘sufficiently serious reason’ lie in the ethical
foreground, then questions of ‘being a follower of Christ’, ‘realising one’s Christian

59

Pope John XXIII, ‘Opening Address to the Second Vatican Council.’ (11 October 1962) in
Walter Abbott SJ, ed. The Documents of Vatican II. (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1967) 710-719.
At 715: ‘The substance of the ancient doctrine of the deposit of faith is one thing, and the way in
which it is presented is another. And it is the latter that must be taken into great consideration with
patience if necessary, everything being measured in the forms and proportions of a magisterium
which is predominantly pastoral in character.’
60
1 Peter 3:15 (New Revised Standard Version).
61
It is important to note that ‘fruit’ here could never refer to the evil effects of the principal
agent’s action: by definition, an evil action can never be motivated by true charity. But realisation of
the cooperator’s Christian identity might well be considered among the ‘fruit’ brought forth by the
cooperator ‘in charity, for the life of the world’.
62
This is evident even in the traditional metaphysics of human action: Thomas argues that every
being acts for an end, and all truly human acts have but one end, namely God (ST I-II 1, 1 and 8).
Likewise in more recent moral theology: not only do Germain Grisez’s basic human goods include
‘religion or holiness, which is harmony with God’ (CMP, 124), but his other criterion for right moral
choosing - personal vocational commitments - obviously encompasses the Christian’s sense of
being called to follow Christ.

283

identity’, and ‘bringing forth fruit in charity’ constitute a theological horizon. The
following brief comments on Christology and ecclesiology aim to sketch only an
outline of this background.
Transcendental thomism offers a starting point, in its concept of the
essentially symbolic structure of being. So as to ‘be’ in the order of reality a being
must express itself in some way.

This self-expression symbolises the ‘being-in-

itself’ and makes it real, and yet is distinguishable from it.63 This structure of selfexpression has two important implications.
First, since symbols operate by a process of mediation, the medium itself is
of crucial significance: the medium is the very self-expression of the being which
reveals itself. This sense of the medium assumes particular significance within the
theological horizon of ‘Revelation’, the fact that God communicates the divine
presence to humanity.
If God desires to be present to human beings, God’s presence
must create a symbolic expression for itself in order that it can be
‘real’ for human beings, since the complete disparity between
God and the human makes an unmediated presence and
communication of God impossible. Thus in this case ‘symbolic
expression’ means that God, in order to reach human beings, to be
given or uttered to them, is present in a created medium that
retains its created uniqueness, but is transparent to an interpretive
recognition of God.64
Second, in consequence, the concept of ‘personal communication’ takes on a
specific meaning: the mutual self-expression of personal subjects constitutes not just
a dynamic of ‘self-revelation’ or mediated dialogue, but a more fundamentally
intimate encounter between the subjects themselves.

63

‘Karl Rahner (d. 1984) pointed out in a fundamental essay that in the strict and proper sense a
symbol is never a mere pointer, but is always a “real symbol”. This is based on the philosophical
consideration that all being necessarily creates its own “expression”, in order to come to itself, to
discover its own being. This means that all being is necessarily “symbolic”. A being realises itself
by expressing itself. To put it another way: a symbol is effective because it brings a being to reality.
That is what is meant by “real symbol”: a genuine symbol does what it symbolises. . . . Anyone who
has understood the essential character of symbolism cannot play off the “merely symbolic” against
the “real”.’
Herbert Vorgrimler, Sacramental Theology. Translated by Linda M Maloney.
(Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1992) 10.
64
Vorgrimler, Sacramental Theology, 10.
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A turning toward this medium does not imply ordinary growth in
knowledge or information; instead, it is a self-opening of the
human person for God’s self-communication, an opening that is
not the autonomous work of the human person, but is caused by
the prevenient grace of God. Thus it is in the turn to this medium
that the person becomes conscious of the most intimate nearness
of God; it is here that revelation occurs.65
These two points shed light on the unique meaning of the Incarnation, that
union of the human and the divine in Jesus Christ who is the medium par excellence
of God’s self-communication.66
As God, Jesus Christ is the (self-)Revelation of the Father to humanity in and
through the Word-made-flesh;67 while as human, Jesus Christ freely responds fully
and in complete obedience to the will of God.68

In his entire being - ‘his words

and deeds, his silences and sufferings, indeed his manner of being and speaking’ 69 Jesus Christ is the real symbol of God, in himself both containing and conveying the
presence and invitation of God to mankind.

At the same time, in his entire being,

Jesus Christ offers mankind’s fullest and most perfect response to that invitation,
even to accepting death on the Cross in fidelity to the Father’s will.

In his own

person and in every aspect of his life, then, Jesus Christ typifies the particular
dialogical symbolism which the Christian community identifies as ‘sacramental’.
Jesus Christ is the sacrament of salvation.70
The sacramental structure of the Incarnation highlights three points of
significance for the present discussion on cooperation in evil:

65

Vorgrimler, Sacramental Theology, 10-11. This structure describes the Christian’s personal
encounter with the Eternal Word in and through the Scriptures.
66
See CCC 464-469, summarising the teachings of the Councils of Nicea I (325), Ephesus (431),
Chalcedon (451), and Constantinople II (553).
67
CCC 456-460 and 516.
68
CCC 475, citing Constantinople III (681).
69
CCC 516.
70
CCC 774. Hence Avery Dulles SJ can say that Jesus is ‘simultaneously the sacrament of God’s
self-gift and of man’s fully obedient acceptance.’ See his Models of the Church. Expanded edition.
(New York: Image Doubleday, 1987) 68.
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• First: the fact of the Incarnation teaches that human experience cannot be neatly
separated into spheres of ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’.71

God’s complete self-

realisation in Jesus takes place in a realm marked by evil and sin - indeed, it
takes place because of evil and sin. If God did not flee the profane but sought in
Jesus to bring to it the divine saving presence, then neither must the Christian
person - or, it will be suggested, the Catholic institution - flee the challenge of
evil.

Far from divorcing oneself from the realm of evil and sin, the individual

Christian and the Catholic institution must be present and active within that
world.

The moral agent, therefore, not only recognises that the challenge of

cooperation in evil is virtually unavoidable, but accepts that positive engagement
in and with the realm of evil and sin is an aspect of Christian identity.
• Second, Jesus Christ, the sacrament of salvation, communicates God’s presence in
this realm precisely in order to redeem it. Even personally culpable evil - not
merely ‘malum’ but also ‘peccatum’ and even ‘culpa’ - can be redeemed through
God’s salvific will realised in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus.

The

‘message about the Cross’ 72 is essentially a message that God’s nearness can be
obscured by evil and sin, but not destroyed by them - indeed, the resurrection
reveals God’s triumph over them.73

The Christian cooperator may be assured,

then, that even those who do evil in the world can be redeemed if and when they
respond to the God who communicates himself to them.
• Third, the sacramentality of Christ is not restricted to the historical Jesus or the
Risen Lord, but by the power of the Holy Spirit extends to the whole Body of
Christ in history. The Church, in Christ, is ‘in the nature of sacrament - a sign
and instrument, that is, of communion with God and of unity among all men’;74 it
is ‘the instrument for the salvation of all; as the light of the world and the salt of
71

Vorgrimler, Sacramental Theology, 17-18: ‘First, a separation of reality into sacred and
profane realms is impossible within Christian faith. A sacred realm (ie, related to the ‘sacrum’, the
‘holy’) would absorb people and things that are removed from the ‘profane’ and are ordered
exclusively to God, reserved to God, and close to God alone. In contrast, the incarnation of God in
Jesus of Nazareth affirms that the realm in which God comes to human beings, communicating God’s
own self and remaining with them, is not removed from the world, no matter how depraved that world
may seem to us to be. Christian separation from the evil in this world thus does not express itself in
the creation of a sacred space, and the religious realisation of Christianity cannot consist in sacred
actions [only].’
72
1 Corinthians 1:18 (New Revised Standard Version).
73
See Vorgrimler, Sacramental Theology, 18.
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the earth (cf Mt 5:13-16) it is sent forth into the whole world’;75 it is ‘the
universal sacrament of salvation’.76 The Church itself is sacrament, the medium
of God’s self-communication in the world, because it is the Body of Christ.
If Christ is the sacrament of God, the Church is for us the
sacrament of Christ; she represents him, in the full and ancient
meaning of the term, she really makes him present. She not only
carries on his work, but she is his very continuation, in a sense far
more real than that in which it can be said that any human
institution is its founder’s continuation.77
The Church, the community of believers, is the Body of Christ present in the
world for the salvation of the world - ‘to bring forth fruit in charity for the life of
the world’.78 Jesus continues to proclaim the Gospel of salvation to the present age
in and through the life of the community of Christians. They make Christ present in
the world, just as Jesus makes the Father present in the world.

Jesus Christ is the

sacrament of God, and the Church is the sacrament of Christ.
For the purposes of the present study on cooperation in evil it is possible to
distinguish two aspects of ‘sacramentality’. The reference point for the first, which
might be called the ‘ontological’ aspect, is the sacramental symbol itself: in the case
of Jesus Christ, in himself and for himself Jesus is the sacrament of God.79

The
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up by Rahner, Semmelroth, Schillebeeckx, Smulders, Congar, Groot, and Martelet. For a short
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suggests that the notion of ‘symbol’ necessarily includes the concept of ‘self-communication to
another’ in such a way that it makes little sense to speak of a ‘symbol for its own sake’ - or, as here,
to speak of Jesus Christ as a sacrament of God in himself. See Splett, ‘Symbol’, 1655. Nevertheless
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reference point for the second aspect, which might be called ‘existential’, is the
community among whom and for whom the symbol mediates the selfcommunication of the other: in the case of Jesus Christ, among his disciples and for
the life of the world Jesus is the sacrament of God.80
A sacrament is not a static but a dynamic reality, having ‘an event character’
because it is a true symbol of God’s presence and action in the world.81 This is of
enormous importance for the Church.
The Church becomes Church insofar as the grace of Christ,
operative within it, achieves historical tangibility through the
actions of the Church as such.
The Church becomes an actual event of grace when it appears
most concretely as a sacrament - that is, in the actions of the
Church as such whereby men are bound together in grace by a
visible expression. The more widely and intensely the faithful
participate in this corporate action of the Church, the more the
Church achieves itself.82
This suggests two points: first, to some extent at least, the ‘sacramentality’ of
the Church subsists in, or coexists with, the lives of the individual Christians who
make up the Church; and second, it is by means of its own corporate action in the
world that the Church ‘achieves itself’ or realises its identity as sacrament.
First: through baptism the individual Christian ‘becomes Christ’ or ‘puts on
Christ’;

through confirmation and Eucharist this Christian identity is uniquely

nourished and strengthened; but it is through personal vocational commitments and
moral choices, through engagement with the world and taking responsible action

minister. Nevertheless, the fruits of the sacraments also depend on the disposition of the one who
receives them.’
80
To cast it in Johannine terms: ontologically, Jesus Christ is the sacrament of God in himself and
continued to be so even though ‘the world did not know him’ and ‘his own people did not accept him’
(John 1:10-11); existentially, Jesus Christ is the sacrament of God actually encountered and received
by ‘all who did accept him’, those to whom ‘he gave the power to become children of God’ (John
1:12). Not everyone who saw Jesus recognised in him the presence and self-communication of God,
but only those who ‘saw his glory, the glory that is his as the only Son of the Father, full of grace and
truth’ (John 1:14). What initially distinguished the Christian community from the rest of humanity,
then, is their ‘turning-to-the-medium’ of God’s self-revelation precisely as such, and their radical selfopening to the God whom they encounter in Christ. What ultimately distinguishes the Christian
community from the rest of humanity, however, is that it is constituted ‘sacrament of Christ’.
81
Dulles, Models of the Church, 69.
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therein, that the individual Christian concretely ‘real-ises’ that identity. By baptism
the individual Christian ‘is configured to Christ’ in a more or less ontological
sense,83 but it is by taking action in the world the Christian ‘makes Christ present’
for the life of the world, realising his Christian identity existentially.
Second: with regard to the ontological aspect of its corporate sacramentality,
the Church is most fully ‘sacrament of God’ when the community of believers
actually gathers in order to be the Body of Christ, active in and for itself in its own
liturgy - most especially in Eucharist.84 With regard to the existential aspect of its
sacramentality, however, the Body of Christ must be active well beyond the
boundaries of its own membership.

Individually and corporately, Christians must

take action in the world, doing that which Christ established the Church to do in
order to become in fact that which Christ established the Church to be - the
continuing presence in history of God’s offer of salvation in Christ.85
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CCC 1272.
See Dulles, Models of the Church, 70: ‘The Eucharist is indivisibly Christological and
ecclesiological. In its Christological aspect it actualises in a palpable way the presence of the
Redeemer with the congregation of those who look to him in love and trust. In its ecclesiological
aspect the Eucharist celebrates and solidifies the union of the faithful with one another about the holy
table. Inasmuch as the celebration of the Eucharist is the sacramental anticipation of the heavenly
marriage banquet, the final, eternal form of the community of the saints shines forth even now in this
solemnity, just as the source of the Church, Christ’s own sacrifice, is present in it.’
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In this regard the Second Vatican Council provides two key points of reference: the Church’s
role as the ‘soul of human society’, and its missionary nature. The relevant documents are the
Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et spes. (7 December 1965), and
the Decree on the Church’s Missionary Activity Ad gentes. (7 December 1965).
First, the Second Vatican Council held not just the coexistence but indeed the compenetration of
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the Gospel to all’ (Ad gentes, 1). The Church is missionary by its very nature (Ad gentes, 2), and
indeed missionary activity is essentially sacramental, ‘the manifestation of God’s plan, its epiphany
and realisation in the world and in history’ (Ad gentes, 9). In the world, and especially in the realm
of those who do not know God or who deny God’s existence, the Church must implant itself ‘in the
same way that Christ by his incarnation committed himself to the particular social and cultural
circumstances of the men among whom he lived.’ (Ad gentes, 10). All Christians have a duty to
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whom they are strengthened at confirmation’ (Ad gentes, 11). This ‘revealing’ is more than merely
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Now it can be argued that the Church is most clearly active and effective in
the world beyond its own boundaries when it acts in and through those structures and
institutions which rightly claim an ecclesial identity. Catholic institutions are one of
the principal and most clearly identifiable ways in which the Church fulfils its
mission as sacrament in the world: for example, it has been noted that the Church
fulfils its mission to continue the healing ministry of Christ through the ministry of
health care in Catholic hospitals.86
In the context of the present study on institutional cooperation it has also
been noted that, in view of the more public ecclesial identity of Catholic institutions,
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith considers that material cooperation in
evil is harder to justify for institutions than for individual Catholics, an argument
apparently based on the danger of scandal.87

But an ecclesiological argument can

also be mounted: in virtue of their more public ecclesial identity, Catholic
institutions bear a significantly greater responsibility than Catholic individuals to
ensure that their institutional actions realise the Church’s

- and their own -

‘sacramental potential’.
According to this argument ‘a general policy of material cooperation in
Catholic institutes’ would be damaging not only to ‘public morality’, but to the
sacramental nature and identity of the Church itself, that is, to the Church’s ability to
make Christ present in the world. The same argument might support the contention
that ‘proportionately graver’ reasons in a particular case may convince a Catholic
institution that fidelity to its sacramental identity positively requires it to cooperate
mediately and materially in an evil perpetrated by others.
In many arenas of life in the world the Church, through its institutions,
mediates the saving presence of Christ who attends to the whole needs of the human
indicative: it is a constitutive self-expression, a sacramental ‘real-ising’ of Christ the New Man in the
power of the Holy Spirit. If there is a weakness in Dulles’ treatment of the Church as ‘sacrament’ it
is that he pays little attention to the missionary aspect of the Church’s identity. On the other hand,
this aspect emerges very clearly in his study of the Church as ‘herald’ and ‘servant’.
86
See 4.3 above.
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person, including especially the need for salvation. ‘To make Christ present in the
world’ is the essential mission of the Church in every aspect of its life, and therefore
it is the essential mission of all of the Church’s institutions: it is the mission of the
Catholic school beyond mere education, of Catholic social welfare agencies beyond
meeting

merely

human

needs,

of

diocesan

structures

beyond

temporal

administration, and of the Catholic hospital beyond simply caring for the sick. And
if the Church as a whole cannot fulfil its mission in isolation from the world in which
evil and sin are present, then Catholic institutions cannot fulfil the sacramental
potential of their own particular ecclesial identities unless they are prepared to
engage the very powers of the world which make that mission so necessary.
These threads of systematic theology - and in particular of ecclesiology and
christology - have a great deal to offer a theological vision of Christian moral life in
general, and of institutional cooperation in particular.

They demonstrate, first and

foremost, that institutional actions do not exhaust their meaning in reference to the
particular institution alone, but find their fullest meaning in the identity and mission
of the Church as the sacrament of Christ.
• Like the acts of an individual moral agent, a Catholic institution’s actions are
more than isolated single events: they represent both ‘interior’ and ‘personal’
responses to particular moral situations, but they are also ‘constitutive’ and
‘existential’ responses which both express and construct the very identity of the
institution itself. Taken in their fullest meaning, institutional moral actions flow
from an institution’s sense of self-identity and mission: they express ‘who I am’,
and they make real ‘who I am called to become’.
• Like the individual moral agent, a Catholic institution acts according to its
consciousness of moral truth found first and foremost in the Person of Jesus
Christ, who is encountered in and through the Christian community, in particular
in the Scriptures and the Sacraments. Prior to conforming its actions to the
content of positive moral law - and certainly never contrary to that law - an
institution seeks to conform its very identity to the Person of Christ in and through
identification with the Church, the sacrament of Christ. Its moral actions, then,
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are an expression of its daily ‘conversion of heart’ in conformity with Christ and
the Church.
• Through the Catholic institution the Church makes present the saving life, death
and resurrection of Christ for the salvation of the world.

Like the individual

Christian, the Catholic institution is to ‘bring forth fruit in charity for the life of
the world’ precisely because this is the mission of the whole Church.88

But

because of its more public ecclesial identity, a Catholic institution’s moral actions
have particular sacramental significance.

5.1.5

Continuity with the Catholic Moral Tradition

How does this view of institutional action correspond with the traditional
interpretation of legitimate cooperation in general, and of institutional cooperation in
particular?
First it must be admitted that this ‘sacramental’ view of institutions interprets
their actions from just one of several possible perspectives. Nevertheless, to grasp
the ontological and existential significance of external moral actions is, it is claimed,
faithful to a theology which acknowledges the central significance of the moral
agent, and this is certainly in keeping with the teaching of the Second Vatican
Council.
This view obviously ascribes great importance to the particular intention of
the cooperating institution, but this is not to say that institutional actions can never
be adequately described unless one takes account of those intentions. The proposed
‘sacramental’ view of institutional actions, on the contrary, assumes the traditional
position on intrinsically evil acts: some actions so ‘radically contradict the good of
the person’ that they can never express the moral agent’s Christian identity.89
The present proposal would exclude all actions which could be conceived as
‘intrinsically evil’ or as ‘implacably opposed to one or other of the basic human
88

See John 15:1-17, especially v.16.
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goods’ because, even if moral theology is to grant a central position to the person
who acts, a moral agent is never entirely self-defining.

Rather the identity of any

moral agent, individual or institutional, finds its fullest definition in reference to its
relationship with, and fidelity to, the Truth. It is only in the encounter with Christ
that a person’s most profound identity is revealed, since the individual moral agent is
not merely ‘man’ but ‘man redeemed by Christ’.90 Like the Church itself, Catholic
institutions can be fully defined only in relation to Christ’s saving and redeeming
activity. Whether individual or institutional, a moral agent’s ability to conform his
exterior actions to this identity is proportionate to his conversion to the Word who is
Truth. This is a precondition for the present view of institutional cooperation.
Second, however, an institution’s particular intention (as distinct from the
intentionality of its exterior acts) does often play a critical role in determining the
meaning of its moral actions.

Given that an external action is not already morally

determined (as it would be in an intrinsically evil act), deliberation about possible
alternative actions may lead an institution to a state of equilibrium or poise wherein
arguments in favour of cooperation seem perfectly balanced by arguments against
cooperation. In this case it is possible that a desire to express the institution’s fullest
identity, an intention to fulfil its sacramental nature - to be the presence of Christ
here and now - could be the deciding factor. After all, ‘fulfilling one’s identity’ is
not to be measured solely in relation to the effects which follow upon one’s action,
but also and even primarily in terms of faithfulness to one’s personal vocational
commitment.91
But neither can the external effects of one’s cooperation be entirely
discounted, as the traditional teaching on scandal warns. The present proposal is, in
one sense, an interpretation of Alphonsus’s position on the primacy of charity in
cooperation properly so called.

Alphonsus held that cooperation in evil can

sometimes be permitted according to the order of charity because ‘charity does not
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oblige’ when meeting its needs causes one ‘grave inconvenience’.92

The present

question is whether charity can impose a positive obligation to cooperate in evil.
The answer offered here is : a Catholic institution may be constrained to cooperate
in evil if, in a particular case, cooperation is required of it in order to be faithful to
its ecclesial identity. The question of whether this obligation flows from charity or
elsewhere will be addressed in the next section.
At the same time, of course, it is important to recall that in de caritate
Alphonsus deliberately excluded aspects of cooperation which might be treated
under the virtue of justice:

were the demands of justice to be offended by

cooperating, then the institution would need a substantially more serious reason to
cooperate and might also be required to make restitution for the evil effects to which
it had contributed. Indeed, in many instances the demands of justice will compel an
institution not to cooperate at all.
For, thirdly, even if the institution’s action is not evil either in itself or as
cooperative, it is still necessary for a cooperator to hold a sufficiently serious reason
to cooperate. In this theological interpretation of the moral life, ‘a desire to express
the institution’s fullest identity, an intention to fulfil its sacramental nature - to be
the presence of Christ here and now’ might constitute such a reason, but only if :
• it is foreseeable that no injustice will be done to third parties, and
• the alternative to cooperating would deny the institution the possibility of
entering a situation in which it could and should be active as the offer of God’s
salvation in Christ.
And still institutional cooperation in evil often poses the risk of scandal, a
risk that is all the greater because the cooperator in question is a Catholic institution.
But where there is no risk of scandal and where the demands of justice will not be
offended in relation to third parties, a Catholic institution might conceivably consider
that its sacramental nature requires it to commission an action which another will
abuse, if it is only by cooperating in this way that the institution can extend to the
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principal agent God’s offer of salvation in Christ.

This sacramental role might

include the possibility of exercising a positive influence upon the principal agent at a
later time, but that in itself would not justify cooperation: it is rather the institution’s
possibility of being here and now the presence of Christ, of extending here and now
God’s offer of salvation, which might justify material cooperation in evil. As noted,
it seems necessary to assess every instance of cooperation on the basis of its concrete
circumstances and on present actual probabilities, not on mere future possibilities
which may never eventuate.93
Furthermore, an institution’s total vocational commitment is often extremely
complex.

For example, a Catholic hospital must provide excellent medical care,

keep all relevant civil and ecclesiastical laws, and operate according to best business
practices and highest professional standards. Even when taken together these do not
fully define the Catholic hospital’s identity, but each element is so essential to its
total vocational commitment that an institution could not reasonably claim to be a
‘sacrament of Christ’ if it culpably failed to fulfil - or worse, actually contradicted one or other of them.
The task of ‘real-ising’ or expressing a hospital’s vocational commitment is
complicated even further when one recalls that an institution’s identity rests in many
hands.94

There is a formal and official identity which may be enshrined in the

hospital’s mission statement or constitution, and there is an informal (but no less
real) identity which is expressed in the behaviour of individuals who act in the name
of the corporate whole. The formal identity of a Catholic hospital is given shape by
the ecclesial community it represents in the field of health care, by the goals and
intentions of its founders, and by the ‘accumulation of traditions as ways of doing
things’ which make this institution distinct from other similar institutions.95 Ideally
it is this ‘formal institutional identity’ which is realised in the behaviours of
individuals within the hospital.

Since patients and others encounter the institution
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first and foremost through those individual behaviours, these are of great
significance.
Because individual behaviours have such significance in Catholic institutions,
hospital administrators bear special responsibility to ensure that all institutional
actions, whether formal or informal, are appropriate. For example, because ‘respect
for persons’ is an essential aspect not only of good health care but also of Christian
charity, a Catholic hospital can authentically express its ecclesial identity and
vocational commitment only if individual members of staff act respectfully in all of
their ministrations.

Clearly this includes not only dealings with patients, but also

relationships among staff members, and relationships between management and
employees.

Or again, since a Catholic hospital acts as a corporate whole through

decisions and actions undertaken by its management acting in the name of the
institution, hospital management must be structured and must operate always in
complete conformity with this aspect of its identity.
For is not just in providing good medical care that a Catholic institution
expresses its sacramental identity, since many hospitals provide excellent medical
care. Nor is its identity expressed simply by constructing a ‘Catholic environment’,
or by providing Catholic chaplaincy services, or by formally enshrining a Catholic
mission statement - nor, indeed, just because it chooses to enter into cooperative
ventures with other health systems in order to provide a full range of medical care to
a particular community which might otherwise be deprived.

Rather, the defining

aspect of a Catholic hospital’s identity is its ecclesial meaning: the fact that when
the institution acts, it is the Church which acts.

The institution has a sacramental

nature because the Church is sacramental, and a Catholic hospital can extend the
healing mission of Christ into the present day only because the Church itself is
charged with that mission.

Therefore a Catholic hospital can most authentically

realise its identity only when the institution as a whole, in all of its corporate actions
and in all of the actions of its individual members, conforms itself to the Church’s
own identity as sacrament of salvation.
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The relationship between institutional identity and institutional action - or
between ontological and existential identity - suggests that a theological view of
institutional cooperation might find an appropriate interior structure in an ethics of
virtue.

5.1.6

Cooperation and Virtue

To develop a comprehensive theology of virtue is not only beyond the scope
of the present work, it is largely unnecessary in an era in which the ethics of virtue is
undergoing something of a revival.96 However, two points should be borne in mind
in the brief comments which follow.
First: strictly speaking, virtue theory applies to individual moral agents and
can be applied to institutions only analogically.

That is to say, one might well

consider a good individual to be virtuous, but one does not normally apply the
description ‘virtuous’ to an institution.
On one hand, virtuous action on the part of an individual (for example, an
employee) properly flows from and perfects that individual alone, and it is only by
analogy that the actions of individuals could be said to ‘flow from and perfect’ the
institution as such. On the other hand, it has already been suggested that just as the
Church acts in the field of health care through its Catholic hospitals, an institution
such as a hospital acts through individual agents such as doctors and nurses97 - so it
is not altogether unreasonable to transfer the term ‘virtuous’ from individual to
institution. Insofar as an individual acts in the name of the institution, the virtues of
the individual are the virtues of the institution - so, for example, an institution can
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be said to act prudently if the one who acts in the name of the institution acts with
prudence.98
Second: the idea of ‘virtue’ here is the classical concept rather than the neoscholastic version of the later manuals. In the classical view the intellectual virtue
of prudence, for example, does not direct the moral virtues from a distance, as it
were, by merely supplying knowledge of the virtuous mean; rather, it interacts very
intimately with the moral virtues such that practical wisdom shapes the very life and
identity of the moral agent.99 For a virtue not only renders a moral action good but
also makes its possessor good;100 and a moral action is truly good not just when the
right thing is done, but when it is done rightly.101 Thus, in the case of prudence:
The actions of the truly virtuous person express his settled,
intellectually informed commitment to live the sort of life that is a
good life for human beings. It is sometimes possible for a person
who does not have this sort of settled commitment to perform the
sorts of actions that a truly virtuous person would perform, but
her actions will not be truly virtuous actions precisely because
they do not flow from an intellectual commitment to live in a
virtuous way (I-II.57.5; I-II.58.4).102
Further articulation of the classical concept of virtue would take the present
discussion beyond reasonable bounds, but these brief comments help to explain how
the proposed sacramental model of moral life finds an appropriate ‘mechanism’ in an
ethics of virtue. The specific virtues in question are charity and prudence.103
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In any event the suggestion here is only that the structure of virtue sheds some light on how the
proposed sacramental model of institutional moral life might function in particular instances of
cooperation.
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It has been noted that Alphonsus identified the order of charity as an
objective basis for preferring cooperation in evil to non-cooperation.104 By the same
token, of course, it may sometimes be an act of the very greatest charity to refuse to
cooperate at all. But can charity ever compel one to cooperate in evil?
An answer might begin with the nature of charity, the theological virtue
which ‘reaches to God by joining us to Him’:105
Aquinas holds that charity . . . functions as the supreme
organising principle in the personality of the justified, by which
not only all their actions but all their desires and impulses are
directed toward God (II-II.23.3, 7).
Through charity, the
individual is enabled to participate in the very mind and will of
God, not only to fulfil the precepts of the natural law . . . but
even to grasp intuitively what God’s will is for the individual in
any given situation. That is why wisdom is the gift of the Holy
Spirit that corresponds to charity (II-II.45.1, 2). At the same
time, charity transforms not only the behaviour but the affections
and the whole person of the justified.106
Now it would seem from this description that charity could never compel one
to cooperate in evil, since evil can never ‘join us to God’.

But this would be to

overlook the very reason that ‘cooperation in evil’ has been such a complex question
for moral theologians through the ages: while the First Principle of Practical reason
certainly obtains, it is not the cooperator but the principal agent who does evil.
When cooperation in evil is rightly deemed ‘legitimate’, the cooperator does no evil
at all but justifiably provides goods or services which are abused by the other. So
the present question concerning cooperation and charity, the virtue which directs the
acts of all other virtues to our final end,107 may be formulated variously:
• is it conceivable that virtuous moral agents may believe themselves to be
compelled by charity to provide particular goods or services which will be abused
by another for an evil end?
• could cooperation in evil ever be, or at least appear to the moral agent to be,
congruent with union with God, the moral agent’s final end?
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• is it possible that virtuous moral agents might believe that cooperation in evil is
necessary if they are to express here and now their Christian identity and fulfil
their Christian mission to make present God’s offer of salvation in Christ?
These questions cannot be answered in the abstract, since so much depends
on the concrete details of the particular instance. Indeed, the tradition’s success in
discerning different categories of cooperation - formal and material, immediate and
mediate, proximate and remote, necessary and contingent - arose from a moral
conviction that some kinds of cooperation are acceptable not in theory or in general
but only according to the concrete facts of the particular case.

Likewise, recent

controversy over the legitimacy of immediate material cooperation in the case of
intrinsic evil emphasises that in particular cases some kinds of cooperation are never
acceptable.108 On the other hand, it was noted above that the magisterium itself has
suggested that moral agents may in some cases feel ‘constrained’ to cooperate,109
and even Germain Grisez acknowledges that one’s vocational commitment may
sometimes provide a strong reason to accept ‘bad side effects’.110
This suggests that the question of whether an institution can feel itself
compelled to cooperate in evil finds an answer not immediately in charity, the
theological virtue which directs moral virtues to their end, but in the virtue of
prudence, the intellectual virtue which in particular cases directs the moral virtues to
their mean.111
Under the direction of charity, the aim of all moral virtues is the same,
namely, to achieve human good.

The human good is grasped in natural reason by
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synderesis.112 While it is charity which inclines a moral virtue to its proper end and
synderesis which apprehends that end, prudence has a distinct and critical role:
Yet quite how and through what we strike the virtuous mean, this
is the business of prudence. For though keeping the mean is the
aim of moral virtue, nevertheless it is in the correct marshalling of
the means to the end that the mean is found.113
It is essential to note here the distinction between the ‘mean’ of a virtue and
the ‘means’ by which a virtue is realised.114

The latter is id quod est ad finem,

where the finis is the end to which charity inclines. But the former, the ‘mean’ of a
virtue, always consists in ‘conformity with reason’, and ‘conformity with reason is
specified in different ways for the different virtues’.115
. . . the mean of these virtues is said to be the rational mean,
which is determined by reference to the individual’s own overall
good. . . . [But] it is the task of prudence to determine what,
concretely, the mean of the virtue is. That is to say, synderesis
determines the formal end of the virtue, namely, correspondence
to the mean, whereas prudence determines the substantive ends of
the virtues (cf II-II 47.7 ad 3).116
Thomas’ theory of virtue, then, already provides an answer to the ‘gap’ which
Germain Grisez proposes to fill by way of his complex value theory,117 and Thomas’
answer is ‘the virtue of prudence’. The First Principle of Practical Reason dictates
that good is to be done; charity orients the moral agent toward the good and
synderesis apprehends that good; but it is the virtue of prudence which plays the
pivotal role of determining what constitutes the specific ‘instantiation’ of human
good in any particular case:
Natural reason, functioning as synderesis, generates the principle
that the good of the human person is to be in accordance with
reason. Prudence, which takes account of the specifics of an
112

ST II-II 47, 6 Resp. & ad 1.
ST II-II 47, 7.
114
Because of this possibility of confusion between the ‘mean’ of a virtue and the ‘means’ of a
virtue, the second sentence of the preceding passage (‘Licet enim attingere medium sit finis virtutis
moralis, tamen per rectam dispositionem eorum quae sunt ad finem medium invenitur’) might better
be translated: ‘For although attaining the mean is the end of moral virtue, nevertheless that mean is
found in the right disposition of those things which are for the end.’ As Porter argues (The Recovery
of Virtue, 159), prudence always locates the mean of virtue, but sometimes does not seem to be
required to identify the means to attain it.
115
Porter, The Recovery of Virtue, 160. The reference is to ST I-II 64, 2.
116
Porter, The Recovery of Virtue, 160. Emphasis added.
117
See 3.1.4.1, above.
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individual’s own character and circumstances, determines what,
concretely, it means for this individual to be in accordance with
reason; prudence does this in and through determining the mean
of the virtues relative to the individual and to the demands of
equality and the common good.
That is to say, prudence
determines what amounts to a substantive theory of the human
good, at least as it applies to this individual in his particular
setting, although of course the individual may not be able to
formulate that theory in any systematic way.118
So the virtuous mean is determined in relation to both the individual moral
agent and the particular situation with which the agent is confronted. In the context
of the present discussion, this means that the virtuous mean is determined in relation
to the identity of the institution and its present and future possibilities to make Christ
present in the particular situation.

For prudence must consider numerous

possibilities, including the goods which are actually achievable within a given
situation and the concrete subjective possibilities of the particular moral agent.
How does this apply to the question of institutional cooperation in evil, and to
the proposed ‘theological background’ to institutional cooperation?
Insofar as a Catholic institution is conscious that it acts on behalf of the
Church to make Christ really present in a given field of endeavour, it can be said to
have a ‘settled commitment’ to be a sacrament of Christ, to become what God desires
it to become.

As for an individual moral agent, the basic moral question for a

Catholic institution is, ‘who am I to become?’ The answer is always ‘a sacrament of
Christ’.

This commitment permanently informs and guides the actions of the

institution, and in turn those actions ‘real-ise’ that commitment.

In all of those

actions it is charity which keeps the institution oriented toward the good which is its
proximate end (and towards God as its ultimate end), and it is charity which impels
the institution to fulfil its Christian vocational commitment.
This ‘settled commitment’ to the good applies to all of the institution’s
actions, including those which may be cooperative in evil. Cooperation in evil must
118

Porter, The Recovery of Virtue, 162. Emphasis added. Germain Grisez’s great contribution is
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be assessed in terms of the specific circumstances surrounding each instance, and
one particular question is always, ‘what is the good to be done in this concrete
situation?’

It is charity which orients the institution toward doing the good in

general terms, but it is the virtue of prudence which permits the institution to
‘instantiate’ the good according to the concrete circumstances of the particular case.
That is, an institution’s ability to determine where a realisable good might lie in a
concrete situation, and whether on balance that realisable good ought to be done in
fact, is a function of the virtue of prudence.
Two further comments are warranted.

The first concerns the analogy

between individual and institution: an institution as such could be said to possess the
virtue of charity insofar as a ‘settled commitment’ to its ecclesial meaning is a more
or less permanent and determining feature of institutional life and work. It might be
formally enshrined, for example, in a mission statement. But the very nature of the
virtue of prudence suggests that it is possessed not so much by the institution per se
as by individuals within the institution.
Thomas teaches that reason consists in three ‘acts’: counsel and judgment,
which pertain to speculative reason, and command which pertains to practical
reason.119 The role of prudence is to ‘charge our conduct with right reason’,120 and
since actual moral conduct concerns the concrete and particular, it is evident that
prudence is most properly an exercise of practical reason.

It is for the leadership

and administrators of institutions to make practical determinations of the ‘realisable
good’ in concrete situations, and so it is most properly these individuals, acting in the
name of the institution as such, who must possess the virtue of prudence.
Nevertheless, in virtue of the analogy, an institution guided by prudent
administrators could be said to act prudently itself.
Second: as noted, there is general agreement that cases of cooperation in evil
are among the most complex and difficult in the whole run of moral theology, and

precisely this, to articulate ‘a substantive theory of the human good’ in a systematic way.
119
ST II-II 47, 8.
120
ST II-II 47, 1 ad 3; 4.
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opinions on what is justified and unjustified cooperation are many and varied. This
further explains the need for an institution’s administrators to possess the virtue of
prudence, and especially for that ‘part’ of the virtue which deals with difficult cases.
Thomas teaches that prudence includes the ‘special virtues’ of eubulia
(concerning counsel), synesis (concerning sound judgment in cases where normal
rules of conduct apply), and gnome (concerning sound judgment in truly exceptional
cases).121

The last, gnome, he describes as follows:

Now sometimes it happens that something has to be done which
is not covered by the ordinary rules of conduct, such as when we
should not return a deposit entrusted to us by a would-be attacker
of our country, or some other such case. We ought, therefore, to
judge matters of this kind by certain principles higher than the
ordinary rules followed by sound judgment. They call for a
corresponding superior virtue of judiciousness, and this is called
gnome, which implies a certain sharpsightedness of judgment.122
A single instance of institutional cooperation may be fraught with many
complicating factors: the particular institutional structure, the many permutations of
professional and corporate relationships which are possible between institutions, the
need to retain an often historically-conditioned institutional identity while
simultaneously addressing very contemporary social and cultural situations, to name
just a few.

The urgency of assessing possible cooperative relationships is often

compounded by economic pressures, and the whole process further complicated by
the fact that moralists often disagree among themselves on the proper classification
of proposed actions:

does a particular action constitute mediate or immediate

material cooperation? is it too proximate or sufficiently remote? is it necessary or
contingent? is the institution’s end, to make Christ present, likely to be achieved in
this way? The task of determining the reasoned mean among an institution’s actual
possibilities

in

the

concrete

case

would

surely

demand

precisely

that

‘sharpsightedness of judgment’ which is the specific virtue of gnome.

121
122

ST II-II 48.
‘perspicacitatem judicii’. ST II-II 51, 4.
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Finally, Thomas notes that prudence belongs principally to command, which
‘consists in bringing to execution what has been thought out and decided on’ by
eubulia and either synesis or gnome.123 Therefore prudence has a certain imperative
character:

the virtuous person must act according to the decision reached in

prudence.
Here there is, perhaps, an answer to the question of whether a moral agent
(such as a Catholic institution) could ever feel compelled to cooperate in evil in order
to realise its nature as a sacrament of God’s offer of salvation in Christ. It is charity
which inclines a Catholic institution to desire realisation of its own sacramental
nature (as a proximate end conducting it towards its final end, which is God), but it is
prudence which (i) ultimately determines the extent to which this end is practically
realisable in the concrete circumstances of the situation, which (ii) settles upon the
means to realise it, and which (iii) commands that the external act be performed.
Of course, prudence commands not only the attainment of good but also the
avoidance of evil. If in a particular situation it is unable to identify ‘realisation of
the institution’s sacramental nature’ as an attainable good - if, for example, it
identifies that overall there is no good to be attained, or if it determines that any
positive action would represent a contradiction of the very identity the institution
seeks to realise - then prudence may command that no action be taken at all.

In

this case ‘to do nothing’ may be considered an action commanded by prudence, and
a virtuous action at that: an example of practical wisdom informing the virtue of
temperance, perhaps, or courage, or justice. Here still the moral agent is inclined to
the good by charity, and here still prudence determines the virtuous mean.
But the point of this section is that prudence may determine that, although
another agent will certainly abuse the Catholic institution’s good action and thereby
bring about evil, its own vocational commitment to make present God’s offer of
salvation in Christ is still an attainable good to which charity inclines that institution.
Whether or not the principal agent responds to that sacramental presence is not the

123

ST II-II 47, 8.
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primary measure of the goodness and validity of the institution’s cooperative action,
any more than the actions of the Old Testament prophets are to be judged good and
valid according to the number of sinners who actually repented.124 Faithfulness to
one’s own identity carries, to some extent, its own measure of validity.
To summarise: fidelity to God demands fidelity to oneself and to one’s very
identity as a person redeemed by Christ.

A Catholic institution has a sacramental

identity, a mission to become Christ and to make Christ present in the concrete
circumstances of life in the world. So it is that the person of the moral agent enters
into the heart of the moral decision, and that moral decisions are governed by the
virtues of charity and prudence which must take account of the concrete
circumstances of the particular moral agent and the particular case.

It is of the

essence of prudence to ordain only those actions by which the particular moral agent,
in view of all concrete circumstances, may attain the realisable good. Love of God
may incline an institution towards entering a cooperative relationship in order to
make present there God’s offer of salvation in Christ, and for precisely the same
reason prudence may command the institution to enter that cooperative arrangement.

In the question of institutional cooperation, as in all moral matters, it seems
that ‘only the soul which really loves the good can be prudent, but only the prudent
soul can really do the good’.125

124

The Scriptures abound with examples of prophets who were faithful to their prophetic mission
‘in season or out’, regardless of the effects of their preaching - see 2 Timothy 4:1-2; Isaiah 6:9-10;
Ezekiel 3:27.
The prophets expressed their prophetic identity by their words and actions, by
responding faithfully to their personal vocational commitment. Their mission was not defined by the
reception they received, but by their actions themselves.
125
Crossin, What are they saying about virtue?, 16, where he summarises the virtue theory of
Josef Pieper in Pieper’s The Four Cardinal Virtues. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1966).
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5.2

Assessing Institutional Cooperation
Whereas material cooperation commissioned by an individual moral agent

has traditionally been assessed from the standpoint of the metaphysics of human
action, this interpretation of institutional cooperation proposes an additional
theological criterion.

The aim of this final section is to outline some of the

implications of this interpretation, and to suggest how a theological view of
institutional material cooperation might be applied to the case study with which this
work began, the Bunbury case.

5.2.1

Some Implications of a Theological View of Institutional Cooperation

There are three immediate benefits in the proposed view of cooperation: it
underlines the need for an individual assessment of individual cases; it places the
person of the moral agent squarely at the centre of moral decision-making; and it
affirms the unity which must exist between moral decision-making on one hand and
spiritual life on the other - in other words, the unity of reason and faith.
The proposed theological view of institutional cooperation emphasises the
importance of judging each case on its merits.

There are many varieties of

institutional structures and collaborative corporate arrangements, and many different
social and political environments to be accounted in the assessment of institutional
cooperation.

The breadth of this range of variables suggests that individual

instances of cooperation are best evaluated by those with greatest knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the particular case.
This interpretation of cooperation ideally requires the Catholic institutional
moral agent to be aware of its ecclesial sacramental identity, and to seek to realise
that identity in and through the cooperative arrangement it is considering. A great
deal, therefore, rests on the Catholic institution’s consciousness of its mission, on its
ability to identify its own mission with that of the ecclesial community in whose
name it acts, and on its actual desire to realise its ecclesial identity as sacrament.
There can be, and often will be, significant variations in these.
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On one hand this might seem to complicate the practical implementation of
this view of institutional cooperation: like individual moral agents, institutions may
be considered to possess greater or lesser abilities to identify their moral obligations
and to act upon them.126 On the other hand, this is precisely why the Catholic moral
tradition developed an appreciation of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ morality, and why
there is today a revival in the ethics of virtue.

The fact that an objective moral

obligation exists, is a datum quite distinct from a particular moral agent’s subjective
appreciation of being bound by that obligation.127 Much depends on the particular
institution’s consciousness of its ecclesial identity and of the obligations which flow
from that identity.

For example, two hospitals may enter virtually identical

collaborative arrangements with other institutions: for one, cooperation is simply
good business and nothing more; for the other it represents an authentic opportunity
to make Christ present in the field of health care. The outward or physical actions
may be identical, but they have very different moral meanings.
For the person of the moral agent is engaged in the very ‘stuff’ of morality,
especially in moral decision-making. In the fuller theological sense proposed here,
morality concerns the meaning which human acts have in relation to the present and
future identity of the moral agent, as expressing and constructing that identity.
Moral decision-making requires the moral agent to assess an external action in the
light of its meaning for his or her identity as the acting person.

The key moral

question in the theological view is not ‘what am I to do?’ but ‘who am I to become?’
At the same time, universal norms of morality preserve the objectivity of
moral goodness by orienting the institutional moral agent toward authentic moral
truth.

As much as a Catholic institution is responsible for formulating its unique

126

In the case of individual moral agents, this variation underlies the ‘developmental’ approach to
human learning and moral reasoning elaborated by Piaget, Kohlberg and Erikson. See for example
Gerald J Mathias, Moral Development and Psychosocial Development: A Comparative Study of the
Developmental Theories of Lawrence Kohlberg and Erik H Erikson. Doctoral Dissertation. (Rome:
Academia Alfonsiana, 1987).
127
This is the meaning of the so-called ‘principle of graduality’: see Pope John Paul II, Apostolic
Exhortation Familiaris consortio. ‘The Role of the Christian Family in the Modern World.’ (22
November 1981). AAS 74(1982) 81-191, nn.9 and 34 in particular.
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subjective response to the invitation of Truth, and so for constructing its particular
institutional identity, it is also required to affirm the universal and objective
hallmarks of its ecclesial identity.

Because the measure of goodness is universal,

there is no place here for a ‘situationism’ in which anything and everything can be
justified on the grounds that it ‘seemed right in the circumstances’. The ‘rightness’
of institutional moral action rests primarily on the authenticity of the institution’s
response to God’s invitation, not on a subjective balancing of goods or values or
outcomes.
This view of institutional cooperation also restores a traditional emphasis to
morality: the life of virtue.

The moral life is about much more than ‘sins to be

avoided’: in its essence it concerns ‘what God wants me to be and to become here
and now’. Moral actions not only express the agent’s response to God’s invitation,
they also realise it: they make the agent to be what God wants him or her to be.
This is the nature of virtue.

Thus moral life is reintegrated with spiritual life, and

faith with reason.
But this theological interpretation of institutional cooperation would
represent only a vague theory if it were not grounded in the traditional interpretation
of legitimate cooperation.

It is applicable in practice because it complements and

does not contradict that tradition. If an institution’s action is itself immoral, or if it
constitutes formal cooperation in evil when assessed according to the traditional
criteria of intention and intentionality, or if it constitutes unjustified material
cooperation (because there is no sufficiently serious reason), or if it constitutes
mediate material cooperation which is too proximate under the circumstances, or if
cooperation would give scandal, then the present theological interpretation cannot
‘rescue’ the cooperative act by making it somehow legitimate or justifiable.
In other words, this theological perspective does not significantly impact the
traditional ethical categories or their application to the particular case.

Rather it

adds a dimension to the interpretation of ‘sufficiently serious reason’: if all other
elements are favourable and only a ‘sufficiently serious reason’ is lacking, then an
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institution’s intention to realise its ecclesial identity as sacrament may constitute a
sufficient reason in a particular case.
This raises a question which, in terms of actually applying the proposed view,
requires a very clear answer: who makes the assessment of legitimacy in instances of
cooperation by Catholic institutions?
Where the moral agent is an individual person, it is obviously for the agent
himself or herself to make this judgment, for only the individual can answer the
question ‘who am I to become?’. The general principle seems to be: the judgment of
whether a proposed course of action will or will not express the moral agent’s
identity lies with the moral agent whose identity is at stake.
In some respects a Catholic hospital acts in its own name to realise its unique
institutional identity, and so the assessment of cooperation rests with the institution
itself - that is, with the management structure responsible for institutional actions.
But a Catholic hospital also has an ecclesial identity: it can claim to exercise
Christ’s ministry of health care only because that ministry belongs to the Church as a
whole. Therefore the assessment of institutional cooperation must also rest with the
‘management structure’ responsible for ecclesial actions: that is, with the bishop of
the local Church.
If an institution’s management and the diocesan bishop were to work
independently in assessing proposed collaborative arrangements then, in the ideal
case, they would reach identical judgments. Of course it is possible that they would
not, and for perfectly legitimate reasons: a diocesan bishop may not possess all of
the required medical or other professional knowledge, and an institution’s
management may not have access to all of the required theological and ethical skills.
Nevertheless, it seems unreasonable to remove from the diocesan bishop the right
and duty to assess the morality of actions undertaken in the name of the Church he
leads. Since this question is raised in terms of the theological model proposed, it is
reasonable to draw a solution from the same model:

the Christology and
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ecclesiology evoked here place the diocesan bishop squarely in the focus of decisionmaking.
In some instances, perhaps, the proposed view will make cases of cooperation
easier to solve in theory but harder to solve in practice. But if it is necessary to go
beyond an ethics based in the traditional metaphysics of human action and reach a
genuine theology of Christian moral life, it is equally necessary to appreciate that the
Christian moral life is grounded in the Christian spiritual life.

This is where the

moral agent encounters moral truth in the Person of Jesus Christ, and it is in this
encounter that the moral agent is called to ongoing conversion of heart - indeed, to
ongoing conversion of self - through moral actions.

Neither institutional nor

diocesan leadership need fear the challenge of institutional cooperation if they
remain faithful both to the moral tradition of the Church on one hand and, on the
other, to that prayer and contemplation which are the very heart of the Church’s
spiritual and moral life. The claim here is that, insofar as the present proposal unites
these aspects of a Christian’s life, it represents an approach to material cooperation
which is entirely faithful to both Thomas Aquinas’ view of Christian morality and
the Vatican Council’s call to renewal.128 It is an approach which may prove useful
in evaluating instances of institutional cooperation.

5.2.2

The Bunbury Case Revisited

A practical application of this view of institutional cooperation can be
illustrated by re-reading the case study with which this work began, the collaborative
arrangement between the St John of God Catholic Hospital and the public Regional
Hospital in Bunbury, Western Australia.

As suggested earlier, this requires an

appreciation of the significance of, and interaction between,
Church’s insight into cooperation in evil;

(i) the Catholic

(ii) the social ethos and world-view

prevalent in the 1990’s in Western Australia in general and in Bunbury in particular;

128

On Thomas’ view, see Cullinan, Contemplation as the Basis of the Christian Moral Life. On
the Second Vatican Council’s agenda for renewal, see 5.1.1 above.
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and (iii) the world-view, moral experience and sense of self-identity of the St John of
God Hospital in Bunbury.129
The relationship between these elements will emerge more clearly as the
Bunbury case is reinterpreted in terms of a renewed moral theology.

The two

specific foci here are (a) the hospital’s sense of itself as a moral agent ‘created by
God and redeemed by Christ’ which possesses an ecclesial identity and a sacramental
mission, and (b) whether the various configurations of institutional collaboration
which were proposed would constitute or contradict that core identity.
An insight into the institutional identity of St John of God Hospital Bunbury
can be gained by reviewing something of the history of the hospital itself and of the
religious congregation which established it.
The Sisters of St John of God were founded in County Wexford, Ireland, in
1871. The date is significant: Ireland at that time was emerging from the poverty of
The Famine and, in virtue of the Land Act of 1870, was transforming itself from ‘a
nation of peasants to a nation of landowners’.130

The catalyst for the Sisters’

foundation was Bishop Thomas Furlong of Ferns, who wanted to establish ‘a nursing
Congregation in his diocese who would care for the poor in the workhouses and in
their homes’.131 The core of the foundation was a small group of religious from the
Congregation of Bon Secours, a community of Sisters founded in Paris in 1824. The
confluence of Bishop Furlong’s charitable intention and the Sisters’ dissatisfaction
with their present congregation was surely providential. In a very real sense the St
John of God Sisters were called into existence by a local Church precisely in order to
fulfil the Church’s mission to care for the poor and the sick.
Periodic revisions of the St John of God Sisters’ Constitution reveal that the
Congregation has always envisioned an apostolate which would keep pace with
changing social, cultural and religious needs.

The 1873 Constitution stated that,

129

See 5.0 above.
John Scally, To Speed on Angels’ Wings: The Story of the Sisters of St John of God. (Dublin:
Columba Press, 1995) 34.
130
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apart from the perfection of its members, the Congregation had several specific
characteristics, among them ‘the introduction of religion and salvation into the
families of worldlings, rich and poor, above all, in their last moments; the care of
the sick, both rich and poor, in hospitals and in their own homes’.132 There was also
an openness to other fields of the apostolate which the sisters might identify: they
could also ‘take charge of schools, and any other works of charity the bishop of the
diocese may approve of’.133
With this sense of identity the first eight Sisters arrived in Australia in 1895,
and opened their first hospital in Perth in the same year. In 1896, in response to a
typhoid epidemic in the Western Australian goldfields, they established another
hospital in Coolgardie (which they subsequently moved to Kalgoorlie); by 1900
they had added three schools; and by 1912 another five schools, a school of nursing,
and the Kimberley Mission.

St John of God Hospital, Bunbury, was their fifth

Australian hospital when it opened in 1927.134
By all of these works the Sisters of St John of God expressed and constituted
their Congregational and ecclesial identity, and fulfilled their mission among the
people of Australia. In combining the provision of hospital-based health care with
proclamation of the Gospel the Sisters perhaps reflected the spirituality of Bishop
Furlong,135 but this fusing of charitable and religious works was also very much a
distinctive mark of their Congregation, suffusing every aspect of their mission. This
persists in the new Bunbury health campus.

By the time the new Bunbury hospital was under consideration in 1989, the
Congregation was already developing a more specifically Christological and
ecclesiological sense of itself:
131
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For the Congregation,
as for the Church itself,
there is but one mission, the mission of Jesus.
Anointed by the Spirit (Lk 4.18; Is 42 and 61),
Jesus was sent by the Father
to set his people free:
to liberate them from oppression,
from everything, within and without,
which prevented them from reaching the full stature of their
personhood.
The Congregation seeks
to continue and make present again
in concrete, specific time and place,
this liberating mission of Christ,
and in particular,
to show forth by its ministries,
by the witness of its consecrated members
and by the visibility of its corporate existence,
the compassionate care of Christ for his people.
The particular apostolic concern
of the founders of the Congregation
was the faith-view of the people:
‘the introduction of religion and salvation
into the families of worldlings, rich and poor.’
Nurturing this faith-view of life
is the essential apostolic concern
of the Congregation.
In their ministry of holistic health care,
education, catering services,
pastoral and social work,
and in all their activities,
the concern of the members is ultimately
the building up of the kingdom of God.
In working with people,
and in turn being enriched by them,
they discharge their unique role
in the apostolic, social and cultural life of the world in which they
live.
As the Church is missionary by nature,
so too is the Congregation.’136
Three aspects of this statement of self-identity are directly relevant to the
present discussion.
136

From the 1989 Constitution, cited in Scally, To Speed on Angels’ Wings, 215-216.
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• First, the St John of God Sisters are very aware that their mission is the mission
of Christ and of the Church

The language used to express the identification of

these two missions is more or less sacramental: ‘to continue and make present
again . . . the compassionate care of Christ for his people.’ The Congregation is
conscious of its ecclesial and sacramental identity, and the realisation of that
identity is clearly a primary object among its moral choices.
• Second, the Congregation holds as central the ‘personhood’ of those with whom it
works: its ministry is largely determined by the needs and best interests of the
people themselves, both rich and poor.137

In this way the Congregation

recognises another primary object of its moral choices: the good of the person. It
is here that the charitable and religious aspects of its mission coincide: the very
same actions which express the Congregation’s religious self-identity also realise
its foundational commitment to Christ’s command of practical charity towards
neighbour.138
• Third, the Congregation is aware that it expresses its sacramental identity in
various ways: ‘by its ministries, by the witness of its consecrated members, and
by the visibility of its corporate existence.’ Both formal and informal aspects of
institutional identity are acknowledged: the Congregation’s authenticity rests in
the hands of both the individual members of the Congregation and the visible
corporate ‘self’ of the Congregation as a whole.

The same applies to the

Congregation’s hospital in Bunbury: not only is the provision of holistic health
care an expression of the Congregation’s sacramental identity, but that identity
rests simultaneously with the hospital as a ‘corporate self’, and with the staff of
the hospital.
When it was evaluating various configurations of institutional collaboration
with the regional hospital, St John of God Bunbury was aware of itself as a moral
agent ‘created by God and redeemed by Christ’, possessing a specific ecclesial and
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sacramental identity.

Public consultation had reassured the Congregation that its

hospital ministry in that town was recognised and valued by the people, and the
Sisters themselves wished to continue a ministry which had occupied, for some, a
major portion of their religious lives. By providing Catholic health care the hospital
had offered the people of Bunbury an opportunity to experience Christ’s compassion
for the sick.

Through their ministrations the Sisters made present and active the

saving love of God. The decision to continue a ministry in Bunbury by entering a
collaborative relationship with the regional hospital represents a desire to realise this
identity.
The two-fold nature of the Sisters’ ministry - delivery of health care and
witness to Christ - warrants closer attention. The charity which orients the St John
of God Sisters toward God and neighbour - a charity which the St John of God
Hospital Bunbury seeks to make real for the people of that town - is intended to
bear fruit for the life of the world, beginning in the lives of the patients themselves.
In some ways, then, the physical ministrations of hospital staff are both an end and a
means: an end, insofar as it is by this care that the patient is restored to physical
health; and a means, insofar as hospital care at St John’s has a unique quality which
enables the patient to encounter, identify and respond to the presence and action of
God. These aspects of the intention of the caregivers sets health care at St John of
God Hospital Bunbury apart from health care provided at the regional hospital.
Awareness of St John of God Hospital’s ecclesial identity played a major role
not only in the decision to enter a collaborative arrangement in the first place, but
also in determining the final collaborative structure and in settling the range of
services which St John’s would provide within that arrangement.
The first proposed configuration in Bunbury (Proposal 1) was for St John’s to
build and manage a single new public hospital.

But this would have required St

John’s to provide, or to cooperate formally in providing, immoral procedures such as
abortions and contraceptive sterilisations. On these grounds alone St John’s would
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have rejected Proposal 1 - but before this became necessary it was rejected for other
reasons.139 Several other proposals were eliminated for reasons of cost.
That left the option of collocated campuses with some shared ancillary
services.

The final configuration of these services on the collocated campuses

minimises, but does not entirely eliminate, the risk of material cooperation in evil.
This is most likely to arise where one campus provides services to the other, but the
kinds of services which are actually provided make the risk of cooperation very
remote. For example, there are no referrals for abortions or sterilisations from one
campus to the other because all attending physicians are aware of St John’s
opposition to such immoral procedures and to any involvement in them.
These practical considerations will always be major factors in the assessment
of proposed collaborative relationships, and the need to fully appreciate these
practicalities makes it clear that accurate assessment can only be made from a
position of close proximity to the facts.

But the objectivity which can and must

mark these deliberations cannot be that arising from a purely theoretical,
metaphysical assessment of ‘the case’. It must be that ‘trans-subjective’ objectivity
which is attainable only when all responsible parties - that is Sisters, hospital staff,
administrators and diocesan bishop - enter deeply and openly into the assessment of
the concrete possibilities of the particular instance.

When all parties engage in an

honest search for the best moral choice, when they work together guided by that
‘wisdom that responds to life’s deepest questionings’,140 then they are able to attain
a degree of unanimity which only occurs through encounter with the same moral
truth.
In summary, St John of God Bunbury saw that it has a mission to give
witness to Christ through providing health care in Bunbury; both the Sisters and the
people of Bunbury consider that ministry an important aspect of their lives; and a
decision to withdraw from Bunbury would have robbed the Sisters of an essential
aspect of their identity, the town of a powerful witness to Christ, and the Church of
139

See the Introduction to this work.
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an opportunity to be what it is created to be - a sacrament in the world of the
presence and action of God in Christ.
The Bunbury case therefore brings to light several touchstones of legitimate
institutional cooperation which emerge from a theological view of Catholic
institutions, and which complement the three general ‘principles’ noted earlier.141
These are (a) the extent to which a proposed cooperative action authentically realises
the mission of the institution to make Christ present among those to whom the
institution ministers in the name of the Church; and (b) the consequences - for the
institution, for those to whom it ministers, and for the Church - of not cooperating.
If these can be reduced to a fourth principle or axiom to guide future deliberation on
institutional cooperation, it might be worded in this way:
When a Catholic institution’s activity is deemed necessary for the
Church to fulfil its divine mission in a particular field, this may
constitute a sufficiently serious reason for the institution to
engage in that activity, even though it may also thereby constitute
material cooperation in evil.

5.2.3

Two Examples of Institutional Cooperation

As noted, St John of God eventually chose to provide oncology and palliative
care services in the final configuration of collocated health campuses.142

The

background to this option, and to another which did not eventuate, is revealing.
5.2.3.1 A Case for Institutional Cooperation
Several factors are driving the current trend in health care toward shorter
stays in hospital, among them better surgical techniques which require shorter
recovery times, the financial pressures of managed care and ‘case mix’ (in which
funding is linked to the number and variety of patients admitted), and the need to
limit patient exposure to nosocomial infection. One side effect of this trend is that
hospital staff generally have very limited time in which to offer the patient anything
but the necessary medical attention.

This limited exposure severely curtails
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Pinckaers, Sources, 66.
See 4.3.4 above.
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See the Introduction to this work.
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opportunities to expose the patient to the Catholic identity and mission of the
institution.
However, exceptions occur in oncology and palliative care which, by their
very nature, generally require hospitalisation over much longer time-frames.

In

oncology there are often repeat admissions as a cancer either does or does not
respond to treatment, and the very nature of palliative care often means that periods
of hospitalisation are prolonged. Furthermore, oncology frequently - and palliative
care by definition - are ‘end-of-life’ phases of health care. That usually means that,
in addition to requiring specialised medical care, the patient has particular emotional,
psychological, social, familial and spiritual needs.

Preparation for death is often a

difficult experience for both the patient and his or her family, a time when extra care
must be taken to meet sometimes urgent personal needs while maintaining quality
health care. Patients and families often require constant spiritual and pastoral care
to help them deal with the life-changing transitions which are taking place.
In offering this care - not as an ‘added extra’ but as a normal and ongoing
aspect of its holistic health care - the St John of God Hospital expresses and
constitutes its identity as sacrament of Christ the divine physician.

In view of the

spiritual nature of the human person, it can be argued that respect for the dignity of
patients demands the provision of more than the purely medical aspects of health
care.

And in view of its sacramental nature, it can be argued that St John’s has a

positive duty to offer those wider services - indeed, failure to do so would amount
to failure to meet one of the essential aspects of its ecclesial identity and mission. In
light of this, the decision to cooperate with the regional hospital at collocated
campuses was not an option but an imperative: in order to be faithful to its own
identity and mission St John’s had to maintain its health-care ministry in Bunbury,
and the ‘collocated campuses’ option was the best way to do so.
Note, furthermore, that St John of God fulfils its ministry without offending
the demands of justice toward third parties: there is no scandal attaching to the
cooperative venture. A careful campaign of public information has borne fruit, and
the collocation is not considered problematic by either the Catholic or non-Catholic
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people of Bunbury. Rather, this arrangement is seen as the best way for the Sisters
to express their ‘settled commitment’ not only to the town and its people, but also to
the Church and to the Congregation’s own identity. In the circumstances, it can be
argued that it would have been scandalous if the hospital had chosen not to collocate.
The St John of God Sisters rightly considered that provision of oncology and
palliative care services offered a special opportunity to make an uniquely Catholic
contribution to hospital care in Bunbury, a contribution which both benefited the
people of Bunbury and realised the hospital’s institutional identity.

A second

opportunity for cooperation, however, was less clear-cut and raised more intriguing
problems.
5.2.3.2 A Case for Institutional Cooperation ?
Every surgical hospital requires access to a Hospital Sterilisation Supply Unit
(HSSU) which prepares instruments for various surgical procedures.

Instruments

are collected from theatres, sterilised, and made up into ‘surgical packs’ which
contain a range of instruments required for particular operations.

These packs are

labelled according to the procedures for which they are prepared.

During the

planning phase of the Bunbury project, St John of God Hospital considered
submitting a tender for providing a HSSU for both campuses.
It must be understood that St John’s was determined not to provide any
immoral surgical procedures itself - procedures such as terminations of pregnancies
(TOP) or contraceptive sterilisations.

But running a HSSU would mean that St

John’s would have to prepare surgical packs so that these immoral procedures could
be performed on the regional campus: for example, St Johns might be asked to
provide the regional hospital with packs labelled ‘TOP’. This would have involved
St John’s in cooperation in evil.

The critical questions are: ‘what kind of

cooperation is this?’ and ‘would it ever be justified?’
The initial answers are straightforward enough. Provision of surgical packs
which are destined only for an immoral procedure would involve St John’s in formal
cooperation in that procedure, and this could never be justified.

According to the
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traditional analysis, the object of the act of providing packs labelled ‘TOP’ would
necessarily intend (ex fine operis) the provision of the immoral procedure itself - in
manualist terms, ‘an act which of its own intentionality is ordained only to the
other’s evil act also necessarily intends the evil itself’.143

Since TOP is in fact

immoral, cooperation in this way will always be formal and unjustified.144 Even in
the presence of ‘duress’, when some would consider cooperation to be ‘immediate
material’, the act by which cooperation is rendered would share the same moral
object as the immoral procedure itself.

As argued above, if a cooperative act is

already deemed immoral, then St John’s could not invoke a theological argument to
justify such cooperation based on ‘fidelity to its ecclesial identity and sacramental
mission’.

Furthermore the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s

determination in the Replies to Questions would rule out any institutional policy or
arrangement favouring such cooperation.
But then other possibilities emerge.

For example, St John’s might have

offered to manage a limited HSSU which provided all surgical packs except those
plainly destined for immoral procedures.

The regional hospital could obtain these

packs elsewhere - from another regional hospital, for instance - which would
remove from St John’s the danger of formal cooperation in those procedures. One
argument in favour of this arrangement is that when the unit was asked to provide a
‘TOP’ pack, a chain of events might be set in motion: an initial refusal by St John’s
might prompt inquirers to ask ‘why will you not provide this pack?’, and this might
create an opportunity for St John’s to explain the reasons for its opposition to such
immoral procedures - in other words, an opportunity for evangelisation.
The most curious feature of this possibility is that, far from threatening the
institution’s ecclesial identity and mission, providing a limited HSSU would

143

See 2.1.3 above.
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positively promote St John’s ability to bear witness to Christ by creating
opportunities for that witness to occur.

Such opportunities sit fairly comfortably

within St John’s ecclesial identity and sacramental mission;

but could the

theological argument support this alternative? A brief analysis is revealing.
In the alternative HSSU proposal, St John’s would never have supplied
surgical packs destined only for immoral purposes, so there would have been no
formal cooperation in the immoral procedures. Certainly this proposal includes the
probability that another agency will provide the packs in question; however, St
John’s does not intend that another agency will provide these packs but only acts in
the knowledge that this will probably happen.145

Furthermore, even provision of

seemingly ‘innocent’ surgical packs might constitute cooperation in evil if those
packs are used for evil purposes, but that is not always a possibility which can be
foreseen in a particular case.

In traditional terms, the immoral procedures

themselves, their outcomes, and the provision of the necessary surgical packs would
remain praeter intentionem for St John’s: none of these would be either direct or
indirect objects of intention.

The objects of St John’s volition, rather, would have

been (directly) the provision of all other packs so that legitimate surgical procedures
might be performed, and (indirectly) the creation of opportunities to explain its moral
stance to those who inquire. It is in regard to the latter that the theological argument
might be employed.
This arrangement might have created occasions on which St John’s ecclesial
identity and mission could have been realised in particularly effective ways, at times
when those inquiring were most open to perceive the presence of moral truth. From
this point of view it is arguable that St John’s had a duty to propose this
configuration of service provision, precisely in order to create those opportunities
and so realise its identity and mission.

But in any event, St John’s was not given

this option: the State Government refused to countenance what it considered to be a
‘piece-meal’ approach to a core medical service, and chose to have the regional

145

Grisez might argue that this still constitutes formal cooperation, since the proposal St John’s
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example CMP, 240. This objection is addressed above, 3.1.4.2.
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hospital provide the HSSU.

On one hand this deprived St John’s of an excellent

opportunity to realise its identity as sacrament of God’s offer of salvation in Christ;
on the other hand, it obviated the need for St John’s to reach a definitive moral
evaluation of this complex and intriguing possibility.

5.2.4

Conclusions: Institutional Cooperation, Past and Future

The present work has attempted to portray the history of the principle of
legitimate cooperation as an evolution which more or less matches that of moral
theology in general.
In the early part of its evolution the problem of cooperation in evil was
treated largely in the context of confessional practice, as a matter of pastoral concern.
Its complex structure and many permutations made it necessary to develop clarity
about categories and kinds of cooperation, so that confessors might know how best to
assist penitents in practice. But differentiation of various aspects of cooperation and
clarification of related questions (such as scandal and induction) created the
impression that the principle was more concerned with theoretical clarity than with
offering practical pastoral help to penitents. In other words, the principle took on a
life of its own, particularly in the manuals.
This probably led some to believe that all problems of cooperation in evil can
be resolved at the level of objective norms and metaphysical theory.

Vatican II

realised that this is not true - not for the problem of cooperation in evil, nor indeed
for any moral question. From the outset the Council saw the role of moral theology
(and of the Church in general) as essentially pastoral: to proclaim the Gospel by
word and work, to help Christians respond ever more faithfully to God’s invitation in
Christ, and so to ‘bring forth fruit in charity for the life of the world’.146
This challenge has a specific meaning within the context of Catholic moral
theory. Charity is the virtue which orients humanity toward its ultimate end, which
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is God. To ‘bring forth fruit in charity’ in the midst of a pluralist world, therefore,
represents a challenge to produce goodness in the world by remaining oriented
toward God in all things and in every institutional action, and so witnessing
continually to the validity of this orientation. This is a duty not just for the Church’s
own sake, but also and even primarily ‘for the life of the world’: that is, in order to
continue in the world the presence and activity of Christ who has come ‘so that they
may have life, and have it to the full’ (John 10:10).
The Second Vatican Council sought to resolve the pastoral difficulties
created by an excessive emphasis on objective morality, and to restore the person of
the moral agent to the centre of moral analysis. This means much more than merely
‘excusing’ certain actions on subjective grounds (for example, erroneous
conscience): it also means accepting that the person of the moral agent contributes
something to the full objective moral meaning of particular actions.

Note that the

Council’s concern was not with objective morality as such, but with an excessive
emphasis upon it: the traditional metaphysics and moral theory continue to play an
essential role in clarifying the objective meaning of human actions. The challenge
rather was to restore the balance between objective or doctrinal clarity on one hand,
and subjective or pastoral benefit on the other. The so-called ‘law of graduality’ is
one attempt to bring these two together.147

The theological interpretation of

legitimate cooperation proposed here is another.
What this interpretation offers moral theology in general, and the principle of
legitimate cooperation in particular, is a framework which links practical moral
decision making to the authentic Christian identity of the moral agent. The former is
in the realm of practical reason, the latter in the realm of faith: in contrast to the
traditional ‘metaphysics of agency’, this ‘theology of agency’ ties these two
inextricably.

As an interpretation of moral theology in general, this proposal also

has the benefit of relating the moral agent to the entire body of the Church: for
example, the full moral meaning of the actions of a Catholic institution can only be
assessed in the context of that institution’s ecclesial identity and its mission to make

147
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Christ truly present and active in the world.

With regard to the specific question of

cooperation in evil, this proposal emphasises the compelling power of ‘vocation’:
sometimes, despite the evil which will be done by others, a Catholic institution
simply must cooperate with them in order to bring about a good which only it can
produce and which is necessary ‘for the life of the world’.
One important question is whether the proposed ‘sacramental’ view of
institutional actions can also apply to individual moral agents.

In some senses it

would seem so: the structure of self-realisation through action is the same, and it can
be argued that since by Baptism one is grafted into the ecclesial Body of Christ, one
also shares the mission and identity of that Body. But insofar as it is more readily
identifiable as acting in the name of the Church, a Catholic institution has a more
obviously ecclesial role as ‘sacrament’.

On the other hand, of course, whether

individual or institutional, a moral agent’s ecclesial identity will play an active role
in shaping moral actions only to the extent that the moral agent is aware of that
identity and wishes to ‘real-ise’ it.

It is not simply ‘ecclesial identity’ but

‘awareness of ecclesial identity’ which makes the moral agent’s self or ‘person’
operative in moral decision-making.

The present work has proposed that this

awareness can and should play a decisive role in the resolution of at least some
instances of institutional cooperation in evil.
What of the future of the principle of legitimate cooperation?

It has been

argued here that the traditional metaphysical analysis of cooperative acts must be
retained, since this brings a great deal of clarity to what are often very complex
situations. But that metaphysical approach alone cannot always produce satisfactory
outcomes, often precisely because it tends to exclude the moral agent as a
constitutive element in morality.

As instances of cooperation become ever more

complex, it will seem harder and harder to analyse and resolve them using only the
traditional approaches.

Some additional terms of analysis are required.

The

suggestion here is that, since moral actions both express and constitute the identity of
the moral agent, the importance of ‘real-ising’ this identity should be taken into
greater account in the analysis of cooperative situations.
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All of this is particularly true in the case of Catholic institutions. The world
today is becoming more institutionalised. In bigger and bigger cities individuals are
thrust ever closer together, and yet are more and more anonymous to one another;
this makes it difficult to know exactly with whom one is cooperating and what their
intentions are. The business world is increasingly dominated by national and multinational corporations supplying a vast range of consumables, which brings the
institution more intimately into the lives of individuals.

These corporations are

often engaged in a wide range of businesses, not all of which would be morally
acceptable.

Individuals who engage the services or accept goods from those

corporations will find themselves more and more caught up in cooperation in these
evils.
The need for clear Christian witness in this world is urgent, yet it seems
increasingly difficult to know with certainty exactly what one ought to do. As time
goes by, not only will institutional cooperation become more complex, but Catholic
institutions will have to assess their options in terms broader than simply their own
particular institutional identity or mission. In the future the Church as a body will
insist even more strongly that its institutions assess cooperative ventures in light of
their ecclesial identity and mission, and only enter those which promise to enable the
Church to fulfil its mission to ‘bring forth fruit in charity for the life of the world’.
**********
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This study established four major aims:
• to explore the meaning of cooperation in evil through studying the evolution of
the principle of legitimate cooperation;
• to explore the similarities between ‘cooperation between individual moral agents’
and ‘cooperation between institutional moral agents’, and suggest how the
principle of legitimate cooperation might be applied to institutions;
• to suggest a theological framework within which to view institutional
cooperation;
• to demonstrate that a truly theological interpretation of legitimate cooperation in
evil can be, at one and the same time, grounded in the Catholic moral tradition
and responsive to the Second Vatican Council’s call to a renewal of moral
theology.
In addressing these aims the author expresses his sincere hope that this study will
make a useful contribution to the Church’s understanding of institutional cooperation
in evil.

**********

327

Selected Bibliography

I

Church Documents : Collections

Abbott SJ, Walter M. ed. The Documents of Vatican II. London: Geoffrey Chapman,
1967.
Flannery OP, Austin, ed. Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar
Documents. Dublin: Dominican Publications, 1975.
—

ed. Vatican Council II Volume 2: More Post Conciliar Documents. New
York: Costello, 1982.

Neuner SJ, J. and J. Dupuis SJ, eds. The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents
of the Catholic Church. 2nd edition. Bangalore: Theological Publications
in India, 1976.
Vv. eds. Enchiridion Vaticanum. 13 volumes, 2 supplements and Index. Bologna:
Dehoniane, 1977-

II

.

Church Documents : Papal and Curial

Catechism of the Catholic Church. (11 October 1992). Homebush, NSW: St Pauls/
Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1994.
Congregation for Catholic Education. The Theological Formation of Future Priests.
(22 February 1976).
Congregation for the Clergy. The Washington Case. (26 April 1971). L’Osservatore
Romano 20(164) 20 May 1971. 6-7.
—

General Directory for Catechesis. (11 August 1997).

Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Replies to Questions. Addressed to the
Australian Episcopal Conference. (29 July 1974). Unpublished.
—

Declaration Quaestio de abortu. ‘On Procured Abortion.’ (18 November
1974). AAS 66(1974) 730-747.

—

Response Quaecumque sterilizatio. ‘On Sterilisation in Catholic Hospitals.’
(13 March 1975). AAS 68(1976) 738-740.

—

Declaration Jura et bona. ‘On Euthanasia.’ (5 May 1980). AAS 72(1980)
542-552.
329

—

Instruction Donum vitae. ‘On Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on
the Dignity of Procreation.’ (22 February 1987). AAS 80(1988) 70-102.

—

Note Non sono mancante. ‘On the Moral Norm of Humanae vitae and the
Pastoral Ministry.’ (16 February 1989). Enchiridion Vaticanum 11:2142ff.

—

Instruction Donum veritatis. ‘On the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian.’
(24 May 1990). AAS 82(1990) 1550-1570.

John Paul II, Pope. Apostolic Exhortation Catechesi tradendae. ‘Catechesis in Our
Time.’ (16 October 1979). AAS 71(1979) 1277-1340.
—

Message to the Signatories of the Final Act of Helsinki on 1 August 1975
L’église catholique. ‘On Freedom of Conscience and Religion.’ (1
September 1980). AAS 72(1980) 1252-1260.

—

Apostolic Exhortation Familiaris consortio. ‘The Role of the Christian
Family in the Modern World.’ (22 November 1981). AAS 74(1982) 81191.

—

‘Address to Priests participating in a Seminar on ‘Responsible Parenthood’.’
L’Osservatore Romano 14(828) 2 April 1984. 7+16.

—

Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Reconciliatio et paenitentia.
Reconciliation and Penance in the Mission of the Church Today.’

‘On
(2

December 1984). AAS 77(1985) 185-275.
—

Apostolic Letter Spiritus domini. ‘On the Occasion of the Bicentenary of
the Death of St Alphonsus M de Liguori.’ (1 August 1987). AAS 79(1987)
1365-1375.

—

Encyclical Letter Sollicitudo rei socialis.

‘On Social Concerns.’

(30

December 1987). AAS 80(1988) 513-586.
—

Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Christifideles laici. ‘On the Vocation
and the Mission of the Lay Faithful in the Church and in the World.’ (30
December 1988). AAS 81(1989) 393-521.

—

Encyclical Letter Veritatis splendor. ‘On Certain Fundamental Questions of
the Church’s Moral Teaching.’ (6 August 1993). AAS 85(1993) 11331228.

—

Encyclical Letter Evangelium vitae. ‘On the Value and Inviolability of
Human Life.’ (25 March 1995). AAS 87(1995) 401-522.

330

—

Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Vita consecrata. ‘On the Consecrated
Life and its Mission in the Church and in the World.’ (25 March 1996).
AAS 88(1996) 377-486.

—

Encyclical Letter Fides et ratio. ‘On the Relationship between Faith and
Reason.’ (14 September 1998). AAS 91(1999) 5-88.

Paul VI, Pope. Encyclical Letter Humanae vitae. ‘Of Human Life.’ (25 July 1968).
AAS 60(1968) 481-503.
Pius XI, Pope.

Encyclical Letter Casti connubii.

‘Christian Marriage.’

(31

December 1930). AAS 22(1930) 539-592.
Pius XII, Pope. ‘Address Vegliare con sollecitudine, to Members of the Congress of
the Italian Association of Catholic Midwives.’ (29 October 1951). AAS
43(1951) 835-854.
—

‘Address Nell’ordine della natura, to “The Family Front”.’ (26 November
1951). AAS 43(1951) 855-860.

—

‘Address Ci riesce, to the National Convention of Italian Catholic Jurists.’
(6 December 1953). AAS 45(1953) 794-802.

—

‘Address Trois questions religieuses et morales concernant l’analgésie, to
the Italian Society of Anaesthesiology.’

(24 February 1957).

AAS

49(1957) 129-147.
Pontifical Biblical Commission. The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church. (15
April 1993).
Pontifical Council ‘Cor unum’. Document Dans le cadre. ‘Some Ethical Questions
concerning the Gravely Ill and the Dying.’ (27 June 1981).

Enchiridion

Vaticanum 7:1234ff.
Pontifical Council for Pastoral Assistance to Health Care Workers. Charter for
Health Care Workers. (1994). Bombay: Pauline Publications, 1995.
Pontifical Council for the Family. Vademecum for Confessors Concerning Some
Aspects of the Morality of Conjugal Life.

(12 February 1997).

L’Osservatore Romano 11(1482) 12 March 1997. I-VII.
III

Church Documents : Bishops

Australian Catholic Bishops’ Conference. Pastoral Letter on the Application of
‘Humanae vitae’. (September 1974) in Nicholas Kerr, comp. Australian
331

Catholic Bishops’ Statements Since Vatican II. Homebush, NSW: St Pauls,
1985.
—

The Word Dwells Among Us. Melbourne: Collins Dove, 1990.

Catholic Health Association of Canada.

Health Care Ethics Guide.

Ottawa:

Catholic Health Association of Canada, 1991.
—

Health Ethics Guide.

Ottawa: Catholic Health Association of Canada,

2000.
United States Catholic Conference. Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic
Health Facilities. Linacre Quarterly 39(1972) 8-12.
—

Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services.
Origins 24(1994) 449, 451-462.

IV

Moral Texts and Manuals

Aertnys CSsR, J. and C. A. Damen CSsR. Theologia Moralis secundum doctrinam
S Alfonsi de Ligorio doctoris ecclesiae. 2 volumes. 12th edition. Turin:
Marietti, 1932.
Alphonsus Liguori.

Theologia moralis. 4 volumes. Leonardi Gaudé, ed. (Critical

edition.) Rome: Typographia Vaticana, 1905.
Davis SJ, Henry. Moral and Pastoral Theology. 4 volumes. 1st edition. London:
Sheed and Ward, 1935.
Grisez, Germain.

The Way of the Lord Jesus. 3 volumes.

Franciscan Press 1983-1997.

Quincy/Chicago:

Vol. 1: Christian Moral Principles (1983);

Vol. 2: Living a Christian Life (1993); Vol. 3: Difficult Moral Questions
(1997).
Häring CSsR, Bernard.

The Law of Christ.

3 volumes.

1st English edition.

Translated by Edwin G Kaiser CPPS. Cork: Mercier, 1963.
—

Free and Faithful in Christ. 3 volumes. Homebush, NSW: St Pauls, 19781981.

Peschke SVD, Karl H. Christian Ethics: Moral Theology in the Light of Vatican II.
2 volumes. Revised edition. Alcester: C Goodliffe Neale, 1986-1993.

332

V

Books, Reference Texts and Dissertations

Anscombe, G. E. M. Intention. 2nd edition. Oxford: Blackwell, 1968.
Attard O.Carm., Mark. Compromise in Morality. Doctoral Dissertation. Rome,
1976.
Black CSsR, Peter J. The Moral Relevance of the Object of the Human Act in the
Developing Thought of Richard A McCormick 1965-1984: Fundamental
Moral Theology through Critical Dialogue. Doctoral Dissertation. Rome:
Academia Alfonsiana, 1994.
Bonandi, Alberto.

Veritatis splendor: Trent’anni di teologia morale.

Milano:

Glossa, 1996.
Brennan CSsR, Augustine Joseph.

Moral Action in Aristotle and Aquinas.

Canberra: The Canberra Province of the Redemptorist Fathers, n.d.
Brennan SJG, Sister Mary Eugenia. The Love of Christ Urges Us. Subiaco WA:
Sisters of St John of God, 1994.
Bruce, Steve. Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996.
Burke CM, D. F. The History of the Catholic Church in Western Australia 18291979. Perth: Vanguard, 1979.
Cessario OP, Romanus. The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics. Notre Dame,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991.
Crossin OSFS, John W. What are they saying about virtue? Mahwah, NJ: Paulist,
1985.
Cullinan, Edmond Gerard. Contemplation as the Basis of the Christian Life in St
Thomas’s Treatise on the New Law.

Doctoral Dissertation.

Rome:

Academia Alfonsiana, 1986.
Curran, Charles E. and Richard A. McCormick SJ, eds. Readings in Moral Theology
1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition. New York: Paulist, 1979.
D’Arcy, Eric. Conscience and its Right to Freedom. New York: Sheed and Ward,
1961.
Dedek, John F. Contemporary Medical Ethics. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1975.
de Finance SJ, Joseph. An Ethical Enquiry. Translated by Michael O’Brien SJ.
Rome: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1991.

333

Demmer MSC, Klaus. Interpretare e Agire: Fondamenti della morale cristiana.
Translated by Mauro Pedrazzoli. Milano: Edizione Paoline, 1989.
Dulles SJ, Avery. Models of the Church. Expanded edition. New York: Image
Doubleday, 1987.
Fabbro, Ronald. Cooperation in Evil: A Consideration of the Traditional Doctrine
from the Point of View of the Contemporary Discussion About the Moral
Act. Doctoral Dissertation. Rome: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1989.
Fagothey SJ, Austin. Right and Reason: Ethics in Theory and Practice. 4th edition.
St Louis: C V Mosby, 1967.
Finnis, John.

Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth.

Washington:

Catholic University of America Press, 1991.
Fuchs SJ, Josef.

Human Values and Christian Morality.

Dublin: Gill and

Macmillan, 1970.
—

Christian Ethics in a Secular Arena. Washington: Georgetown University
Press, 1984.

—

Moral Demands and Personal Obligations.

Washington: Georgetown

University Press, 1993.
Furton, Edward James, ed. Ethical Principle in Catholic Health Care: Selections
from 25 Years of Ethics and Medics.

Boston: The National Catholic

Bioethics Centre, 1999.
Gallagher, John A. Time Past, Time Future: An Historical Study of Catholic Moral
Theology. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 1990.
Gilson, Etienne. The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas. London: Victor
Gollancz, 1957.
Gowans, Christopher W. Innocence Lost: An Examination of Inescapable Moral
Wrongdoing. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Hannon, Patrick. Church, State, Morality & Law. Westminster MD: Christian
Classics, 1992.
Häring CSsR, Bernard. Teologia Morale verso il Terzo Millennio. Appunti per gli
studenti. Rome: Academia Alfonsiana, 1987.
—

and Valentino Salvoldi. Tolerance: Toward an Ethic of Solidarity and
Peace. New York: Alba House, 1995.

334

Hughes, Philip; Craig Thompson, Rohan Pryor, and Gary D Bouma. Believe It or
Not: Australian Spirituality and the Churches in the 90s. Kew, Victoria:
Christian Research Association, 1995.
Kasper, Walter.

The Christian Understanding of Freedom and the History of

Freedom in the Modern Era: The Meeting and Confrontation between
Christianity and the Modern Era in a Postmodern Situation. The 1988 Pere
Marquette Lecture in Theology. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press,
1988.
Kekes, John. The Morality of Pluralism. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press,
1993.
Kelly SJ, Gerald. Medico-Moral Problems. St Louis: Catholic Hospital Association
of the United States and Canada, 1957.
Lonergan, Bernard.

Doctrinal Pluralism. The 1971 Pere Marquette Theology

Lecture. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1971.
—

Method in Theology. 2nd edition. New York: Seabury, 1979.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. A Short History of Ethics. London: Macmillan, 1967.
—

After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. 2nd edition. London: Duckworth,
1985.

—

Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. London: Duckworth, 1990.

Mackay, Hugh.

Generations: Baby Boomers, their parents and their children.

Sydney: Macmillan, 1997.
—

Turning Point: Australians Choosing their Future. Sydney: Macmillan,
1999.

Mahoney SJ, John. Seeking the Spirit: Essays in Moral and Pastoral Theology.
London: Sheed and Ward, 1982.
—

The Making of Moral Theology: A Study of the Roman Catholic Tradition.
Oxford: Clarendon, 1987.

Mathias, Gerald J.

Moral Development and Psychosocial Development: A

Comparative Study of the Developmental Theories of Lawrence Kohlberg
and Erik H Erikson. Doctoral Dissertation. Rome: Academia Alfonsiana,
1987.
May, William E. An Introduction to Moral Theology. Huntington, Indiana: Our
Sunday Visitor, 1991.
335

McCormick SJ, Richard A. Notes on Moral Theology: 1965 through 1980. Lanham,
MD: University Press of America, 1981.
—

Corrective Vision: Explorations in Moral Theology. Kansas City: Sheed
and Ward, 1994.

—

and Paul Ramsey, eds. Doing Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in
Conflict Situations. Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978.

McDonagh, Enda. The Declaration of Religious Freedom of Vatican Council II.
London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1967.
McEvoy OMI, Raymond Owen. John Courtney Murray’s Thought in Religious
Liberty in its Final Phase.

Doctoral Dissertation.

Rome: Academia

Alfonsiana, 1973.
Mendus, Susan, and David Edwards, eds. On Toleration. The JB and WB Morrell
Memorial Addresses on Toleration, University of York. Oxford: Clarendon,
1987.
Mindling OFMCap., John Daniel.

Germain Grisez: Commitment and Choice.

Doctoral Dissertation. Rome: Academia Alfonsiana, 1987.
Mullady OP, Brian Thomas.

The Meaning of the Term ‘Moral’ in St Thomas

Aquinas. Studi Thomistici 27. Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1986.
Murray SJ, John Courtney. We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the
American Proposition. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960.
—

The Problem of Religious Freedom. London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1965.

—

ed. Religious Liberty: An End and a Beginning. New York: Macmillan,
1966.

O’Donnell SJ, Thomas J. Medicine and Christian Morality. Second revised and
updated edition. New York: Alba House, 1991.
Osborne OFM, Kenan B. Sacramental Theology: A General Introduction. Mahwah:
Paulist, 1988.
Pinckaers OP, Servais. Le Renouveau de la Morale: Études pour une morale fidèle à
ses sources et à sa mission présente. Téqui, 1964.
—

The Sources of Christian Ethics. Translated by Sr Mary Thomas Noble OP.
Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995.

Porter, Jean. The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas to Christian Ethics.
London: SPCK, 1994.
336

—

Natural and Divine Law: Reclaiming the Tradition for Christian Ethics.
Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1999.

Quarello, Eraldo. Morale cristiana e cultura. Biblioteca di Scienza Religiose 28.
Roma: Libreria Ateneo Salesiano, 1979.
Scally, John. To Speed on Angels’ Wings: The Story of the Sisters of St John of God.
Dublin: Columba Press, 1995.
Schillebeeckx OP, Edward.

Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God.

London: Sheed and Ward, 1963.
—

God and Man. London: Sheed and Ward, 1969.

Schmaus, Michael. Dogma 5: The Church as Sacrament. Kansas City: Sheed and
Ward, 1975.
Schnackenburg, Rudolf. The Moral Teaching of the New Testament. Translated by J
Holland-Smith and W J O’Hara. London: Burns & Oates, 1965.
Schoonenberg SJ, Piet. Man and Sin: A Theological View. Translated by Joseph
Donceel SJ. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965.
Schooyans, Michel.

Aborto e Politica. Translated by A. Maltarello.

Città del

Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1991.
Thiemann, Ronald F. Constructing a Public Theology: The Church in a Pluralistic
Culture. Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1991.
Thomas Aquinas. Summa theologiae. Blackfriars edition: Latin Text with English
translation. 60 volumes. New York: McGraw Hill, 1964-1976.
Vermeersch SJ, Arthur.

Tolerance. Translated by W Humphrey Page. London:

Washbourne, 1913.
Vorgrimler, Herbert.

Sacramental Theology. Translated by Linda M Maloney.

Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1992.
Westberg, Daniel.

Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action and Prudence in

Aquinas. Oxford: Clarendon 1994.
Wiltgen SVD, Ralph M. The Rhine flows into the Tiber: A History of Vatican II.
Rockford, Ill.: Tan, 1985.

VI

Articles and Monographs

‘On Material Cooperation.’ Catholic World Report (February 1995) 46.
337

‘The Secret of Mauritius.’ Catholic World Report (February 1995) 44-47.
Abbà, Giuseppe. ‘I Christian Moral Principles di G Grisez e la Secunda pars della
Summa theologiae.’ Salesianum 48(1986) 637-680.
Ambrosetti, Giovanni. ‘The Spirit and Method of Christian Natural Law.’ The
American Journal of Jurisprudence 16(1971) 290-301.
Anscombe, Elizabeth.

‘Gradualness in a Law, and a Law of Gradualness.’

Anthropos 1986:2. 183-186.
Arntz OP, Joseph. ‘Natural Law and its History.’ Concilium 5(1965) 23-32.
Atkinson, David J. and David H Field, eds. New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and
Pastoral

Theology.

Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1995.

S.v.

‘Compromise’ by D. H. Field.
Aubert, Jean-Marie.

‘Hiérarchie de Valeurs et Histoire.’

Revue des Sciences

Religieuses 44(1970) 5-22.
Bastianel SJ, Sergio.

‘Strutture di Peccato: Riflessione Teologico-Morale.’ La

Civiltà Cattolica 1989:1, Quaderno 3328. 325-338.
Baum, Gregory. ‘Structures of Sin’ in Gregory Baum and Robert Ellsberg, eds. The
Logic of Solidarity: Commentaries on Pope John Paul II’s Encyclical ‘On
Social Concern’. Maryknoll N.Y.: Orbis 1989. 110-126.
Bernardin, Joseph Cardinal.

‘Crossroads for Church’s Health Care Ministry.’

Origins 22(1992) 409-411.
—

‘The Consistent Ethic of Life and Health Care Reform.’ Origins 24(1994)
60-64.

—

‘The Case for Not-for-Profit Health Care.’ Origins 24(1995) 538-542.

Boyle, John P.

‘Lonergan’s Method in Theology and Objectivity in Moral

Theology.’ The Thomist 37(1973) 589-601.
Brennan, John J. ‘Quicksands of Compromise.’ Linacre Quarterly 39(1972) 13-15.
Buckley, William J. ‘Ethical and Religious Directives.’ Health Progress (JulyAugust 1995) 8.
Byron, William J. ‘Catholic Health Care: Partnering and Progress.’ America (28
September 1996) 16-21.
Canavan SJ, Francis. ‘Murray on Vatican II’s Declaration on Religious Freedom.’
Communio 9(1982) 404-405.
—

‘Our Pluralist Society.’ Communio 9(1982) 355-367.
338

Casey, Gerard N. ‘A Problem of Unity in St Thomas’s Account of Human Action.’
The New Scholasticism LXI(1987) 146-161.
Capone CSsR, Domenico. ‘Il pluralismo in teologia morale.’ Revista di Teologia
Morale 6(1974) 289-302.
Carrier SJ, Hervé. ‘The Contribution of the Council to Culture’ in René Latourelle,
ed. Vatican II: Assessment and Perspectives. New York: Paulist, 1989.
Volume 3: 442-465.
Cataldo, Peter J.

‘Models of Health Care Collaboration.’

Ethics & Medics

23:12(1998) 3-4.
Cessario OP, Romanus. ‘The Meaning of Virtue in the Christian Moral Life: Its
Significance for Human Life Issues.’ The Thomist 53(1989) 173-196.
Composta, Dario. ‘Le tendenze della teologia morale nel post-Concilio Vaticano II.’
Euntes Docete XLVII(1994) 351-400.
—

‘L’antropologia come presupposto dell’encicla Veritatis splendor.’ Euntes
Docete XLVIII(1995) 335-346.

Connery SJ, John R. ‘Prudence and Morality.’ Theological Studies 13(1952) 564582.
—

‘The Teleology of Proportionate Reason.’ Theological Studies 44(1983)
489-496.

Constable, George W.

‘A Criticism of ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and

Ultimate Ends’ by Grisez, Boyle, and Finnis.’ The American Journal of
Jurisprudence 34(1989) 19-22.
Coreil DC, Sister Bernice. ‘Forging a Future for Catholic Health Care.’ Origins
22(1992) 411-412.
Cornerotte CICM, L.

‘Loi morale, valeurs humaines et situations de conflit.’

Nouvelle revue théologique 100(1978) 502-532.
Coyle sc, Maryanna. ‘The Future of Catholic Hospitals.’ Chicago Studies 35(1996)
249-259.
Crotty OP, Nicholas. ‘Conscience and Conflict.’ Theological Studies 32(1971) 208232.
Curran, Charles E. ‘Dialogue with Joseph Fletcher.’ Homiletic and Pastoral Review
67(1967) 821-829.

339

—

‘Cooperation: Toward a Revision of the Concept and its Application.’
Linacre Quarterly 41(1974) 152-167.

—

‘Cooperation in a Pluralistic Society’ in Charles E. Curran, ed. Ongoing
Revision in Moral Theology. Notre Dame: Fides/Claretian, 1975. 210-228.

Dedek, John F. ‘Moral Absolutes in the Predecessors of St Thomas.’ Theological
Studies 38(1977) 654-680.
—

‘Intrinsically Evil Acts: An Historical Study of the Mind of St Thomas.’
The Thomist 43(1979) 385-413.

—

‘Intrinsically Evil Acts: The Emergence of a Doctrine.’ Recherches de
Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale 50(1983) 191-226.

Demmer MSC, Klaus. ‘Entscheidung und Kompromiss.’ Gregorianum 53(1972)
323-351.
—

‘Der Anspruch der Toleranz: Zum Thema ‘Mitwirkung’ in der
pluralistischen Gesellschaft.’ Gregorianum 63(1982) 701-720.

—

‘Cristologia - Antropologia - Teologia morale’ in René Latourelle, ed.
Vaticano II: Bilancio e Prospettive. Assisi: Cittadella, 1987. 1033-1048.

—

‘Cooperación’ in Hans Rotter and Gunter Virt, eds. Nuevo Diccionario de
Moral Cristiana. Barcelona: Herder, 1993. 90-94.

—

‘Tolerancia y cooperación: Una pregunta a la ética del derecho’ in Lorenzo
Alvarez Verdes and Marciano Vidal, eds. Le Justicia Social: Homenaje al
Prof. Julio de la Torre. Madrid: Editorial el Perpetuo Socorro, 1993. 329338.

Denny, David M.

‘Christ and Culture: An Interview with Avery Dulles SJ.’

Forefront 2:2(1995) 8-11.
Dorr, Donal. ‘Karl Rahner’s Formal Existential Ethics.’ Irish Theological Quarterly
36(1969) 211-229.
Duffey, Michael K.

‘The Moral-NonMoral Distinction in Catholic Ethics: The

Sterilization of Moral Language.’ The Thomist 49(1985) 343-366.
Dwyer, Judith A. ed. New Dictionary of Catholic Social Thought. Collegeville,
Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1994.

S.v. ‘Methodology, Moral’ by Brian

Johnstone CSsR; ‘Cooperation, Principle of’; ‘Double Effect, Principle of’;
‘Toleration, Principle of’ by James F Keenan SJ.

340

Finnis, John. ‘Object and Intention in Moral Judgments According to Aquinas.’ The
Thomist 55(1991) 1-27.
Fisher OP, Anthony.

‘Co-operation in Evil.’

Catholic Medical Quarterly

44:3(1994) 15-22.
Flannery SJ, Kevin L. ‘The Aristotelian First Principle of Practical Reason.’ The
Thomist 59(1995) 441-464.
Ford SDB, Norman. ‘Material Cooperation and Abortion.’ Chisholm Health Ethics
Bulletin (Spring 1998) 10-12.
Fuchs SJ, Josef. ‘A Harmonisation of the Conciliar Statements on Christian Moral
Theology’ in René Latourelle, ed. Vatican II: Assessment and Perspectives.
New York/Mahwah: Paulist, 1989. Volume Two: 479-500.
Gallagher CSsR, Raphael. ‘The Manual System of Moral Theology Since the Death
of Alphonsus.’ Irish Theological Quarterly 51(1985) 1-16.
Gleeson, Gerald. ‘Extending the Limits of Material Cooperation.’ (Unpublished
paper.)
—

‘The harm strategy.’ Letter in The Catholic Weekly (23 April 1995).

—

‘Fr Gleeson replies.’ Letter in The Catholic Weekly (21 May 1995).

—

‘US Catholic Bishops revise health care directives.’

Bioethics Outlook

6:1(1995) 1-8.
—

‘Involvement without Complicity: possibilities for ‘material’ cooperation.’
Bioethics Outlook 6:4(1995) 5-8.

Gregg, Samuel. ‘Playing with Fire: Churches, Welfare Services and Government
Contracts.’ Issue Analysis 14 (14 August 2000) 1-8.
Grisez, Germain. ‘The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the
Summa theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2.’

Natural Law Forum

10(1965) 168-201.
—

‘Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing.’

The American

Journal of Jurisprudence 15(1970) 64-96.
—

‘Against Consequentialism.’

The American Journal of Jurisprudence

23(1978) 21-72.
—

‘A Critique of Two Theological Papers.’ Homiletic and Pastoral Review
84:10(1984) 10-15.

341

—

‘Moral Absolutes: A Critique of the View of Josef Fuchs SJ.’ Anthropos
1985:2. 155-201.

—

‘Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Some Comments and Clarifications.’
The New Scholasticism LXI(1987) 307-320.

—

‘A Contemporary Natural-Law Ethics’ in William C Starr and Richard C
Taylor, eds.

Moral Philosophy: Historical and Contemporary Essays.

Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1989. 125-143.
—

‘The Basic Principles of Natural Law: A Reply to Ralph McInerny’ in
Charles E Curran and Richard A McCormick SJ, eds. Readings in Moral
Theology No. 7: Natural Law and Theology. Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1991.
157-170.

—

‘Dear Father Gleeson - 1.’ Letter in The Catholic Weekly (14 May 1995).

—

‘Difficult Moral Questions: How Far May Catholic Hospitals Cooperate
with Non-Catholic Providers?’ Linacre Quarterly 62:4(1995) 67-72.

—

‘In Answer to Critics: The Revised, Final Version of a Difficult Moral
Question About Cooperation by Catholic Hospitals.’ Linacre Quarterly
65:3(1998) 59-76.

—

Joseph Boyle and John Finnis.

‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and

Ultimate Ends.’ The American Journal of Jurisprudence 32(1987) 99-151.
Hannigan SJ, E. T.

‘Is it ever lawful to advise the lesser of two evils?’

Gregorianum 30(1949) 104-129.
Hannon, Patrick.

‘Aquinas, Morality, and Law.’

Irish Theological Quarterly

56(1990) 278-286.
Himes OFM, Kenneth R.

‘The Contribution of Theology to Catholic Moral

Theology’ in Charles E Curran, ed. Moral Theology: Challenges for the
Future. Essays in Honour of Richard A McCormick SJ. New York: Paulist,
1990. 48-73.
Hittinger, Russell. ‘Varieties of Minimalist Natural Law Theory.’ The American
Journal of Jurisprudence 34(1989) 133-170.
Hoose, Bernard. ‘Circumstances, Intentions and Intrinsically Evil Acts’ in Joe
Selling and Jan Jans, eds. The Splendor of Accuracy: An Examination of the
Assertions made in ‘Veritatis splendor’.

Kampen, Netherlands: Kok-

Pharos, 1994. 136-152.
342

Hurley, Denis E. ‘A New Moral Principle - When Right and Duty Clash.’ The
Furrow 17(1966) 619-622.
—

‘Principle of Overriding Right.’ The Clergy Review 52(1967) 479-482.

—

‘Note in Defense of the Principle of Overriding Right.’ Theological Studies
29(1968) 301-309.

Janssens, Louis. ‘St Thomas and the Question of Proportionality.’ Louvain Studies
IX(1982) 26-46.
—

‘Personalism in Moral Theology’

in Charles E Curran, ed.

Theology: Challenges for the Future.

Moral

Essays in Honour of Richard A

McCormick SJ. New York: Paulist, 1990. 94-107.
Johnstone CSsR, Brian V. ‘A Proposal for a Method in Moral Theology.’ Studia
Moralia 22(1984) 189-212.
—

‘The Meaning of Proportionate Reason in Contemporary Moral Theology.’
The Thomist 49(1985) 223-247.

—

‘The Structure of Practical Reason: Traditional Theories and Contemporary
Questions.’ The Thomist 50(1986) 417-446.

—

‘The Revisionist Project in Roman Catholic Moral Theology.’ Studies in
Christian Ethics 5(1992) 18-31.

Keenan SJ, James F. ‘Prophylactics, Toleration, and Cooperation: Contemporary
Problems and Traditional Principles.’

International Philosophical

Quarterly 29(1989) 205-220.
—

‘The Function of the Principle of Double Effect.’

Theological Studies

54(1993) 294-315.
—

‘The Return of Casuistry.’ Theological Studies 57(1996) 123-139.

—

‘Institutional Cooperation and the Ethical and Religious Directives.’
Linacre Quarterly 64:3(1997) 53-76.

—

‘Cooperation and ‘Hard Cases’.’ Ethics & Medics 23:9(1998) 3-4.

—

and Thomas R Kopfensteiner. ‘The Principle of Cooperation.’ Health
Progress (April 1995) 23-27.

—

and M. Cathleen Kaveny. ‘The Revised Ethical and Religious Directives.’
Theological Studies 56(1995) 144-150.

Kiely SJ, Bartholomew M. ‘The Impracticality of Proportionalism.’ Gregorianum
66(1985) 655-686.
343

Kissell, Judith Lee. ‘Cooperation with Evil: Its Contemporary Relevance.’ Linacre
Quarterly 62:1(1995) 33-45.
Kosnick, Anthony R. ‘The Present Status of the Ethical and Religious Directives for
Catholic Health Facilities.’ Linacre Quarterly 40(1973) 81-90.
Kossel, Clifford G. ‘Religious Freedom and the Church: J C Murray.’ Communio
11(1984) 60-74.
Lawler, Peter Augustine. ‘Natural Law and the American Regime: Murray’s We
Hold These Truths.’ Communio 9(1982) 368-388.
Lawler, Philip F. ‘Playing in Peoria.’ Catholic World Report (February 1996) 40-42.
Leal, Dave. ‘Tolerance.’ Studies in Christian Ethics 9(1996) 36-51.
Lewis, Brian.

‘Co-operation in Immoral Acts or Procedures.’

Reflections (St

Vincent’s Hospital Bioethics Committee) 2:1990. 3-4.
Lonergan, Bernard. ‘The Transition from a Classicist World View to Historical
Mindedness’ in James E Biechler, ed. Law for Liberty: The Role of Law in
the Church Today. Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1967. 126-136.
Mangan SJ, Joseph T. ‘An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect.’
Theological Studies 10(1949) 41-61.
Marshner, William A. ‘Aquinas on the Evaluation of Human Actions.’ The Thomist
59(1995) 347-370.
May, William E. ‘The Moral Meaning of Human Acts.’ Homiletic & Pastoral
Review 79(1978) 10-21.
—

‘Aquinas and Janssens on the Moral Meaning of Human Acts.’ The Thomist
48(1984) 566-606.

McCormick SJ, Richard A.

‘Not what Catholic Hospitals Ordered.’

Linacre

Quarterly 39(1972) 16-20.
—

‘Ambiguity in Moral Choice’
Ramsey, eds.

in Richard A. McCormick SJ and Paul

Doing Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict

Situations. Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978. 7-53.
—

‘Moral Theology 1940-1989: An Overview.’ Theological Studies 50(1989)
3-24.

—

‘Value Variables in the Health-Care Reform Debate.’ America (29 May
1993) 7-13.

344

—

‘Some Early Reactions to Veritatis splendor.’ Theological Studies 55(1994)
481-506.

—

‘The Catholic Hospital Today: Mission Impossible?’

Origins 24(1995)

648-653.
McDonald, Matt. ‘The Limits of Cooperation.’ Catholic World Report (December
2000) 40-51.
McInerny, Ralph. ‘The Principles of Natural Law’ in Charles E Curran and
Richard A McCormick SJ, eds. Readings in Moral Theology No. 7: Natural
Law and Theology. Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1991. 139-156.
McReavy, L. L. ‘When Right and Duty Clash - A New Moral Principle?’ The
Clergy Review 52(1967) 213-216.
Miech, Ralph P. ‘Physician Cooperation in Patient Suicide.’ Ethics & Medics
24:7(1999) 1-4.
Mieth, Dietmar. ‘The Tension between Law and Morality in the Catholic Church.’
Concilium 5(1996) 40-47.
Millard, Charles E. and Robert McManus. ‘The Enigma of Today’s Physician.’
Linacre Quarterly 64:2(1997) 89-93.
Murray SJ, James Courtney. ‘The Declaration on Religious Freedom.’ Concilium
5(1966) 3-10.
—

‘The Issue of Church and State at Vatican Council II.’ Theological Studies
27(1966) 580-606.

Nelson, Daniel M.

‘Karl Rahner’s Existential Ethics: A Critique Based on St

Thomas’s Understanding of Prudence.’ The Thomist 51(1987) 461-479.
Norris OP, Patrick. ‘The Movement Toward Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Step in
the Wrong Direction.’ Linacre Quarterly 63:2(1996) 31-40.
O’Donnell SJ, Thomas J. ‘The Directives: A Crisis of Faith.’ Linacre Quarterly
39(1972) 139-146.
O’Donovan, Oliver. ‘John Finnis on Moral Absolutes.’ Studies in Christian Ethics
6(1993) 50-66.
O’Rourke OP, Kevin. ‘A Brief Response to Father Keenan.’ Ethics & Medics
23:9(1998) 4.

345

Oliver OP, Bernard. ‘The ‘Rights’ of Conscience: The Problem of the Misguided
Conscience’ in Tolerance and the Catholic: A Symposium. Translated by
George Lamb. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955. 137-165.
Paganelli, Vitale. ‘The Directives: The Report - Revisited.’ Linacre Quarterly
40(1973) 155-157.
Pangallo, Mario.

‘Aspetti filosofici del Rapporto tra Legge e Coscienza nella

Veritatis splendor.’ Euntes Docete XLVIII(1995) 347-364.
Place, Michael D. Memoranda to Colleagues in the Catholic Health Care Ministry,
20 and 26 September 2000, on the Catholic Health Association of the
United States of America website: http://www.chausa.org.
Quay SJ, Paul M. ‘The Disvalue of Ontic Evil.’ Theological Studies 46(1985) 262286.
Rahner SJ, Karl. ‘On the Question of a Formal Existential Ethics’ in Theological
Investigations 2: Man in the Church. London: Darton, Longman and Todd,
1963. 217-234.
—

‘A Small Question regarding the Contemporary Pluralism in the Intellectual
Situation of Catholics and the Church’ in Theological Investigations 6:
Concerning Vatican Council II. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1969.
21-30.

—

et al., eds. Sacramentum Mundi: An Encyclopedia of Theology. London:
Burns & Oates, 1970. S.v. ‘Tolerance’ by Werner Post.

—

ed. Encyclopedia of Theology: The Concise Sacramentum Mundi. New
York: Seabury, 1975. S.v. ‘Symbol’ by Jörg Splett.

Regan CSsR, Augustine.

‘The Accidental Effect of Moral Discourse.’

Studia

Moralia 16(1978) 99-127.
Reich, Warren T. ‘Policy vs Ethics.’ Linacre Quarterly 39(1972) 21-29.
—

et al. ‘Catholic Hospital Ethics.’ Linacre Quarterly 39(1972) 246-268.

Reiser, Stanley Joel. ‘The Ethical Life of Health Care Organisations.’ Hastings
Centre Report 24:6(1994) 28-35.
Rhonheimer, Martin. ‘Intrinsically Evil Acts and the Moral Viewpoint: Clarifying a
Central Teaching of Veritatis splendor.’ The Thomist 58(1994) 1-39.
—

‘Intentional Actions and the Meaning of Object: A Reply to Richard
McCormick.’ The Thomist 59(1995) 279-311.
346

Rigali SJ, Norbert J. ‘The Unity of the Moral Order.’ Chicago Studies 8(1969) 125143.
Ripperger, Chad. ‘The Species and Unity of the Moral Act.’ The Thomist 59(1995)
69-90.
Robert, Charles. ‘La situation de ‘conflit’, un thème dangereux de la théologie
morale d’aujourd’hui.’ Revue des Sciences Religieuses 44(1970) 190-213.
—

‘La Situation de Conflit: Recherche de solutions dans le théologie
protestante d’aujourd’hui.’ Le Supplement 24(1971) 150-175.

Roberti, F. and P Palazzini, eds. Dictionary of Moral Theology. London: Burns &
Oates, 1962. S.v. ‘Tolerance’ by Pietro Palazzini.
—

and P Palazzini, eds. Dizionario di Teologia Morale. 2 volumes. 4th
edition. Rome: Studium, 1968. S.v. ‘Cooperatori’ by Pietro Palazzini.

Roy CSsR, Roger.

‘La coopération selon Saint Alphonse de Liguori.’

Studia

Moralia 6(1968) 377-435.
Sala, Giovanni. ‘L’évolution de l’entendement moral.’ Concilium 120(1976) 49-61.
Schüller, Bruno.

‘Can moral theology ignore natural law?’

Theology Digest

15(1967) 94-99.
Schultz, Janice L. ‘Is-Ought: Prescribing and a Present Controversy.’ The Thomist
49(1985) 1-23.
Simon, Rene. ‘Critères pour une Hiérarchie des Valeurs.’ Concilium 120(1976) 93104.
Simpson, Peter. ‘St Thomas on the Naturalistic Fallacy.’ The Thomist 51(1987) 5169.
Smith, Russell E. ‘Formal and Material Cooperation.’ Ethics & Medics 20:6(1995)
1-2.
—

‘Duress and Cooperation.’ Ethics & Medics 21:11(1996) 1-2.

—

‘Ethical Quandary: Forming Hospital Partnerships.’

Linacre Quarterly

63:2(1996) 87-96.
—

‘Immediate Material Cooperation.’ Ethics & Medics 23:1(1998) 1-2.

Surlis, Paul. ‘Rahner and Lonergan on Method in Theology.’ Irish Theological
Quarterly 38(1971) 187-201 and 39(1972) 23-42.
Tettamanzi, Dionigi. ‘Problemi morali circa la cooperazione all’aborto.’ Medicina e
morale 28(1978) 396-427.
347

The Ethicists of the National Catholic Bioethics Centre. ‘Cooperating with NonCatholic Partners.’ Ethics & Medics 23:11(1998) 1-5.
Therukattil, George. ‘Christian Ethics of Responsibility: Theologico-anthropological
Methodology of Charles E Curran in Moral Theology.’ Louvain Studies
IX(1982) 47-60.
Uniacke, Suzanne M. ‘The Doctrine of Double Effect.’ The Thomist 48(1984) 188218.
van Ouwerkerk CSsR, Coenraad.

‘Gospel Morality and Human Compromise.’

Concilium 5(1965) 5-12.
Waldstein, Wolfgang. ‘The Distinction between the ‘Law of Gradualness’ and the
‘Gradualness of the Law’.’ Anthropos 1986:2. 187-200.
Walgrave OP, Jan H. ‘Is Morality Static or Dynamic?’ Concilium 5(1965) 13-22.
Walter, Rev. J. J. ‘Dear Father Gleeson - 2.’ Letter in The Catholic Weekly (14 May
1995).
Weber, Helmut. ‘Il compromesso etico’ in Tullo Goffi, ed. Problemi e Prospettive
di Teologia Morale. Brescia: Queriniana, 1976. 199-219.
Weisman, Carol S., Amal J. Khoury, Christopher Cassirer, Virginia A. Sharpe, and
Laura L. Morlock. ‘The Implications of Affiliations Between Catholic and
Non-Catholic Health Care Organisations for Availability of Reproductive
Health Services.’ Women’s Health Issues 9(May-June 1999) 121-134.
Welch, Lawrence J. ‘An Excessive Claim: Sterilisation and Immediate Material
Cooperation.’ Linacre Quarterly 66:4(1999) 4-25.
Zalba SJ, M. ‘Cooperatio materialis ad malum morale.’ Periodica de Re Morali
Canonica Liturgica 71(1982) 411-441.
_________________________

348

